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Jan 31

Geopolitics, Climate Change, and Supply Chain Resilience

  • January 31, 2022
  • Jacob Shapiro
  • Climate change, Geopolitics, International security, Iraq, Publications, Syria, UN
Geopolitics, Climate Change, and Supply Chain ResilienceDownload

Summary:

– “Climate change” and “supply chains” are both extremely complex subjects. Climate change encompasses a range of phenomena: precipitation patterns, temperature, emissions, pollution, erosion, desertification, etc. Similarly, “supply chains” is too general a term to be of analytical value. The supply chain for wheat, for example, may share little in common with the supply chain for an advanced microchip.

– Our goal in this article will be to offer an adaptable analytical approach to integrating climate change into a geopolitical risk assessment of global supply chains. We will develop usable concepts and definitions for climate change, supply chains, and geopolitics and construct a framework for understanding how these phenomena interact with each other.

– We will turn our attention to two cases studies: wheat (a commodity particularly susceptible to climate change) and advanced semiconductors (a complex, manufactured product dependent on multiple supply chains). By applying this analytical approach, we hope to provide a high-level outline for government officials and supply chain professionals to empower them to better strategize how they can tailor to managing specific risks and opportunities in the face of such large and unwieldy forces.

Definition of Terms

Analysis of human behavior is an act of supreme hubris. Analysis is the notion that the human mind can split a broad topic into its constituent parts, examine them, stitch the topic back together, and have emerged with unique and fundamental insight into the analyst’s target. Analysis in the case of a static subject, like an industrial product, is relatively easy. One can take apart the components of a machine and, with some skill, reassemble them, and understand how the machine works, with the machine being no worse for the where. But applying analytical methods to things like geopolitics, climate change, and supply chains – which are all dynamic – is far more difficult. The very act of attempting to reduce such complex processes to words on a page is to tilt at windmills.

The word “analysis” derives from an ancient Greek word meaning, roughly, “to loosen up.” But as this paper will embark on a study of two of the most complicated and dynamic aspects of modern life – geopolitics and climate change – and in turn, how these dynamic forces affect the circulatory system of modern industrial life, namely, supply chains, it is worth beginning with a warning paraphrased from Socrates: that ignorance is the beginning of wisdom. The most important aspect of geopolitical analysis, in particular, is to reject both assumptions and certainties: to maintain enough intellectual flexibility and confidence in the face of unexpected developments without becoming paralyzed; to never fall in love with one’s own ideas, no matter how elegant.

Geopolitics is a 19th century European social science that surmises that geography exerts a significant influence on the behavior of states.[1] The essence of geopolitics is deceptively simple: the state will always pursue survival and power within the limits of geography, and most of its behavior will be driven by these basic instincts, whether conscious or not.[2] The “science” of geopolitics is to determine a state’s imperatives and constraints.[3] The former are those things a nation must do to survive. The latter are obstacles to a nation achieving its imperatives. The goal of geopolitical analysis is to produce a dynamic, explanatory model that is predictive of international political behavior by examining the interplay between various states’ imperatives and constraints on a net basis.

Climate change is an oxymoron. Climate, strictly speaking, is always in a constant state of change. In the time it has taken the reader to get through the first few paragraphs of this paper, the temperature outside may have changed by a degree, or the winds may have shifted direction or changed intensity. “Climate change” as it is understood today – negative, large-scale climate changes, especially but not limited to an increase in the planet’s average temperature due to carbon emissions, which, in turn, are due to human industry and behavior – is a relatively recent idea.[4] Climate change must encompass everything from regularly shifting weather patterns, desertification, global warming and cooling cycles, a range of other variables.

A supply chain, defined at its simplest, is the “activities required by an organization to deliver goods or services to a consumer.”[5] Supply chains have grown increasingly more complex since the First Industrial Revolution greased the wheels of global commerce.[6] The reconstruction of much of the developed world after World War II along the lines proposed to Bretton Woods, combined with the U.S.-China détente of the 1970s and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ushered in an unprecedented era of globalization. Today, a global supply chain for a single product can be infinitely complex, encompassing everything from sourcing raw materials, labor, and assembly in multiple countries, and trade across myriad borders before a good or service to delivered to its intended customer.

