Mikołaj Woźniak, Konrad Falkowski
1.07. De Wever-Wang Meeting
At the beginning of July this year, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China embarked on a multi-day tour of European capitals — which can be seen as a prelude to the July summit in Beijing. On the first of July, he met with Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever. According to the Chinese communiqué, the interlocutors discussed the nature of EU–China relations in political and economic terms. The Belgian Prime Minister described his country as a “gateway to EU–China cooperation.” Despite differences in perspectives, in his view, “both sides should strengthen exchanges and increase mutual trust in the face of the current complex geopolitical situation.” He also declared that Belgium supports both a multilateral world and a “more autonomous Europe,” while referring to the upcoming Beijing summit. He added that Belgium consistently adheres to the “One China” principle.
Wang, for his part, emphasized that Belgium, as a founding member of the European Union, “plays a unique role in the process of European integration and in EU–China relations.” De Wever also heard praise from the Chinese side, which described Belgian policy towards Beijing as rational and pragmatic. The Chinese Foreign Minister acknowledged that China welcomes the expansion of Belgian companies in the PRC. He also expressed hope that Belgians will ensure a “fair, safe, and predictable business environment for Chinese companies investing in Belgium.” Regarding broader China–EU relations, Wang noted that both sides, as “major global powers, markets, and civilizations,” should make every effort to develop the China–EU partnership, whose main goal is one — delivering benefits to both parties. Moreover, he declared that the contemporary world can greatly benefit from EU–China cooperation, since both sides, as advocates of multilateralism and free trade, constitute a “stability anchor” for the world, “becoming mutually reliable and strong partners that support each other in achieving success.”
The Belgian Prime Minister and the Chinese Foreign Minister also discussed the issue of the war in Ukraine, though the PRC communiqué referred to it merely as the “situation in Ukraine” and did not provide any details.
3.07. Eighth Round of the German–Chinese Strategic Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security
Wang Yi, continuing his European tour, stopped in Berlin on July 3 to participate in the 8th round of the German–Chinese Strategic Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security. Germany was represented by Foreign Minister Johann David Wadephul. The Chinese representative said: “China–EU and China–Germany relations have reached a critical point, building on past achievements and opening up to the future. Good Sino–German relations will not only drive the overall development of China–EU ties but will also be of great significance for global stability and development.” He further emphasized that China and Germany, as the world’s second and third largest economies, shoulder “important international responsibilities” and “meet the expectations of many sides.” Therefore, Berlin and Beijing should expand cooperation to support the construction of a multilateral international order based on international law and “with the United Nations at its core,” especially in the face of today’s turbulent situation marked by rampant protectionism, advancing deglobalization, and current unilateralism (implicitly American). Wang also noted that the key to deepening bilateral relations between China and Germany is mutual understanding, trust, and a rational approach to differences. According to him, China places relations with Germany high on its diplomatic priority list. He expressed the hope that “Germany will support China’s aspirations for full national reunification, just as China unconditionally supported German reunification,” and that Germany will continue to strictly adhere to the “One China” principle. For Beijing, it is also crucial that Germany, as one of the EU’s main members, actively contributes to the development of EU–China relations. Therefore, he foresees a continuation of Berlin’s constructive role in this regard.
Wadephul, in turn, informed his counterpart that Germany is ready to cooperate with China “as a partner worthy of mutual trust.” He stressed that, in light of current global crises, it is extremely important for both sides to maintain close communication and cooperate internationally. He also stated that the German government officially supports the “One China” policy and looks forward to enhancing bilateral communication and cooperation between Berlin and Beijing. In terms of international security, the Chinese communiqué from this meeting reports that German and Chinese representatives exchanged views on the “crisis in Ukraine,” Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the situation in the Middle East. Both sides agreed to maintain close communication and coordination in order to ultimately achieve a ceasefire and an end to hostilities.
