Contracts for arms supplies between Poland and South Korea have resulted in a close defense cooperation between an Asian and a European state, which benefits both sides.
Russian invasion of Ukraine launched on 24th February 2022 brought back a full-scale inter-state conflict to Europe, shaking the European security architecture and incentivizing security policy changes and military build-ups of various states. One such country is Poland, which in the aftermath of the invasion turned its attention to a new partner in Asia for potential arms supplies, namely South Korea.
In mid 2022 Polish-South Korean contracts were signed for the procurement of 1000 K2 tanks and its Polonized K2PL version together with associated vehicles, 672 K9A1 self-propelled howitzer and its Polonized K9PL version along with accompanying equipment, and multi-guided K239 CHUNMOO launchers (rocket artillery systems)[1]. In September 2022 Poland and South Korea concluded an agreement for the delivery of 48 FA-50 light attack aircraft, which will permit the retirement of the Soviet-designed MiG-29 and Su-22 fighter jets. As part of the deal, Polish Armed Forces receive training and logistics packages for the aircraft from their producer, Korea Aerospace Industries[2].
Having South Korea as another substantial, beside the USA, arms supplier advances Poland’s objective of developing a robust military posture.
Moreover, although if combined together all the signed contracts with Washington, Seoul etc. constitute a costly endeavor, diversification of these substantial weaponry purchases secures the timely delivery of at least some tranche of the orders, should there be delays on the side of one of the suppliers, as South Korean provisions are generally regarded as expeditious[3].
The accords between Poland and South Korea align concurrently with Warsaw’s plans to elevate its domestic production and expand its arms industry. That is to be accomplished through the transfer of technology and know-how to Poland, as well as the cooperation of Polish and South Korean companies on the manufacturing of military equipment, including a consortium between Hyundai Rotem and Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), Poland’s biggest defense industry company, on the production of K2s[4]. The fact that K2PL tanks will be produced in Poland offers a unique opportunity for the Polish defense industry of joining the elite club of main battle tank producers, possibly making Poland one of the three European NATO states capable of manufacturing these vehicles[5]. Warsaw does not only want some of the equipment to be manufactured in Poland, but also seeks for the national facilities to service, repair and modernize South Korean armament[6]. For instance, the deal for FA-50s entails South Korean assistance in the establishment of an aircraft service center operated by the PGZ[7]. This underscores Poland’s ambitions not solely to be a passive recipient of weaponry, but to foster its own defense industrial base and achieve autonomy in developing arms.
South Korea is undoubtedly another beneficiary of the contracts with Poland and, consequently, collaboration in the defense dimension. Seoul has long pursued independence in its security and defense policy, simultaneously attempting at broadening its spectrum of allies and partners, which the former President Moon Jae-in and current President Yoon Suk-yeol have successfully accomplished. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine happened to be a turning point for South Korean defense industry and international cooperation, with countries like Poland seeking to modernize their armed forces and substitute old post-Soviet equipment with new weaponry[8]. South Korea’s arms exports skyrocketed from $7.25 billion in 2021 to $17 billion in 2022. Affordability and promptness of South Korean supplies combined with the global demand for military gear situate Seoul advantageously on the international market, creating a new role for the democracy from the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea now ranks as the 8th largest arms exporter, aiming at 4th place by 2027[9], and Poland has substantially contributed to this success[10].
Warsaw has become the primary recipient of South Korean equipment on the global stage after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2022, and it occupies a unique position in Seoul’s defense policy. Fulfilling big contracts signed with Poland (and other countries) can prove to other prospective clients that South Korea is capable of effectively realizing large contractual obligations. In addition, Warsaw may serve as a hub for South Korea for future penetration of the European market, dominated so far by the American and European contractors, allowing Seoul to further unleash its potential as an arms exporter[11]. It is essential to recognise that selling military assets to Poland and other states has deeper implications as South Korea searches to build on the contracts in order to deepen ties in various domains with its partners. This falls within Seoul’s plans for transformation into a global pivotal state – a player able to leverage its diplomatic, economic, military and soft power assets to enhance its foreign policy[12].
