Key Points:
- The War in Ukraine was initially greeted with neutrality by many Arab states, with the outliers being UAE and Saudi Arabia being reluctant to support USA’s diplomatic pressures against Russia.
- Saudi Arabia and UAE perceive the US as an uncommitted security partner in the region, as displayed by historical acts like the retreat from Afghanistan and its lack of reaction over the Houthi strikes.
- The two are also looking to expand their range of partners, and have economic and political interests they must address; leading to a staunch resistance against Biden’s push for more oil production.
Introduction
The Middle East has mostly reacted with neutrality at the start of the war in Ukraine, as displayed in the voting patterns in the Security Council on February 25th seeking to condemn Russia.[1] The Arab League’s statement also reflected this stance, failing to condemn Russia by name and calling for a diplomatic resolution.[2] However, in the later General Assembly vote condemning the act, many abstains were turned into favouring votes.[3]
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), strategic US partners in the region, stood out during these proceedings. The UAE abstained from voting on the UNSC resolution, but voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution, likely due to Western influence.[4] Saudi Arabia voted in favour of both, but released no statement on the matter. Being Washington’s most strategic partners and given the longstanding cooperation these countries have, their lack of immediate alignment over the invasion has led to the surprise of many.
The reality is that the UN votes acted as an open message for the US that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not happy with the relationship, going as far as to rejecting Biden’s calls[5] and repeatedly denying requests to increase oil production. They have also invested into expanding their range of partners via economic deals with US competitors, like China. While the US security provision is still most needed, the relationship has been eroded to the extent where they show reluctance towards picking sides between Western security agreements and Eastern economic investments.
Portfolio of Partners: From Grievances with the US to Investments from the East
In the eyes of the Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, the US has not been a consistent regional ally, evidenced in part by their attempt to revive the Iran Nuclear Deal and their unilateral retreat from Afghanistan in 2021. Iran, the nemesis of Saudi Arabia and UAE, would see its oil return to the world market as a result of reviving the Iran Deal, which would mean that there will be direct competition against their oil and also economically empower Tehran which would support proxies currently engaged in fighting them, like the Houthis. As a result, while the Iran Deal would work to greatly slow the Tehran’s nuclear programme, it would also give greater security concerns to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.[6] The lack of a strong reaction from breaking “red lines” the use of chemical weapons in Syria, together with the unilateral nature of the retreat from Afghanistan also signalled that the USA could say one thing and do another, and this damaged the trust in their commitment in the region.[7] In fact, one might consider that Biden’s “Pivot to Asia” can be interpreted as “Pivot from MENA” as Washington’s attention is directed towards China instead, and this can force the Gulf states towards working closer with China.[8]
As far as the Emirati ambassador to the US is concerned, the relationship is under a “stress test”,[9] firstly due to when the Houthis attacked one of Abu Dhabi’s oil facilities with drones in January 2022.[10] The UAE had its involvement in the war shifted back since 2019, instead switching to supporting proxy fighters.[11] This attack is a rarity compared to the frequency Saudi Arabia bearing the brunt,[12] and has damaged UAE’s reputation for building a safe haven, undermining its reputation as a touristic and business haven.[13] The US response involved sending a small number of F22s and the missile destroyer USS Cole to patrol their shorelines.[14] The UAE requested the Houthis to be put back on the international terrorist list, but no answer was given.[15] The UAE has held a major grudge on the US since then, to the extent where Blinken would apologise for the lacklustre response the US had over the attack.[16]
UAE’s intent to expand its range of economic partners would also push them away from the US: Dubai is a center for Russian business, and has become a safe haven for its oligarchs avoiding international sanctions.[17] It is also a good investment area with low taxes for Russian businessmen looking to start operations again.[18] At a more international level, the UAE’s and Russia’s foreign ministers stressed the “strength” of the relationship the two nations had just days before Ukraine was invaded.[19] Furthermore, they may appear to be backing each other in the Security, as UAE abstains over Russia’s invasion and Russia abstains over a resolution responding the Houthi attack.[20]