4.07. Barrot-Wang Meeting
On July 4, the foreign ministers of France and China met in the French capital to discuss matters of concern to both sides regarding politics, security, the economy, and trade. Wang stated that China and France, as two independent and influential countries on the international stage — and as permanent members of the UN Security Council — should jointly promote and implement multipolarity, safeguard the principles of free trade, and work toward peace and development in today’s world. He also expressed hope that, in order to maintain positive relations, Paris would continue its commitment to the “One China” policy. Regarding trade relations, the Chinese Foreign Minister declared that China and France had established a rapid coordination mechanism for the entire supply chain — “from the French farm to the Chinese table.” In his view, this reflects a “high level of practical cooperation.” He again expressed his hope that the French would cooperate with the Chinese in continuously developing and expanding the bilateral partnership. Furthermore, Beijing expects that Chinese companies in the French market will encounter a fair, transparent, non-discriminatory, and predictable business environment.
Wang also raised an issue important to the French — Chinese tariffs on European brandy. He stated: “The resolution of the brandy issue through friendly consultations between China and the European Union shows that both sides are fully capable of handling frictions.”
The French representative, for his part, said that “in the face of the complex international situation, France and China, as well as the EU and China, should provide the world with greater stability and rationality.” Therefore, Paris and Beijing maintain intensive high-level contacts, and cooperation between the capitals is producing positive results. Barrot admitted that, like China, France stands on the side of multilateralism. He added that the French government continues to uphold the “One China” principle and recognizes China as a key partner of the European Union. He expressed hope that the July summit would provide an opportunity to deepen this partnership.
Once again, the Chinese communiqué only briefly mentioned Ukraine, consistently referring to Russia’s aggressive war as a “crisis in Ukraine.”
18.07. Chinese Entities in the EU’s 18th Sanctions Package Against Russia
On July 18, the European Union announced the introduction of its 18th package of sanctions against Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine. Ksawery Stawiński and Adam Jankowski wrote more extensively on this topic in their cyclical Russia Affairs Review, to which we refer. In the context of EU–China relations, the EU again included economic entities from the People’s Republic of China.
According to the European Commission’s communiqué, entities from China and Hong Kong were added to the sanctions list due to their direct or indirect support for the Russian military-industrial complex or involvement in helping Russia circumvent sanctions. Notably, for the first time, the EU added Chinese banks to its “blacklist.” These were the Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank and the Heihe Rural Commercial Bank, two regional lenders from cities near the China–Russia border. In Annex XLV (“List of persons, entities, and bodies referred to in Article 5ad”) to Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 of July 18, 2025, these banks were described as credit and financial institutions providing crypto-asset services outside the Union that significantly obstruct the effectiveness of the sanctions. Sanctions on the above banks came into force on August 9, 2025. In the same regulation, nine companies from China and Hong Kong were also included in the list of entities subject to restrictive measures in connection with Russia’s destabilizing actions in Ukraine:
- Kalinka Tianjin International Trade Co., Ltd.
- Arcos Harbin Supply Chain Management Co. Ltd.
- MKPL Technology HK Co. Ltd.
- Luchengtech Co. Ltd.
- Xinghua Co. Ltd.
- CHIP SPACE ELECTRONICS CO. LTD
- CUVEE Importers Limited
In addition, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1478 of July 18, 2025 — concerning restrictive measures in response to actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine — named two companies from the PRC:
- Shandong ODES Industry Co., Ltd.
- Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co. Ltd.
The first manufactures and sells off-road vehicles, and after the start of the war in Ukraine began supplying the Russian armed forces with military-purpose vehicles. The second operates in the tech and electronics sector, supplying electronic military equipment such as infrared detectors and other optical components to the Russian military-industrial complex.
The same decision also listed three companies from Hong Kong:
- Zhu Jiang Shipmanagement Co., Ltd.
- ACE Electronic HK Co., Limited
- Bellatrix Energy Limited
More detailed justifications regarding these companies can be found in the Decision mentioned above.
21.07. Gordan Grlić Radman’s Visit to Beijing
Croatia’s Foreign Minister, Gordan Grlić Radman, paid an official visit to the People’s Republic of China. The central point of his two-day stay in Beijing was a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. According to the Croatian ministry’s communiqué, the talks focused both on economic and trade issues, as well as on security and regional politics.