Without any doubt, both Seoul and Warsaw benefit from the partnership. On the one hand, Poland receives military equipment necessary to expand and modernize its armed forces, at the same time restocking its military resources after transferring much of its assets to Ukraine, and creating a base for enhancing its domestic defense industry. On the other hand, by provisioning Poland with combat equipment Seoul has emerged as a prominent arms exporter and gained a new non-Asian partner, which enhances its efforts to be a significant actor in international relations and security.
The cooperation between Poland and South Korea goes beyond customer-seller relationship with joint production as one of key elements of the signed agreements.
Both parties express willingness to create a political and institutional framework for collaboration to secure a long-term partnership and deepen defense cooperation, exemplified by the foundation of the Joint Korean-Polish Committee on Cooperation in the fields of Defense and Defense Industry in July 2023 and talks about mil-to-mil relations[13]. In addition, the collaboration between Warsaw and Seoul is bound to strengthen even more in the foreseeable future.
Text prepared as part of the INE Academy, a series of publications created by young analysts and trainees of the Institute of New Europe
Foto: Image OpenClipart-Vectors z Pixabay and Image Pexels z Pixabay
[1] Polish-Korean cooperation strengthens the capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces. Ministry of National Defence. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/polish-korean-cooperation-strengthens-the-capabilities-of-th
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[2] Adamowski, J. Poland inks deal for FA-50 light attack aircraft from South Korea. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/09/17/poland-inks-deal-for-fa-50-light-attack-aircraft-from-south-korea/. access: 05.09.2023.
[3] Cha, S. South Korea’s arms sales double amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Japan Times. https://www.japanti
mes.co.jp/news/2022/12/09/asia-pacific/south-korea-arms-sales-double/. access: 05.09.2023.
[4] Cucino, A., Scarazzato, L. The impact of the war in Ukraine on Polish arms industrial policy. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2023/impact-war-ukraine-polish-
arms-industrial-policy. access: 05.09.2023.
[5] Palowski, J. Polska coraz bliżej produkcji czołgów. Defence24. https://defence24.pl/przemysl/polska-coraz-
blizej-produkcji-czolgow. access: 05.09.2023.
[6] Pietrewicz, O. Nowy etap partnerstwa strategicznego Polski i Korei Południowej. Polski Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/nowy-etap-partnerstwa-strategicznego-polski-i-korei-polud
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[7] Adamowski, J. Poland inks deal for FA-50 light attack aircraft from South Korea. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/09/17/poland-inks-deal-for-fa-50-light-attack-aircraft-from-south-korea/. access: 05.09.2023.
[8] Pacheco Pardo, R. South Korea Is Sidestepping the Hub. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/03/south-korea-seoul-united-states-arms-weapons-sales-military-alliance-diplomacy/#cookie_message_anchor. access: 05.09.2023.
[9] Cha, S. South Korea’s arms sales double amid Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/12/09/asia-pacific/south-korea-arms-sales-double/. access: 05.09.2023.
[10] Lentowicz, Z. Polskie zamówienia na broń budują eksportową potęgę Seulu. Radar. https://radar.rp.pl/przemysl-obronny/art38081711-polskie-zamowienia-na-bron-buduja-eksportowa-potege-seulu. access: 05.09.2023.
[11] Pietrewicz, O. Nowy etap partnerstwa strategicznego Polski i Korei Południowej. Polski Instytut Studiów Międzynarodowych. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/nowy-etap-partnerstwa-strategicznego-polski-i-korei-polud
niowej. access: 05.09.2023.
[12] Pacheco Pardo, R. South Korea as a “global pivotal state”: the role of partners. Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy. https://brussels-school.be/sites/default/files/CSDS%20Policy%20brief_2207_0.pdf. access: 06.09.2023.
[13] Ji, D. S. Korea, Poland agree to expand defense cooperation, arms trade. The Korean Herald. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230607000713. access: 06.09.2023.
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