Geopolitically, the world is undergoing a transformation. The unipolar era of U.S. relative dominance over potential rivals is giving way to a multipolar era reminiscent of the decades that immediately preceding World War I, replete with rising and falling great powers, a global competition to secure access to critical raw materials, and elevated trade tensions. The acceleration of specific aspects of human-induced climate change is leading to weather patterns that are increasingly more erratic and unpredictable. It is also leading to increases in transnational migration and challenging food security, manifesting as protectionist trade policies related to products deemed to relate to national security and a renewed “scramble” to secure access to energy, food, and critical mineral commodities.

These long-standing processes were accelerated by COVID-19 – a global pandemic which reminds how warming trends lead to a distinct rise in microbiologic infections acquired from animals.[7] Before the pandemic, the U.S. launched a trade war against China because the latter had come to enjoy a dominant position in global supply chains. COVID-19 led to a sudden awareness of the risks of dependence on a single node of failure, like China, in addition to attendant geopolitical risks and rising labor costs. Perch Perspectives predicted in March 2020 that global companies would struggle to bear the brunt of dislocation as they reformed their supply chains to become more resilient and less dependent on a single country – a forecast that has clearly come to fruition in the last 12 months, and a process that is far from over.[8]

Due to the sheer complexity of each of these topics, it is impossible to make broad or general statements about the relationship between geopolitics, climate change, and supply chains. That is one of the cardinal mistakes of analysis: attempting to simplify that which is complex and dynamic. Increasing the resilience of supply chains by accounting for geopolitical and climate change variables is not a question in search of a neat and tidy answer, but a problem in search of an iterative and flexible process. As such, rather than grope for grandiose and unfalsifiable assertions – patterns of thought which are the enemy of useful analysis – this analysis will delve briefly into two very different case studies. By applying geopolitical analytical techniques to the impact of climate change on supply chains for wheat and for semiconductors, the goal is to sketch how to go about tackling these difficult questions rather than making summary conclusions with insufficient data.

Wheat

Global wheat prices are one of the most effective leading geopolitical indicators for unrest. Take, for example, the 2006-2009 drought in Syria and Iraq. Conditions in Syria were particularly bad: the UN Food and Agriculture Organization described the situation in 2007 as “the worst drought to strike Syria in four decades.”[9] Syria’s drought came as global food prices were climbing upwards, which led to higher prices and supply disruptions in water-constrained countries in North Africa and the Middle East. This underlying pressure exploded in December 2010, when a Tunisia vegetable salesman self-immolated to protest his dire prospects and his feelings of personal humiliation.[10] What happened next is now common history: the Arab Spring brought down dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya; the Islamic State rose from the ashes and declared a caliphate, which in turn played a significant role in the short-lived U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. Migrants from the region headed for the exits, leading to the EU’s immigration crisis, and by extension, Brexit.

These geopolitical developments can, in a sense, be traced back to a drought in Syria that crippled the part of the country where wheat was grown. This, in turn, was the continuation of a long-term desertification trend in the Middle East, which was the cradle of civilization thousands of years ago. As a result, young men from the countryside, unable to make a living farming, flooded Syrian cities, creating a disillusioned class willing to fight against a repressive political regime and anxious for an ideological framework that could supply meaning to their lives.[11] This knowledge is ominous when considering that global food prices, and in particular, wheat prices, are ascending again. While global wheat prices remain significantly below their 2008/09 peaks, the question is whether 2022 will see a return to the previous downward trend – or whether the price-rise in the last two years have been the overture to a sustained rally.[12]

The outlook for global wheat prices in the short-term is for higher prices, as evidenced by the imposition of wheat export taxes by the top global exporter: Russia.[13] Even here, however, the picture is not clear. Some experts believe Russia is poised to “win” the global climate crisis.[14] The rationale for this is fairly simple: global warming will lead to rising temperatures in the Arctic. As Russia is the country with the most Arctic territory in the world, it will suddenly enjoy a climate change dividend as Siberia becomes a fertile breadbasket. A UN map predicting changes in overall agricultural production by 2050 shows Russia increasing relative to most of the rest of Asia. In another study, Russia’s wheat production is not only forecast to increase, but its share of the global market is forecast to increase as well, due to declines in rival exporters’ market share because of climate change.[15]

