Introduction:
In April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted that any future negotiations with Iran must include its ballistic missile program.[1] This position underscores Israel’s strategic objective to limit Iran’s ballistic missile strike capabilities and curb the transfer of advanced missiles to regional proxies. Netanyahu’s remarks came a month before the outbreak of the Iran-Israel conflict in June, a major escalation in the decades-long hostilities between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
The June conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv turned the region into a battleground marked by reciprocal strikes on each other’s territories. Israel, leveraging its advanced air fleet and the ability to use the airspace of countries like Syria and Iraq whose weakened authorities allowed such operations successfully carried out precision strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, key officials, and military assets.[2] Conversely, Iran, drawing on its extensive ballistic missile arsenal, launched multiple missile attacks against Israeli territory, hitting critical energy infrastructure[3] and military installations.[4] This intense exchange highlighted both sides’ military capabilities and escalated the ongoing confrontation to a new level.
However, Tel Aviv, benefiting from strong U.S. support including the deployment of naval-based air defense[5] systems and THAAD air defense batteries[6] enjoyed a significant advantage in both defense capabilities and military assets. In contrast, Tehran lacked comparable external backing during the conflict. This imbalance is further compounded by more than 40 years of international sanctions on Iran, which have severely limited its ability to acquire advanced weaponry and modernize its military forces, particularly its aging air force.[7] The disparity in external support and access to modern arms has contributed to a strategic gap between the two rivals.
However, this is not the first time a Western official or one of its allies has raised the issue of limiting Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. In the past, several U.S. officials have also called for restrictions on Iran’s missile capabilities, viewing them as a key component of Tehran’s regional power projection. In response, Iranian officials have consistently emphasized that the country’s ballistic missile program is non-negotiable,[8] framing it as a vital element of national defense and deterrence. This long-standing impasse has remained a major obstacle in broader negotiations between Iran and the West.
The Trust Deficit: Lessons from Iraq and Libya in Tehran’s Strategic Calculus
Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was subjected to strict disarmament measures under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which required the elimination of all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. These limitations were enforced by UN inspection bodies. Throughout the 1990s, Iraq’s WMD and missile programs were heavily degraded under international oversight. Despite periods of non-compliance and concealment, Iraq was largely disarmed by the early 2000s,[9] as later confirmed by the Iraq Survey Group after the U.S.-led invasion. Nevertheless, in 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq, citing alleged WMD threats claims that were ultimately unsubstantiated. The invasion led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the dismantling of the state, and years of violent instability. Iraq’s disarmament, in retrospect, did not guarantee its security or regime survival.
Thousands of kilometers away in North Africa, Libya presents a parallel case with a similarly cautionary outcome. In 2003, under growing international pressure and seeking normalization with the West, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi agreed to abandon his country’s WMD, and long-range ballistic missile programs.[10] Libya dismantled its WMD infrastructure and eliminated missiles exceeding the 300-kilometer range in accordance with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. At the time, Libya’s disarmament was hailed by Western leaders as a diplomatic success. In exchange, economic sanctions were lifted, and Libya regained limited access to the international system. However, the situation drastically changed in 2011, when domestic unrest escalated into civil war. NATO, under a UN mandate to protect civilians, intervened militarily.[11] The mission quickly shifted toward regime change, resulting in Gaddafi’s overthrow and death. Libya, like Iraq, descended into chaos and fragmentation despite its earlier disarmament. The state collapsed, and the country remains divided and unstable to this day
For Tehran, Iraq and Libya’s fate serves as a strategic warning: even full or near-full compliance with disarmament demands did not prevent regime change. The UN-enforced 150 km ballistic missile range cap is remembered not as a guarantee of peace, but as part of a disarmament process that ultimately left Iraq vulnerable to foreign intervention. Similarly, Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear and long-range missile programs in 2003 was followed less than a decade later by NATO-led military intervention and the violent overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Iranian officials frequently cite both cases as evidence that disarmament, absent mutual trust and a balance of power, invites existential risks.
