Introduction
It has now been seven days since the outbreak of open conflict between Iran and Israel, triggered by an initial Israeli airstrike that marked the beginning of a new and highly volatile chapter in their long-standing adversarial relationship. While this is not the first time tensions have flared, the scope, scale, and directness of current military engagement is unprecedented in recent decades.
The roots of the Iran–Israel relationship trace back to the pre-1979 era, when both countries maintained covert strategic ties. Their alignment was largely driven by shared alliances with Western powers, especially the United States, and a common interest in counterbalancing the rise of Pan-Arabism in the Middle East particularly in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.[1] This pragmatic cooperation reflected geopolitical necessity rather than ideological affinity.
However, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution[2], Iran’s regional posture underwent a profound transformation. The newly established Islamic Republic adopted an explicitly anti-Western and anti-Israeli foreign policy, framing Israel as a colonial outpost and illegitimate presence in the region. Over the decades, this ideological shift was reinforced by Iran’s support for non-state actors like Hezbollah[3] and Hamas[4], and by Israel’s efforts to counter Iranian influence across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Gaza.
Despite their deep hostility, the Iran–Israel conflict has historically remained within the bounds of indirect confrontation a pattern shaped by unique geopolitical and military constraints. The two countries are separated by over thousand kilometers, lacking a shared border, which significantly complicates direct military operations for both sides.
This geographical distance, combined with each state’s toolkits, has shaped the nature of their confrontation. Iran leverages a network of regional proxies[5] and missile program[6], while Israel relies on superior airpower, intelligence, and precision-strike capabilities.[7] These structural factors have not only prolonged the conflict but also transformed it into a multi-layered, transnational rivalry one that is now entering a more open and dangerous phase
Strategic Depth over Distance – Iran’s Regional Calculus
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s defense doctrine and regional strategy have undergone a profound transformation. Prior to the revolution, Iran under the Shah was a close ally of the West, particularly the United States, and played a critical role in containing the spread of communism in the Middle East during the Cold War. This alignment was reflected in Iran’s heavy investment in advanced Western-supplied arms.[8]
However, the post-revolutionary Islamic Republic inherited a very different strategic environment. Iran’s break with the West resulted in comprehensive arms sanctions, severely restricting its access to Western military equipment.[9] These limitations were further compounded by the eight-year Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)[10], during which Iran was forced to rely on a limited supply of weapons from Eastern bloc countries such as North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union.[11] Iran’s inability to modernize or replenish its aging air fleet, coupled with its heavy use of ballistic missiles during the so-called “War of the Cities”[12] pushed Iranian strategists to rethink the utility of conventional military reliance.
Out of both necessity and ideology, Iran began to shift its focus toward asymmetric warfare and expanding its regional influence through proxy forces. The rise of Islamic resistance movements in the region, many of which framed their mission around the liberation of Palestine, provided Tehran with a unique opportunity to project power indirectly. Support for groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories became central pillars of Iran’s anti-Israel strategy.[13]
Syria’s emergence as a critical ally in this effort due to it’s rivalry to Israel provided both a political alliance and a logistical corridor for Iranian arms transfers and military advisors.[14] This partnership allowed Iran to establish a physical and strategic foothold in the Levant, bypassing its core geographic disadvantage being located more than thousand kilometers away from Israeli territory.
Later developments further enhanced Tehran’s strategic depth. The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, followed by the rise of pro-Iranian political and militia forces, gave Iran an opportunity to extend its influence westward.[15] Tehran quickly capitalized on the power vacuum in Iraq, building land-based logistical routes often referred to as the “Shia Crescent”[16] that span Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen..
