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Institute of New Europe Institute of New Europe
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May 10
Africa and Middle East, Analysis, International Politics, Publications, Security, Terrorism

In The Shadows: The Threat Of an Islamic State On The Brink in the Middle East and Africa

May 10, 2021
In The Shadows: The Threat Of an Islamic State On The Brink in the Middle East and AfricaPobierz

Key Points:

– As Islamic State’s (IS) continues its attacks in Iraq and Syria, its expansion into Africa poses a threat that warns of an enduring battle in a new environment.

– IS has been creating various connections with African insurgency groups to retain its global image while the groups receive international recognition and support.

– Some of ISIS’s branches embed themselves in local communities as alternatives to state governance by using tactics aimed at winning the population over.

Introduction

The Department of Defence’s Inspector-General report concerning the progress of Operation Inherent Resolve covering October-December 2020 reveals IS’s capability in the Middle East, where it is stated that ISIS’s members are conducting low-level insurgencies and small scale attacks, yet displaying a persistent degree of cohesiveness despite organisation’s loss of territory, major population centres and finances.[1] This cohesiveness was highlighted in the previous 2019 report as well, where it was stated that the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi merely vaguely impacted the organisation’s ability to strike.[2] Yet, as the group continues its fight in the Middle East, IS also expanded its operations into Africa as a means to regain its strength, as evidenced by the Mozambique attack in April 2021.[3]In this article, the status and threat of IS in the Middle East are briefly reviewed, while its second part will focus on IS’s push towards moving into Africa and how their tenacity is a signal of their willingness to once again return as a ferocious threat.

Operation Inherent Resolve: IS in the Middle East

Despite its major losses, IS has demonstrated a continuous ability to adapt and carry on with attacks in Iraq and Syria. The COVID-19 pandemic had an effect on IS’s operations in the Middle East, offering an opportunity to intensify their attacks since March 2020.[4] The extremists increased their attacks as governments around the world, Western and Arabic, were distracted with tackling the pandemic, which led to them regrouping and launching increasingly more complex attacks and increasing the risk of a possible return of their caliphate.[5] The defeat of IS is argued to be merely territorial in nature, and declaring a victory over the group now would not take into account the non-material aspect of fighting their movement.[6] Reports indicate that even if IS lost its final enclave in 2019,[7] its ideology remains persistent, with fighters claimed to have merely dispersed and waiting for an opportunity to regroup at a more opportune time; launching persistent attacks on soldiers and police forces in the meantime to retain presence.[8] The risk of a major return is not only real but also backed by persistent exploitation of hostilities between Shia and Sunni Muslims,[9] as well as recruitment campaigns[10] and large cash reserves.[11]

Where the US ponders on withdrawing some troops from Iraq as its own forces become more capable in fighting IS,[12]the terrorist group conducted over 300 attacks in the last quarter of 2020, out of which 65 were targeted at civilians.[13] In January 2021, IS further conducted attacks, where it struck a market in Baghdad which involved 2 suicide bombings and killing 32 people.[14] In April 2021, a car bombing in the same city killed 4 people and wounded 20.[15] And in the same month, another notable attack involved targeting two oil wells located in Bay Hassan, Northern Iraq, where officials denied any substantial damage was made to the facilities that would disrupt their operation.[16] Meanwhile, the coalition equally pushes back against the jihadist’s campaign of violence. On March 12, 2021, ‘Operation Ready Lion’, a ten-day strike campaign against IS’s tunnel networks in the Makhmour Mountains, was launched with the backing of the US and Royal Air Force, complemented by Iraqi ground forces.[17] The coalition’s attack destroyed over 120 hideouts and resulted in the deaths of over 27 terrorists.[18] Furthermore, the coalition assisted Iraqi forces on the ground as well, with at least a part of the 200 Canadian special forces deployed in Iraq supporting the ground offensive during the operation.[19]

