Mikołaj Woźniak, Konrad Falkowski
Tsahkna in China
Estonia’s foreign minister Margus Tsahkna paid his first official visit to the capital of the People’s Republic of China on 4 November of this year. According to information provided by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsahkna spoke with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, about both bilateral and multilateral relations as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Estonian foreign minister stressed: “We engage with countries whose views may differ from ours on certain issues, and we explain our positions. […] Estonia seeks to maintain open and pragmatic communication with China.” He also added that he clearly conveyed to the Chinese representative how Tallinn perceives the ongoing war in Ukraine and how important it is to support Kyiv in its defense. Tsahkna firmly stated that all companies supporting Russia in its military activities will have to reckon with EU sanctions. In his view, “EU sanctions are part of a broader effort to uphold international law, and China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has a key role and responsibility in defending international law, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.” Moreover, the head of Estonia’s diplomacy noted that his country is actively involved in returning Ukrainian children deported to Russia back to their homeland, and at this point he proposed cooperation with China as well.
The conversation then smoothly moved—according to the Estonian account—to the issue of EU–China relations. Tsahkna noted that Estonia remains committed to the European Union’s unified policy. “We are committed to constructive, principled, and values-based dialogue in EU-China relations, including on human rights,” he said. In doing so, he raised a topic uncomfortable for China—human rights—emphasizing that “Estonia considers the protection and promotion of universal human rights essential. Human rights principles are universal and indivisible.” However, the Estonian MFA’s communiqué does not provide any specific examples directed at China in this regard.
The meeting was described somewhat differently by the Chinese side, which referred to the war in Ukraine in a single sentence: “The two sides also exchanged views on international and regional issues, including the Ukraine crisis.” The Chinese foreign ministry’s communiqué focused mainly on highlighting the lack of conflicts between Estonia and China and the need to build “a mature, stable, mutually respectful, win-win and cooperative relationship.” Wang recalled the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tallinn, stating that it is an appropriate moment to “enhance political mutual trust, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and consolidate the positive momentum of growth of bilateral relations.” An important point from the Chinese perspective was raising the issue of Taiwan, which the PRC regards as an integral part of its territory, and recognition of the PRC as the only Chinese state—under the “One China” policy—as the foundation of all of Beijing’s diplomatic relations. According to the communiqué, Tsahkna confirmed that Estonia upholds its commitments on this matter.
Regarding EU–China relations, Wang stated that despite systemic differences between the EU and China, these do not have to weigh negatively on bilateral relations. He went on to say that China is ready to sign a free trade agreement with the EU and also to “advance synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway initiative.” China, for its part, expects Estonia to play a constructive role “in encouraging the EU to have a right perception of China and view and develop China-EU relations with mutual respect and a positive and rational attitude.”
The EU-China “special channel”
Maroš Šefčovič, the European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security as well as Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency, informed the media on 5 November that the European Union and the People’s Republic of China had established a “special channel” of communication concerning an issue that is increasingly burdening current bilateral relations—namely, the flow of rare earth metals. This matter, Šefčovič emphasized, is of vital importance to a united Europe and its industrial engine.
The EU’s Commissioner for the Economy had already announced earlier this month that he had raised this topic with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Wentao. For example, at the beginning of November Šefčovič wrote on the X platform that “constructive discussions” had taken place at the level of senior officials with the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce. According to the post, China confirmed that the suspension of export controls introduced in October applies to the European Union. Consequently, both Brussels and Beijing are actively engaged in continuing “engagement on improving the implementation of export control policies,” Šefčovič wrote.
PRC Ministry of Commerce Spokesperson on Trade Arrangements with the EU
He Yadong, spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, addressed the topic of trade arrangements between the European Union and China during his press conference, noting that the prospect of concluding a new bilateral agreement on trade or investment is emerging on the horizon. Negotiations on such an agreement would carry weight similar to that of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which was frozen in 2021.
Responding to a question on whether China intends to conclude any new agreements with Europe, the spokesperson stated: “China is willing to deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU and explore the possibility of negotiating various economic and trade agreements, including investment agreements.” Continuing this line of thought, he argued that both China and the European Union share many common interests and that there are numerous economic and trade fields and areas in which Beijing and Brussels could cooperate.
King Felipe VI in China
Between 10 and 13 November, a historic event took place—Spain’s King Felipe VI visited the Chinese capital for the first time in 18 years. The most important part of the visit was the meeting between the Spanish monarch and the leader of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. However, Felipe VI also met with other high-ranking Chinese officials, such as Premier Li Qiang and Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The Spanish king was accompanied by members of Spain’s government, including the foreign minister and the economy minister, which can be interpreted as an expression of Madrid’s broader diplomatic strategy.
