Poland, with the high-intensity war behind its border, rising tensions between major powers, economic malaise in Europe and incoming second Trump administration, faces now the highest level of strategic risks and unpredictability since the end of the Cold War. In the near future, Poland’s defense policy is going to strive for the best possible outcome of the war in Ukraine, to ensure the long-term security of this state, and to further enhancement of NATO eastern flank. At the same time, it will have to take into account a number of factors, such as uncertain course of US policy, significant constrains imposed by US current and prospective military overstretch, relative military weakness and political fragmentation of Europe, as well as the serious risk of another economic crisis.
Navigation though these uncharted waters will demand combination of perseverance and flexibility, high diplomatic skills, and investment in its own strength. One of the changes forced by new circumstances is going to be a higher priority given to outcomes, and smaller to processes and institutions. This stems from the fact that commonality of national interests and position, similar threat perception and ensuing willingness to act is often more important (means more) than large but latent aggregated material resources.
Since the early 1990s, Poland’s security and defense policy has been built around four pillars – membership in NATO, close security relationship with the United States, membership in the EU and European security cooperation, and national defense efforts. The relative importance of these pillars, however, has been highly unequal and varied over time. Today, this four-pillar structure is to remain, but the significance and content of individual pillars will likely change substantially.
NATO
The current NATO strategy of deterrence and defense of its eastern flank by rests on small western forces deployed in the frontline states, some US prepositioned assets, and the readiness of the US and western European NATO members to quickly send reinforcements in case of crisis or conflict, preferably before the start of hostilities. The strategy has its merits. Most importantly, it contributes to the Alliance’s internal political cohesion and solidarity, increased readiness of armed forces and improvement of military mobility. However, because of its downsides and limits, it should be considered just as a part of the solution rather than a comprehensive answer.
The biggest problem with this strategy is that it is more a product of political compromise within the Alliance rather than a tailored response to nature and scale of the threat[1]. More specifically, it doesn’t meet military requirements of most stressing scenarios in the East, such as a fait accompli against a Baltic state. NATO simply will not be able to send reinforcement quickly enough to prevent or blunt a sudden Russian invasion, and this is precisely the reason why Moscow can select this form of aggression [2].
The biggest challenge that NATO faces on its eastern flank is a deficit of high-quality military forces that are already in place or can be quickly deploy to the area. This problem is most acute in the case of the Baltic states, as they are small and geographically exposed. While the efforts to provide each of these countries with permanent or quickly deployable brigade-size NATO contingent are in progress, further steps and solutions are needed. Poland, as a centrally located middle power with growing military capabilities, including soon expanding and modernized heavy land forces, is positioned to play a key role in addressing the challenge.
US–Poland partnership
Poland began to seek closed political and security ties with the United States just after regaining independence in 1990, and by the early 21st century transformed itself from a member of hostile Warsaw Pact to one of Washington’s most valued and trusted allies.[3] For Warsaw, the US has been above all consider as an “indispensable ally”, the only state that can reliably provide Poland with deterrence and defense against major hard security threats. Warsaw aligned with US positions on practically all major issues that appeared on transatlantic security agenda, including those, such as missile defense, intervention in Iraq or European defense autonomy, that were the subject of substantial divisions within NATO. This consistent truck record has been the result of the commonality of interests and similar strategic cultures, as well as Poland’s desire to preserve and further strengthen bilateral ties with Washington has also played a role. The first years of the George W. Bush administration was a period in which the relationship probably reached its apex, but, though this honeymoon could not have last forever, the ties essentially remained very good and close[4]. Poland hosts ballistic missile defense unit in Redzikowo, the V Corp forward headquarters element in Poznań, US Army Prepositioned Stock (APS) in Powidz, to name just the main US military facilities on the Polish soil. In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the number of American troops deployed on the Polish soil has increased to over ten thousand.
Today, however, while the bilateral ties remain important, this fruitful US-Poland relationship must be seen in the context of profound shifts in global balance of power and ensuing US prioritization of Asia. It is possible to argue that in the light of growing tensions with an axis of authoritarian powers the value of transatlantic alliance has even raised in comparison with the previous era. But the US approach to Europe under the Trump administration is yet to take shape. While US involvement in deterrence and defense of Europe is still needed, it is less certain, and is going to diminish in the future. According to one often mentioned scenario, Washington will tend to concentrate American contribution to NATO collective defense in selected areas, such as nuclear deterrence, advanced long-range kinetic systems, ISR and other essential enablers, leaving the task of deploying the bulk of combat and support forces to the Europeans[5]. But even this smaller engagement is uncertain.