In Syria, the Islamic State is equally relentless, especially in the Dayr Az Zawr region.[20] As the organisation remains locked in a fight against the increasingly unassisted Syrian Democratic Force (SDF), it now faces an uptick in battles against regime-backed forces as well.[21] Among many other attacks, IS ambushed and killed a Syrian Arab Army brigadier general and 9 other soldiers on November 20, 2020, and carried out another ambush against a bus convoy that resulted in the deaths of over 39 regime troops on December 30, being the highest-profile IS attack of the year in Syria.[22] On April 8 2021, IS launched a raid against a police station in al-Saan, killing 11 people and kidnapping over 45.[23] In return, where IS originally controlled the Syrian oil fields, the area is now under the control of the SDF which benefitted from intensive training specialised in the protection of petroleum infrastructure and also benefits from the backing of the coalition, deterring IS from attacking the fields directly again.[24] Furthermore, between April 12 and 17, 2021, Russian and Bashar al Assad’s regime forces launched their own operation against IS, which involved 70 Russian airstrikes against the group’s bunkers and caves in the Hama-Aleppo-Al-Raqqah area, followed by ground forces aimed to launch combing operations in the nearby desert.[25]

The New Frontier: IS in Africa

Since the Islamic State’s territorial gains were almost entirely reversed in the Middle East, and with the group being forced into hiding, the organisation sought to expand in other areas to ensure its survivability and operability. Africa is a prime choice that fits these criteria, particularly the Sahel Region: a 3.05 million square kilometre region sprawling from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, between the Sahara Desert and the Sudanian Savanna, which has become a theatre for the fight against Islamic insurgents over the last years.[26] As the Sahel’s importance to IS in particular will be explored in the following paragraph, a note will be made on one of the group’s main local factions: Islamic State in West Africa Provence (ISWAP), and the population-centred tactics it uses near the Lake Chad region. 

The Sahel region includes parts of many states bordering the south of Northern Africa, most relevant for this article being Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger who together form the ‘G5 Sahel’: an organisation that aims to bring the states closer economically and security-wise as they combat insurgencies in the region.[27] The formation of this France-backed group comes as a response to increased attacks from Islamic insurgents operating in the region, where the number of attacks increases every year and reaches 4,161 since June 2020.[28] Since the Sahel region sees a yearly increase in attacks, this is a sign of frequent activity from local fighters as well, which are often formed not due to an extreme ideology of Islam, but rather due to the local grievances with the state government; something that both IS and Al-Qaeda exploit to their advantage. However, despite their similar approaches, they are by no means complementing each other’s efforts: reports of clashes between IS and Al-Qaeda groups in Africa have been reported in Mali and beyond.[29]

One way IS uses local insurgencies to its advantage is by creating loose ties with them, which would help promote recruitment and fundraising campaigns.[30] The symbiotic relationship crafted features the small group receiving international legitimacy by using IS’s brand, receiving more recruits and support, while IS reaffirms its global image of strength and also motivate affiliate branches to continue fighting.[31] An example of this is the 3-day siege on the city of Palma, Mozambique, where the local insurgency with loose ties to IS killed more than 55 persons and displaced tens of thousands of people.[32] Despite IS claiming the attack, it was a largely independent insurgent group that arose from local grievances which carried it but used the IS brand to gain international exposure and reinforce the image that IS still has power and reach in spite of its losses.[33] The Mozambique attack is a symptom of how the security situation in Africa is exploited by the IS, used to entrench its networks in Africa and also recreate strength for future counter-attacks there or in the Middle East by harnessing local insurgencies to their advantage with new recruits and more funds.

Another means through which IS establishes a foothold in Africa is by directly exploiting lacklustre socio-economic and military security situation in areas where the state cannot deliver. This is especially true with ISWAP, which was the new name given to Boko Haram by al-Baghdadi after the group’s allegiance in 2015. The initial leader Abubakar Shekau was soon replaced with Abu Musab al-Barnawi in 2016 over the excessive imposition of ‘takfir’ (accusation of apostasy) prompting the leader to break away from ISWAP under the original name: Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (JAS), but still having allegiance to IS’s leader.[34] A common tactic used by ISWAP is to distance themselves from the connections with JAS and even protect local civilians from their attacks. And while lacklustre socio-economic and security circumstances are exploited by the IS branch, human rights abuses done by state militaries and their proxy groups are also used to their advantage. For instance, the Islamic State of Greater Sahara (ISGS) operating in the Liptako-Gourma region similarly offers protection from the state-sponsored GATIA and GSA armed groups, which attack the Fulani ethnic community under the pretext of counterinsurgency, resulting in ISGS painting themselves as a pragmatic alternative to the untrusted state.[35] For the purposes of this section, however, the article will focus on ISWAP and how their distinctive approach to the population makes them not only a military threat but a political one too.

