Mikołaj Woźniak, Konrad Falkowski
2.10. China Seen as a Threat to Lithuania’s Energy Sector
At the beginning of October, Lithuanian broadcaster LRT reported remarks by Žygimantas Vaičiūnas, the country’s Minister of Energy, concerning the risks posed by the presence of Chinese components in Lithuania’s energy infrastructure. Vaičiūnas stated: “We are looking for solutions and ways to prevent threats to our energy sector. I am talking specifically about inverters, converters, and other elements in the system. Certain regulatory decisions have been made to this end,” adding that “China remains a threat.”
These comments do little to advance Lithuania’s broader strategy of improving relations with China, but they underscore Vilnius’s firm stance that it will not “humiliate itself to normalize these relations,” a point repeatedly emphasized by Lithuanian authorities. The minister further noted that the “ball is now in China’s court” if Beijing truly wishes to restore diplomatic ties with Lithuania. However, he stressed that when it comes to energy security, Vilnius remains resolute. Vaičiūnas also acknowledged that avoiding Chinese equipment may slow down the development of renewable energy projects.
It is worth noting that Lithuania continues to implement its “de-risking” strategy. In line with efforts to reduce dependence on the People’s Republic of China, the country signed an agreement with Vietnam in June this year to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the energy sector.
3.10. Belgian Police Officer Accused of Spying for the PRC
On October 3, POLITICO reported the arrest of a Belgian security officer on suspicion of espionage. His home was searched the same day, but the investigating judge later released him under strict conditions, meaning he remained under close supervision. Two individuals familiar with the case confirmed this information, with one noting that the charges involved spying for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The officer was reportedly recruited due to his access to Brussels’ diplomatic circles.
A week later, Belgian broadcaster RTBF published additional details revealing that the detained individual was a police officer from the Brussels-Capital Region, specifically from the Ixelles municipality. The charges included espionage for both China and Russia. Investigators are currently examining whether the officer shared or disclosed images of opponents of the Chinese and Russian regimes during demonstrations held in Brussels.
If this is confirmed, authorities will then seek to determine whether the officer acted knowingly or was unwittingly exploited. The Brussels police announced that “an internal investigation is ongoing” and that “appropriate measures will be taken based on its findings.” The Federal Prosecutor’s Office, however, declined to comment on the matter, according to RTBF.
4.10. Turmoil Surrounding Nexperia
On October 4, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed export restrictions on selected components and parts manufactured by Nexperia in its Chinese facilities. The move was interpreted as a reaction to rising tensions over the company’s ownership structure and potential European interference in its operations. In practice, this decision hindered the export of certain Nexperia products from China and sparked concerns about the stability of global semiconductor supply chains.
A few days later, on October 13, the Dutch government announced the introduction of extraordinary measures and the temporary takeover of control over Nexperia. The decision was justified on the grounds of national security and the need to protect key technologies. Dutch authorities invoked legal provisions allowing state intervention in situations threatening strategic economic interests. This step provoked a wide international response, including particular discontent from the Chinese side. On the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that he was not the appropriate source to comment in detail on the matter but emphasized that “China always opposes overstretching the concept of national security and taking discriminatory moves that target companies from certain countries.” Thus, the PRC indicated that the “certain country,” in this case the Netherlands, should adhere to free-market principles and avoid politicizing trade-related issues.
As early as October 14, China transformed its dissatisfaction into concrete action: Beijing imposed a formal ban on the export of Nexperia products from Chinese territory. The company itself confirmed the existence of these restrictions and undertook efforts to obtain exemptions for some of its contracts. On October 17, media reports indicated that Dutch officials were in talks with their Chinese counterparts regarding the export controls imposed on the Chinese semiconductor manufacturer. The next day, on October 18, Nexperia China issued a statement emphasizing that its operations were conducted in accordance with Chinese law and that the company in China retained the right to make independent operational decisions. The announcement was interpreted as both an attempt to reassure employees and partners, and as a sign of a growing rift between the company’s headquarters in the Netherlands and its local management in China.