Another important risk, that Warsaw must factor in, is that Washington will seek closer ties only with selected NATO and EU member states and undermine in this way European unity. Such a development would harm the effectiveness of deterrence and defense of NATO eastern flank, since the frontline states are engaged in close defense cooperation with the EU and European states alike (i.e. Lithuania and Germany).
European defense cooperation
Poland has always considered its membership in the EU as a factor that increases its security, but, as hard security matters are concern, it has treated the exclusively European efforts in this field with skepticism. And for good reasons. While the idea (promoted under various labels) that Europe would undertake collective, integrated efforts to build more robust defense capabilities and diminish its security dependence on the US sound sensible, it has not brough any tangible effects so far. The main obstacles have been divergent threat perceptions and scarcity of resources earmarked on defense. There are some recent signs, however, that these two obstacles are being overcome. But, even if this time the outcome will be different, it will not materialize any time soon. Thus, most likely Warsaw will treat the European defense cooperation as both a supplement to the wider, transatlantic framework, and, more importantly, as a back-up option in case of the rapture of US-European alliance.
Poland’s defense build-up
Largely in response to the changing international environment, Poland has embarked on a robust military build-up that started roughly at the beginning of the 2020s. As former Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński said, Poland must be prepared to resist an armed invasion for many weeks largely on her own, before allied support comes in greater strength[6]. While the government has changed since then, this position remains in place. Moreover, many Polish experts believe that Poland must hedge against a scenario, in which allied support for some reason is minuscule or not available at all. Finally, the strengthening of armed forces is perceived as a tool to boost Poland’s standing in NATO and other fora, and in this way have a greater say on matters that affect Poland’s interests.
The outcomes of increased defense efforts are already visible in such area as defense spending, equipment modernization and force expansion. In 2025, Poland is going to spend 4,7 percent of GDP on defense. By the mid-2030s, Poland should posses large armed forces of above 200.000 active personnel, equipped with modern weapon systems. This allows Poland, apart from defending its own territory, be able to bring greater contribution to NATO collective defense and to be a more valuable US defense partner.
Conclusions
Poland’s key security objectives, such as an independent and secure Ukraine or viable regional deterrence and defense framework against Russia’s threat, can best be achieved through joint transatlantic efforts underpinned by NATO. Warsaw is mindful, however, that it security policy choices will be to large extent shaped by the decisions taken by others. Probably the most consequential will be US policy towards Europe, adopted by the upcoming Trump administration. While hoping for the best, Poland has to be prepared for other scenarios.
[1] Eva Hagström Frisell (ed.), Robert Dalsjö, Jakob Gustafsson, John Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement: The Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO’s Evolving Defence Strategy, FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency, November 2019, 49
[2] R.D. Hooker Jr (2020), Major Theatre War: Russia Attacks the Baltic States, The RUSI Journal, 165:7, 85-94, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2021.1895548 ; Eva Hagström Frisell (ed.), Robert Dalsjö, Jakob Gustafsson, John Rydqvist, Deterrence by Reinforcement: The Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO’s Evolving Defence Strategy, 47-50
[3] David H. Dunn (2002), America’s New Model Ally, Defense Studies 2:2, 63-86 https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430208405026 ; Marcin Zaborowski and Kerry Longhurst (2003), ‘America’s protégé in the east? The emergence of Poland as a regional leader’, International Affairs 79:5, 1009-1026, https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-2346.2003.00351.x
[4] Alexander Lanoszka (2020) ‘Poland in a time of geopolitical flux’, Contemporary Politics, 26:4, 458-474, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777042
[5] J. P. Clark and C. Anthony Pfaff, Striking the balance: US Army Force Posture in Europe, 2028, U.S. Army War College Press, June 2020
[6] Large and modern armed forces: main features of the Homeland Defense Act [Duże i nowoczesne siły zbrojne czyli założenia ustawy o obronie ojczyzny], Defence24, October 26, 2021, https://defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/duze-i-nowoczesne-sily-zbrojne-czyli-zalozenia-ustawy-o-obronie-ojczyzny
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