ISWAP, being the branch directly under IS rule, receives financial support and trainers from its core organisation.[36] It uses a suite of tactics focused on winning ‘hearts and minds’, portraying themselves as a better choice between counterinsurgency forces and JAS, the former having a long list of grave human rights abuses[37] while the latter being especially known for their brutality.[38] ISWAP also seeks to win over the population through various policies that make for an alternate form of governance, including offering protection from attackers, allowing local communities to operate economically in markets and engaging in agriculture while paying taxation to them.[39]Furthermore, ISWAP’s approach allows it to spread its ideology across local communities, and more importantly embed itself in the local life by controlling the education, marrying the women and trying to recruit marginalised youth by providing weapons, motorbikes and more.[40] The opportunity for local communities to pay taxes in exchange for being able to do business is a more acceptable outcome than being under the threat of the military or JAS, and their connections deepen with the group by treating Muslims comparatively better than other Boko Haram factions and even constructing basic infrastructure like wells, with this strategy paying dividends in recruitment and loyalty.[41] This results in communities eventually seeing ISWAP as a more tolerable alternative in a region where none have full control.[42]Naturally, ISWAP and ISGS both use violence to coerce the local population to abide by the group’s rules. Their embedding in the local life gives IS the opportunity to radicalise African communities, resulting in more fundraising, recruiting more people and eventually having communities resisting an eventual change from ISWAP’s control due to prolonged exposure to their influence. Moreover, the G5 Sahel’s armed forces and Niger’s, are exacerbating the situation with their own record of human right abuses, which involves extrajudicial killing or forceful disappearances of civilians in areas where IS and other insurgents operate.[43]

Conclusion

While IS turned to low-level insurgency attacks in the Middle East, it sees to expand its foothold in Africa by winning over communities through providing services to them and exploiting grievances. Despite losing all of its territories, the persistent nature of the attacks conducted by IS in Syria and Iraq, combined with the networking of insurgent groups in Africa, showcases that IS is not defeated and that their fighting power remains robust. The territorial perspective provides an insufficient vision on what would bring the end of IS, as the vectors of attack the organisation employs have gone beyond that of military nature, and into socio-economic ones. Branches such as ISWAP combine violence and coercion with the provision of services and business, where it is the state that should provide such instead. IS is placing local communities in a situation where the locals would prefer them over other alternatives such as JAS or state military, pushing them to support the Islamic State out of necessity or even choice if they are exposed enough to their ideals in so much as to be radicalised.

Recommendations for the international community

1. The approach towards counter-insurgency in the Sahel Region must complement the military aspect with providing support to the local communities, such as welfare, healthcare and other public services to pose as a valid alternative to that of the IS’s.

2. The G5 Sahel requires further support from regional and international actors to be able to combat the increasingly aggressive Islamic insurgencies in the region. Not only global awareness needs to be raised further to facilitate action, but the type of support offered must be inclusive to that of a military nature, but also economic as well, with regional actors being able to support more robust services to its citizens to minimise the opportunities for jihadists to exploit these grievances.

3. The international community must cooperate with the G5 Sahel members in tackling the root causes of mistrust between the governments and the citizens. Among other means, by ensuring that the state militaries are held accountable for their own actions and guaranteeing justice against human rights abuses by state-sponsored actors. These would be starting points to improve the willingness of the community to cooperate with the government against IS. 

4. Offering military training to Sahel states can help provide both the tools and the doctrine necessary to avoid the frequent occurrence of human right abuses, and make the state militaries more approachable and justify the trust from the local communities. This would help counteract IS’s push in offering protection from various insurgent forces, as the military would be able to provide that while also being able to build rapport.

5. Tackling arms trafficking routes from North Africa, such as from Libya,[44] or other regions can help combat the growing violence done by extremist insurgents by making it more difficult for them to acquire the necessary armament to carry out large scale attacks in the Sahel Region and beyond.