Contradicting this, however, are analysts equally convinced that Russia’s wheat production capacity will not benefit at all from climate change – but quite the opposite. According to CSIS, “dramatic shifts in global weather patterns, accelerated by warming Arctic waters and a diminishing ice cap, are expecting to increase droughts in Russia’s rich southern agricultural “breadbasket” regions encompassing Stavropol and Rostov. This could pose food security risks and threaten a primary Russian export: wheat.” In addition, “though climate change will expand arable land in Russia in its northern latitudes,” these improvements will not make up for lost production in Russia’s traditional growing regions, which have seen arable land shrink by thousands of acres in the last few years.[16] It is not a coincidence that Russian aggression toward Ukraine – the world’s fifth-largest wheat exporter – has become more serious just as Russia’s food security has become more uncertain. Russian President Vladimir Putin no doubt remembers the negative impact Soviet dependence on imports of foreign grain – especially U.S. wheat – had on the USSR.[17]

In addition to the challenges posed by global warming and desertification, global wheat prices are also susceptible to more mundane and predictable global weather patterns. For the last 12 months, much of South America has been facing one of the worst droughts in recorded history – Brazil’s National Meteorology System (SNM) has described it as the worst in Brazil in 111 years.[18] This drought has more to do with the presence of a “double-dip” La Niña pattern in the Pacific Ocean.[19] During La Niña, surface winds across the entire tropical Pacific are stronger than usual, and most of the tropical Pacific Ocean is cooler than average. La Niña leads to a higher probability of increased rainfall over Southeast Asia, cooler and drier conditions in the western part of North and South America, and more hurricanes in the Atlantic Ocean basin. As a result, countries like Brazil and Paraguay have already been revising crop harvest projections downwards. In addition, low levels on the Paraná River are making it harder for South American farmers to get their crops to market. 

Integration of geopolitics and climate change into a better understanding of the global wheat supply chain, therefore, is indispensable. The future of wheat production and prices has always been dependent on weather patterns like La Niña – but human-induced climate change and geopolitical competition are introducing new variables that must be incorporated into an analytical model. From the point of view of major wheat producers, like Russia and Canada, climate change may offer significant benefits in terms of increased availability of arable land, but even these optimistic projections must be tempered with declining yields in traditional breadbaskets and more irregular weather patterns. Major consumers, like India, China, Saudi Arabia, and most of sub-Saharan Africa, are engaging in varied tactics to try and achieve greater security of supply. Recent protests by Indian farmers over much-needed reform to India’s agricultural markets sparked significant unrest and suggests India may struggle, and as a result, will be buying more wheat in the future.[20] It remains to be seen if Saudi delusions of grandeur over utilizing hydroponics can make its deserts bloom.[21] One of China’s imperatives is to stabilize its domestic grain output, which is difficult anytime weather does not cooperate (as during July 2021 floods).[22] Africa’s problem is not that it lacks natural resources but that its countries have lacked the governance, stability, and infrastructure necessary to take advantage of them – to the extent that sub-Saharan African countries are obtaining just 20 to 30 percent of possible yields.[23]

Geopolitical analysis, as a result, is a critical tool for investors, farmers, and agribusiness to integrate into their price forecasts and projection frameworks. The basic geopolitical imperative of wheat importers is to ensure the security of supply, while the imperative of exporters is to boost their exports while reserving enough for domestic consumption. Constraints to these imperatives are intertwined with climate change, both the dynamism of standard weather patterns and the acceleration of human-induced phenomena like desertification, warming, and erratic but more deadly storms. Nowhere is this more significant than in India, where the monsoon season is becoming stronger and more erratic, upending centuries of accepted knowledge.[24] These gyrations will inevitably have domestic political impacts, and as in the case of the Arab Spring, can have derivative second and third-order effects that make tracking such variables critical for those with indirect interests in key countries in the wheat supply chain.

This framework is sketched in intentionally broad terms, as the specific interests of a given actor will determine what imperatives and constraints are most critical. Marrying geopolitical analysis to climate change awareness and supply chain resilience is a task of surgical precision. The considerations above point towards macro considerations to track and layout a rough basis for how to think about layering these variables into a model, but their effectiveness is dependent on tailoring the impact of these variables to specific and falsifiable forecasts, which is what transforms a geopolitical model from wishful thinking to a dynamic and constantly updated tool to stay ahead of supply chain disruptions. 

Semiconductors

Wheat’s exposure to geopolitical risks and climate change is relatively straightforward. Wheat is an agricultural commodity. It is planted in the ground, harvested, and transported elsewhere. It is inherently cyclical, and its yield depends on specific weather conditions. While there are a few important inputs into the wheat supply chain – chief among them fertilizer – these inputs are not esoteric and are easily tracked. The same cannot be said for semiconductors, which is why they will serve as the second case study.