Through this growing network, Tehran cultivated a web of proxy and partner forces. These included Hezbollah in Lebanon, various Iraqi Shiite militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah[17] and the Badr Corps[18], Hamas, and the Assad government along with aligned paramilitary groups in Syria. Iran has supported these actors with financial aid, military training, ballistic and precision-guided weaponry, and intelligence. This layered strategy has allowed Iran to compensate for its conventional military weaknesses and establish a forward-deployed deterrent posture capable of threatening Israel’s borders from multiple fronts
Israel’s Strategic Doctrine
Unlike many of its regional adversaries, Israel faces acute geographical constraints. Its narrow territorial width just over 15 kilometers at its narrowest point leaves the country highly vulnerable to external attacks, particularly missile strikes. This lack of strategic depth has been a central concern of Israeli military planning since the state’s founding. In response to this vulnerability, Israel developed the concept of “artificial strategic depth”[19] a military doctrine that prioritizes preemptive action, early threat detection, and the ability to neutralize threats far beyond its borders. The goal of this strategy is straightforward but demanding: to eliminate or significantly degrade threats before they can reach Israeli territory.
At the core of Israel’s national security strategy lies Israel’s intelligence apparatus deliver real-time intelligence across the region. This capability enables Israel to monitor hostile actors, carry out targeted assassinations, and sabotage adversaries.[20] In parallel, Israel has built the operational capacity to project military force deep into the middle east. Through a combination of airstrikes and covert missions, it has consistently struck targets in Syria[21] and Lebanon.[22] These actions are designed to prevent the entrenchment of hostile military infrastructure near Israel’s borders, with a particular focus on thwarting Iranian influence and weapons proliferation in Syria and Lebanon.
Israel has consistently applied this doctrine in its confrontation with Iran and its allied proxy groups. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, Tehran’s expanding influence in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza represents not just an ideological rivalry but a tangible and growing security threat. To counter this, Israel has pursued a military approach known as the “campaign between wars”.[23]. This strategy involves ongoing, low-intensity operations primarily airstrikes and sabotage missions targeted at enemy assets and weapon transfers, with the aim of degrading enemy capabilities while avoiding full-scale war.
In summary, Israel’s strategy toward rivals shaped by its geographical vulnerability, a doctrine of preemption and forward defense, heavy reliance on advanced intelligence capabilities, and the strategic use of military force.
From Proxy to Open Confrontation
Post–October 7th[24] can be seen as a defining milestone in the decades-long confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv. While the two states had previously avoided direct military conflict, preferring to engage through regional proxies, covert operations, and limited strikes, the events following Hamas’s large-scale attack on Israeli civilians shattered the fragile equilibrium of this indirect war.
On October 7th, Hamas launched a surprise assault on Israeli territory, targeting civilian populations with barrages of rockets and armed incursions into border towns.[25] The scale and brutality of the attack shocked Israeli society and triggered an immediate and massive military response. Israel initiated a full-scale invasion of Gaza, with the stated aim of eliminating Hamas and dismantling its leadership. However, this conflict did not remain confined to Gaza. Within days, the violence spilled across Israel’s northern border, as Hezbollah, in a show of solidarity and strategic coordination, intensified its operations from southern Lebanon. In response, Israel expanded its military engagement and launched a ground offensive into Lebanese territory, attempting to push Hezbollah away from its northern towns and destroy cross-border infrastructure.
In following Israel’s efforts targeting Iran-related sites, its strike on Iran’s consulate in Damascus which resulted in the killing of several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders[26] triggered the direct confrontation between the two countries. In retaliation, Iran launched a large-scale ballistic missile and drone attack from its own territory into Israel on April, in an operation called Va’ade Sadegh 1 (“True Promise 1”).[27] This marked the first time Iran directly struck Israeli soil with missiles, escalating the conflict from proxy engagements to open state-to-state warfare. This marked a historic escalation in the long-simmering conflict, shifting it from shadow warfare and proxy battles to overt state-to-state confrontation. However, this escalation did not stop the conflict. Israel’s assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran[28] further intensified the direct confrontation, prompting Iran to retaliate with Va’ade Sadegh 2 (meaning “True Promise 2”)[29] a ballistic missile strike on Israel.
All in all, Regardless of the achievements of both sides in carrying out operations in each other’s territories, the escalation into direct, overt confrontation marked a major milestone in the Tehran–Tel Aviv conflict. This historic shift moved the conflict beyond shadow warfare and proxy battles into a dangerous phase of open military confrontation between both countries. This progression of events represented a decisive shift in the character of the conflict.
