Iran’s revolutionary course

Iran finds itself in a difficult position—though some might argue it has been in one for quite some time. With the Middle East in turmoil, it is worth examining one of the region’s key players: its internal socio-political struggles, ongoing efforts to export the Islamic Revolution, and an economic crisis that has left Iranians facing unprecedented financial hardship.

Is change possible? What will be the consequences of the imminent succession of the current Supreme Leader? Could the balance of power shift?

In addition to analyzing Iran’s current socio-political landscape, this article will explore Bayat’s concept of “non-movement” as a framework for understanding Iran’s revolutionary trajectory. It will also consider the perspectives of several scholars who have weighed in on the potential for a new Iranian revolution, offering a range of viewpoints on the issue.

ECONOMIC CRISIS

On the 14^th of January, former president Biden concluded a segment of his foreign policy speech with the words: “Iran is at its weakest in decades” [1]. While the intent behind this statement was clear—to undermine the strength of a key rival—it still carries some truth.

On December 26, another former president, this time of Iran, Mohammad Khatami also voiced concerns about the country’s current situation. He went even further, suggesting that the fall of the Islamic Republic is no longer beyond the realm of possibility [2]. While such an outcome remains unlikely for now, if Iran fails to address the many long-standing issues it has been grappling with, talk of revolution may no longer be limited to those opposed to the regime.

One of the most pressing challenges is the country’s poor economic performance. While well-being cannot be measured solely in numbers, the figures paint a stark picture. Approximately 50% of Iranians now live below the poverty line, and the average monthly income hovers around 150 dollars [3]. According to the data published by Iran’s Central Bank, inflation stands at 37.3% [4]. The resonance of the latter statistic might be deemed positive in a sense. While this is the lowest rate in four years, some experts question the reliability of the official figures.

Any economic data released by the Iranian government must be examined carefully, given the unique national factors that shape the country’s economy. One of the key players are the bonyads – para-governmental bodies, which enjoy several benefits. Such as tax-exemptions, government funding and independence in decision-making [5].

All of this is possible because bonyads are designed to serve a specific purpose. First and foremost, they function as an ideological apparatus, institutionalizing the ruling class’s ideology. As a result, only key members of the Iranian elite—those with strong ties to the Supreme Leader—are permitted to control a bonyad.

Another factor that enables bonyads to operate without significant public resistance is their social role. Many bonyads function as foundations that claim to promote justice and equality for the underprivileged—such as the Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled [6]. By positioning themselves as charities, they have garnered some degree of popular support, allowing them to exist with minimal opposition. However, they should ultimately be viewed as private monopolies whose primary function is to serve as an indirect instrument of state control.

Another key stakeholder is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is a branch of the Iranian military, which holds tremendous influence over the economy. Some experts claim they control over 30 percent of Iranian economic sector [7]. Constitution describes the IRGC to be “guardians of the revolution”. In reality, it is far more than that. The group consists of an arms force and intelligence service and is in charge of the Iranian nuclear project. As for benefits, similarly to bonyads, IRGC is strongly favoured by the government. It receives many no-bid contracts and is allowed to shape the economic landscape of the whole country [8]. The staggering influence of IRGC has led many Iranians to redirect their criticism from the Supreme Leader to the IRGC, blaming the group for the deepening crisis [9].

POWER HOLDERS IN IRAN

Before moving towards another dimension of Iran’s crisis it is worth to understand who holds power. The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is undoubtedly the most powerful person in Iran at the moment. With the concept of velayat-e faqih behind him, he holds almost absolute power – “for it views itself as the sole legitimate body able to determine what is sacred and what is sin, what is authentic, what is fake, what is right, and what is wrong” [10].