Tensions remained high in the second half of the month. Dutch Economic Affairs Minister Vincent Karremans announced that he had spoken with Chinese officials to find a solution to the Nexperia issue. According to Karremans, the Chinese view “the Netherlands as part of an alliance with the US,” but added that the Dutch government’s goal was to prevent “the former Chinese CEO from transferring his business activities and intellectual property outside of Europe.” On October 23, Nexperia China issued another statement addressing the ongoing dispute and calling for a peaceful resolution, emphasizing the need to respect local laws.
By the end of the month, the problem began to affect industry operations. On October 29, European automotive associations and car manufacturers warned of possible production halts resulting from disruptions in component supplies from Nexperia. The semiconductor sector is critical for the automotive industry, and any disturbances immediately translate into production constraints.
On October 31, reports emerged about the suspension of shipments of certain products—including semiconductor wafers—from Europe to Nexperia’s plant in Dongguan. In response, the European Union and the Commission for Technology and Industry launched diplomatic efforts to find a resolution to the conflict. Within the framework of the EU’s Chips Act program, the creation of a special task force was proposed to help maintain production continuity and develop a compromise between the parties.
8.10. Wang Yi in Rome
On October 8, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the Italian capital, where he met with his counterpart, Antonio Tajani, and the following day with President Sergio Mattarella. Wang’s visit was connected to the 12th session of the Italy–China Intergovernmental Committee. According to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the Committee is the main driving force behind the Global Strategic Partnership (established in 2004) and is tasked with supporting cooperation among various sectors of the Partnership.” The previous session had taken place in Beijing in early September 2023. Moreover, the meeting served as an opportunity to “review the state of bilateral relations and strengthen cooperation in many areas,” particularly in economic and trade relations. For this purpose, three working groups were established to develop positions on the following aspects of bilateral relations: economy and finance; culture and civil society; science, technology, and higher education.
On more political issues, Tajani and Wang discussed ongoing armed conflicts around the world, especially in the Middle East and Ukraine. Tajani stated that he and his Chinese counterpart had found “a will to work for peace.” He further said he believed that “Italy and China can play a significant role in building peace.” Notably, Beijing announced its decision to support the Italian-promoted idea of a global Olympic truce related to the upcoming Winter Olympic Games in Italy. Tajani emphasized that, in the context of the war in Palestine, both his country and China “signed the New York Declaration on the implementation of the two-state solution” and are obliged to provide humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip. According to Tajani, China’s support for the Olympic truce “could be truly persuasive also for the Russian Federation.”
A significant part of the talks, however, focused on bilateral trade and economic relations. Members of the Italian delegation included representatives of Italian companies such as Unione Italiana Vini, the Association of the Automotive Industry (Anfia), and Zambon Pharma. Tajani noted that Italy’s goal was to “increase investment and exports to China” and that great emphasis was being placed on tourism. In this context, a plan was presented to establish a direct flight connection between Beijing and Venice—the second such route after Shanghai–Venice. According to Tajani, “commercial flights are of extraordinary importance and serve to intensify and balance trade and investment.” His Chinese counterpart added that China “will continue to open its vast market, offering new cooperation opportunities to Italy and other countries.”
An analysis of the communiqué published by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that issues related to the development of bilateral economic and trade relations were also raised. Wang stated that “China and Italy, as comprehensive strategic partners, should maintain close exchanges, trust and support each other, and address each other’s major concerns.” Furthermore, the Chinese side expressed readiness to cooperate with Italy in sectors such as green development, the digital economy, aerospace, and artificial intelligence. The Chinese foreign minister also remarked that China and Italy, as representatives of “the ancient civilizations in the East and in the West,” should cultivate the wisdom derived from their historical heritage—especially in today’s world, “where change and turbulence are closely intertwined.” Therefore, both countries should act to promote global peace and stability and strive to build “a more just and equitable global governance system,” Wang said, characterizing the present times.
The communiqué did not present the People’s Republic of China’s position on the war in Ukraine. It merely noted that Tajani expressed his country’s readiness to strengthen cooperation with China in order to “jointly promote the peaceful settlement of issues such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Ukraine crisis.”
