Authors: Maciej Pawłowski, Małgorzata Czarnik, Bartosz Mirowski
Key information:
- Libyans rarely migrate permanently abroad. They prefer to migrate seasonally to Tunisia when a front is approaching their town or for medical treatment or holidays.
- Libya is a transit country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.
- The agreement between Italy and Libya is an effective tool to reduce illegal migration. However, it’s implementation is connected with violations of migrants’ rights.
On August 19, 2024, the Algerian press reported on Gen. Khaftar’s impending offensive in south-western Libya. Its goal was to track down and eliminate Saif al-Islam Khadafi’s (son of the former Libyan dictator) troops hiding in the desert, then strike the capital Tripoli. The offensive has not yet taken place. Its implementation could lead to the temporary migration of Libyans to Tunisia and an increase in the flow of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan African countries to Italy and Malta. Indeed, Libya is the main transit country for citizens of these countries wishing to enter the EU. The government’s policy in Tripoli is to counter illegal migration to Italy, and it is one of the regime’s main sources of income for Gen. Khalifa Khaftar in eastern Libya. At the same time, under both centres of power, migrants are victims of violence.
Internal situation
Libya has not had a unified central authority since the fall of Muammar Khadafi’s regime. Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dubejba’s government in Tripoli controls approximately 25% of the territory. Gen. Khalifa Khaftar’s troops and their local allies occupy the rest of the country. Between 2014 and 2020, the two sides waged a civil war against each other, with parliaments from both parts of the country passing laws together and a single central government in place between 2020 and 2022. With the failure to hold nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections, two separate centres of power have again emerged. At the same time, the country has various tribal militias with fluctuating loyalties. Algerian media also suspect that in the Fezzan region in the southwest of the country, Khadafi Jr.’s troops are hiding in the desert areas.
The relationship between the government in Tripoli and Gen. Khaftar is complex. When there is mutual benefit, the state integrates itself. A single central bank manages the monetary policy for the entire country. Sadek Elkaber, who was de facto one of the most powerful people in the country, headed the central bank from 2011 until August 2024. However, the Presidential Council, the collective head of state that recognizes the government in Tripoli, dismissed him on August 18 this year. The unofficial reason for his dismissal was his alleged collaboration with Gen. Khaftar. Mohamed Shoukry is the man who succeeded Prime Minister Dubejba. The state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) sets the rules for the distribution of trade profits between the two centres of power. The Tripoli government nominates the NOC authorities, and Gen. Khaftar acquiesces to their decisions as long as they guarantee him a consistent income stream. However, both power centres do not want to hold nationwide parliamentary elections or form a joint government for fear of losing power and access to the hydrocarbon rent. Having their own military troops and foreign allies is the best way for them to maintain their current position. Türkiye, Italy, and Algeria primarily support the Tripoli government. General Khaftar’s troops receive financial support from France, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. China and Russia supply them with weapons. They also include Russian mercenaries. At the same time, however, there has been virtually no fighting between the armies of the two power centres since 2020.
Legal migration
Libyans have shown no mass interest in migrating, as the country’s living conditions meet their basic needs. Despite the dismantling of social benefits and subsidies (for electricity, gas, water, and food) and the increase in income inequality after the fall of the Gaddafi dictatorship, many Libyans continue to benefit from the profits of oil exports. They feel secure living in traditional communities and are reluctant to leave. Their strong connection to their homeland makes migration less appealing to them. They prefer seasonal migration. Some have homes in Tunisia, where they go for short periods of time to rest, heal, or take refuge from threats, but then overwhelmingly return to Libya. Seasonal migration to Egypt and Algeria is less frequent.
Existing visa regulations also influence the scale of migration to neighbouring countries. Libyans can enter Tunisia and Algeria legally for up to 90 days without a visa. Women, children, and men over 45 can stay in Egypt for up to 6 months without a visa. Men aged 18-45 must apply for a visa. Population movement is not a constant trend. Recent decades have seen repeated closures and openings of border crossings.
Some Libyans migrate to the EU. Between 2014 and 2023, a total of 127,813 Libyan citizens applied for a Schengen visa. Almost 80% of them received a positive response.