War in Ukraine and Absence of Moscow
The reduction of Russia’s influence[12] in the Middle East, largely a consequence of its deep involvement in the Ukraine conflict combined with the election of Donald Trump, significantly reshaped the regional dynamics. This shift echoed the geopolitical environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the United States operated with greater freedom to conduct military interventions, such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. With Russia’s focus diverted Washington found new opportunities to assert influence and pursue strategic objectives across the Middle East, altering the balance of power and heightening tensions. A visible illustration of taking advantage of this opportunity was the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facility, demonstrating how perceived vulnerabilities can be exploited in a shifting regional power dynamic while there is no clear consensus, such attacks are generally not accepted under International Humanitarian Law.
Implementation and Conclusion
The history of disarmament and arms control efforts often framed as a pathway to peace has, in the cases of Iraq and Libya, proven far from promising in the MENA region. From Iran’s perspective, these experiences serve as stark reminders that compliance with disarmament demands does not necessarily ensure security or sovereignty. Coupled with recent confrontations, including U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and set against a backdrop of complex regional and global dynamics, these factors have severely undermined Tehran’s trust in Western promises of negotiation and diplomacy. Additionally, the legacy of distrust stemming from the previous nuclear deal, particularly the U.S. withdrawal under the Trump administration, has further deepened Iran’s skepticism.
After nearly five decades of hostility and deep-seated mistrust between Tehran and the West, the prospect of resolving these issues through traditional negotiation and arms control appears increasingly untenable. The legacy of broken agreements and unilateral actions has created a profound trust deficit that simple diplomatic overtures cannot easily overcome.
Therefore, moving forward requires a fundamental reassessment and the development of new, more effective frameworks. Such frameworks must be underpinned by binding legal provisions that guarantee compliance and accountability. Only through these comprehensive and enforceable mechanisms can there be hope for a sustainable resolution that addresses the legitimate security interests of all parties involved
[1] Le Monde, “Israel’s Netanyahu Calls For ‘Dismantling’ Iran’s Nuclear Infrastructure”, Le Monde, 2025. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/27/israel-s-netanyahu-calls-for-dismantling-iran-s-nuclear-infrastructure_6740684_4.html>
[2] Mehran Atashjameh, “Iran–Israel Conflict Long-Distance Rivalry, Strategies, Toolkits, and Struggle for Penetrating Rival’s Strategic Depth”, Institute of New Europe, 2025. < https://ine.org.pl/en/iranisrael-conflict-long-distance-rivalry-strategies-toolkits-and-struggle-for-penetrating-rival82117s-strategic-depth/>
[3] Reuters and ToI Staff, “Haifa Oil Refinery Partly Reopens After Shutdown Caused By Deadly Iran Strike”, The Times of Israel, 2025. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/haifa-oil-refinery-partly-reopens-after-shutdown-caused-by-deadly-iran-strike/>
[4] Dilara Papers, Sami Sohta, Betul Yilmaz, “Iranian Missiles Directly Hit 5 Israeli Military Bases During 12-Day War, Radar Data Shows”, Anadolu Agency, 2025. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iranian-missiles-directly-hit-5-israeli-military-bases-during-12-day-war-radar-data-shows/3623440>
[5] TARA COPP, Lolita C. Baldor, “US Air Defense Systems, Naval Destroyer Help Down Iranian Missiles Fired at Israel”, The Times of Israel, 2025. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-air-defense-systems-naval-destroyer-help-down-iranian-missiles-fired-at-israel/>
[6] Tom Spender, Chris Partridge, “US Deploys Thaad Anti-Missile System To Israel After Iranian Attack”, BBC,2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20jye8v5dro>
[7] Mehran Atashjameh, “Passive Defense Measures in Saving Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal”, Marine Corps University, 2024, 1. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES%20Insights_Atashjameh_15_4.pdf>
[8] Tehran Times, “Military power ‘non-negotiable’, IRGC says no compromise on defense”, Tehran Times, 2025. <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/511872/Military-power-non-negotiable-IRGC-says-no-compromise-on-defense>
[9] Scott Ritter, “The Case for Iraq’s Qualitative Disarmament”, Arms Control Association, 2000. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000-06/features/case-iraqs-qualitative-disarmament>
[10] Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States”, Arms Control Association, 2018. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chronology-libyas-disarmament-and-relations-united-states>
[11] NATO, “NATO strikes Gaddafi forces”, NATO., 2011. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_72192.htm>
[12] Jeffrey Mankoff, “The Middle East and the Ukraine War: Between Fear and Opportunity”, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), 2024. <https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/3794932/the-middle-east-and-the-ukraine-war-between-fear-and-opportunity/>
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