China is another reason UAE may slowly drift away from the US, being one of Shanghai’s biggest partners in the region.[21] The Chinese economy is heavily reliant on raw materials and trading channels to support itself, therefore securing lines of communication over the Indian Ocean is critical; prompting the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) to buy 90% of Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Container Terminal 2 shares.[22] UAE and China also signed 16 memorandums of understanding at an economic forum in 2019.[23] Therefore, UAE is important to China’s Belt and Road trade plans, and Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed wishes for UAE to become a bigger global trading and logistical center.[24]
The US has already displayed concerns with the closeness UAE and China are displaying, most easily underlined by the turbulent sale of the F35.[25] While MBZ would like to turn the UAE into an “armed business hub”,[26] the sale was suspended by the Emirates quoting “technical requirements, sovereign operational restrictions, and cost/benefit analysis”.[27] This could be a negotiation tactic, where UAE threatens to pull out of the deal if they do not get concessions; and signalled doing so by buying 80 French Rafale.[28] But there is a clear intelligence gathering concerns over Huawei’s 5G tower investments in the country.[29] Despite the fact that the F35 does not use 5G technology, the reality that communication lines and ground bases will rely on these channels means that China may have an opportunity to gain access to the plane’s closely guarded secrets.[30] The US also intervened a Chinese project to build a secret military base in UAE, which Abu Dhabi halted as a result.[31]
Saudi Arabia also has a number of issues with its security partnership with the US. Perhaps the clearest issue is the rift between the de-facto leader Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) and President Joe Biden over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. During the 2020 campaign, Joe Biden called MBS a “pariah” and vowed to punishment for the murder.[32] He released an intelligence report that finds the Crown Prince responsible for the murder,[33] and has instead talked to King Salman instead of his son when discussing regional concerns.[34] MBS said he “does not care” about what Biden has to say about him.[35] With MBS ruling an authoritarian government, the rift between the two leaders would impede efforts to push Saudi Arabia into answering to US oil demands.
Biden has also vowed to help end the Yemen war in a policy shift, where he decided to end the support for the Saudi-led cooperation on its offensive operations instead vowing to focus on diplomacy.[36] Furthermore, the US retracted some of its Patriot and THAAD missile defences during Houthi attacks in September 2021.[37] Saudi Arabis is need of these attacks when one considers they are bearing the brunt of the Houthi strikes: over 4100 between Jan. 2016 – Oct. 2021.[38] On March 2022, after the War in Ukraine started, the Patriot systems were sent back to Saudi Arabia after tensions sharpened.[39] By taking these systems and then putting them back, US left Saudi Arabia more exposed to the rocket and drone attacks of the Iran-backed Houthis; further giving reasons for MBS to think twice before committing to producing more oil at Biden’s behest and fuelling the concept that the current US diplomacy in the region is temporary.
The Leverage: Oil as Finance and as a Message
Oil prices have skyrocketed due to the war in Ukraine and the sanctioning of Russia, supporting rising inflation and the cost living. EU’s 90% ban on Russian oil,[40] and an insurance ban on ships carrying this oil (effectively removing it from the global market),[41] greatly intensified the need to find supply replacement. In 2020, the EU was Russia’s biggest energy client,[42] therefore the ban comes as an attempt to stop or slow Moscow’s economy from feeding the ongoing invasion. The United States has repeatedly tried to convince Saudi Arabia and UAE, the only able oil suppliers, to increase production and to decrease the prices by adding more supply on the market and compensate for the Russian one, but the Saudi-led Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have turned Biden down repeatedly.[43] Besides oil being central to sending a message to the US that Saudi Arabia and UAE are upset with them, it is also a critical economic lifeline for post-pandemic recovery and within the relationship in Russia-led OPEC+ non-member alliance.
Around 40% of the world’s oil production is from OPEC and its oil exports represent 60% of the international petroleum trade.[44] The attention and subsequent pressure to increase production was turned down repeatedly due to the tradition of keeping geopolitics away from the market-oriented decision making process.[45] In March 1st 2022, OPEC and Russia agreed to gradually unwind production limitations imposed since the 2020 period when oil prices went in the negatives due to the pandemic.[46] Without these limitations, the price of oil risks to drop and damage the economies of those who are part of OPEC+, thus any change in production is carefully considered and exploiting greater oil production capacity as a result of geopolitical reasoning can lead to mistrust within the cartel and a potential split.
