Małgorzata Czarnik, Bartosz Mirowski, Maciej Pawłowski
– Moroccans migrate mainly to France and Spain.
– Morocco is effectively fulfilling its obligations to prevent illegal migration in exchange for EU member states pursuing its interests.
– Morocco’s economic development may limit migration to the EU.
In October of this year, while visiting Rabat, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed a strategic partnership on illegal migration to King Mohammed VI of Morocco. In return, he supported the country’s sovereignty over Western Sahara territory. Macron’s actions are based on Spain’s experience. Spain supports Moroccan interests, and in return, Morocco’s border guards make it difficult for migrants to cross Spanish borders.
Causes of migration
Despite rapid economic development, Morocco is a country fraught with social problems. Between 2000 and 2023, its GDP grew by as much as 88.7% (about 3.7% per year), and the unemployment rate did not exceed 11%. However, despite its great fortunes and growing middle class, the country continues to face high levels of poverty. The social inequality rate is as high as 46%. Public education levels are low, forcing the middle class to spend heavily on private education for their children. Public health services have been in existence since 2022. The level of private education and health care is close to that of these services provided in EU countries with public funds.
Moral reasons also motivate migration to the EU. Moroccans face strict parental control, and the morality police patrol the streets. The morality police’s tasks include punishing individuals who display affection for each other in public places and preventing extramarital relations. Women are often subject to scrutiny by their brothers. The solution for those who do not accept such interference with privacy is immigration.
Legal migration
The main destinations for Moroccans’ legal migration are France and Spain. This is due to geographic proximity, historical ties, and close economic relations with the former colonisers. Between 2014 and 2023, Moroccans submitted 4.8 Schengen visa applications. France and Spain processed 85% (over 4.1 million) of them. Furthermore, the consulates of the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Germany received over 11% (over 560,000) of the applications. Germany and the Benelux countries are in demand due to their stable economies, demand for blue-collar workers, relatively open migration policies, and Moroccan diasporas present in these countries. The scale of migration peaked in 2017-2019, when nearly 2 million Moroccans applied for Schengen visas. At the same time, the level of visa refusals rose from 14.2% to 26% between 2014 and 2023.
Some Moroccans who have had their visa applications rejected or have a low chance of approval are engaging in visa extortion. This phenomenon mainly affects young people under the age of 30. Popular methods include using false certificates, falsifying documents and investment plans in Europe. Formally legal but ethically questionable ways include marrying for the sole purpose of gaining entry. This practice is particularly common among young Moroccan men and European women older than them, who often take advantage of the desperation of young men by promising to help them obtain visas. Illegal activities also make use of regulations governing university operations, including Polish ones. Moroccans declare their intention to start studying, but after obtaining a student visa, they do not show up at universities. Instead, they choose to take up illegal employment in Western Europe.
Middlemen complicate the process of obtaining a Schengen visa. Private agencies monopolise access to visa appointments at consulates, artificially limiting availability. In exchange for a fee (1,000–1500 euros), they offer to prepare the application and make a faster appointment at the consulate. However, they could still hold meetings much earlier if they didn’t block appointments. The activity of “agencies” is convenient for consulates, as it reduces the number of errors in visa applications. However, over time, using their services becomes almost the only option for obtaining a visa, as the challenge of scheduling an appointment at the consulate increases. This problem mainly occurs at consulates that offer relatively easy-to-obtain visas, such as Poland. Consulates attempt to counteract this practice by, for instance, establishing lists or queues for specific applicants who undergo pre-vetting.
Illegal migration
In the 1980s, Morocco became a transit country for migrants going to Spain illegally. In 1992, countries signed a Spanish-Moroccan migration agreement to curb this phenomenon. However, it did not enter into force until 20 years later. The agreement provides for the expulsion of people illegally crossing the Spanish border by sea from Moroccan territory. Between 2009 and 2024, nearly 40,000 Moroccan citizens illegally crossed the EU border. During the same period, more than 350,000 migrants from various countries reached the EU via Moroccan routes: the Western Mediterranean (233,500 migrants) and West African (to the Canary Islands, 128,100 migrants).
