Mikołaj Woźniak, Konrad Falkowski
1.12. The EU Ends Dispute with China over Lithuania.
On December 1, the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued document number WT/DS610/14, which states that the European Union has notified a published information dispute it initiated with China in 2022. The case concerns accusations against Beijing of discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania – manifested primarily in a drastic reduction in the exchange of information in the confirmation request. According to the WTO statement, the European side “notifies the Dispute Settlement Body that, considering that the key objectives behind this dispute have been met and relevant trade has resumed, it no longer considers it necessary to pursue its complaint in DS610.” This resulted in a request for a final infringement proceeding.
3.12. Macron in China
French President Emmanuel Macron paid his fourth visit to China during his presidency from 3–5 December. As emphasized in the official French communiqué on the visit to Beijing, the aim of the 2025 trip was, first, to deepen Franco-Chinese relations in the fields of the economy, trade, culture, and education, and second, for France to “reaffirm Europe’s role in an extremely unstable geopolitical and economic context.” Macron, accompanied by his wife Brigitte Macron, was welcomed at the Great Hall of the People by President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, also accompanied by his wife Peng Liyuan. The leaders of both countries then proceeded to hold bilateral talks.
The agenda of the talks can be divided into five key issues. First, trade and economic relations. Macron, referring to France’s assumption of the G7 presidency, suggested the need to intensify dialogue “with key players, above all China, on global economic imbalances and global governance.” In Macron’s view, France and China, given their well-established positions in the international system, should play a key role in building “more balanced, fair, and robust economic governance, based on rules rather than the law of the strongest.” The French president stressed that China, for its part, should “implement its program to strengthen domestic consumption,” which would help address the prevailing global trade imbalance. Moreover, appropriate frameworks should also be found to increase PRC investment in Europe. “And especially in France,” he added. In the Chinese communiqué, Xi noted that “protectionism cannot solve the problems caused by global industrial restructuring, but will only worsen the international environment for trade.” Therefore, the goal of China and Europe should be to maintain a deepened partnership and expand existing cooperation in order to develop Sino-European relations “along the right track of independence and mutually beneficial cooperation.”
Second, issues of international security, with an emphasis on Ukraine and Palestine. These matters were addressed in a joint statement by Macron and Xi, which stated that, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, France and China commit themselves to “seeking constructive solutions grounded in international law to address the challenges and threats to international security and stability.” Both sides expressed support for efforts aimed at finding an appropriate resolution to the conflict in Ukraine based on international law and the principles enshrined in the UN Charter (Chinese terminology in this case uses the expression “the Ukraine crisis”). Regarding the situation in the Middle East, the leaders of France and China declared their joint support for a two-state solution in Palestine. Furthermore, they expressed approval for humanitarian support for the Palestinian Authority by the international community.
Another statement concerned “cooperation in addressing global climate and environmental challenges.” In this context, Macron and Xi announced their commitment to previously issued appeals and declarations on environmental protection within both bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks (including the Rio Conventions, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement). They also reaffirmed the need to protect and develop science that enables the fight against climate change. Finally, it was stated that “France and China are willing to actively explore the possibility of establishing a working group on addressing climate and environmental challenges.” Talks on establishing such a group are to take place in the first half of 2026.
The fourth main topic of the talks between representatives of France and the PRC was cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This area of cooperation was defined in a joint declaration as “an essential element of the Franco-Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership.” Building on existing cooperation, both sides announced their intention to continue it in the exchange of experience and technical solutions concerning, among other things, the construction and operation of third-generation pressurized nuclear power plants, the operation of existing facilities, and the disposal of radioactive waste. Innovation in this field is key to improving safety, and therefore France and China also intend to cooperate in this area. Moreover, representatives of both sides jointly committed to ensuring safe, reliable, and sustainable management, processing, and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. It was additionally emphasized that nuclear safety is extremely important for the “sustainable development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy.” This, in turn, led to the statement that Paris and Beijing reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in accordance with the 1968 treaty.
