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Jul 27
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Comparative Analysis of Türkiye’s Foreign Relations in the Indo-Pacific: The Cases of Malaysia, Japan, North Korea, and Myanmar

July 27, 2025

In line with the increasing political and economic significance of the Asia-Pacific and, more broadly, the Indo-Pacific region, Türkiye has implemented its “Asia-Pacific opening policy,” and with the announcement of the “Asia Anew Initiative” in August 2019, it has aimed to develop its relations with Asian countries based on a holistic and comprehensive strategy (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). While Türkiye prioritizes strengthening its economic, political, and cultural ties, it frequently uses the term “Asia-Pacific” in its foreign policy and regional strategies. The term “Indo-Pacific,” on the other hand, is mainly used by the U.S. and some Western actors, whereas Türkiye’s emphasis on “Asia-Pacific” reflects more balanced and multilateral relations (Çakmak, 2021; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023; Kardaş, 2020; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Within this framework, Türkiye has developed strategic-level relations with China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; it has also opened embassies in Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos. Türkiye’s outreach to Southeast Asia includes growing ties with ASEAN, and Türkiye took its first step toward institutional engagement with ASEAN in 1999 and became a party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2010. The establishment of the Sectoral Dialogue Partnership (SDP) in 2017 marked a significant milestone in Türkiye–ASEAN relations, followed by the annual ASEAN–Türkiye Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee (AT-JSCC) meetings held in Jakarta. In 2019, a “Practical Cooperation Areas” document outlining joint initiatives for 2019–2023 was adopted, and Türkiye pledged a contribution of 1 million USD to support related projects. The SDP framework is considered instrumental in enhancing Türkiye’s political, economic, and diplomatic visibility in Southeast Asia and supporting its broader Asia-Pacific outreach goals (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Türkiye maintains cooperation with the region through international platforms such as the UN, G-20, OIC [Organization of Islamic Cooperation], MIKTA [Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Australia], and the Pacific Islands Forum. The trade volume increased from 17 billion USD in 2004 to 75 billion USD in 2021. Meanwhile, direct investments from the region to Türkiye climbed from 2.1 billion USD in 2004 to 7.6 billion USD by the end of 2017 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Free Trade Agreements have been signed with South Korea (2012), Malaysia (2014), and Singapore (2015); development projects have been carried out through TİKA, and medical aid was provided during the COVID-19 pandemic. Türkiye closely monitors the situations of Uyghur Turks, Rohingya Muslims, and Muslim minorities in Myanmar, and has provided approximately 70 million USD in aid to the Rohingya since 2012 (Anadolu Agency, 2012; Trade Ministry of Türkiye, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

Türkiye regards Malaysia and Japan as strategic partners due to their strong economic and diplomatic ties in the region, while North Korea and Myanmar, with whom Türkiye maintains limited diplomatic relations, provide suitable cases for a comparative analysis of Türkiye’s diverse engagements. The selection of these countries enables a more comprehensive assessment of Türkiye’s foreign policy approach in the region, considering both opportunities and challenges.

  • In the Context of Strong Bilateral Ties: Türkiye and Malaysia

With its strategic location and multidimensional foreign policy, Turkey maintains strong economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations with Malaysia, one of the key actors in the Indo-Pacific region. As a founding member of ASEAN, Malaysia plays a critical economic and political role in the Indo-Pacific due to ASEAN’s function as a fundamental platform for regional integration and cooperation. ASEAN is a central actor in shaping the balance of power in the region, and Malaysia holds a balancing and harmonizing position within this multilateral structure. Therefore, Malaysia stands out as a key partner in Turkey’s strategic initiatives and regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN’s effectiveness in the region occupies a priority place in Malaysia’s foreign policy, making Malaysia an important actor in regional stability and development. The relations have been elevated to a strategic level since 2010 (Atatürk University Open Education Faculty, n.d.; ASEAN Malaysia 2025, 2025).

Diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Malaysia were established in 1965 and have continued in a friendly atmosphere through high-level and technical visits. A Joint Declaration on elevating relations to a “Strategic Partnership” was signed on January 10, 2014, in Putrajaya. This was further upgraded to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” during Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s visit to Türkiye on July 7, 2022, marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties. The State Visit of King Sultan Abdullah from August 15–22, 2022, was the first royal-level visit from Malaysia to Türkiye in nearly 30 years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

The two countries also cooperate closely in multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and D-8. The defense industry holds special significance in bilateral ties; Malaysia is one of Türkiye’s key partners in Southeast Asia for defense cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

In terms of economic relations, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Türkiye and Malaysia entered into force in 2015. It covers trade in goods, customs regulations, technical legislation, and economic cooperation, while also providing a framework for future negotiations in services and investments. The agreement enabled most industrial goods to become duty-free, with a gradual transition period for sensitive products (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