The following day, Wang met with Italian President Sergio Mattarella. The meeting covered similar topics to those discussed earlier with the Italian foreign minister. It is worth noting that, according to China’s official communiqué, Wang repeatedly referred to initiatives announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping—such as the Global Governance Initiative. According to the Chinese narrative, Mattarella spoke favorably about these initiatives, stating that “they fully meet the needs of the international community and the aspirations of people in all countries.” The discussions also addressed global conflicts, particularly in the Middle East and Ukraine (the latter being referred to as the “crisis in Ukraine”). Both sides expressed support for a two-state solution regarding Israel and Palestine. As for Ukraine, China and Italy agreed to “maintain contact on a political solution to the crisis in Ukraine.”
15.10. Albares in Beijing
The meeting between Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares Bueno and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi took place on October 15 of this year in Hangzhou. The talks were held in the context of the 20th anniversary of the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.
In the political sphere, Wang Yi emphasized that Spain’s and China’s development strategies are compatible, and cooperation between them can contribute to strengthening international peace. The Chinese side stressed its willingness to maintain a partnership based on mutual respect, dialogue, and a long-term perspective. Albares reaffirmed Spain’s adherence to the “One China” principle and recognized the PRC’s role as an important actor in the international system and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Both sides agreed that bilateral relations should be viewed strategically and developed despite differences arising from distinct political systems and traditions.
A significant portion of the discussions was dedicated to economic and investment cooperation. The Chinese side encouraged Spanish enterprises to take advantage of opportunities offered by the Chinese market, particularly in the areas of green and digital transformation. Minister Albares highlighted the need to improve balance in trade relations and to ensure Spanish companies have equal access to markets and investment opportunities in China. Both parties announced the launch of a new format for intergovernmental meetings aimed at deepening cooperation structures and enhancing institutional dialogue.
Another important topic of discussion was cooperation in education, culture, and tourism. The participants emphasized the importance of academic and cultural exchanges in strengthening ties between the societies of both countries. The Chinese side expressed its readiness to expand its visa-free policy toward Spain, which is intended to facilitate people-to-people contacts and support the development of two-way tourism.
In the area of international cooperation, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of multilateralism and the UN-based international system. Notably, in this case, it was the Chinese side—not the European one—that raised the issue of the war in Ukraine. The official communiqué from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not indicate that Albares addressed this topic. However, a statement published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry included one sentence mentioning that “the two sides also had an in-depth exchange of views on the Ukraine crisis, the Middle East peace process, and other international and regional issues of common concern”.
23.10. Another EU Sanctions Package Targets Chinese Entities
On October 23 of this year, the European Union implemented another, this time the 19th, package of sanctions against the Russian Federation in response to its aggression toward Ukraine. The key elements of this package include a ban on the import of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG)—for long-term contracts starting January 1, 2027, and for short-term contracts within six months of the package’s entry into force—as well as the extension of sanctions to sectors such as energy, banking, trade, and cryptocurrencies.
More importantly from the perspective of this Review, the EU sanctions once again targeted entities from the People’s Republic of China—this time two Chinese refineries and one oil trading company. They were identified as significant recipients of Russian crude oil. These companies are: Liaoyang Petrochemical Company, Shandong Yulong Petrochemical Co., Ltd., and Chinaoil (Hong Kong) Corporation Limited (the Hong Kong branch of PetroChina).
In addition, the package specifies that 45 new entities have been added for supporting sanctions evasion, of which 12 are based in China (including Hong Kong). The sanctions are both energy-related (Chinese refineries/traders purchasing Russian oil) and technology-related (Chinese entities assisting Russia in accessing military technologies or circumventing restrictions).
The following day, on October 24, the Chinese side responded through the Ministry of Commerce. A spokesperson for the ministry stated that despite previous Chinese warnings, the EU had included additional Chinese companies in its sanctions against Russia, and therefore, “China strongly deplores and firmly opposes this move.” Moreover, he declared that “China has consistently opposed unilateral sanctions that lack a basis in international law and are not authorized by the United Nations.,” adding that the EU’s actions run counter to the spirit of cooperation and undermine overall trade and economic relations between China and the EU.
Accordingly, the spokesperson said that China, first, called on the European side to “immediately stop adding Chinese enterprises to the sanctions list,” and second, that it “will take all necessary measures to resolutely safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises, as well as its own energy security and economic development.”
