Introduction:
In armed conflict, one of the enduring challenges is the risk of targeting civilians instead of military objectives, which is often a consequence of the blurred lines between military and civilian assets. Despite the clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the complexities of modern warfare such as the use of dual-purpose objects and tactics like camouflage frequently lead to civilian casualties and violations of international law. This persistent issue underscores the importance of the principle of distinction, a cornerstone of Armed Conflict Law (ACL), which mandates that parties to a conflict must differentiate between military targets and civilian objects. According to Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, this principle requires that all parties must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, as well as between civilian objects and military objectives, directing their operations only against military targets.
Passive Defense and Law
The use of commercial heavy trucks with civilian camouflage as Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) for Ballistic Missiles (BMs)is a key element of passive defense measures, specifically focusing oncamouflage, mobility, and deception. These tactics are designed to protect BMs and their launchers by making them harder to detect and target. Countries such as North Korea and Iran have employed this approach to shield their ballistic missile systems from enemy Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) systems and strikes. By camouflaging TELs on trucks that resemble civilian vehicles, these military forces aim to blend military equipment into civilian traffic, reducing the likelihood of preemptive strikes. Camouflage and deception are integral to passive defense, as they focus on concealing and misleading the enemy to protect military assets without direct confrontation.
However, while effective in enhancing security, these tactics present significant challenges under ACL, particularly the principle of distinction. The blending of military and civilian objects can make it difficult to differentiate between legitimate military targets and civilian property, raising the risk of accidental targeting of civilians and violations of ACL.
Case Study: The August 9, 2018 Saudi-led Coalition Airstrike on a School Bus in Yemen
One of the most significant and controversial incidents during the ongoing conflict in Yemen occurred on August 9, 2018, when a Saudi-led coalition airstrike targeted a school bus in Sa’dah province, northern Yemen, killed and injured children. The bus, which was carrying children on a school field trip, was struck by a guided bomb while traveling through a marketplace. The Saudi-led coalition initially defended the strike, claiming the bus was carrying Houthi fighters or military assets. However, humanitarian organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, condemned the attack, arguing that it violated ACL, particularly the principle of distinction, which mandates the differentiation between civilian objects and military targets. The attack also raised concerns about proportionality, as the harm caused to civilians appeared excessive compared to any potential military advantage, and precautionary measures were not adequately taken to avoid civilian casualties. Despite the coalition’s internal investigation that deemed the strike “legitimate,” the incident highlighted the challenges in ensuring compliance with ACL, especially during aerial bombardments in complex, asymmetric warfare. This tragic event can become a case study in discussions about civilian protection and the accountability of states and military forces in modern warfare, particularly in conflicts involving state and non-state actors.
The Challenge
The evolving nature of warfare, particularly the increasing use of camouflage and deception tactics, presents significant challenges to ACL. While ACL is designed to regulate armed conflicts and protect civilians, core principles such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution are becoming harder to apply due to modern military strategies. One of the most pressing concerns is the use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes, such as disguising missile launchers as commercial trucks, which complicates targeting decisions and increases the risk of ACL violations. These emerging tactics highlight the need to revise, clarify, orexpand certain aspects of ACL to ensure its continued effectiveness in modern warfare. A potential solution could involve greater international oversight, clearer definitions of unlawful deception, and updated guidelines on military camouflage practices to prevent abuses that endanger civilians.
Ballistic Missiles, Passive Measures, A Challenge for ISR and Distinction
In the case of using camouflage and deception tactics combined with advanced missile technology, as seen in North Korea and Iran, these strategies pose a significant challenge for distinction by ISR systems. In addition, Unlike liquid-fuel missiles, which require a longer preparation time due to fueling procedures, in case of conducting operations by solid-fuel missiles which can be launched within short time of receiving an order, it can reduces the time window available for ISR assets, such as satellites, drones, and reconnaissance aircraft to detect, track, and classify them as missile launchers or civilian assets.
For liquid-fuel missiles, the fueling process can take long period of time, giving ISR systems a better chance to identify a missile as it is being prepared for launch. However, solid-fuel missiles on TELs, especially those disguised as civilian vehicles, can remain undetected while in motion and quickly fire before ISR can confirm them as military assets. This hit-and-hide capability makes them harder to preemptively strike, increasing their survivability in modern warfare.