According to bilateral trade data, Türkiye’s exports to Malaysia amounted to 0.49 billion USD in 2023, whereas imports totaled 4.13 billion USD, reflecting a continued trade deficit (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.). Türkiye’s primary exports include precious metals and stones, inorganic chemicals, mineral fuels, machinery, carpets, and nuclear reactors. In contrast, major imports from Malaysia consist mainly of palm oil, electrical and electronic devices, aluminum products, iron and steel, and glassware (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.). The Free Trade Agreement (FTA), signed in 2014 and effective since 2015, has facilitated this growing trade volume, marking Türkiye’s first FTA with an ASEAN country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.).

Table 1. Bilateral Trade between Türkiye and Malaysia (2021–2024)

Year / PeriodExport (Billion $)Import (Billion $)Trade Volume (Billion $)Balance (Billion $)
20240.4494.4904.939-4.041
20230.4904.1374.627-3.647
20220.4784.2894.767-3.811
20210.4453.0983.543-2.653
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.; COMTRADE, n.d.; Trading Economics, n.d.)
  • In the Context of Strong Bilateral Ties: Türkiye and Japan

Türkiye and Japan have maintained a deep-rooted and multifaceted relationship for over a century. Diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Japan were established in 1924 and were elevated to the level of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2013. These relations continue to be deepened across various fields. The centennial of diplomatic relations in 2024 was commemorated with a series of high-level visits and events. Notable among these were the visit of the Crown Prince and Princess of Japan to Türkiye, as well as official visits to Japan by the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye and several ministers. To strengthen the ties between the peoples of the two countries, various cultural events have been organized over the years. Accordingly, the years 2003, 2010, and 2019 were respectively declared as the “Year of Türkiye in Japan,” the “Year of Japan in Türkiye,” and the “Year of Turkish Culture in Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.).

Relations between Türkiye and Japan have developed across various fields, including diplomatic visits, economic and cultural cooperation, and mutual support during natural disasters. In addition to the establishment of a strategic partnership in 2013, cooperation agreements were signed in areas such as nuclear energy and science and technology. Historically, events such as the Ertuğrul Frigate disaster and humanitarian aid during wartime have become symbols of the friendly ties between the two nations.

Economically, Japan is one of Türkiye’s major trade and investment partners. Infrastructure projects funded by Japanese loans, such as the Second Bosphorus Bridge and the Marmaray Metro Tunnel, stand as concrete examples of this economic cooperation. Mutual support during natural disasters also constitutes an important area of collaboration. Assistance was exchanged during the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, the 2011 Japan Earthquake, and the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye. Following the devastating earthquakes in Türkiye in 2023, Japan sent disaster relief teams. The two countries aim to enhance cooperation through knowledge and experience sharing in earthquake management, infrastructure development, and disaster resilience. In this context, they continue to strengthen economic and technological cooperation for mutual benefit at both regional and global levels (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2024).

Between 2020 and 2024, the trade volume between Turkey and Japan remained relatively high with some fluctuations. Exports increased from 441 million USD in 2020 to 731 million USD in 2024. Imports also rose from 3.743 billion USD in 2020 to 4.737 billion USD in 2024. Throughout this period, Turkey consistently recorded a trade deficit, reaching its peak in 2023. Overall, while trade volume grew, the trade balance remained unfavorable for Turkey (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

Table 2. Bilateral Trade between Türkiye and Japan (2020–2024)

YearExports (USD million)Imports (USD million)Trade Volume (USD million)Balance (USD million)
202044137434185-3302
202152243894911-3868
202266446415305-3976
202364554676112-4822
202473147375469-4006
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, n.d.)
  • In the Context of Weak Bilateral Relations: Türkiye and North Korea

The relations between Türkiye and North Korea are limited due to North Korea’s isolationist policies. Diplomatic contacts were established with a memorandum of understanding signed in Beijing in 2001; however, no high-level visits have taken place to date. Embassy relations are conducted indirectly through Seoul and Sofia. (INSAMER, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.)

Due to North Korea’s developing nuclear program and long-range missile tests, the United Nations Security Council has imposed sanctions targeting North Korea. These UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea are implemented within Türkiye. The Law No. 7262 on the Prevention of Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on December 27, 2020. Since 2005, Turkey has supported and co-sponsored draft resolutions titled “Human Rights Situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” submitted to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and since 2008, to the UN Human Rights Council. Additionally, Türkiye supports international statements calling for an end to North Korea’s activities contrary to UN Security Council resolutions and for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, endorsing the related draft resolutions. (INSAMER, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.)