24.10. Germany Postpones Visit to China
On October 24, German Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kathrin Deschauer announced the postponement of a planned visit to China, originally scheduled for Sunday, October 26. The decision was reportedly due to the lack of confirmation from the Chinese side regarding additional meetings for the German Foreign Minister in Beijing—only one meeting had been arranged, with Wang Yi, the Chinese counterpart of Minister Wadephul. Nevertheless, Deschauer emphasized that Germany remained committed to maintaining dialogue with China. She stated: “There are many issues we would like to discuss with our Chinese counterparts, especially in today’s world. While diversifying our economy and supply chains and strengthening our competitiveness, we want to cooperate with China. At the same time, German companies are deeply concerned about trade restrictions, particularly in the rare earth metals and semiconductor sectors.” A moment later, she highlighted that Asian and European security are closely interconnected, referencing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s role in the matter: “It is in our interest that China contributes to achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. No other country has as much influence over Russia,” she told reporters. Deschauer further reaffirmed Berlin’s commitment to a partnership-based approach in relations with Beijing, despite the postponed visit. She concluded by informing that the German foreign minister “plans to hold a detailed phone conference with his Chinese counterpart in the near future.”
On October 27, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun commented on the issue in response to a question from a journalist with the German Press Agency (DPA). Asked for a statement, he said: “China has always viewed and developed its relations with Germany from a strategic and long-term perspective. […] Under the current circumstances in particular, it is all the more vital for the two sides to uphold mutual respect, equality and win-win cooperation, and advance the bilateral relationship on the right track.”
25.10. German SPD Politician Calls for a New Strategy Toward China
Just one day after the postponement of Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul’s planned trip to China, Adis Ahmetovic, spokesperson for foreign affairs of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), stated that “the short-term cancellation of the trip to China does not bode well for improvement in tense German-Chinese relations.” He went on to say that Germany needs to rethink its strategy toward the People’s Republic of China. “More than ever, we need an active, strategic foreign policy that focuses on dialogue, clarity, and long-term interests,” Ahmetovic added.
The Chinese side responded through the state-run daily Global Times. According to Zhao Chen, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Ahmetovic’s remarks reflect an internal call within Germany to resume discussion on the country’s China strategy.” He further noted the existing divisions on the German political scene regarding the perception of the PRC: “Some view China as a competitor that must be countered, while others believe that without closer cooperation with China, German industry and the economy will face additional strain.” In his view, Ahmetovic’s statements represent “a constructive voice in Germany calling for a more rational approach.”
27.10. Costa and Li in Kuala Lumpur
On the sidelines of this year’s ASEAN Summit on 27 October, a meeting took place between European Council President Antonio Costa and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. Both leaders attended the summit as representatives of partners cooperating with the Southeast Asian organization.
According to the European Council’s press release, Costa and Li discussed EU–China bilateral relations as well as broader global issues. Costa emphasized the importance of maintaining constructive and stable relations between the European Union and China and reaffirmed the EU’s readiness to deepen cooperation in tackling global challenges. He stressed that climate action must remain a top priority for both the EU and the PRC, particularly in view of the upcoming climate summit in Brazil. Costa also underlined the need for concrete progress on the commitments made during the recent EU–China summit, especially on “restoring balance in trade and economic relations.” Another key topic was China’s export controls on critical raw materials and related goods and technologies. Expressing deep concern, Costa called for swift restoration of smooth, reliable, and predictable supply chains. The European side addressed the war in Ukraine, with Costa expressing hope that China will help bring about an end to the conflict. He stated: “This war represents an existential threat to the EU’s security. The EU will continue to increase pressure on Russia.”
The Chinese government also released a statement about the meeting. In it, Premier Li Qiang noted that “current China–EU relations face both development opportunities and challenges. Both sides should maintain the right course, strengthen the foundations of mutual political trust, and continue to implement their consensus.” He affirmed China’s readiness to cooperate with the EU to promote balanced trade development and to deepen cooperation in green and digital technologies. Li emphasized that equality and respect are essential to resolving trade and economic disputes through dialogue and consultation. He expressed hope that the EU would ensure a fair, just, and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese companies operating within Europe.
Notably, unlike the European statement, the Chinese release made no mention of the war in Ukraine.
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