On economic matters, the Croatian Foreign Minister emphasized the importance of improving access for Croatian companies to the Chinese market and increasing the export of Croatian products, as well as the need to establish a direct air connection between Croatia and China to further support tourism and economic ties.
In the field of security and the Central and Eastern European region, Radman informed his counterpart — bearing in mind China’s position on the UN Security Council — of Croatia’s stance on the necessity of ensuring full equality for Croats as a constituent nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, referring here to the 1995 Dayton and Paris Peace Agreements that ended the wars in Croatia and Bosnia during the breakup of Yugoslavia. As part of his visit, the Croatian minister also gave a lecture at the Center for China and Globalization, during which he spoke about the goals of Croatia’s foreign policy.
By contrast, the Chinese communiqué from this meeting emphasized Radman’s declaration confirming adherence to the “One China” policy: “The Croatian government adheres to the One China policy, believing that the government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China, and that Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory.” Furthermore, according to the communiqué, Croatia looks forward to closer trade and investment cooperation, stronger bilateral communication, and the development of people-to-people exchanges. In the context of EU–China relations, Radman declared that “Croatia supports the EU and China in resolving specific differences through constructive dialogue and promoting the lasting and stable development of EU–China relations,” stressing that cooperation with China in trade, economy, and investment is beneficial to Croatia, especially in the Central and Eastern European region. Wang, for his part, also noted that cooperation with countries in this part of Europe is “an important element of EU–China relations.” In his view, Beijing is ready to expand cooperation with Croatia on the basis of openness, transparency, and mutual benefit. He also called for respect for the principles of a multilateral international order and free trade. Wang emphasized that on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the comprehensive partnership between China and Croatia, China wishes to strengthen this partnership in every possible respect, also mentioning the Belt and Road Initiative.
It is worth noting that neither the Croatian nor the Chinese ministerial communiqué touched upon the issue of the war in Ukraine.
7.08. China Bans Imports of Spanish Poultry Due to Avian Flu
On August 7, 2025, Chinese customs authorities announced a ban on the import of poultry and poultry products from Spain following the detection of an avian flu outbreak. The decision aimed to safeguard sanitary safety in China. The Spanish Ministry of Agriculture emphasized that the ban would not significantly affect current trade, as poultry exports to China — including turkeys and chicken feet — had not yet begun. In April 2025, both countries had signed an export protocol, but Spanish companies were still in the process of applying for shipment approvals. The decision followed the detection of avian flu on August 4, 2025, in the Basque Country in northern Spain. Spanish veterinary authorities announced cooperation with the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) to control the situation and restore the possibility of trade with China.
12.08. China Cuts Ties with Czech President After His Meeting with the Dalai Lama
On July 27, 2025, Czech President Petr Pavel made a private visit to India, during which he met with the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, to personally congratulate him on his 90th birthday. During the same trip, President Pavel also met with leaders of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, which was seen as a rare and symbolic gesture. The Tibetans themselves described the visit as “historic.” Despite the private nature of the trip, as noted by Reflex.cz, such a meeting carries political weight and sends a strong signal toward Beijing.
China’s response was distinct. On July 28, the Chinese Embassy in Prague “firmly opposed” to the meeting and called on the Czech Republic to respect the “One China” policy, warning against signals that could support separatist movements.
On August 12, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially suspended all contacts with President Pavel, stating that his actions constituted a serious violation of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The communiqué emphasized that China’s relations with the Czech government as a whole remained unchanged, thereby limiting the sanctions solely to the person of the President.
The Czech Presidential Palace responded that the meeting was entirely private and had no impact on foreign policy, since no direct presidential-level communication between the Czech Republic and China was taking place at the time.
Meanwhile, domestic reaction in the Czech Republic was different — the President’s meeting received broad public support. The Central European Institute of Asian Studies reported that most Czechs hold a negative view of China’s policies, with nearly 60% speaking critically of China. More than 50% approved of Czech politicians meeting with the Dalai Lama despite Beijing’s opposition.
