Israel–Lebanon Relations: Status as of December 2025
Beirut, December 1–31
Since October 2024, a ceasefire has been in effect between Israel and Lebanon. One of the key conditions for its maintenance is the commitment of the government in Beirut to disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025. Despite numerous incidents violating the agreement, a clear decrease in the intensity of Israeli operations on Lebanese territory was recorded in December. The death toll fell to thirteen – the lowest recorded since the ceasefire came into effect.
Hope for de-escalation is brought by direct talks between representatives of Israel and Lebanon – the first in over four decades. These discussions focused primarily on security arrangements along the border but also touched on potential areas of economic cooperation, including infrastructure and energy-related issues. The Lebanese side emphasized that participation in dialogue should not be interpreted as normalization, reflecting both domestic political constraints and long-standing regional sensitivities.
At the beginning of January, the command of the Lebanese army announced it was taking responsibility for security in the area up to the Litani River and the completion of the first stage of the disarmament process. Israel described these actions as insufficient. According to Israeli authorities, Hezbollah continues the process of rearming, and the fundamental obligations of Lebanon resulting from the ceasefire have not been fully implemented. This makes the risk of a renewed escalation of the conflict remain real.
Perspectives for extending demilitarization to areas reaching the Awali River are unclear, mainly due to the growing resistance of Hezbollah. The organization explicitly opposes the total laying down of arms on the remaining territory of Lebanon, arguing that attempts to impose such a solution would lead to the destabilization of the state and violent internal clashes.
Attack on American Soldiers in Syria
Palmyra, December 13
On December 13, 2025, in the Palmyra region of central Syria, an attack occurred on a patrol of American and Syrian forces conducting counter-terrorism operations against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). As a result of the attack, two American soldiers and a civilian translator were killed, and several other members of the patrol were injured. The attacker was immediately neutralized by Syrian security forces.
According to information from the Syrian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the perpetrator of the attack was an officer of the local security forces. He had previously been identified as a person with extremist views, and the decision to dismiss or remove him from service was to be made on December 14, 2025. This incident leads to a disturbing conclusion: the Islamic State is still capable of infiltrating Syrian state structures. It emphasizes the seriousness of internal threats that can flow from individuals formally associated with the security apparatus.
In response to the attacks, the Pentagon announced decisive military actions. The United States announced the start of a retaliatory operation code-named “Operation Hawkeye Strike,” aimed at the remnants of ISIS structures in Syria. The airstrikes covered, among others, training facilities, weapons warehouses, and command points. The goal of the operation was to weaken the terrorist organization and prevent further strikes.
The Palmyra incident shows that the conflict in Syria is still ongoing, and the threat from terrorist organizations has not been completely eliminated. This event also highlights the risks associated with the presence of foreign troops and the destabilizing influence of radicalization within state structures.
Operation Hawkeye Strike: U.S. Air Force airmen loading munitions onto an F-15E aircraft (DoD, 2026).
Counter-terrorism Operation in Turkey: Neutralization of ISIS Cells
Istanbul, December 25
On Thursday, December 25, Turkish security services conducted a large-scale counter-terrorism operation targeting individuals suspected of links to the so-called Islamic State (IS). The action was the result of many weeks of operational work and led to the arrest of over 130 people, of whom 115 suspects were detained on charges of direct terrorist activity. The arrests took place simultaneously in several provinces of the country, primarily in Istanbul, which for years has remained one of the main targets of extremist groups.
As informed by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Istanbul, the detainees are suspected of planning a series of attacks during the Christmas and upcoming New Year period. According to investigators’ findings, the attacks were to be directed against public places, such as shopping malls, places of religious worship, and areas with high tourist traffic.
The threat from the Islamic State (IS) to Turkey is best illustrated by the dramatic attacks that have shaken the country over the last decade:
- October 10, 2015: Suicide bombers linked to IS attacked a peace rally in front of the main railway station in Ankara. At least 102 people were killed, and over 400 were injured. It was the bloodiest terrorist attack in Turkey’s history.