Semiconductors are the embodiment of the era of globalization. They are highly complex products to both design and manufacture, entail massive investment outlays, and have large energy footprints. Furthermore, the global semiconductor supply chain is both lean and highly integrated. The U.S., Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, China, and the European Union have specialized capabilities at separate steps of the semiconductor supply chain – but no country can replicate the entire semiconductor supply chain by itself. Examples of this extreme dependence on particular nodes of the supply chain include Taiwan’s ~54 percent market share of the global foundry market and ASML’s 100 percent market share of the extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography systems critical to fabricating the most advanced semiconductors.[25] Just a smartphone application processor will 10 different national borders before going to market.[26]

Taiwan’s dominance in the global foundry market by itself exposes the semiconductor supply chain to specific and massive geopolitical risk. China’s long-term goal is to reintegrate Taiwan into the mainland, while the U.S. and its allies, like Japan and Australia, want to maintain Taiwan’s status quo as something less than a sovereign, independent country but more than a rogue province for China to eventually absorb, à la Hong Kong. But it is hardly the only geopolitical factor affecting the semiconductor supply chain. The ongoing Japan-South Korea trade dispute, which began in 2019, also has massive implications for the semiconductor supply chain, leading to disruptions in the global supply chain and incentives for Korean chipmakers to develop vertically rather than depend on Japanese suppliers.[27] Or consider the European Union’s new strategy for data and digital sovereignty, a clear indicator that geopolitical risks for the semiconductor supply chain are not limited to Asia alone.[28]

The impact of climate change on semiconductor supply chains is not as apparent as its geopolitical risks but is no less critical. For one thing, semiconductor manufacturing is consuming more and more electricity worldwide each year. The chip-dependent information and communication technology (IT) sector may account for 7 percent of global energy demand by 2030, which makes the semiconductor supply chain exposed to both energy geopolitics and the broader transition away from hydrocarbons to renewables due to climate change politics.[29] Even as semiconductor manufacturing becomes more efficient, both in terms of energy usage and carbon emissions, its overall footprint continues to increase due to increased demand because of the Internet of Things (IoT) revolution, the widescale roll out of 5th Generation wireless networks, and increased automation of manufacturing processes globally.

And that is before accounting for the natural resources that go into manufacturing semiconductors, like copper, lithium, silicon, and other mineral commodities. Water is also a critical input for semiconductor production, as last year’s drought in Taiwan made abundantly clear. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s water consumption has increased by a factor of 5 in the last decade alone – in 2019, TSMC used enough water to fill 79,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools, while accounting for almost 5 percent of Taiwan’s entire energy consumption.[30] A water shortage in Taiwan eventually led to TSMC buying water by the truckload and shipping it to foundries even as the Taiwanese government imposed stringent restrictions on water supply for the rest of the population.[31] Taiwan’s water supply, in other words, seems to be as critical to the future of global semiconductor supply chains as the average temperature and rainfall in Russia’s breadbasket regions will be to the global wheat supply chain in the future.

As with wheat, the diversity and complexity of the semiconductor supply chain resists blanket statements. In the long-term, China, the U.S., the EU, and other actors will seek to build self-sufficient local supply chains for the industry, but that will take years if not decades, as well as trillions of dollars in upfront investment and significant price increases for semiconductor prices.[32] In the meantime, the world is stuck with the semiconductor supply chain it has. And that will mean very different things from an analytical perspective depending on the system or component in question. The supply chain for photoresist, a market dominated by Japan, is markedly different from the supply chain for German-manufactured mirrors that project light onto wafers for patterning.[33]

Ironically, the geographic specialization of the semiconductor supply chain reduces the risk of wider global conflagrations or wars because until countries are more self-sufficient, they cannot afford to simply lose access to the semiconductor supply chain. This is why one of the most critical things any supply chain professional in the semiconductor industry must be doing is keeping close track of government investment programs and national security initiatives in countries attempting to become self-sufficient. Whether and how fast China, for instance, can develop its own EUV lithography equipment is a major signpost for the future direction of relations between Beijing and Washington.