13.08. China Imposes Countermeasures on Two EU Banks
On August 9, 2025, the European Union imposed sanctions on two Chinese banks — Heihe Rural Commercial Bank and Heilongjiang Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank — accusing them of links with Russia and of violating the EU sanctions package against Moscow. China’s Ministry of Commerce condemned this decision as a violation of international law and fundamental norms of international relations, arguing that the sanctions seriously damage economic cooperation and infringe upon the rights of legitimately operating enterprises.
In response, China imposed retaliatory measures against two Lithuanian banks: UAB Urbo Bankas and AB Mano Bankas. The decision imposed a complete ban on transactions and cooperation between these institutions and organizations or individuals in China, with restrictions taking immediate effect. At the same time, Chinese authorities called on the EU to respect existing economic partnerships and withdraw actions that, in Beijing’s view, harm bilateral relations and could deepen political and economic tensions. The Ministry of Commerce stressed that China would continue to take “necessary steps” to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests. As Reuters noted, this escalation fits into a broader geopolitical context — the EU has for months expressed concerns about China’s role in the conflict in Ukraine.
18.08. China Extends Anti-Subsidy Investigation into EU Dairy Products
On August 18, 2025, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China announced the extension of its ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into EU dairy imports for an additional six months — until February 21, 2026 — citing the complexity of the case and compliance with domestic anti-subsidy regulations. The investigation had been launched on August 21, 2024, following a formal request by the China Dairy Association and the China Dairy Industry Association, which represent domestic producers – we wrote about that in the last year August edition of the Review. They argued that EU dairy producers benefit from unfair subsidies, leading to an influx of cheap products that inflict significant financial and operational damage on the Chinese sector.
According to Zhou Mi, an expert from the Chinese Academy of International Trade, the extension is justified by the complex structure of subsidies — both at the EU level and within individual member states — which makes it difficult to collect evidence and conduct a thorough analysis.
The probe covers 20 different EU subsidy programs, involving countries such as Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Croatia. The investigation currently covers imports of fresh cheeses, processed cheeses, blue cheeses, and selected high-fat dairy products. The subsidy period under examination runs from April 2023 to March 2024, while the economic impact is being assessed over a broader period — January 2020 to March 2024.
If subsidies are confirmed, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce reserves the right to impose countervailing duties in line with WTO rules. It also stressed that proper investigation procedures are key to maintaining and developing trade cooperation between China and the EU, calling on the European side to address disputes in a scientific and objective manner.
20.08. New PRC Ambassador to Poland
On August 20, a new representative of the People’s Republic of China, at the rank of ambassador, arrived in Poland — Lu Shan, born in 1971 and holding a bachelor’s degree in literature. He became the 21st Chinese ambassador to Poland. According to Polish Radio, Lu is an experienced diplomat who previously served as director of the Department of European Affairs at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was responsible, among other things, for cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. From 2022 to 2025, he worked at China’s diplomatic mission in Burkina Faso. In Warsaw, he replaced Sun Linjiang, who resigned as ambassador after being appointed China’s Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs.
One of the new ambassador’s first actions was to present copies of his credentials to Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Wojciech Zajączkowski on August 28th. During this meeting, he exchanged views on current relations between Warsaw and Beijing. Two days later, the Chinese embassy published Lu’s report on the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance of the Chinese People against Japanese Aggression and in the World Anti-Fascist War.
25.08. Espionage Case of Martin D. – Continuation
In the November edition of the Review, we reported on the arrest in Germany of an American, Martin D., accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China. He was arrested in Frankfurt am Main by officers of the Federal Criminal Police Office.
On August 25, 2025, the Federal Prosecutor General filed a formal indictment against the US citizen before the Higher Regional Court. He is accused of a particularly serious offense, namely offering his services to a foreign intelligence agency for the purpose of espionage. According to the indictment, between 2017 and spring 2023, Martin D. was employed as a civilian contractor for the US Department of Defense. From 2020 at the latest, he was stationed at a US military base in Germany. In the summer of 2024, he repeatedly contacted Chinese state authorities, offering to pass on sensitive information about the US armed forces. The suspect has been in custody since November 7, 2024, pursuant to an arrest warrant previously issued by the Investigative Judge of the Federal Court of Justice.
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