Thus, Saudi Arabia agrees that politics should not be part of OPEC+, which is a form of support for Russia by refusing to easily answer to third party demands while looking after its own interests.[47] Moscow’s entry in the alliance let Saudi Arabia expand to new markets and their relationship helps keep USA’s oil influence under control.[48] Furthermore, OPEC+ members see a need for maintain a friendly connection with Putin, among others Egypt and Iraq relying on wheat exports from both Ukraine and Russia, on top of energy contracts being long-term by their inherent nature and guaranteeing a steady stream of income for less developed member economies.[49] Therefore, other OPEC+ members may be less keen to agree to increase production if they see their economies contract, particularly when one considers that the Gulf Cooperation Council states will not have any deficits if the oil price remains above $100 for the rest of 2022.[50] Finally, Russia and Saudi Arabia already had a price war in 2017 and 2020, and have lived with deficit budgets.[51]
In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s current oil revenue puts them on a budget surplus for the first time since 2014.[52] The Saudi state-owned Aramco overtook Apple as the world’s most valuable company, with profits surging by 82% in the first three months of 2022 amidst the high oil prices, marking a clear opportunity by energy companies – and by extension energy-exporting countries – to gain from the high energy prices.[53] This revenue is important for MBS’s “Saudi Vision 2030” plan, his answer to the country’s dependence on extracting and exporting crude oil, where he seeks to diversify the economy away from single-product dependence.[54] The plan also involves a fundamental restructuring of the social contract between the Saudi people and the monarchy, and a change in public investment patterns and a heightened focus on privatisation.[55] The plan requires much government spending to support involving projects such heavily developing the entertainment industry[56] and reducing emissions by 130 million tonnes;[57] resulting in its national reserves falling by 58% since 2016.[58] The Kingdom is also facing severe youth unemployment issues, with 32% of men and 20% of women unemployed, making oil revenue important to addressing economic woes as well.[59]
This is not to say that Saudis and OPEC+ are not impervious to outside. Only after a couple of days since the EU ban on Russian oil, OPEC agreed to increase production from 400,000 million barrels per day to 650,000.[60] Biden also committed to visiting Saudi Arabia in July and meeting MBS, ending his “pariah” status.[61] This shows that the West is moving to impose combined diplomatic and market pressure to change OPEC’s tune, as the oil producers must now account for less Russian oil available on the market. Perhaps Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia may make a difference in MBS’s stance when combined with the rattling of the energy market as a result of the recent developments.
Conclusion
The world’s attention has focused on the Arab oil states in the hopes that they will increase production to reduce the skyrocketing prices of oil. Saudi Arabia and UAE met the US with silence and neutrality, instead rejecting these demands to the surprise of Western leaders. However, both Saudi Arabia and UAE see their security concerns as sidetracked by the USA’s as observed with their recent behaviour in the region and lack of commitment during Houthi attacks. Furthermore, they have pressed for expanding their range of economic partners in the last few years, and thus would not give into Biden’s demands as easily despite the US being the premium security partner in the region. As a result, the War in Ukraine has proven to be an opportunity for USA’s Middle Eastern partners to express frustrations with their relationship at a time when Washington would most likely listen the most.
Recommendations – to the US:
- The US must ease the tensions with its regional Middle Eastern partners as a means to ensure Saudi Arabia and UAE do not drift closer towards forging economic partnerships with China that would develop into security agreements that would challenge USA’s influence in the region.
- Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia must focus on addressing the grievances Riyadh has with Washington. Careful consideration must be given towards recognising MBS’s leadership and thus undermining Biden’s position over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, as this can bring strong political backlash domestically and possibly internationally.
- The US should consider deepening the partnership with its Arab partners beyond focusing on security, and expand such agreements towards economic investments as a means to offset growing Chinese influence in the region.
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[1] Leshchiner, D. et. al., “The UN Resolution on Ukraine: How Did the Middle East Vote?”, The Washington Institute of Near East policy, 2 March 2022, Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/un-resolution-ukraine-how-did-middle-east-vote
[2] Middle East Monitor, “Arab League avoids naming Russia in Ukraine statement”, Middle East Monitor, 1 March 2022, Available at: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220301-arab-league-avoids-naming-russia-in-ukraine-statement/
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