Poland-Romania-Türkiye Trilateral Format as a Bridge Between NATO’s Eastern and Southern Flanks

Author: Uğur Can Özkan

Content Supervision: Jędrzej Błaszczak

Introduction

The trilateral format between Poland, Romania, and Türkiye has evolved since the early 2010s into a key framework aimed at strengthening regional security and connectivity between NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. Institutionalized at the foreign ministers’ level since 2016, the format has gained strategic prominence in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It now serves as a vital platform linking three states whose geographical positions and military capacities are crucial for the Alliance’s defense posture and for the stability of the wider Black Sea region (Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).

This paper argues that the trilateral format’s strategic significance lies not in achieving alignment among like-minded allies, but in its ability to manage and reconcile fundamental strategic divergences within NATO.

While Poland and Romania perceive Russia as a direct, even existential, threat requiring hard deterrence and deepened transatlantic coordination, Türkiye adopts a balancing approach that combines deterrence with selective cooperation and dialogue with Moscow. The trilateral mechanism therefore functions as a “strategic shock absorber” within NATO, mitigating the potential rupture between the hawkish eastern flank and the more flexible southern flank (Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023). By examining this dynamic, the paper situates the trilateral format as both a geopolitical stabilizer and a laboratory for pragmatic cooperation across divergent strategic cultures. Through this lens, it also assesses how concrete defense and infrastructure projects, such as the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Black Sea Task Group and the Three Seas Initiative’s north-south connectivity corridors, translate political dialogue into tangible regional resilience.

Despite the differences in their geopolitical orientations and security priorities, Poland, Romania, and Türkiye share a unique strategic complementarity that links NATO’s eastern and southern flanks. The rationale behind their cooperation lies not only in their geographical proximity but also in their mutual interest in balancing deterrence and dialogue within the Alliance (Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023; Rusanda, 2025). Yet, as the regional and institutional dynamics evolved after 2022, managing these strategic divergences became a more critical challenge than merely identifying common threats. This analytical perspective sets the ground for understanding how the trilateral format functions as a platform for aligning diverse national agendas under shared NATO objectives.

Table: Chronology of the Poland-Romania-Türkiye Trilateral Format

(Sources: Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023; Rusanda, 2025; TVP World, 2025; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022)

Managing Strategic Divergence with Core Analytical Frame

The Poland-Romania-Türkiye trilateral format derives its unique strategic relevance from the way it brings together states with fundamentally different threat perceptions and strategic cultures. Unlike other NATO coordination platforms such as the Bucharest Nine, which primarily unites like-minded allies of the eastern flank, this trilateral mechanism operates across a line of divergence within the Alliance. Its value lies not in generating consensus, but in enabling structured dialogue and practical cooperation between partners that approach Russia, regional security, and alliance commitments from distinct perspectives.

Poland and Romania as the Hard-Deterrence Axis

For both Poland and Romania, Russia represents the central—and for Warsaw, existential—security challenge shaping their national strategies. Historical experiences of domination and geopolitical vulnerability have translated into an uncompromising stance that defines Moscow as the primary adversary. Consequently, both countries advocate for robust deterrence, deepened defense integration with the United States, and the permanent presence of NATO forces on their territories.

Warsaw’s leadership in initiatives such as the Bucharest Nine and its role as a principal logistics hub for military support to Ukraine demonstrate its commitment to maintaining a strong transatlantic alignment. Similarly, Bucharest’s emphasis on NATO’s forward defense posture and its growing military cooperation with the United States underline its determination to secure the Black Sea as an integral part of the Alliance’s eastern defense line. From their perspective, the trilateral framework offers an avenue to embed these security priorities in a broader regional structure, ensuring coherence between the Baltic and Black Sea theaters (Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023).

Türkiye as the Balancing and Autonomous Actor

Türkiye approaches the trilateral format from a markedly different strategic rationale. While a committed NATO member, Ankara pursues a policy of strategic autonomy that combines deterrence with selective engagement toward Russia (Rusanda, 2025). Rather than embracing an outright confrontational posture, Türkiye seeks to preserve channels of communication and economic interdependence with Moscow, particularly in the energy and trade sectors, while simultaneously contributing to NATO’s defense efforts in the Black Sea.