Hence, the combination of adopting passive defense measures with advanced missile technology creates serious challenges for identification under ACL. The principle of distinction in ACL requires that combatants differentiate between military and civilian objects, but when military assets are camouflaged as civilian vehicles, it becomes increasingly difficult for ISR systems to correctly classify them before an attack. This blurring of military and civilian identities creates legal and operational dilemmas, including the risk of unlawful targeting, challenges in preemptive strikes, and complex accountability issues
Complex Challenges and Complex Solutions
As modern warfare evolves, so do the challenges associated with distinguishing military targets from civilian assets. The use of camouflage and deception in BM deployments complicates adherence to the principle of distinction under ACL. However, effective solutions can be developed through a combination of intelligence-driven prediction, real-time surveillance, and enhanced combat readiness. By focusing on the prediction of launch zones based on BM trajectories, enemy targeting patterns, real-time ISR capabilities, and rapid response measures, armed forces can mitigate the risks associated with disguised missile systems.
Predicting Launch Zones Based on Trajectory
Since BMs follow a relatively direct and predictable trajectory, their potential launch sites can be estimated by studying:
I. Missile Flight Paths: Mapping out previous missile strikes helps identify common geographical launch areas. By analyzing past records of BM strikes, decision-makers can map the suspected direction and areas of BM launcher activity, allowing ISR assets to focus on identifying the launchers in the shortest possible time.
II. Range Estimation: Establishing a database that includes the capabilities of hostile BMs, such as their minimum and maximum ranges, will help decision-makers define the most probable launch radiuses.
III. Topographical Constraints: Due to the widespread use of the “shoot and scoot” tactic in missile warfare, it is essential to identify locations with the infrastructure necessary to conceal BM launch operations within predicted areas. These sites often sheltered, camouflaged, or located in complex terrain offer protection and enable rapid deployment and relocation of launchers, significantly complicating detection and targeting efforts. By analyzing these factors, military analysts can better narrow down probable launch zones and optimize the allocation of ISR resources.
Identifying the Enemy BM Arsenal’s Favorite Targets
A key element in predicting BM launch zones is understanding the enemy’s targeting patterns. Historical attack data and strategic assessments can help identify:
Psychological, Political, and High-Value Targets: The use of BMs by non-state groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis has established them as effective weapons of terror. Consequently, densely populated urban centers and strategic infrastructure such as airports are often preferred targets due to their scale and symbolic impact. Identifying such infrastructure within the range of hostile BMs can help predict likely launch zones and enable more effective allocation of ISR assets.
Leveraging Real-Time ISR Capabilities
To enhance detection and response times, ISR efforts must be concentrated on high-risk launch zones, with an emphasis on satellite and aerial systems equipped with high-resolution imaging to monitor suspected launchers. In this context, deploying long-endurance ISR platforms such as long-duration airborne ISR and ISR-T systems can support rapid target acquisition and enable effective left-of-launch operations in suspected areas.
Combat Readiness and Rapid Response
Due to the time-sensitive nature of this issue, once ISR assets detect probable BM launch activity, rapid real-time response mechanisms must be in place to neutralize the threat efficiently. In this regard, deploying long-endurance aerial weapons, such as armed drones capable of extended flight, is crucial.
Conclusion
All in all, complex challenges require complex solutions. By combining predictive intelligence, real-time surveillance, and combat readiness, armed forces can effectively distinguish hostile threats from civilian assets. Enhancing these capabilities will not only safeguard military and civilian assets but also strengthen compliance with ACL by ensuring that only legitimate military targets are engaged. However, such solutions are highly technical and resource-intensive, requiring substantial investment and expertise to implement effectively. Additionally, due to limitations in time and the vast amount of data that must be analyzed rapidly, changes in command and control (C2) systems may be necessary. In the context of intense conflict where prioritizing military assets and strategies may take precedence the principle of distinction may be less consistently applied, potentially leading to challenges in maintaining full compliance with ACL.
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