The final issue discussed during the French president’s visit to the Chinese capital, also included in a joint statement, concerned global governance. In this field, it was noted that Macron and Xi conducted an in-depth discussion on multilateralism in the contemporary world. Once again, reference was made to the fact that both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which entails the necessity of playing an appropriate role in promoting multilateralism. As stated in the declaration: “The two leaders call for continued efforts to promote multilateralism. Multilateralism is the cornerstone of the international order, and the best way to promote international cooperation, maintain world peace and prosperity and address the evolving problems and challenges.” This also applies to economic and trade multilateralism, whose institutionalized form is the World Trade Organization. At this point, France and China also reaffirmed their commitment to supporting “the WTO-centered, rules-based multilateral trading system, commit to fostering a free, open, transparent, inclusive and non-discriminatory environment for trade and investment, and state their support for the necessary reform of the WTO.” France—according to the statement—takes a positive view of China’s Global Governance Initiative and is ready to undertake joint actions to develop this issue. In order to maximize efforts in support of multilateralism, France, as chair of the G7, and China, as leader of the APEC format, also expressed their readiness “to conduct inclusive dialogues” to address looming challenges and threats.
On that day in Beijing, the French president and the Chinese leader took part in the closing of the 7th meeting of the Franco-Chinese Business Council, and Macron also met with two high-ranking Chinese officials. The first was Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and the second was the Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Li Qiang. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also present during the Macron–Xi talks.
It is also worth adding that the meeting featured a symbolic accent. China is known for practicing a distinctive diplomacy known as “Panda Diplomacy.” It involves lending live pandas to other countries in order to ease tensions and improve bilateral relations; it is a specific form of soft power employed by China. During Macron’s December visit, Xi confirmed that “on the basis of the previous cooperation, both sides will carry out a new round of cooperation in giant panda protection.” “The French people love giant pandas,” the Chinese leader added.
On 5 December, the last day of the French president’s visit to China, at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Macron traveled to the city of Chengdu, the fourth most populous city in the People’s Republic of China. This meeting was less formal and more behind the scenes in nature. Macron and Xi walked together through the historic Dujiangyan irrigation system, discussing culture, dialogue, and global challenges. Macron then met with students at Sichuan University and delivered a speech. The French daily Le Monde described the event as a “rockstar greeting,” as hundreds of students and city residents lined up to meet the French leader. Concluding his visit to China, Macron delivered a press statement in which he summarized the diplomatic and economic topics discussed and answered journalists’ questions.
8.12. Wadephul in China
In October, news circulated in public discourse about the cancellation of the planned visit of the German foreign minister to China and its postponement to an unspecified date. Ultimately, Johann Wadephul’s trip took place on 8 December 2025. A day earlier, on 7 December, the head of German diplomacy delivered a statement outlining the purpose of the meeting. He stated, among other things, that in view of the prevailing and escalating tensions in the contemporary world, “direct and in‑depth discussion with China is necessary, in fact indispensable.” He emphasized that Germany not only must, but also wants to talk with the Chinese in order to “find solutions together with China for pressing international challenges.” The existence of differences in the perception of certain issues is obvious, but this does not disqualify attempts at dialogue. The most important matter in this context is ending the war in Ukraine. “In my talks, I will reiterate that no other country has as much influence on Russia as China, nor can exert as much pressure to persuade Russia to finally accept serious negotiations that respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. It is in our interest to see China help achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine,” Wadephul declared.
Turning to the visit in Beijing itself, the German foreign minister met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. According to the official communiqué of the German Federal Foreign Office: “The aim of Foreign Minister Wadephul’s visit to China is to continue the two countries’ dialogue at a high level […] and to discuss the whole spectrum of German-Chinese relations.”
More details about the meeting are provided in the statement issued by the Chinese ministry. It notes that this was the first visit by a German foreign minister to China since the formation of the new government in Germany, which was commented on with the remark that “the timing is not the key; what truly matters is the purpose.” For his part, Wang expressed the hope that Germany would have “a more objective and rational view of China, remain committed to the positioning of China-Germany partnership, regard China’s development as an opportunity for deepening cooperation and a driving force for mutual benefit and win-win outcomes.” Translated from diplomatic language, this may mean that developing economic and trade partnership is key, without focusing on political frictions. Wang further added that China remains ready to strengthen and expand cooperation with Germany, emphasizing that the country is “a key force in European integration and an important cooperative partner for China.”
