Mikołaj Woźniak, Konrad Falkowski
Baerbock in China
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock visited Beijing on December 2, where she spoke with her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. The day before the meeting, she could be heard in her statement criticizing China for supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine. “Putin’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine is a very direct threat to our peace. I will also be talking in Beijing about how we cannot simply leave that aside in our relations with China”, the German Foreign Minister said before her departure. It is also worth noting Baerbock’s words regarding cooperation and rivalry with the People’s Republic of China: “As Europe’s biggest economy, we are just as resolute in upholding our interests as the Chinese leadership is. No matter whether in economic, climate or security policy, our maxim is: cooperation where possible, autonomy where necessary.”
The conversation with Wang was also in a similar tone. Baerbock warned her interlocutor that the Russian president was trying to drag Asia into the war. She further raised the issue of reports that Beijing supports Russia with Chinese drones or components for these drones, which are then used on the front against the defending Ukraine. She also said directly that such actions, as well as the presence of North Korean troops in Ukraine, “violate our basic European security interests.” As can be read from the Chinese statement on the website of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, it committed only three sentences to this issue. First, both sides exchanged their views on the “Ukrainian crisis.” Second, the head of the German Foreign Ministry expressed her hope that China would play a “positive role as a cooperative partner for Europe in this regard.” And third, Wang presented China’s position on promoting peace talks in a “comprehensive and systematic manner.”
Another extremely important point of discussion was the issue of bilateral relations and between Brussels and Beijing. Wang stated that there is no hiding the fact that there are some “difficulties” between China and Germany, but these “difficulties” should not turn into “obstacles to cooperation or reasons for confrontation”. He added that the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany, being the world’s second and third largest economies, “should overcome obstacles, remove barriers, uphold the underlining tone of dialogue and cooperation, discard outdated Cold War and confrontation mentality, and work together to fend off external risks and address global challenges.” Moreover, both sides should be interested in striving to establish pragmatic cooperation, openness or multilateralism in international relations. For her part, Baerbock called on the Chinese to “engage constructively” in the EU’s actions regarding the dispute over Chinese electric vehicles. In her statement, she emphasized that Germany is one of the few member states that opposed the adopting of countervailing duties, arguing that this decision would affect the situation of German automotive brands on the Chinese market. Wang, on the other hand, pointed out that competition – any kind – should be fair and not based on a zero-sum game, and – in his opinion – the steps taken by the EU in the form of imposing anti-subsidy duties on Chinese EVs are a violation of the principle of fair competition and free trade. Beijing is therefore expected to place its hopes on both Germany and Europe taking an “objective and rational” view of China’s development, and to rely on dialogue and consultation to resolve this conflict and other trade disputes. His German interlocutor was supposed to confirm, according to the Chinese statement, Germany’s willingness to support the continuation of negotiations between the EU and China.
China, Lithuania tensions and hopes
On December 2, the People’s Republic of China responded to Lithuania’s actions in the context of the expulsion of three Chinese diplomats from the country, which took place at the end of November last year. Lin Jian, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, spoke on the matter, opening his statement by saying directly that “China strongly condemns and firmly rejects this wanton and provocative action.” Lin noted that the expulsion and recognition as persona non grata of the employees of the Chinese embassy in Vilnius took place “without any reason”, which is de facto true, as the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs only stated (as we wrote in the November Review) that the decision was made based on “information provided by the competent authorities and the incompatibility of the status and activities of the non-accredited staff with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), other principles and practices of international law and the laws of the Republic of Lithuania.”
Returning to the Chinese spokesperson, he stated that it is no secret that for some time now, i.e. since 2021, the actions of the Lithuanian administration have been perceived as a “serious violation of the One China principle”, and the country has “breached the political commitment Lithuania made in the communiqué on the establishment of China-Lithuania diplomatic relations.” As can be read from this communiqué, Lithuania undertook “not to establish official relations or engage in official relations with Taiwan.” This has thus caused “severe difficulty for bilateral ties”. At the end of his statement, Lin, on behalf of China, calls on Lithuania to “immediately stop undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and, consequently, “stop creating difficulties for bilateral relations”. He also noted that China could take retaliatory action against Lithuania, but immediately expressed hope that the new Lithuanian government would, firstly, be guided by the prevailing international consensus, secondly, respect the One China principle, and thirdly, strive to normalize relations between Vilnius and Beijing.
Beijing’s above hopes are not without reason, especially in the context of reports of the new Lithuanian government’s desire to “normalize” relations with China, which took place between the two rounds of the October parliamentary elections (October 13-27). Furthermore, on December 3, before the new government officially began functioning, the current Lithuanian Prime Minister said that he was not aware of the whole situation at all, shifting the responsibility to the government that was leaving in the first half of December: “These are decisions of the outgoing government, and they could comment on why and what they are doing and under what circumstances […] I was certainly not informed about it, and I was not informed about the circumstances.”