The start of the second civil war (2014–2020) prompted the submission of the largest number of visa applications. In 2015 and 2016, the number of applications was at a record low—the unstable situation in the country and difficult access to diplomatic missions most likely contributed to this. Between 2017 and 2019, a further 31,028 people applied (74.1% success rate). The situation changed in 2020, when, due to the pandemic, their number dropped by four times (from 11,254 in 2019 to 2,694 in 2020). Since 2021, the number of submitted visa applications among Libyans has steadily increased, driven by the re-opening of EU consulates in the country. Between 2021 and 2023, the number of applications submitted increased more than fivefold, from 4,700 to 24,500. In 2023, Libyans were most likely to apply for visas at the consulates of Italy (12,040), Malta (7,023), and Greece (5,160). In 2020, Turkey simplified visa procedures and allowed free entry for Libyan nationals for up to 90 days without the need to obtain a visa. It is estimated that in 2023, 200,000 Libyans visited Turkey for tourism purposes.
Illegal migration
Libya is a key transit country on the Central Mediterranean route. Due to its proximity to Europe, it serves as a migration route not only for Libyans but also for citizens of sub-Saharan African countries (e.g., Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Benin, Ghana, Kenya). The country borders Niger and Chad for about 1,400 km, covering desert areas. At the same time, smuggling of migrants has become the main livelihood for Gen. Khaftar’s troops.
Libya has signed a series of agreements with Italy since 2000 to combat irregular migration. The Italian migration crisis disrupted these agreements from 2013 to 2016. Cooperation has continued since 2017 under a Memorandum of Understanding between the Italian governments and the UN-recognized government in Tripoli. Already in its first year, the number of irregular EU border crossings on the Central Mediterranean route decreased to 20,000 from 181,000 in 2016. In February 2024, they signed the last agreement, which provides Libya with financial support and expects it to return vessels carrying migrants leaving its shores. A considerable deal of controversy has grown up around the agreement over violations of human rights and international law.
The Tripoli government established the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM). It de facto collaborates with migrant smugglers, whom it transfers to official and unofficial detention centers and extorts ransoms through physical and sexual violence. Additionally, it purchases access to food, clean water, and personal freedom through sexual services.
Migrants in Libya (including those seeking work there or passing through it on their way to Europe) are extremely vulnerable to sex and labour trafficking. 76% of men, 67% of women, and 77% of children and young people transiting through Libya have experienced exploitation and abuse.
International organisations estimate that, as of December 2023, there were at least 706,369 migrants and refugees from over 44 nationalities in Libya.
Conclusions and outlook
Libya has been a failed state since the overthrow of the Khadafi regime. Its chaos was the primary cause of Italy’s migration crisis in 2015-2016. The cooperation mechanism developed in 2017 between the governments in Tripoli and Rome allows for a significant reduction in irregular migration to the EU. However, it will cease to function if Gen. Khaftar undertakes an effective offensive in the western part of the country. A new migration crisis is then likely to erupt in Italy.
To prevent this, the EU must establish a shared stance on Libya and propose a solution that maintains equal access to the hydrocarbon trade profits within a single centre of state power. The EU should also build effective channels of communication with Gen. Khaftar, as it is likely that he will extend his power to the entire Libyan territory in the future. We should work out a mechanism with him to compel his subordinate services to counter illegal migration to the EU, similar to Italy’s cooperation with the government in Tripoli, before this happens.
Libya, with its oil and coal resources and small population (7 million), is a country that can provide jobs for millions of migrants from Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign direct investment in the hydrocarbon extraction sector, which will return to the country in 2021, could be beneficial. However, it is crucial to uphold the rights of migrants working in the area and prevent them from becoming de facto slaves to their employers. In order to achieve this, it is crucial that the EU institutions compel the Libyan authorities to relinquish control of the detention centres to the UN, and condition the delivery of development assistance on this demand.
Maciej Pawłowski’s book ‘Gateway to Europe’ will present more information on migration via Libya to the EU. Prześwity Publishing will release the book ‘Will North Africa Determine the Future of the Old Continent’ in 2025.
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