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Reuters, “Islamic State claims responsibility for Saturday’s attack at Iraq’s oilfield”, Reuters, 19 April 2021, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-saturdays-attack-iraqs-oilfield-2021-04-18/

Rose D., “Islamic State takes dozens of hostages in surprise Syria desert attack”, The Times, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/islamic-state-takes-dozens-of-hostages-in-surprise-syria-desert-attack-gvlq6cnpg

Sabbagh D., “RAF engaged in 10-day attack on Isis in Iraq this spring”, Guardian News, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/08/raf-engaged-in-10-day-attack-on-isis-in-iraq-this-spring

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[1] Department of Defence Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report To The United States Congress, October 1, 2020 – December 30, 2020”, Department of Defence, 5 February 2021, Available at: dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/2497908/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-inherent-resolve-quarterly-report-to-the-u/

[2] Department of Defence Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Quarterly Report to Congress October 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019”, Department of Defence, 3 February 2020, Available at: https://oig.usaid.gov/node/3751

[3] Ramsay S., “Mozambique insurgency: Unseen pictures show ‘carnage’ of Islamic State attack that killed dozens”, Sky News, 5 April 2021, Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/unseen-pictures-show-carnage-of-islamic-state-attack-that-killed-british-man-in-mozambique-12265947

[4] Hanna A, “ISIS Offensive Exploits Pandemic”, Wilson Centre, 8 June 2020, Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-offensive-exploits-pandemic

[5] Abdul-Zahra Q. et.al.,“IS extremists step up as Iraq, Syria, grapple with virus”, AP News, 3 May 2020, Available at:https://apnews.com/article/22cf69f5f7ab4a3268fd224107fadc61

[6] Cordesman A.H., “The Real World Capabilities of ISIS: The Threat Continues”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 9 September 2020, Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-world-capabilities-isis-threat-continues

[7] VOA News, “US-backed Fighters Launch Final Push to Defeat IS in Syria”, VOA News, 9 February 2019, Available at: https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/us-backed-fighters-launch-final-push-defeat-syria

[8] Vohra A., “‘Constant fear’: Iraq and Syria face ISIL resurgence”, Aljazeera News, 2 March 2021, Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/2/we-liv-in-constant-fear-iraq-and-syria-face-isil-resurgence

[9] DoD Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report Oct-Dec.2020”, Online

[10] Meyer C., “Terrorists Ramping Up Recruitment and Propaganda Efforts”, Asis International, 4 November 2020, Available at: https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2020/november/terrorists-ramp-up-recruitment-propaganda-efforts/

[11] Talley I., Faucon B., “Islamic State, Defeated U.S. Foe, Still Brims With Cash, Ambition”, Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2020, Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-defeated-u-s-foe-still-brims-with-cash-ambition-11600464409

[12] Liebermann O., “US eyes eventual Iraq exit as ISIS threat wanes”, CNN News, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/07/politics/us-iraq-exit-isis/index.html

[13] DoD Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report Oct-Dec.2020”, Online

[14] BBC News, “Iraq attack: Twin suicide bombings in central Baghdad kill 32”, BBC News, 21 January 2021, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/54a3ad8c-f65c-4759-9c16-8ca2a07427d1

[15] Reuters, “Car bomb blast kills four in Baghdad’s Sadr City – police”, Reuters, 15 April 2021, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/car-bomb-kills-four-baghdads-sadr-city-police-2021-04-15/

[16] Reuters, “Islamic State claims responsibility for Saturday’s attack at Iraq’s oilfield”, Reuters, 19 April 2021, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-saturdays-attack-iraqs-oilfield-2021-04-18/

[17] Sabbagh D., “RAF engaged in 10-day attack on Isis in Iraq this spring”, Guardian News, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/08/raf-engaged-in-10-day-attack-on-isis-in-iraq-this-spring

[18] Everstine B.W., “Coalition Aircraft, Iraqi Forces Continue Large Offensive Targeting ISIS”, Air Force Magazine, 24 March 2021, Available at: https://www.airforcemag.com/coalition-aircraft-iraqi-forces-continue-large-offensive-targeting-isis/

[19] Berthiaume L. “Canadian special forces supported major Iraqi military assault on ISIS last month”, CTV News, 11 April 2021, Available at: https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canadian-special-forces-supported-major-iraqi-military-assault-on-isis-last-month-1.5383073

[20] DoD Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report Oct-Dec.2020”, Online

[21] ibid.