Another Lithuanian official, who decided to say a few words on China issue, was the new head of the Ministry of Economy and Development of the Republic of Lithuania, Lukas Savickas. In his opinion there is a need to adopt the common strategy toward the PRC within the European Union. He stated that in recent years Lithuania has been acting “solo” in the international arena in the context of the dispute with China. In my personal opinion, a better model is to act together with the EU and other strategic partners and maintain a common position with them. Such a policy is certainly more effective”, added Savickas. He pointed also that from the point view of Lithuanian foreign policy “it is very important for Lithuania’s foreign policy to return somewhat to the usual model, which is maintaining unity and working together with our technical partners [on the China issue].” Nevertheless, he admitted that this task is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Kęstutis Budrys, because he is the new head of the Lithuanian MFA who – as Savickas put it – “will have to find the key to that door” to the Chinese door, “and only then can we talk about economic ones”.
Referring to Budrys, it is worth noting that he also managed to say a few sentences about China. So does the new Lithuanian Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas. Following in the order, Budrys announced in early December – with the considerable self-confidence – that improving relations between Vilnius and Beijing should primarily be an initiative of China, not Lithuania: “It was not Lithuania that decided to downgrade the level of diplomatic representation and initiated the change of its form altogether, which is not even defined by our laws.” Later in his speech, he said in a similar tone that “the ball is not in our court, and it was not Lithuania’s initiative to do it [reduce the status of relations].” In turn, Paluckas, at the end of October, as a candidate for Prime Minister of Lithuania, said that his government would look for opportunities to fully restore diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, “without humiliating ourselves, falling to our knees and begging for anything.” He also added that allowing Taiwan to change the name of its representative office (which started the whole dispute) was a “grave diplomatic mistake”. He summed up his statement as follows: “We are a sovereign country, we have no dependency on China and nobody is trying to create one, but diplomatic relations are valuable. And one truly needs to have them.”
So, based on the above, we can assume that 2025 will be the year when Lithuania and China will try to improve their relations, which will also affect the relations between Vilnius and Taipei. Although Taiwan itself claims that it will not oppose the renewal of ties between Lithuania and the People’s Republic of China, because this trilateral arrangement of relations is “not a zero-sum game.”
Bonne in China
Emmanuel Bonne, a French diplomat and advisor to French President Emmanuel Macron, visited Beijing as part of the 26th round of the China-France Strategic Dialogue. His arrival in the Chinese capital was confirmed by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning on December 12. As she put it, the purpose of the meeting was to “strategic communication on implementing the common understandings between the two presidents and deepening bilateral cooperation in various fields” and both sides were to exchange views on international and regional issues.
And so it happened, because on December 14, Bonne appeared in Beijing and met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, thus starting a new round of the China-France Strategic Dialogue. As can be read from the statement published by the Xinhua news agency, Wang stated that China is ready to cooperate with France, as evidenced by the top-level meetings between Xi and Macron. At the same time, Beijing’s priority is to maintain relations with France at a level that will continue to be “a driving force for the development of China-Europe relations.” Therefore, to achieve this, Wang proposed four possibilities:
- Consensus between the parties and the creation of “more positive bilateral agendas”;
- Promotion of “pragmatic cooperation”;
- Continuing to build on the “positive effects of the China-France Year of Culture and Tourism”;
- Jointly upholding multilateralism in contemporary international relations.
Moreover, in the context of talking about the current dispute between the EU and the PRC over electric vehicles, Wang said that the trade war only leads to a situation in which both sides lose, and in turn ” China is the staunchest defender of the free trade system and opposes the politicisation of economic and trade issues”. He also addressed the European Union, saying that it should adopt a “constructive attitude and find mutually acceptable solutions through dialogues.”
The French President’s envoy, for his part, admitted that his country is opposed to trade wars and supports a cooperative approach that will be beneficial to all. He also added that France places its hopes in cooperation with China, which would bring about the implementation of “ambitious goals” in various areas, such as trade, investment, artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, agriculture and ecology. Importantly (especially for the People’s Republic of China), Bonne confirmed that France remains committed to the principle of the One China policy and will continue to maintain bilateral close relations at a high level.
When it comes to the issue of the maladies of the modern world, the Chinese statement provides only one-sentence information that “both sides also exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis, the Iranian nuclear issue, the situation in the Middle East, and other topics.” So, there is no denying there is little to gain from this, but it can be suspected that there was no breakthrough in relation to, for example, the Russian-Ukrainian war. It’s likely that more information will be available after a potential Macron-Xi meeting in 2025. Thus, the Bonne-Wang meeting should be seen as a “taste” of the French-Chinese leaders’ meeting. That is also highlighted by Phoebe Zhang of the South China Morning Post, writing: “Bonne’s China visit is expected to lay the groundwork for a potential China trip by Macron in the new year.”
China and the 15th EU Sanctions Package Against Russia’s War in Ukraine
On December 16, the Council of the European Union officially announced the adoption of another package of sanctions against entities and individuals proven to be supporting Russia in its aggressive war in Ukraine. Once again, these measures also affected China (the first time this happened was in February 2024).