This “balancing act,” or what some analysts call a policy of “cooperative rivalry,” is designed to safeguard Türkiye’s regional influence and to prevent the Black Sea from becoming an arena of direct confrontation (Isachenko, 2023). The Montreux Convention grants Ankara significant leverage over the passage of naval forces, and its measured application of this regime during the Russia-Ukraine war reflects its preference for maintaining equilibrium. Within the trilateral framework, Türkiye uses its diplomatic flexibility to mediate between hardline deterrence advocates and those favoring strategic caution, thereby ensuring that cooperation remains functional despite underlying divergences (Wódka, 2023).

The Trilateral Mechanism as a NATO Shock Absorber

By bridging these opposing strategic logics, the trilateral format functions as a NATO shock absorber, a mechanism that mitigates internal frictions between the hawkish eastern flank and the balancing southern flank. Its core contribution lies not in harmonizing positions on Russia, but in maintaining operational coordination and preventing strategic rupture within the Alliance. In this respect, the Poland-Romania-Türkiye triangle represents a critical experiment in managing intra-alliance diversity, offering a flexible framework through which divergent security doctrines can coexist, interact, and produce practical outcomes in defense, infrastructure, and regional stability (Rusanda, 2025; Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023).

Concrete Dimensions of Cooperation

The Poland-Romania-Türkiye trilateral format is not merely a diplomatic dialogue platform; its strategic value is most evident in the tangible projects that translate political coordination into operational outcomes. These concrete dimensions reveal how the format reconciles divergent threat perceptions while strengthening NATO’s regional posture (Tringham, 2024; Chudziak & Oleksy, 2023).

Military Cooperation as a Strategic Compromise

A prime example of pragmatic military cooperation is the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Black Sea Task Group, launched in January 2024. This initiative addresses Romania and Bulgaria’s urgent need for maritime security while respecting Türkiye’s insistence on regional ownership and adherence to the Montreux Convention, which restricts the presence of non-littoral NATO forces (Tringham, 2024; Isachenko, 2023). The task group demonstrates how the trilateral format enables countries with differing strategic approaches to coordinate operationally: Poland and Romania prioritize immediate hard-security objectives, whereas Türkiye ensures that actions remain aligned with broader regional stability considerations. The MCM Task Group thus exemplifies the format’s ability to convert diplomatic dialogue into concrete security outcomes while balancing competing national interests.

Infrastructure as Security: The 3SI-NATO Nexus

Beyond military operations, trilateral cooperation extends into critical infrastructure development within the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) framework. These projects serve dual purposes: supporting economic connectivity and enhancing NATO’s strategic mobility. Two key examples illustrate this nexus:

1. Via Carpatia: This north-south highway corridor connects Lithuania to Greece, creating a crucial land route for the rapid deployment of NATO forces along the eastern flank. Its development under the trilateral cooperation framework highlights the intersection of economic and defense objectives (Opriș-Sîrca, 2024).
2. Rail-2-Sea: Linking the Polish port of Gdańsk with Romania’s Constanța, this railway provides an alternative corridor for military transport between the Baltic and Black Seas. Rail-2-Sea demonstrates how infrastructural projects can reinforce NATO’s operational resilience while advancing regional integration goals (Luka, 2024).

By emphasizing these dual-use initiatives, the trilateral format is shown to operate at the intersection of diplomacy, military readiness, and infrastructure planning. It transforms abstract policy discussions into actionable, region-shaping projects, thereby solidifying the platform’s strategic significance within NATO’s broader defense architecture.