The Fall of Assad and the Cracking of the Surrounding Ring
The fall of Bashar al-Assad[30] can be recognized as a defining milestone in the trajectory of the Iran–Israel confrontation. For years, Syria had been a critical piece of Iran’s regional architecture, serving as both a strategic corridor and a forward operating ground for Iranian influence and operations against Israel. Assad’s government, aligned with Tehran in opposition to both Israel and Western influence, functioned as a central pillar in Iran’s efforts to maintain pressure on Tel Aviv through a web of alliances, proxies, and military infrastructure.
Iran invested heavily in Syria after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Through the deployment of IRGC Quds Force units, and by mobilizing thousands of fighters from allied militias. In return for this strategic support, Iran was granted broad operational freedom across Syrian territory. Tehran built military installations, drone bases, and weapons depots particularly in southern Syria establishing a persistent presence dangerously close to Israel’s borders. This allowed Iran to reinforce its strategy of multi-front pressure on Israel, with Syria serving as a bridge between Iran, Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
However, with Assad’s fall, that architecture has begun to collapse. The vacuum of power that followed his regime’s downfall opened the door for Israel to extend its strategic depth beyond its borders. Taking advantage of the disarray, Israel launched a series of strikes on hostile assets within Syria, targeting both Iranian-linked infrastructure and local militias aligned with Tehran. More significantly, Israel rapidly moved to establish air superiority over Syrian airspace[31], conducting operations with far fewer constraints and facing little organized resistance. This marked a dramatic shift in the strategic environment where once Syria had been a shield for Iran, it was now becoming a space dominated by Israel.
Compounding this shift was the emergence of a new Syrian government that, in a stark departure from Assad’s foreign policy, announced it does not view Israel as a hostile power.[32] Although such a position remains fragile and likely contested within segments of the Syrian military and population, its symbolic significance is substantial. It signals a clear rupture from the past decades of alignment with the so-called “Axis of Resistance”[33] and it isolates Tehran even further from direct access to Israel’s northern front.
In this context, the phrase “cracking the surrounding ring” takes on a double meaning. On one hand, Iran’s multi-front architecture carefully constructed over decades to encircle Israel with hostile actors has suffered a significant rupture. Without Syria, Iran’s logistical and military continuity to Hezbollah face difficulties, and the pressure on Israel’s northern and northeastern borders is reduced. Hence, the fall of Assad is therefore not merely a leadership change it is a geopolitical earthquake. It alters the balance of power in the Levant, shakes the foundations of Iran’s regional influence, and opens a dangerous and unpredictable chapter in the already volatile landscape between Tehran and Tel Aviv.
Direct Confrontation
2024: The Onset of Direct Conflict
Israeli strikes in 2024 could be seen as foundational steps leading to its current military posture. These actions followed a series of operations targeting Iranian assets and marked a clear escalation toward broader regional objectives. In the lead-up to the present Israeli campaign against Iran, Tel Aviv conducted Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)[34] operations targeting Iranian radar installations in western and central Iran. The operation specifically focused on long-range early warning radar systems and advanced S-300 air defense systems, particularly in Isfahan. By neutralizing these high-value early warning assets, Israel aimed to degrade Iran’s air defense capabilities, setting the stage for future direct military engagement.
In 2024, Israel’s direct strikes on Iran were specifically aimed at degrading Iran’s high-value air defense systems, particularly long-range over-the-horizon (OTH) radar installations near the country’s western borders. Among the key targets were Ghadir (meaning: Almighty) OTH radar systems[35], which play a critical role in Iran’s early warning and air surveillance network.[36] These phased-array radars, with a reported range of over 1,000 kilometers, are capable of detecting a wide range of aerial threats including aircraft, ballistic missiles, and low-observable (stealth) platforms approaching from the west. Positioned in strategically sensitive regions such as Khuzestan, the Ghadir radars provide Iran with critical early detection capabilities against potential threats from Israeli or U.S.-aligned forces. By targeting these systems, Israel aimed to disrupt Iran’s airspace monitoring and delay its defensive response.