This is equally true from an energy perspective. TSMC, for instance, has pledged to use 100 percent renewable energy sources by 2050. Several semiconductor companies have made similar pledges.[34] To state the obvious: 2050 is a long time from now. Even as the price of solar and wind generation has declined below hydrocarbons, and even as hydrogen offers tantalizing promise for a greener future, for the present and near-term future, hydrocarbons remain the dominant source of energy generation in all the countries in the semiconductor supply chain. Indeed, countries like China (~60 percent of energy supply), Vietnam (~53 percent) India (~50 percent), and Taiwan (44 percent) all rely disproportionately on coal. Years of underinvestment and a pervasive narrative about coal’s pollutive effects have led to a lack of supply. The price of coal reached record prices last year, and the IEA is predicting coal prices will reach new highs in 2022 and continue climbing through 2024 before beginning to decline.

The implications of this are myriad. Continued use of coal and other hydrocarbons for increasing energy demand will lead to greater carbon emissions and, as is expected, to more accelerated climate change. This, in turn, may lead to more restrictions on the use of hydrocarbons. There is a gap between the renewable future that developed countries envision and the sources of their power production presently, and nowhere will potential energy disruptions be felt more acutely than in semiconductor supply chains, where tight supplies can drive up costs and, in a worst-case scenario, even lead to idling factories due to power shortfalls. The semiconductor supply chain is inextricably linked to climate change factors like water scarcity and energy costs and is also disproportionately exposed to geopolitical risks. Identifying these risks, monitoring them, and being flexible enough to change as the global energy mix shifts in unpredictable ways is critical to maintaining situational awareness over the semiconductor supply chain.

Conclusion

This analysis integrates geopolitical risks and climate change into a workable analytical framework to improve supply chain resilience. By focusing on two case studies – the global wheat supply chain and the global semiconductor supply chain – it argues that geopolitics and climate change are inextricably linked and pose significant risks and opportunities for global supply chains in the future. It proposes broad strategies for how to define and monitor these risks, but also notes that these are precision tools that must be tightly calibrated to the client’s specific interests. Even for a relatively simple supply chain, like wheat, there are no crystal balls or silver bullets to ensure resilience, only constant vigilance, and flexibility to integrate new and inevitably unexpected inputs into a broader analytical framework.


[1] Swedish-Germangeopolitics for a new century: Rudolf Kjellén’s ‘The State as a LivingOrganism’, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/abs/swedishgerman-geopolitics-for-a-new-century-rudolf-kjellens-the-state-as-a-living-organism/291349F31F11AE55879830AE38C90240, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[2] What is Geopolitics, and Why Does it Matter?, Lykeion with Perch Perspectives, https://www.thelykeion.com/geopolitical-update/, accessed: 30.01.2022, and The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 1, The Geography of Conflict, https://www.jstor.org/stable/172582?refreqid=excelsior%3A85adc95348da28602e138174a9f922e8, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[3] Id.

[4] The Public and Climate Change, American Institute of Physics, http://history.aip.org/climate/public2.htm#S1988, accessed: 30.01.2022.  

[5] What is a Supply Chain?, Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, https://www.cips.org/knowledge/procurement-topics-and-skills/supply-chain-management/what-is-a-supply-chain/#:~:text=In%20its%20simplest%20form%20a,to%20finished%20products%20or%20services, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[6] Geopolitics 4.0, Perch Perspectives, https://perchperspectives.com/geopolitics-4-0/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[7] Public Health Threat of New, Reemerging, and Neglected Zoonoses in the Industrialized World, NCBI, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2874344/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[8] Long-Term Political Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Perch Perspectives LinkedIn post, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/long-term-political-consequences-covid-19-pandemic-jacob-l-shapiro/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[9] Syria: Drought Appeal 2008, FAO, https://www.fao.org/emergencies/appeals/detail/en/c/149352/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[10] Wheat Prices critical for 2022, The Strategic Funds, https://www.thestrategicfunds.com.pr/wheat-prices-critical-for-2022/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[11] Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought, PNAS, https://www.pnas.org/content/112/11/3241, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[12] Supra, 10.