Official statements emphasized the willingness of both sides to deepen their “comprehensive strategic partnership”—based on mutual respect, respect for sovereignty, shared development, and cooperation on multiple levels. The symbolic significance of the visit was highlighted by the Chinese authorities, who described Spain as a traditional friend and an important partner. Moreover, the Spanish king told his Chinese counterpart that “the friendship between Spain and China undoubtedly benefits both nations and is consistent with two countries with a long history and a global vocation.” Xi, for his part, added that Spain represents a “constructive force” that the world needs in order to achieve peace and development.
During the visit, ten cooperation documents were signed (including agreements, protocols, and declarations) concerning trade and the economy, science and technology, education, culture, and people-to-people exchange. In the field of agriculture and food trade, at least three new protocols were concluded – concerning the export of pork, fish, and aquaculture products from Spain to China. One of these – the protocol on regionalization and control of African swine fever – has strategic importance, as it allows Spain to continue exporting pork even after an outbreak is detected, provided that other regions remain disease-free. This is particularly important for Madrid, since the pork sector is crucial for Spanish exports – Spain supplied China with 540,000 tons of meat worth over €1.097 billion in 2024. Two additional protocols concerned regulations for the export of fishery products from Spain to China. The third protocol related to inspection, quarantine, and sanitary requirements for aquaculture products intended for export. According to Spain’s economy minister, Luis Planas, “these agreements consolidate mutual health confidence and expand export opportunities for the Spanish agri-food sector.”
The discussions and declarations also covered cooperation in future-oriented sectors: new energies (green transition), digital technologies, artificial intelligence, as well as scientific, technological, and educational cooperation. Both sides emphasized their willingness to deepen cooperation in investment, trade, technology, and the export of high-quality Spanish products—both industrial and agri-food. Another direction of development is cooperation in cultural and educational exchange, intended to promote better mutual understanding between societies.
The visit was commented on in an interesting way by Gabriel Reyes Leguen and Bernardo Navazo from the think tank Geopolitical Insights. In their view, Spain is steadily seeking a balance between the United States and China—or more precisely, “seeking room to maneuver, because it cannot afford to play bloc politics: it is dependent on the European market, global technology, and open access to markets.” They further stated that the visit of the Spanish king to Beijing was neither a friendly gesture nor a concession, but “a reminder of a basic principle: sitting at the table does not guarantee a win; staying away guarantees a loss.”
PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on the Report on the Development of Chinese Enterprises in the EU in 2025/2026
During his press conference, Lin Jian, spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, was asked to comment on the findings of a report on the development of Chinese enterprises in the EU in 2025/2026, released on 12 November by the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU. In asking the question, a journalist from the Chinese broadcaster Shenzhen TV cited the report’s main conclusion: the overall assessment of the EU business environment among Chinese companies has declined for the sixth consecutive year, resulting in growing uncertainty among Chinese entrepreneurs, and the EU’s “de-risking” policy, according to most respondents, negatively affects the perception of the European market. He stressed that this “uncertainty” is now the greatest obstacle to the operations of Chinese companies in the EU.
Lin confirmed that his ministry had reviewed the report, and that the MFA had taken note that “Chinese businesses are concerned about the continued pressure on their operations in Europe.” He then recalled that the European Union, under the guise of protecting its own economic security and building competitiveness, has consistently promoted the concept of “de-risking,” introducing “a number of protectionist measures […] restrictions on semiconductor, 5G and electric vehicles […] and taken discriminatory and restrictive measures against Chinese businesses, which disrupted the sound and steady operation of the global industrial and supply chains.” In his view, the EU has achieved the opposite of what it intended: “These moves did no good to improving the EU’s industrial competitiveness, and sent a negative message of retrogression in its market openness and affected Chinese businesses’ confidence in investing in the EU, which will harm the EU’s own interests in the end.”
Later in his remarks, Lin called on the European Union—particularly in these turbulent times—to choose dialogue and cooperation with China, rather than confrontation and rivalry. “We hope the EU will honor its commitment on market openness and uphold the principle of fair competition, listen to and earnestly address the reasonable suggestions and legitimate appeals of Chinese businesses, and provide a fair and predictable environment for Chinese businesses to invest and operate in the EU,” the PRC foreign ministry spokesperson added at the end.
Klingbeil in China
On 17 November, the fourth round of the high-level financial dialogue between China and Germany took place, which in practice meant a visit by German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil to China. He met with He Lifeng, Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China. According to the Chinese readout of the meeting, “both sides agreeing on a series of mutually beneficial outcomes,” though it did not specify what these outcomes were. He Lifeng stated that “hina is willing to work with Germany to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, and to make new contributions to the stability and growth of the global economy.” Klingbeil effectively confirmed his interlocutor’s words, saying that Germany is willing to pursue “close exchange and cooperation with China in the financial and monetary sector.”