The issue of Taiwan—one of the most important for Beijing—was also discussed at length. Wang referred to a recent diplomatic dispute with Japan concerning remarks by the new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, who during a speech before the Japanese parliament described a potential PRC attack on Taiwan as an “existential crisis for Japan,” which would legitimize Japan’s undertaking of military action. In response, a Chinese consul issued personal threats against Takaichi. Wang noted that Japan’s current authorities had caused “serious harm” regarding the Taiwan issue by making their “erroneous remarks.” He added that “unlike Germany, Japan has not fully repented for its history of aggression even 80 years after the end of World War III.” This can be seen as a rhetorical device expressing both condemnation of Japan and courtesy toward Germany. Wang emphasized that the “one China” principle with regard to Taiwan is “an important political foundation” of Sino-German relations, and therefore no “ambiguity” can be allowed. Concluding this point, Wang expressed hope that Germany understands the seriousness of the issue and will “support China’s legitimate position and firmly oppose and resist any words and deeds advocating Taiwan independence.”
For his part, Wadephul stated (according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry) that in the face of the current uncertain world order, Germany and China must assume “special responsibilities, strengthen communication and coordination, and become reliable and predictable cooperative partners for each other.” He also confirmed Wang’s expectations regarding continued adherence to the “one China” principle. He added that, like China, Germany is ready to deepen and strengthen cooperation between the two countries, especially in the fields of economy and trade. The head of German diplomacy noted that German companies in the PRC “have full confidence in the country and are willing to further deepen their presence in the Chinese market.” Moreover, addressing EU–China relations, Wadephul said that his country is willing to play a “constructive role” in dialogue between Brussels and Beijing.
Both sides also addressed the issue of the war in Ukraine (“the Ukraine crisis,” according to Chinese nomenclature). As stated in the communiqué, both Wadephul and Wang presented their respective national positions to one another. The German minister added that he hopes “China will leverage its influence to help bring about an early end to the Ukraine crisis.” Wang, in turn, noted that China has stood on the side of peace from the very beginning. “China supports all efforts conducive to peace and will continue to play a constructive role in this regard,” the Chinese minister concluded.
9.12. Lithuania Will Not Comply with Chinese Demands on Taiwan
Asta Skaisgirytė-Liauškienė, a diplomat and former deputy foreign minister who currently serves as an adviser to Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, stated in an interview with the radio station Žinių radijas that she sees no “significant progress” in negotiations with the People’s Republic of China. She was referring to the diplomatic dispute between Vilnius and Beijing that has been ongoing since 2021, sparked by the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in the Lithuanian capital. It was precisely the use of the adjective “Taiwanese” that was—and remains—unacceptable to Beijing and is seen as violating the foundations of the “one China” policy, which Lithuania accepted upon establishing official relations with the PRC in 1991.
The year 2025 was expected to mark a moment of reconciliation between the two sides; however, no breakthrough has occurred in this area. According to Skaisgirytė-Liauškienė, there has been no visible progress in repairing relations because “the Chinese side is making a certain demand regarding the Taiwanese office, and I do not think this is a demand that can be easily met.” As a result, it can be expected that as long as this “demand” remains on the table, an agreement to resolve the diplomatic tensions will not be reached. President Nausėda’s adviser did not specify what the “demand” entails, leaving it in the realm of speculation. When asked whether Beijing’s condition was the closure of the Taiwanese representative office, she replied: “I would not put it so categorically. Life always brings different turns and opportunities. However, at this point, this is a condition we cannot meet.”
Thus, it may be assumed that Beijing’s condition primarily concerns a change in the office’s name, although this may seem too trivial an issue to sustain the dispute. On the other hand, it can also be interpreted as a form of symbolic resistance to Chinese pressure and an expression of support for Taiwan.
It is also important to note that Lithuania frequently emphasizes its desire to resume relations with China. The new Lithuanian government has identified the normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China as one of its foreign policy goals. Skaisgirytė-Liauškienė also reaffirmed this willingness, stressing that only time will tell whether it will be reciprocated.
11.12. China and the EU Resume Talks on Electric Vehicles
On 11 December 2025, He Yadong, spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, was asked during his regular press conference about the resumption of talks between China and the European Union concerning European tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. This issue had been a key topic of debate in 2024 and was also raised during the most recent EU–China summit in Beijing; however, the European Commission had remained firm, and no changes were agreed upon.
A journalist from the German news channel Phoenix asked the Chinese side for comment during the press conference, noting that according to his information, China and the European Union had been holding “talks on trade remedy measures,” and that the European Commission had launched “a review of price undertakings submitted by certain Chinese companies under the EU’s anti-subsidy duties on electric vehicles.”
He confirmed this information and emphasized that the consultations were to continue. “China welcomes the EU’s resumption of consultations on price undertakings and appreciates the EU’s return to resolving disputes through dialogue,” the spokesperson said. He then expressed concern about the European Union’s actions in conducting separate consultations on price undertakings with individual Chinese companies while bypassing state administration bodies, including the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products. In his view, such actions would not be “conducive to maintaining mutual trust” nor would they “benefit the overall effectiveness of the [negotiation] process.”