[13] Russia floating wheat export tax falls as quota period approaches, S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/agriculture/012122-russia-floating-wheat-export-tax-falls-as-quota-period-approaches, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[14] How Russia Wins the Climate Crisis, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/12/16/magazine/russia-climate-migration-crisis.html, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[15] The Weaponization of Wheat Climate Change and Russian Agricultural Power, PIPS White Paper 10.4, https://www.wm.edu/offices/global-research/research-labs/pips/_documents/pips/2017-2018/nelson.collin.summary.pdf, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[16] Climate Change Will Reshape Russia, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/climate-change-will-reshape-russia, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[17] U.S.-Soviet Trade in the 1980s, RAND, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2682.pdf, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[18] Coffee, Water and the Latin America “EU”?, LatamPolitik, https://latampolitik.substack.com/p/latampolitik-coffee-water-and-the, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[19] El Niño and La Niña: Frequently asked questions, Climate.Gov, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/el-ni%C3%B1o-and-la-ni%C3%B1a-frequently-asked-questions, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[20] The Future of India Depends on its Farmers, Perch Perspectives, https://perchperspectives.com/the-future-of-india-depends-on-its-farmers/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[21] Hydroponic farming boosts prospects of sustainable agriculture in Saudi Arabia, Horti Daily, https://www.hortidaily.com/article/9391880/hydroponic-farming-boosts-prospects-of-sustainable-agriculture-in-saudi-arabia/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[22] Now China’s Wheat Imports are Surging too as Rain Spoils Harvest, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-02/now-china-s-wheat-imports-are-surging-too-as-rain-spoils-harvest, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[23] Yield gap study highlights potential for higher crop yields in Africa, University of Nebraska-Lincoln News, https://news.unl.edu/newsrooms/unltoday/article/yield-gap-study-highlights-potential-for-higher-crop-yields-in-africa/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[24] Climate Change Is Making Indian Monsoon Seasons More Chaotic, Columbia Climate School, https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/04/14/climate-change-indian-monsoon/, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[25] Taiwan’s bargaining chips?, TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2021/12/02/taiwans-bargaining-chips/?guccounter=1#:~:text=A%20detailed%20breakdown%20shows%20that,the%20global%20foundry%20market%20share, accessed: 30.01.2022. and ASML: Not Just A Monopoly In EUV Lithography, SeekingAlpha, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4354007-asml-not-just-monopoly-in-euv-lithography, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[26] Strenghtening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association report, https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/BCG-x-SIA-Strengthening-the-Global-Semiconductor-Value-Chain-April-2021_1.pdf, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[27] Understanding the South Korea-Japan Trade Dispute and Its Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy, ITIF, https://itif.org/publications/2020/01/16/understanding-south-korea-japan-trade-dispute-and-its-impacts-us-foreign#:~:text=As%20a%20U.S.%20International%20Trade,sourcing%20from%20Japanese%20suppliers%2C%20not, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[28] Digital sovereignty for Europe, EPRS Ideas Paper, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651992/EPRS_BRI(2020)651992_EN.pdf, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[29] Chasing Carbon: The Elusive Environmental, Footprint of Computing, paper by Harvard University, Facebook Inc. and Arizona State University, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2011.02839.pdf, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[30] The Chip Industry has a Problem with its Gian Carbon Footprint, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-08/the-chip-industry-has-a-problem-with-its-giant-carbon-footprint, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[31] Chipmakers in drought-hit Taiwan order water trucks to prepare for ‘the worst’, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-drought-semiconductors/chipmakers-in-drought-hit-taiwan-order-water-trucks-to-prepare-for-the-worst-idUSKBN2AO0G3, accessed: 30.01.2022.

[32] Supra, 26.

[33] Id.

[34] TSMC Leads Rush for Renewables Ahead of Taiwan Energy Vote, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-08/tsmc-leads-rush-for-renewables-ahead-of-taiwan-energy-vote#:~:text=TSMC%20became%20the%20first%20in,and%20others%20followed%20suit, accessed: 30.01.2022.

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About The Author

Jacob L. Shapiro. The founder and chief strategist of Perch Perspectives. For over a decade, Shapiro has provided clients with the context, foresight, and analysis they need to solve for the unknown and enhance their understanding of global and regional affairs. He is known for challenging his clients' perspectives to empower them to make accurate, informed decisions and gain a more holistic view of the events that impact them, their businesses, or governments. Shapiro is the former director of analysis at Geopolitical Futures, where he managed a team of analysts in forecasting geopolitical trends and events. Before that, he was a Middle East analyst and director of operations at the global intelligence firm Stratfor. He holds a master's degree with distinction from Oxford University and a bachelor's degree from Cornell University in Near Eastern Studies.

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Przewodniczący Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk ekonomicznych Szkoły Głównej Handlowej. Ekspert w dziedzinie polityki publicznej, w tym m. in. strategii państwa i gospodarki.