More detailed information comes from a Reuters report. According to it, Klingbeil raised the issue of Chinese overcapacity in key industrial sectors such as steel, solar panels, and electric mobility. In his view, this poses a serious problem for fair competition and for jobs in industry. Another troubling issue was China’s restrictions on rare earth metals, which constrain development in Europe and elsewhere. At the end of the meeting, the German finance minister said: “We want to find joint solutions to ensure reliable access and dependable supply chains.” Although the meeting was primarily focused on financial matters, the topic of the war in Ukraine was also raised. Klingbeil stressed that China could play a key role in ending the ongoing conflict. However, nothing further was agreed in this regard, and the minister himself noted: “Today, it remained at the commitment that they [China] want to work with Germany to promote peace. It didn’t go any further than that.”
It is also worth including the commentary of analysts from the Centre for Eastern Studies. Most importantly, they concluded that, first, Klingbeil’s visit constituted an attempt to ease existing tensions between Berlin and Beijing—especially after the recent cancellation of German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul’s trip to China. And second, Beijing sought to use the visit to introduce internal divergences and misunderstandings within Germany’s ruling coalition concerning the shaping of the Federal Republic’s policy toward the People’s Republic of China.
Dutch Statements on Nexperia
The dispute between the Netherlands and China over Nexperia, which unfolded last month, continued into this one. On 19 November, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a statement announcing the suspension of the ministerial decree based on the Goods Availability Act. This legal instrument had been the official trigger for the turmoil surrounding the company. The Dutch side framed its decision as the result of constructive meetings held with Chinese authorities. As stated in the communiqué of the Dutch ministry: “The Dutch government is positive about the measures already taken by the Chinese authorities to ensure the supply of chips to Europe and the rest of the world. This is seen as a show of goodwill,” and therefore Amsterdam deemed it appropriate to suspend the “order under the Goods Availability Act regarding Nexperia, in close consultation with our European and international partners.”
A previous statement of a similar nature had been issued by the Dutch side on 13 November. The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Vincent Karremans, said he welcomed “China’s recent relaxation of its strict licensing conditions placed on Nexperia’s legacy semiconductors.” He added: “The Netherlands, in close coordination with European and international partners, are closely monitoring the situation. Both to verify the resumption of tangible supplies to Europe and the rest of the world and to ascertain if and when trade from Nexperia’s facilities in China is fully resumed.” The 13 November statement effectively signaled the emergence of initial avenues of understanding between the feuding parties.
In response to The Hague’s 19 November announcement, the Chinese side stated that the PRC Ministry of Commerce had agreed with the European Union to call on the Dutch and Chinese branches of Nexperia to resolve the deadlock by bypassing the Dutch government. Meanwhile, the earlier decision of 30 September to suspend the acquisition of a Dutch chip manufacturer owned by China did not meet Beijing’s demand for a complete reversal of that move.
Li’s Meetings on the Sidelines of the G20 Summit
Li Qiang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, used the opportunity provided by this year’s G20 summit to hold meetings with leaders of key European states, highlighting Beijing’s ambitions to deepen bilateral relations as well as economic and strategic cooperation. In this context, two meetings held on the sidelines of the summit in Johannesburg are worth noting: one with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and another with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
During his conversation with Merz, Li stressed that China and Germany are “important economic and trade partners” and that since the establishment of diplomatic relations their ties “have continued to deepen.” He emphasized that “win–win” cooperation, based on mutual respect and strategic communication, should serve stability and benefit both sides. Among the priorities he identified cooperation in new, innovative sectors – renewable energy, smart technologies, biotechnology, hydrogen technologies, and intelligent propulsion systems – which is expected to contribute to industrial modernization and joint development. At the same time, he urged Germany – and more broadly, the EU – to adopt a long-term perspective on relations with China: one marked by openness, dialogue, cooperation, and understanding of both sides’ core interests within organizations such as the UN and the WTO.
Turning to the meeting with Meloni, Li recalled that 2025 marks the 55th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Italy. He noted that in July 2024 the leaders of both countries set out a “strategic roadmap” for deepening relations, and since then both sides have begun implementing shared commitments. Li emphasized China’s readiness to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership with Italy, promoting economic and trade cooperation, increasing industrial and market linkages, and expanding collaboration in new sectors. He also expressed a desire to increase mutual investment—China invites Italian companies to enter the Chinese market (through platforms such as the China International Import Expo and other trade and industrial fairs), while expecting Italy to ensure a “fair, transparent, non-discriminatory and predictable” invironment for Chinese enterprises investing in Italy.
Both sides also declared their willingness to develop cooperation in areas such as tourism, education, sports, cultural exchange, local cooperation, and people-to-people contacts—fields expected to foster deeper mutual understanding and friendship between their societies. Li further stressed China’s readiness to enhance its coordination with Italy within international organizations such as the UN and the G20, which in turn should contribute to the advancement of multilateralism and the pursuit of common positions on global issues.
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