[22] ibid., pages 54-55

[23] Rose D., “Islamic State takes dozens of hostages in surprise Syria desert attack”, The Times, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/islamic-state-takes-dozens-of-hostages-in-surprise-syria-desert-attack-gvlq6cnpg

[24] DoD Office of Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Lead Inspector General Report Oct-Dec.2020”, Online

[25] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Syrian desert | Over 70 airstrikes hit ISIS caves and bunkers in 24 hours”, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 18 April 2021, Available at: https://www.syriahr.com/en/214107/?fbclid=IwAR1NUV1nC_VsopEvl-m2ZWjjGhdYPlJNXVvkrD-kssHKglcLWTi9KiQFfIo

[26] Petesch C., Kabore A., “West African leaders meet on extremism in the region”, AP News, 14 September 2019, Available at: https://apnews.com/article/africa-mali-niger-west-africa-burkina-faso-4c33e26f4c324055aba6a26182540378

[27] Reuters, “African nations form G5 to work on Sahel security, development”, Reuters News, 16 February 2014, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-sahel-g-idUSBREA1F0P520140216

[28] Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, “African Militant Islamist Groups Set Record for Violent Activity”, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 21 July 2020, Available at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-militant-islamist-groups-new-record-violent-activity/

[29] Baldaro E., Diall S.Y., “The End of the Sahelian Exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in Central Mali”, The International Spectator, 55:4, p.69-83 (2020), Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833566

[30] Campbell J., “Islamic State and al-Qaeda Linked to African Insurgencies”, Council of Foreign Relations, 8 April 2021, Available at: https://www.cfr.org/blog/islamic-state-and-al-qaeda-linked-african-insurgencies

[31] Goldbaum C., Schmitt E., “In Bid to Boost Its Profile, ISIS Turns to Africa’s Militants”, New York Time, 7 April 2021, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/world/africa/ISIS-Africa-Mozambique.html

[32] Goldbaum C., “Insurgents Seize Mozambique Town, Killing Several People; Fate of Hundreds Unknown”, New York Times, 27 March 2021, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/27/world/africa/27mozambique-insurgents-attack.html

[33] Goldbaum C., “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Mozambique Attack”, New York Time, 30 March 2021, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/world/africa/isis-mozambique-attack.html

[34] Zenn J, Pieri Z, “How much Takfir is too much Takfir? The Evolution of Boko Haram’s Factionalization”, Journal for Deradicalization, Nr. 11, (2017), Available at: https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/107

[35] Raineri L., “Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara”, Terrorism and Political Violence, (2020), Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078

[36] Foucher V., “The Islamic State Franchises in Africa: Lessons from Lake Chad”, International Crisis Group, 29 October 2020, Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/islamic-state-franchises-africa-lessons-lake-chad

[37] Amnesty International, “Nigeria 2020”, Amnesty International, [31st December 2020], Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/

[38] Ewang A., “Gruesome Boko Haram Killings in Northeast Nigeria”, Human Rights Watch, 1 December 2020, Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/01/gruesome-boko-haram-killings-northeast-nigeria

[39] Berlingozzi L., Stoddard E., “Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice in Niger and Nigeria”, The International Spectator, 55:4 (2020), p.37-53,Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833472 

[40] ibid. p.42

[41] International Crisis Group, “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province”, International Crisis Group, 16 May 2019, Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province

[42] Berlingozzi, “Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice in Niger and Nigeria”, Online.

[43] Amnesty International, “Sahel: Soldiers rampage through villages killing people under guise of anti-terror operations”, Amnesty International, 10 June 2020, Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/sahel-soldiers-rampage-through-villages-killing-people/

[44] Dhaouadi R., “Social media and the sale of arms in Libya”, Enact Africa, 12 April 2019, Available at: https://enactafrica.org/research/trend-reports/social-media-and-the-sale-of-arms-in-libya

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Cosmin Timofte Cosmin Timofte. Graduate student of Politics and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University and International Security at University of Warwick. Former exchange student in the United States. Participant in an analytical project of the media narratives around Brexit in the United Kingdom and Romania. His main research interests are Middle Eastern armed conflicts, disinformation and intelligence.

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Cosmin Timofte Cosmin Timofte. Graduate student of Politics and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University and International Security at University of Warwick. Former exchange student in the United States. Participant in an analytical project of the media narratives around Brexit in the United Kingdom and Romania. His main research interests are Middle Eastern armed conflicts, disinformation and intelligence.
Program Europa tworzą:

Marcin Chruściel

Dyrektor programu. Absolwent studiów doktoranckich z zakresu nauk o polityce na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, magister stosunków międzynarodowych i europeistyki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prezes Zarządu Instytutu Nowej Europy.

dr Artur Bartoszewicz

Przewodniczący Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk ekonomicznych Szkoły Głównej Handlowej. Ekspert w dziedzinie polityki publicznej, w tym m. in. strategii państwa i gospodarki.