Michał Banasiak

Specjalizuje się w relacjach sportu i polityki. Autor analiz, komentarzy i wywiadów z zakresu dyplomacji sportowej i polityki międzynarodowej. Były dziennikarz Polsat News i wysłannik redakcji zagranicznej Telewizji Polskiej.

Maciej Pawłowski

Ekspert ds. migracji, gospodarki i polityki państw basenu Morza Śródziemnego. W latach 2018-2020 Analityk PISM ds. Południowej Europy. Autor publikacji w polskiej i zagranicznej prasie na temat Hiszpanii, Włoch, Grecji, Egiptu i państw Magrebu. Od września 2020 r. mieszka w północnej Afryce (Egipt, Algieria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Absolwent studiów prawniczych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach. Jego zainteresowania badawcze koncentrują się na Inicjatywie Trójmorza i polityce w Bułgarii. Doświadczenie zdobywał w European Foundation of Human Rights w Wilnie, Center for the Study of Democracy w Sofii i polskich placówkach dyplomatycznych w Teheranie i Tbilisi.

Program Bezpieczeństwo tworzą:

dr Aleksander Olech

Dyrektor programu. Wykładowca na Baltic Defence College, absolwent Europejskiej Akademii Dyplomacji oraz Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego główne zainteresowania badawcze to terroryzm, bezpieczeństwo w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz rola NATO i UE w środowisku zagrożeń hybrydowych.

dr Agnieszka Rogozińska

Członek Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk społecznych w dyscyplinie nauki o polityce. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje na problematyce bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego, instytucjonalnym wymiarze bezpieczeństwa i współczesnych zagrożeniach.

Karolina Siekierka

Absolwentka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe, specjalizacji Bezpieczeństwo i Studia Strategiczne. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną i wewnętrzną Francji, prawa człowieka oraz konflikty zbrojne.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Podoficer rezerwy, student studiów magisterskich na kierunku Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe i Dyplomacja na Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, były praktykant w BBN. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują m.in. operacje pokojowe ONZ oraz bezpieczeństwo Ukrainy.

Leon Pińczak

Student studiów drugiego stopnia na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe. Dziennikarz polskojęzycznej redakcji Biełsatu. Zawodowo zajmuje się obszarem postsowieckim, rosyjską polityką wewnętrzną i doktrynami FR. Biegle włada językiem rosyjskim.

Program Indo-Pacyfik tworzą:

Łukasz Kobierski

Dyrektor programu. Współzałożyciel INE oraz prezes zarządu w latach 2019-2021. Stypendysta szkoleń z zakresu bezpieczeństwa na Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security w Waszyngtonie, ekspert od stosunków międzynarodowych. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wiceprezes Zarządu INE.

dr Joanna Siekiera

Prawnik międzynarodowy, doktor nauk społecznych, adiunkt na Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu w Bergen w Norwegii. Była stypendystką rządu Nowej Zelandii na Uniwersytecie Victorii w Wellington, niemieckiego Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, a także francuskiego Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques.

Paweł Paszak

Absolwent stosunków międzynarodowych (spec. Wschodnioazjatycka) na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim oraz stypendysta University of Kent (W. Brytania) i Hainan University (ChRL). Doktorant UW i Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną ChRL oraz strategiczną rywalizację Chiny-USA.

Jakub Graca

Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

Kamil Opara

Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunkach prawo oraz stosunki międzynarodowe (specjalizacja: bezpieczeństwo i studia strategiczne). Ukończył także School of Law and Economy of China UW, gdzie obecnie pracuje jako zastępca kierownika. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje wokół polityki zagranicznej i wewnętrznej, prawa oraz cyberbezpieczeństwa Chin.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Kamil Opara

University of Warsaw graduate (law and international relations; specialization: Security and Strategic Studies); he graduated also from the School of Law and Economy of China in which he currently works as a Deputy Head. His fields of research include Chinese domestic and foreign policy, law and cybersecurity.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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Latest publications

  • Disunited We Stand? Central Europe vis á vis Ukraine and the future of the EU. Interview with prof. Aleks Szczerbiak [part I] May 25, 2022
  • The military involvement of the Russian Federation in Africa. Contracts and agreements signed May 23, 2022
  • The war in Ukraine and international law – what causes its ineffectiveness? April 25, 2022
  • Three Seas Initiative towards the Russian Aggression on Ukraine – Debate April 7, 2022
  • Fleeing the Fire: Conflict and Migration as Two Aspects within the Climate Crisis in MENA April 4, 2022

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