On 22 and 23 March 2026, Italians will vote in a confirmatory constitutional referendum on a reform that redesigns the governance of the judiciary. The subject is technical, but the implications are institutional. Who manages careers and senior appointments. How discipline is enforced when misconduct is alleged. How independence is protected while public confidence is maintained.
The referendum follows the constitutional procedure for amendments approved by Parliament without the two thirds majorities that would have avoided a popular confirmation. In this kind of referendum there is no turnout quorum. A simple majority of valid votes decides.
What the reform changes
The text submitted to voters introduces three structural changes.
First, it strengthens the separation between the careers of judges and public prosecutors. Italy has traditionally placed both within the same professional order of magistrates, a model defended as a shield for independence. The reform moves toward a clearer institutional distinction. Supporters argue that neutrality is easier to guarantee, and easier to explain to citizens, when judging and prosecutorial careers are structurally separate. Opponents counter that prosecutors could become more exposed to political pressure over time, even if formal safeguards remain.
Second, it replaces today’s single High Council of the Judiciary, the CSM, with two councils, one for judges and one for prosecutors, each chaired by the President of the Republic. A central innovation is the selection method. Instead of competitive elections, many members would be chosen by sortition from eligible pools. The declared intention is to reduce the influence of organised internal groupings and negotiated slates, while keeping governance within a constitutional model of self administration rather than direct government control.
Third, it creates a new High Disciplinary Court and moves disciplinary adjudication away from the councils. The rationale is separation of functions. The bodies that manage careers and appointments would no longer be the same bodies that adjudicate disciplinary responsibility. The practical effects will depend on implementing legislation, but the constitutional direction is explicit.
The current system, the CSM, and the role of correnti
The Constitution assigns the CSM a central role in safeguarding judicial autonomy. It is chaired by the President of the Republic and includes senior High Court figures as members by right. The remaining members are selected through a mixed formula, with a majority coming from within the magistracy and a minority chosen by Parliament from senior legal academics and lawyers.
In practice, this representative model has long been shaped by organised currents, commonly referred to as correnti. They are not formal parties, but they do operate as structured Para political networks that endorse candidates and compete for influence, especially in elections and in the distribution of key posts. For many citizens this dimension remains abstract until a controversy reveals it. This is why the reform’s promise to reduce the weight of internal electoral competition has become politically salient.
What the Yes and No camps argue
Supporters of a Yes vote present the reform as a credibility and governance measure. They argue that separating careers clarifies roles in criminal justice and reinforces the perception of judicial impartiality. They also contend that sortition can reduce the leverage of correnti in appointments, and that a dedicated disciplinary court would make accountability more credible because it is institutionally separate from career management. Opponents respond that the current constitutional design, including the placement of prosecutors within the magistracy, is precisely what shields prosecutorial independence, and that separating careers risks weakening that shield in the longer term. They also question whether sortition improves governance, warning it can dilute expertise and accountability, and they stress that citizens experience justice primarily through speed and predictability, outcomes that constitutional redesign does not automatically deliver.
The referendum debate repeatedly returns to discipline, because accountability is where public trust is most fragile. Reform supporters often argue that the current framework escalates too rarely, and that this weakens the legitimacy of self governance. The most authoritative figures cited in this discussion come from the annual report of the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation. In its report on activity during 2025, the office notes that Courts of Appeal transmitted 14,929 decisions under the mechanism linked to excessive length of proceedings, yet only 2 of those transmissions led to the opening of pre-disciplinary proceedings. The same report indicates that, across pre-disciplinary matters in 2025, only 2.5 percent resulted in the opening of a formal disciplinary action, and that 76 disciplinary actions were initiated in total that year. Critics reply that low rates may reflect strict legal thresholds and the filtering of weak complaints. Still, the figures help explain why the reform frames discipline as a constitutional design problem rather than a purely managerial one.
Political stakes and consequences
Italian constitutional referendums can have political effects that extend beyond the legal text. The most significant precedent remains 4 December 2016, when Prime Minister Matteo Renzi personalised the referendum campaign, lost the vote, and resigned shortly after. The defeat produced an immediate government shock and accelerated wider political realignment.
The March 2026 referendum may still be interpreted as a signal about the country’s political climate, particularly given the visible tension between parts of the government and segments of the magistracy. Yet there is a notable difference in strategy. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and senior figures in her political camp have insisted that the referendum is a vote on a constitutional reform, not a plebiscite on the government. This choice reduces the likelihood of an immediate resignation style outcome, even if a defeat would still carry political costs and shape the next phase of the justice reform agenda.
Conclusion
The referendum is a choice between two approaches to protecting independence and restoring confidence. A No vote defends the existing constitutional balance and argues for improvements through ordinary reforms. A Yes vote aims to strengthen credibility through clearer separation of roles, reduced scope for internal factional gatekeeping, and a more visibly distinct disciplinary architecture. Whatever the result, Italy will still face the challenge of delivering faster and more predictable justice. The referendum cannot solve that alone, but it can determine the institutional framework within which the next chapter of reform will unfold.
References
- Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, constitutional law on the judicial order and the disciplinary court, 30 October 2025. (Gazzetta Ufficiale)
- Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, decree clarifying the referendum question, 7 February 2026. (Gazzetta Ufficiale)
- Ministero dell’Interno, institutional information page on the March 2026 confirmatory referendum. (interno.gov.it)
- Senato della Repubblica, Constitution of the Italian Republic, Article 104, composition and role of the CSM. (Prefettura)
- Reuters, reporting and explainer coverage on the March 2026 justice reform referendum and campaign arguments. (Reuters)
- Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, annual report on the administration of justice in 2025, published January 2026. (cortedicassazione.it)
- Sky TG24, interview and reporting on the government’s framing of the referendum as not a plebiscite. (Sky TG24)
- The Guardian, reporting on the 2016 constitutional referendum defeat and Matteo Renzi’s resignation. (The Guardian)
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