Of course, the main recipients of sanctions are companies and individuals from Russia, but in the over 40-page decision of the Council of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, one can find seven items that refer to representatives of the People’s Republic of China, i.e. six companies and one private person. However, to be more precise, it is necessary to indicate what and who has been burdened with restrictions by the EU:
- Li Xiaocui – a Chinese entrepreneur who, through two Chinese companies which she “controls and represents” (ARCLM International Trading Co. Ltd and Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology Co.), was allegedly facilitating Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions by exporting goods listed in the sanctions list and supplying them to a Russian military-industrial company (Unimatik);
- Shijiazhuang Hanqiang Technology Co. – a company manufacturing mineral wool machines that exported European products that were partially covered by the ban to Russian enterprises;
- Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen Co. Limited – this company was to participate in the production and commercial intermediation of components which are the parts of attack drones; those drones are using on the front of line in Ukraine;
- Redlepus TSK Vektor Industrial (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. – this company was subject to sanctions for similar reasons as the above-mentioned one;
- Xiamen Limbach Aviation Engine Co., Ltd. – in this case, we are also dealing with intermediation when it comes to parts for combat drones; this time, however, this Chinese company was not only supposed to supply components, but also specializes in the production of engines and – as the justification states – there is a suspicion that Xiamen Limbach “was involved in sharing L550 engine design with entities involved in producing Shahed-136 unmanned aerial vehicle engines.”, which are used against Ukraine;
- Asia Pacific Links Ltd. – a company registered in Hong Kong, owned by a Russian, specializing in the supply of microelectronic components, which in turn are used to produce drones;
- ARCLM International Trading Co., Ltd. – a company also registered in Hong Kong, which exported products manufactured in Europe to Russian enterprises, thereby violating the EU export ban, while the main recipient of these goods was the aforementioned Unitmatik company.
It is also worth noting here that the Council of the European Union “for the first time, it imposes fully-fledged sanctions (travel ban, asset freeze, prohibition to make economic resources available) on various Chinese actors supplying drone components and microelectronic components in support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine”.
The day after the EU Council’s decision was announced, the interested party, China, took the floor. At a press conference, when asked about the issue, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian first said: “China firmly opposes unilateral sanctions that have no basis in international law or authorization by the UN Security Council.” Moreover, he announced that China expressed its opposition to “the EU’s unjustified sanctions” imposed on Chinese companies. He further claimed that Beijing does not supply weapons to either party or dual-use goods. On the other hand, trade between Russian and Chinese entities should not be of interest to third parties, as it is “normal exchange and cooperation.” Finally, Lin called on the European Union to stop applying double standards, slandering China, and to stop undermining the rights and interests of Chinese companies, because Beijing intends to “do what is necessary” to defend these very rights and interests.
The Yi Peng 3 investigation – continuation
In the previous issue of the Review, we described a dangerous incident that took place in the Baltic Sea – the severing of undersea fiber-optic cables connecting Finland and Germany and Sweden and Lithuania. Sweden was most involved in resolving this matter, issuing requests for cooperation with the government in Beijing.
On December 19, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Chinese had agreed to allow delegations from four interested countries, Germany, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, to board the bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 for a more thorough investigation. According to Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Lars Lokke Rasmussen, it was thanks to Denmark’s negotiating efforts that the meeting between the European and Chinese sides was facilitated, which was supposed to break the deadlock in the talks. On the same day, the Swedish police also released a statement, saying that their representatives were participating in the investigation as observers, and that the ship had docked in the Kattegat Strait that day. Additionally, it can be read that “in parallel, the preliminary investigation into sabotage continues due to two cable breaks in the Baltic Sea.” Nevertheless, the activities carried out on the Chinese bulk carrier “do not take place as part of the preliminary investigation.” Beijing also addressed the above issue through the spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lin Jian. Asked about this by journalists during a press conference, he replied that “China has fully communicated with Sweden, Denmark and other relevant countries on carrying out joint fact investigation.” He added that appropriate actions are being taken, but he did not have more details to provide. However, he stressed that “China stands ready to continue enhancing communication and coordination with relevant parties under the principles of openness, cooperation, professionalism and objectivity” which can be ultimately translated into a proper resolution of the incident.
China prolongs anti-dumping investigation on brandy from Europe
On December 25, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China announced the extension of the anti-dumping investigation into imported European Union branding that had been ongoing since January 5, 2024 (the announcement No. 59). This topic has come up many times throughout the year. We wrote about the temporary suspension of the Chinese investigation in August, the imposition of temporary duties in October, and the questioning of the legality of these duties by the European Union within the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November.
The aforementioned announcement No. 59 is a very short note from which we can read that “taking into account the complexity of this case, the Ministry of Commerce has decided to extend the investigation period in this case until April 5, 2025, in accordance with Article 26 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China”. The ministry did not provide any more information, but it is worth noting that the right to extend was not used in full, but for half a year, as the original extension was assumed to be six months. It can be suspected that on April 5, China will announce the expiry of temporary anti-dumping measures and the introduction of actual duties – similarly to what happened when the EU introduced tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.
Let us recall that the value of Chinese duties ranges between 30.6% and 39%, but their final value (if they come into force after the investigation is completed) may be modified.
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