Michał Banasiak

Specjalizuje się w relacjach sportu i polityki. Autor analiz, komentarzy i wywiadów z zakresu dyplomacji sportowej i polityki międzynarodowej. Były dziennikarz Polsat News i wysłannik redakcji zagranicznej Telewizji Polskiej.

Maciej Pawłowski

Ekspert ds. migracji, gospodarki i polityki państw basenu Morza Śródziemnego. W latach 2018-2020 Analityk PISM ds. Południowej Europy. Autor publikacji w polskiej i zagranicznej prasie na temat Hiszpanii, Włoch, Grecji, Egiptu i państw Magrebu. Od września 2020 r. mieszka w północnej Afryce (Egipt, Algieria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Absolwent studiów prawniczych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach. Jego zainteresowania badawcze koncentrują się na Inicjatywie Trójmorza i polityce w Bułgarii. Doświadczenie zdobywał w European Foundation of Human Rights w Wilnie, Center for the Study of Democracy w Sofii i polskich placówkach dyplomatycznych w Teheranie i Tbilisi.

Program Bezpieczeństwo tworzą:

dr Aleksander Olech

Dyrektor programu. Wykładowca na Baltic Defence College, absolwent Europejskiej Akademii Dyplomacji oraz Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego główne zainteresowania badawcze to terroryzm, bezpieczeństwo w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz rola NATO i UE w środowisku zagrożeń hybrydowych.

dr Agnieszka Rogozińska

Członek Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk społecznych w dyscyplinie nauki o polityce. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje na problematyce bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego, instytucjonalnym wymiarze bezpieczeństwa i współczesnych zagrożeniach.

Aleksy Borówka

Doktorant na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Przewodniczący Krajowej Reprezentacji Doktorantów w kadencji 2020. Autor kilkunastu prac naukowych, poświęconych naukom o bezpieczeństwie, naukom o polityce i administracji oraz stosunkom międzynarodowym. Laureat I, II oraz III Międzynarodowej Olimpiady Geopolitycznej.

Karolina Siekierka

Absolwentka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe, specjalizacji Bezpieczeństwo i Studia Strategiczne. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną i wewnętrzną Francji, prawa człowieka oraz konflikty zbrojne.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Podoficer rezerwy, student studiów magisterskich na kierunku Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe i Dyplomacja na Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, były praktykant w BBN. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują m.in. operacje pokojowe ONZ oraz bezpieczeństwo Ukrainy.

Leon Pińczak

Student studiów drugiego stopnia na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe. Dziennikarz polskojęzycznej redakcji Biełsatu. Zawodowo zajmuje się obszarem postsowieckim, rosyjską polityką wewnętrzną i doktrynami FR. Biegle włada językiem rosyjskim.

Program Indo-Pacyfik tworzą:

Łukasz Kobierski

Dyrektor programu. Współzałożyciel INE oraz prezes zarządu w latach 2019-2021. Stypendysta szkoleń z zakresu bezpieczeństwa na Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security w Waszyngtonie, ekspert od stosunków międzynarodowych. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wiceprezes Zarządu INE.

dr Joanna Siekiera

Prawnik międzynarodowy, doktor nauk społecznych, adiunkt na Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu w Bergen w Norwegii. Była stypendystką rządu Nowej Zelandii na Uniwersytecie Victorii w Wellington, niemieckiego Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, a także francuskiego Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques.

Paweł Paszak

Absolwent stosunków międzynarodowych (spec. Wschodnioazjatycka) na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim oraz stypendysta University of Kent (W. Brytania) i Hainan University (ChRL). Doktorant UW i Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną ChRL oraz strategiczną rywalizację Chiny-USA.

Jakub Graca

Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Aleksy Borówka

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Wroclaw, the President of the Polish National Associations of PhD Candidates in 2020. The author of dozen of scientific papers, concerning security studies, political science, administration, international relations. Laureate of the I, II and III International Geopolitical Olympiad.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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  • Polish-Czech Forum 2023: Czech Foreign Policy. Interview with Šárka Shoup [Part 2]
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    by Julita Wilczek
    September 13, 2023
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