Nonetheless, there are still limitations to his leadership. The second-most influential body in Iran is the IRGC. It does not only control the economy, it holds a significant amount of political power and influences the political reality, chiefly by its relationship to the Supreme Leader [11]. No decision is taken by the Supreme Leader without consulting IRGC. IRGC was established as a safeguard for Khamenei. He lacked a strong religious authority, therefore he sought an ally in the military. So, IRGC was created and Khamenei could take the title of the Supreme Leader, after Ayatollah Khomenei’s death.

Despite the ever-lasting cooperation, “IRGC should not be viewed as a monolithic organization with a completely unified leadership” [12]. The IRGC has not opposed the Supreme Leader in any major issue in the recent years yet that does not mean that it will remain loyal forever, nor that it always was. In 1989 many of the IRGC members expressed support for Montazeri – a reformist who was a rival to Khamenei [13]. Considering the diverse views inside the group and the rising tensions due to Iran’s multi layered crisis, it is not entirely impossible for the IRGC to question Khamenei’s current position.

There are of course more stakeholders in Iran, such as the Assembly of Experts, the Majles (Parliament) or the Guardian Council. None of them, however, at any point of their existence posed a real threat to the Supreme Leader. The structure of power in Iran is highly complex, and it is not the aim of this article to explain the occupation of each institution or the chain of supervision.

What seems very significant however, is the succession of the Supreme Leader, in which every institution will be involved, directly or not. Constitutionally, the Assembly of Experts is the body to determine who is going to be the next Supreme Leader. So far it has been very weak, served only as an affirmative body for Khamenei [14]. It is supervised by the Guardian Council, which consists of 12 judges who are appointed either by the Supreme Leader himself or by Chief Justice, who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader. As for the Majles, it exists as an advisory body; however, it holds authority to amend the constitution and alter qualifications of the next leader. With all that being said, it is fair to conclude that the process of succession might not go as swiftly as many would expect.

LEGITIMACY CRISIS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COURSE

The hardships Iranians have to endure, be it a growing economic crisis or limits on individual freedom, have intensified the discontent among the society. It finds its reflection in multiple protests that have emerged in Iran in the last few years. Probably the most important one was in 2022, after the death of Mahsa Amini. It was led by the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom”, however, as Bayat notes [15] it was far more inclusive, it was “a movement to reclaim life”.

Even though these protests now came to an end, they should be seen as a cornerstone or a point of transition for the Iranian society. For the first time in a while, protests were concerned with more than just one social group. A collective claim by diverse social groups was made. People of Iran unified in a struggle to create a better reality for every Iranian, without taking into consideration the social position.

Regardless of the huge impact, which the “Women, Life Freedom” movement had, it also reinforced the very same issues previous protests in Iran had struggled with. Firstly, as Goldstone [16] and Baram [17] argue, they lacked leadership. Movement cannot succeed without a clear leader to lead the protestors to change. On top of that, even if a power vacuum is created, there must exist a structured and organized entity to replace the abolished regime. This has not been achieved since 2009 and the Green Movement.

Another, and probably the key, issue is that the current establishment – despite all its struggles – was still able to easily overcome any protest that has happened till now. Both Baram and Goldstone believe that the only solution is the internal division among the current elites.

As Goldstone writes, “some shocking action” is needed for a real change to occur. As one possibility, he sees the disruption in the relationship between the IRGC and the clerical elite. On the other hand, Bayat highlights the power of non-movement – “the collective and connective actions of non-collective actors who pursue not a politics of protest but of redress, through direct actions. Its aim is not a deliberate defiance of authorities but to establish alternative norms and life-making practices” [18]. Hence, the essence of a non-movement is anti-systemic. It creates a completely new reality, uncomprehensible to those currently in power. It is the first step in the revolutionary course, and “only radical reform and meaningful improvement can disrupt a revolutionary course” [19].

Whether through change stimulated by disorder among the elites or by reorganization of the protestors, the situation in Iran is going to evolve. Iranian society has worked extensively to enter the revolutionary course, and it is not likely that it will back down now.

BIBLIOGRAPHY