In conclusion, He expressed hope that the European Union would “consistently implement the important consensus reached at the meeting of Chinese and EU leaders, strictly adhere to the principle of non-discrimination, and […] reduce tensions as soon as possible through dialogue and consultations.”
16.12. Final PRC Tariffs on Pork from the EU
In June 2024, following the European Union’s decision to impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, China took retaliatory measures in the form of an anti-subsidy investigation aimed at determining whether pork of European origin was being sold at dumping prices and thus causing harm to the Chinese market. In the meantime, provisional tariffs ranging from 15.6% to 62.4% were introduced.
Ultimately, on 16 December 2025, the case was concluded. The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC issued Announcement No. 80, stating that the investigation had confirmed the use of dumping practices in imports of pork from the EU. Consequently, in the ministry’s view, significant damage had been inflicted on China’s domestic pork industry. As a result, new customs tariffs were imposed, ranging from 4.9% to 19.8%—a marked difference compared to the initial level of Chinese duties.
According to the announcement, the products subject to the tariffs include: “products obtained from slaughtered pigs, including fresh, chilled, and frozen pork; fresh, chilled, and frozen pork offal; fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, smoked, salted, or pickled pork fat and lard that are not rendered or otherwise extracted and do not contain lean meat; as well as fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, smoked, salted, or pickled whole or cut pig intestines, bladders, and stomachs.” The tariffs entered into force on 17 December 2025, one day after the announcement, and were imposed for a period of five years. It is worth noting that European importers have the right to appeal; interested parties may apply for a new exporter review, periodic reviews, and submit appeals through administrative or judicial channels.
Also on 16 December, a spokesperson for the Chinese ministry issued a statement adding that both the investigation and the imposed tariffs stem from the current difficulties faced by China’s domestic industry, and that there is therefore “a strong need for protection.”
Despite the fact that the initial tariffs had been significantly higher, the European Commission expressed its dissatisfaction with the situation, arguing that China’s anti-dumping investigation itself was “based on questionable allegations and insufficient evidence.” The Commission also emphasized that it intends to defend its exporters against the “abuse of trade defense instruments by Beijing.”
22.12. Preliminary Chinese Tariffs on Dairy Products from the EU
In August 2024, China launched an anti-subsidy investigation into dairy products originating from the European Union. This was another retaliatory measure in response to the imposition of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.
On 22 December 2025, the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, through Announcement No. 83, announced the level of preliminary tariffs on these goods based on the findings to date. The announcement clearly stated that subsidization had occurred: “The investigating authorities have preliminarily determined that imported dairy products originating from the European Union were subsidized, causing significant damage to China’s dairy industry, and that there is a causal link between the subsidies and the significant damage.” Consequently, China imposed provisional anti-subsidy measures, which took effect on 23 December 2025. From that date, importers have been obliged to pay the corresponding countervailing duty rates.
The announcement further specified in detail the products covered by the tariffs. Dairy products were defined as including: “fresh cheese (including whey cheese) and curd; processed cheese (grated or in powder form); blue cheese and other textured cheeses produced by Penicillium roqueforti; other cheeses not listed in this publication; as well as milk and cream that are not concentrated and are unsweetened or otherwise sweetened (with a fat content exceeding 10% by weight).” The tariff rates themselves range from 21.9% to 42.7%. Companies that cooperated with the investigating authority received preferential rates of 28.6%, while those that did not cooperate are subject to higher rates of up to 42.7%.
The European side did not leave the Chinese authorities’ decision without comment. Olof Gill, spokesperson for the European Commission, stated that “the commission’s assessment is that the investigation is based on questionable allegations and insufficient evidence, and that the measures are therefore unjustified and unwarranted.” Moreover, the European Commission intends to closely examine the tariffs imposed by China and submit appropriate observations. Gill added that the European Union, despite its desire to rebalance the trade deficit and reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains, still intends to maintain good trade and investment relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, for this to happen, China must address certain requirements raised by the EU: “But in order for that to meaningfully happen, there is a list of issues and concerns that the European Union has had going back many months and even years that we would require China to address, in terms of overcapacity, in terms of unfair use of trade instruments, in terms of trade deficit, and so on,” the Commission spokesperson concluded.
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