2025: 13th June to Present
Israel began its campaign on June 13 under the codename Rising Lion, initially targeting Iran’s air defense systems through covert operations aimed at destroying or degrading these defenses to secure freedom of movement for subsequent air strikes.[37] Following these initial efforts, Israel focused on striking key missile bases in Kermanshah and Khorramabad, as well as several airbases including Tabriz and Hamedan, Several IRGC commanders, and nuclear program scientists.[38] Over the course of more than a week, Israel has gradually achieved relative air superiority over the western and central parts of Iranian airspace which enabled them to engage the Iranian launchers and other high-value assets.
Iraq’s Calculated Neutrality: Impact on the Iran–Israel Escalation
As tensions between Iran and Israel escalated into direct military confrontations, Iraq has taken a clear stance of neutrality, aiming to avoid entanglement in this volatile regional conflict. The Iraqi government, under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, has publicly declared that Iraq will not become a party to the ongoing hostilities between Tehran and Tel Aviv[39]. This approach by Baghdad, in addition to its exerted control over Iran-affiliated militias operating within its territory many of whom share ideological sympathies with Tehran[40] shows that its position is rooted in Iraq’s desire to safeguard its sovereignty and prevent further instability within its borders and prioritization of national stability over alignment with Iran.
However, while Iraq’s neutrality appears balanced on the surface, in practical terms, it benefits Israel strategically. Geopolitically, Iraq holds a significant advantage compared to Iran such as shorter distance when it comes to potential strike routes toward Israel such as shorter distance. Iraq’s location and military infrastructure could theoretically provide a shorter or more direct pathway for missile or drone. By maintaining neutrality and denying Iranian-backed militias the freedom to operate from its territory combined with Baghdad’s inability to control its airspace[41] and Israel’s air superiority Iraq’s approach effectively limits Iran’s operational capacity.
Conclusions:
The current condition of the Iran–Israel confrontation at the strategic level can be define as the result of the weakening of Iran’s regional proxy network, which once served as the foundation of its indirect strategy against Israel. This deterioration stems from several converging factors: the aftermath of Israel’s extensive military campaign following the events of October 7 severely diminished the capabilities of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah; and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria disrupted a critical axis of Iranian influence and supply lines in the Levant coupled with its limited enforcement capacity over Iran-affiliated militias, rendered it an unreliable platform for Iranian operations.
Together, these developments stripped Iran of its traditional buffer mechanisms, compelling Tehran to respond with direct state-led military actions. What was once a contained shadow conflict has now evolved into overt confrontation, underscoring the collapse of Iran’s proxy-based doctrine and ushering in a far more dangerous and unpredictable phase in the Iran–Israel conflict.
At the operational level, the Iran–Israel confrontation has escalated into a sustained exchange of advanced military capabilities, reflecting both nations’ evolving doctrines and preparedness. Iran has demonstrated remarkable resilience by relying on its domestically developed ballistic missile infrastructure, built over decades of strategic investment aimed at self-reliance. Despite losing multiple missile bases and launchers to Israeli airstrikes, Tehran has maintained the capacity to launch coordinated and sustained missile barrages, aided by dispersed launch sites. Meanwhile, Israel has executed a coordinated campaign targeting Iran’s missile infrastructure and nuclear facilities. Beginning with covert special forces operations to disable air defenses, Israel’s strikes have prioritized neutralizing Iran’s ballistic capabilities, aiming to reduce the threat to its population centers. However, the distance and Iran’s territorial extent poses logistical challenges for Israeli forces, requiring complex mission planning and aerial refueling for extended-range strikes. The unfolding military engagements between the two countries reflect a highly complex operational environment shaped by geography, technology, and military doctrines.