The 2006 canoe crisis preceded the migration agreement’s entry into force. It involved people from the Maghreb, mainly Morocco, trying to reach the coast of the Canary Islands illegally. Their journeys, which lasted about 3-7 days, took place in harsh conditions and a state of maya, during which some, believing they had already reached land, jumped out of the boat and drowned. Starvation and thirst-quenching seawater often caused bodily dysfunction, leading to delirious states. Additionally, boats frequently lost their GPS signal and went missing. This led to the loss of 244 boats between 2018 and 2022. Migrants pay about 700—800 euros for such transportation. In 2006, approximately 40,000 individuals arrived in Spain using this method, and this number increased to 60,000 in 2018. In 2021, the figure surpassed 20,000. In 2021, nearly 4,000 individuals lost their lives or got lost while travelling. 86% of the bodies remain undiscovered, decomposing at the sea’s bottom. Spanish exclaves in North Africa are particularly vulnerable to mass migration: Ceuta and Melilla. In response to migrant assaults, Moroccan authorities routinely block their borders.
Morocco is using migration blackmail when Spain implements measures contrary to its interests. When the Spanish government received the leader of the Polisario Front, which is fighting for the independence of Western Sahara, for treatment in the summer of 2021, Moroccan services halted the implementation of the migration deal. In addition, they helped migrants reach Ceuta and Melilla by pointing them to the least guarded points on the border. In a few days, more than 8,000 migrants arrived at the border of these exclaves, equivalent to 5% of their total population.
Until 2018, the topic of illegal migration from Morocco was not controversial in Spanish society. Only the Irish surpassed the two-thirds of Spanish citizens in Europe who expressed positive attitudes toward migrants as recently as 2018. However, since then, an anti-immigrant electorate has emerged, contributing to the rise of the right-wing Vox party, now the third largest force in the Spanish parliament from 2019. The issue of illegal migration is also contributing to the weakening of separatist tendencies in Catalonia. In 2024, for the first time ever, right-wing groups such as the Popular Party and Vox doubled their support. An anti-immigrant separatist party, the Catalan Alliance, also emerged. This is because traditional separatist voters consider limiting migration a more important issue than gaining independence.
A way to stop illegal migration is for the EU to support Morocco’s development. Between 2015 and 2023, the country received more than €3.5 billion in EU funds. Between 2018 and 2022, the country attracted foreign direct investment worth a total of €9.2 billion, mainly from France and Spain. It is anticipated that the newly created jobs will motivate migrants to remain in Morocco.
Conclusion
Morocco is a partner that is effectively countering illegal migration. Its dynamic development gives hope that in the future the country will transform from a transit destination to a destination for migration. Unlike many other non-European countries, the local elite invests more in EU support for Morocco than consumes it. Increasing it in exchange for countering illegal migration seems to be the right solution.
Given that moral issues are also contributing to emigration from Morocco, it is worth encouraging King Muhammad VI to continue reforms in this area. The upcoming 2030 FIFA World Cup, hosted by Morocco along with Spain and Portugal, may provide a beneficial opportunity to do so. The goal of the event is to build a positive image for the country. It is worth proposing that the occasion will witness the abolition of the morality police and the subtle promotion of a more liberal lifestyle in television series that are watched by the majority of the population, among other things.
Morocco is a demanding partner that knows how to lobby for its interests. Morocco has the ability to impose its demands through the use of migration blackmail. Therefore, the EU should develop alternative plans of action in case of an unbridgeable divergence of interests. Morocco has also not renounced its territorial claims to Algeria (Tindouf), Western Sahara, Mauritania, and Spain (Ceuta, Melilla). Therefore, excessive consideration of Moroccan interests may lead to deterioration of relations with its neighbours. Therefore, we should consider enhancing the EU’s cooperation with Mauritania to prevent migratory movements before they reach Moroccan territory.
Maciej Pawłowski’s book “Gateway to Europe. Will North Africa Decide the Future of the Old Continent?” will present more information on migration through Morocco to the EU and will be published by Prześwity Publishing House in 2025.
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