In terms of economic relations, Türkiye and North Korea maintain weak and highly limited trade ties. It is known that their trade relations date back to 1987. According to TÜİK data, trade volume reached a record high of 52.2 million USD in 2008, marking a rare peak in an otherwise stagnant trend (CNBCe, 2024; TÜİK, 2024). Apart from this exceptional year, the trade volume has remained considerably low. Türkiye mainly exports petroleum derivatives, cement, and textiles to North Korea, while importing synthetic fibers and electronic components (INSAMER, n.d.; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). In recent years, there have been periods with minimal or no available data, specifically in 1996, 2021, 2022, and 2023. As of 2024, trade figures remain provisional and have not yet been fully assessed (TÜİK, 2024).

Table 3. Bilateral Trade between Türkiye and North Korea 2018–2024)

YearImport (USD)Export (USD)Total Trade (USD)
20181,095,95678,6941,174,650
201938,614038,614
202017,4032,10919,512
2021000
2022000
2023–––
2024–––
(TÜİK, 2024)
  • In the Context of Weak Bilateral Relations: Türkiye and Myanmar

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1958, and previously, Türkiye’s embassy in Bangkok was accredited to Myanmar. The resident Turkish embassy in Myanmar began its operations on March 9, 2012. Myanmar, which does not yet have a diplomatic mission in Türkiye, is known to have its embassy in Cairo accredited to Turkey. Due to the military coup that took place in 2021, Türkiye downgraded its level of representation in Myanmar to the chargé d’affaires level.

Turkey attaches importance to the situation of the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar’s Rakhine (Arakan) State. In this context, Türkiye has closely followed the events of May-June 2012, the increasing tensions after 2016, and the violent incidents in 2017, which led to approximately 730,000 Rohingya seeking refuge in Bangladesh. Türkiye monitors this issue in bilateral relations as well as on international platforms such as the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Alongside the ongoing state of emergency, conflicts, and protests in Myanmar, there have been cases where certain individuals or groups near Myanmar’s border regions have misled Turkish citizens through online job offers, leading to illegal entry into the country, detention, and ransom demands. In light of these developments, the Turkish Ministry issued a security and travel advisory on January 20, 2023, recommending that travel to Myanmar be avoided unless necessary. (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.)

In terms of economic relations between the two countries, it is stated that they remain insufficient compared to relations in other areas. However, contrary to this, the bilateral trade volume, which was only a few million dollars in the early 2000s, has continuously increased and developed, reaching approximately 100 million dollars in 2020, with exports from Türkiye to Myanmar amounting to 52 million dollars and imports totaling 48 million dollars. (INSAMER, n.d.)

Conclusion

Türkiye’s “Asia Anew” initiative represents a significant transformation in its foreign policy orientation in response to the growing economic and geopolitical importance of the Asia-Pacific region. The analysis conducted through selected country examples such as Malaysia, Japan, North Korea, and Myanmar reveals that Türkiye’s foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific is not homogeneous but rather fragmented and multidimensional.

In this context, the inclusion of countries such as Malaysia, Japan, North Korea, and Myanmar offers a valuable comparative framework. Malaysia and Japan, seen as strategic partners due to their strong economic ties, political stability, and diplomatic alignment, illustrate the potential for broad-based cooperation encompassing trade, technology, and cultural diplomacy. In contrast, North Korea and Myanmar, countries with authoritarian regimes, limited openness, and under heavy international sanctions, represent cases where Türkiye’s engagement remains cautious and constrained. This contrast makes these four countries particularly suitable for comparative analysis, as they embody the spectrum of Türkiye’s foreign policy instruments ranging from deep strategic partnerships to limited, pragmatic interactions. This dichotomy reveals that Türkiye’s diplomacy is shaped not only by strategic interests but also by the unique political contexts and bilateral dynamics of the countries involved.

Moreover, Türkiye’s development of institutional cooperation with ASEAN and its preference for the term “Asia-Pacific” over “Indo-Pacific” demonstrate its emphasis on multilateralism and balanced regional integration, reflecting an approach distinct from security-centered and bloc-oriented global trends.

In conclusion, Türkiye’s foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region is a selective, layered, and multidimensional strategy that adapts to the complexities of regional geopolitics. This approach, aimed at enhancing Türkiye’s regional and global actor capacity, reflects its desire to adapt to the rapidly changing international order.

References

Esma Akçiçek Master student in International Relations at the University of Warsaw. She is the co-founder, editor, and researcher at Reymonta, a platform focused on global affairs. Her academic interests include Indo-Pacific geopolitics, East Asian studies, and maritime security. She completed an Erasmus+ exchange program at Jagiellonian University in Kraków. She also has experience in EU youth projects and international collaboration.