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[2] Mart Jonathan Robert, “The Iranian Revolution: A Case Study in Coercive Power Consolidation”, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994, 1-5. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA276580.pdf>
[3] Shaan Shaikh, Ian Williams, “Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2018. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/>
[4] Congressional Research Service, “Iran-Supported Groups in the Middle East and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 2024, 1-2. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/IF12587.pdf>
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[6] Mehran Atashjameh, “Passive Defense Measures in Saving Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal”, Marine Corps University, 2024, 2. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES%20Insights_Atashjameh_15_4.pdf>
[7] Doug Livermore, ” By fusing intelligence and special operations, Israel’s strikes on Iran are a lesson in strategic surprise”, Atlantic Council, 2025. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/by-fusing-intelligence-and-special-operations-israels-strikes-on-iran-are-a-lesson-in-strategic-surprise/>
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[11]Directorate of Intelligent, “Iran-Iraq: Buying Weapons for War”, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1984, 1. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00283R000500120005-5.pdf>
[12] Mehran Atashjameh, “Passive Defense Measures in Saving Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal”, Marine Corps University, 2024, 2. <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES%20Insights_Atashjameh_15_4.pdf>
[13] Seyed Ali Alavi, “Iran’s Relations with Palestine: Past, Present, Future”, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2021, 20-21. <https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Iran-Relations-with-Palestine-Past-Present-Future.pdf>
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[15] Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq”, Congressional Research Service, 2007, 3-7. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA472400.pdf>
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[17] Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Kataib Hezbollah”, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2018. <https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Katib_Hezbollah.pdf>
[18] Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, Hamdi Malik, “Profile: Badr Organization”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-badr-organization>
[19] Yoav Ben-Horin, Barry Posen, “Israel’s Strategic Doctrine”, RAND, 1981, 5. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R2845.pdf>
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<https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Memo_227_ShelahValensi_ENG.pdf>
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[25] Michel Wyss, “The October 7 Attack: An Assessment of the Intelligence Failures”, Combating Terrorism Center – West Point University, 2024. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-october-7-attack-an-assessment-of-the-intelligence-failings/>
[26] Reuters, “Iran Revolutionary Guards consultant dies from injuries in Israeli strike on Damascus”, Reuters, 2024. < https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-revolutionary-guards-consultant-dies-injuries-israeli-strike-damascus-2024-10-03/>
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[28] Victoria Kim, “What We Know About the Assassination of Ismail Haniyeh”, The New York Times, 2024. <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/30/world/middleeast/ismail-haniyeh-hamas-tehran.html>
[29] Anant Mishra, Christian Kaunert, ” Operation True Promise 2: Has Tehran Altered Its National Security Strategy?”, Eurasia Review, 2024. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/18102024-operation-true-promise-2-has-tehran-altered-its-national-security-strategy-analysis/>
[30] Andrew J. Tabler, “Why Al-Assad Fell”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2024. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/why-al-assad-fell>
[31] Mick Krever, “Israel strikes Syria 480 times and seizes territory as Netanyahu pledges to change the face of the Middle East”, CNN, 2024. < https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/10/middleeast/israel-syria-assad-strikes-intl>
[32] The Times of Israel, “Damascus governor says new Syrian regime wants peace: ‘Our problem is not with Israel”, The Times of Israel, 2024. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/damascus-governor-says-new-syrian-regime-wants-peace-our-problem-is-not-with-israel/>
[33] Guido Steinberg, “The “Axis of Resistance”, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2021, 5. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2021RP06_Axis_of_Resistance.pdf>
[34] Christopher Bolkcom, “Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): Assessing Future Needs”, Congressional Research Service, 2005, 1-3. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RS21141.pdf>
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[36] Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter, “Iran update”, Institute for Study of War, 2024. < https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024>
[37] Eleonora Vasques, “Israel’s Mossad mounted high-tech covert operation to strike targets deep inside Iran, sources say”, Euronews, 2025. <https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/13/israels-mossad-mounts-high-tech-covert-operation-to-strike-targets-deep-inside-iran-source>
[38] Visual Journalism Team, “Israel’s overnight strike on Iran in maps and images”, BBC, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crr7gdr82e0o>
[39] Fadhel al-Nashmi, “Iraqi Govt to Factions: We Are Not Concerned with Israeli-Iranian War”, Asharq Al Awsat, 2025. <https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5154501-iraqi-govt-factions-we-are-not-concerned-israeli-iranian-war>
[40] Hamdi Malik, Michael Knights, “Iraqi Militias Show Cohesion and Restraint During the Iran-Israel War”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2025. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-militias-show-cohesion-and-restraint-during-iran-israel-war>
[41] Seth J. Frantzman, “Iraqis increasingly concerned nobody protecting their skies amid Israel-Iran escalation”, The Jerusalem Post, 2005. <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-858029>
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