- January 1, 2017: In the heart of Istanbul, an armed attacker assaulted the Reina nightclub during New Year’s Eve celebrations, killing 39 people.
In the years 2015–2017, IS also carried out attacks at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul and in the cities of Suruç and Diyarbakır. Although the Islamic State lost territorial control in Syria and Iraq, it did not mean the end of the threat. The organization’s structures have dispersed, but its “sleeper cells” continue to function, planning attacks both in the Middle East and beyond the region.
Wave of Anti-government Protests in Iran
Tehran, December 28, 2025
December 28, 2025 – A wave of anti-government protests began in Iran, being another episode of social unrest in the country in recent years. The demonstrations were initiated by deteriorating economic conditions: the Iranian rial recorded its lowest level of 2025 against the dollar, and the 62% tax increases planned by President Masoud Pezeshkian, combined with over 40% inflation, led to a rapid worsening of the citizens’ material situation. Initially, the protests were economic, local, and peaceful, focusing on Tehran. However, within just three days, the movement covered at least nine provinces, including strategic urban and academic centers in Alborz, Isfahan, and Kermanshah. In the following days, the protests escalated in terms of both the number of participants and geographical reach. In many cities, demonstrators raised not only economic issues but also expressed their dissatisfaction with the current authorities: anti-regime slogans appeared, including “Death to the dictator” and open support for the Pahlavi dynasty. The radicalization of slogans undermines the official narrative of the authorities, who tried to present the protests solely as a reaction to the difficult economic situation. Information about the injured and fatalities is still coming in, the numbers of which are difficult to verify for now. Demonstrations in key cities and provinces — including Tehran, Isfahan, Alborz, Kermanshah, and Fasa — do not cease despite the growing spiral of violence, which testifies to the growing crisis of government legitimacy and deep social dissatisfaction.
Value of the Iranian Rial to One US Dollar over the year (ISW, 2025).
Crisis in the Persian Gulf: UAE Withdraws Forces from Yemen after Escalation of Tensions with Saudi Arabia
Abu Dhabi, December 30, 2025
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced the withdrawal of its remaining counter-terrorism units from Yemen (after the de facto end of the UAE military presence in 2019). This decision is a consequence of the growing crisis in relations with Saudi Arabia and was made after Riyadh supported the demand of Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the Saudi-backed Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, who gave the Emirati forces 24 hours to leave the country. The direct cause of the rapid deterioration of relations was an airstrike by the coalition led by Saudi Arabia on the port of Mukalla in southern Yemen. The target of the attack was a transport that – according to Saudi sources – contained weapons and ammunition intended for the separatists from the Southern Transitional Council (STC).
The coalition reported that the strike occurred after the arrival at the port of two ships from the Emirati port of Fujairah, which did not have the required authorization. The Saudi news agency published a recording of the vessel “Greenland,” which allegedly carried weapons for the STC. The conflict highlights a deep rift within the coalition, which since 2015 has been conducting military operations against the Houthi movement. While Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized government of Yemen, the UAE provides political and military support to the separatists from the STC. Rashad al-Alimi, of the Presidential Leadership Council, publicly accused the UAE of exerting pressure on the STC and directing its actions in order to undermine the authority of the state through military escalation. In turn, the leader of the STC, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, rejected Alimi’s orders, claiming that they had not been agreed upon through consensus, and emphasized that the UAE remains a key partner in the fight. In response to the incident in the port of Mukalla, Al-Alimi announced the introduction of a no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade of all border crossings for a period of 72 hours.
Tensions between the two largest powers of the Persian Gulf have consequences extending beyond the borders of Yemen: both states are key players in the OPEC+ agreement. Analysts warn that the deepening conflict may make it difficult to reach a consensus on oil production levels. Information about the crisis has already contributed to declines in the main stock indices in the Gulf region. Although the voluntary withdrawal of forces by the UAE may temporarily ease tensions, the future of cooperation between the two monarchies in Yemen – as well as continued support from Abu Dhabi for southern separatists – remains uncertain.




























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