Policy Recommendations

To enhance the strategic effectiveness and resilience of the Poland-Romania-Türkiye trilateral format, the following policy measures are recommended:

• Institutionalize Expert Working Groups: Establishing permanent working groups focused on specific challenges would ensure continuity and operational follow-up beyond high-level meetings. Priority areas could include the security of undersea infrastructure, such as pipelines and data cables, leveraging Poland’s regional expertise and Türkiye’s strategic position in the Black Sea (Amadio Viceré & Sus, 2025).
• Integrate 3SI Projects with NATO Planning: Poland, as a leading architect of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), should advocate for the strategic alignment of key infrastructure projects with NATO objectives. Initiatives such as Via Carpatia and Rail-2-Sea not only enhance regional connectivity but also serve as critical dual-use corridors for military mobility along the eastern and southern flanks (Grochmalski et al., 2021).
• Expand Trilateral Defense-Industrial Cooperation: Joint development and procurement initiatives can strengthen interoperability, create economic interdependencies, and bolster NATO’s industrial base. Areas for collaboration could include unmanned systems, maritime platforms, and ammunition production, building on previous successful acquisitions such as Bayraktar drones and armored vehicles.
• Formalize a Parliamentary Dimension: Creating an inter-parliamentary assembly would broaden political support, secure cross-party engagement, and enhance the long-term institutional resilience of the trilateral mechanism. This democratic layer would also help insulate the initiative from shifts in national governments or political priorities.

To strengthen the strategic effectiveness and resilience of the Poland-Romania-Türkiye trilateral format, targeted measures should focus on institutional continuity, operational coordination, and the integration of regional infrastructure with NATO objectives. Key steps include establishing permanent expert working groups to oversee security-sensitive areas such as undersea infrastructure; aligning critical Three Seas Initiative projects like Via Carpatia and Rail-2-Sea with NATO planning to enhance dual-use military mobility; expanding trilateral defense-industrial cooperation to boost interoperability and industrial capacity; and formalizing a parliamentary dimension to secure long-term political support and resilience across changing national administrations. Together, these initiatives would reinforce the trilateral format’s role as a practical and strategic mechanism for managing divergent approaches, sustaining regional stability, and enhancing NATO’s east-south integration.

Bibliography

• Amadio Viceré, M. G., & Sus, M. (2025). Organizing European security through informal groups: insights from the European Union’s response to the Russian war in Ukraine. Int Polit. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-024-00657-7
• Chudziak, M., & Oleksy, P. (2023). Does the trilogue have a future? Romania and Turkey as partners for Poland’s foreign policy (Prace IEŚ, No. 5/2024). Lublin: Institute of Central Europe. https://ies.lublin.pl/en/working-papers/does-the-trilogue-have-a-future-romania-and-turkey-as-partners-for-polands-foreign-policy/
• Grochmalski, P., et al. (2021). Three Seas Project (3SI) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Security Dimension. European Research Studies Journal, 24(1), 1230-1239.
• Inayeh, A., Ünlühisarcıklı, Ö., & Baranowski, M. (n.d.). Avoiding the East-South divide ahead of the NATO Summit. German Marshall Fund of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/avoiding-east-south-divide-ahead-nato-summit
• Isachenko, D. (2023, Ekim). Turkey in the Black Sea Region: Ankara’s reactions to the war in Ukraine against the background of regional dynamics and global confrontation (SWP Research Paper 12). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023RP12/
• Juri, L. (2024). The Three Seas Initiative: Regional cooperation or a military project for New Europe? Dela, 87-106. https://www.google.com/search?q=https://doi.org/10.4312/dela.62.87-106
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland. (2020, April 28). Teleconference of the heads of diplomacy of Poland, Romania and Turkey held in Warsaw. Gov.pl. https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/teleconference-of-the-heads-of-diplomacy-of-poland-romania-and-turkey-held-in-warsaw
• Opriș-Sîrca, P. T. (2024). The Via Carpatia Project and the Integration Perspectives of the Timişoara-Arad-Oradea Development Axis. Social Sciences and Education Research Review, 11(1), 268-277. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.15258185
• Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022). Participation of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in the Poland-Romania-Turkey Trilateral Meeting of Foreign Ministers (27 May 2022). https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-turkiye-romanya-polonya-disisleri-bakanlari-uclu-toplantisi-na-katilimi–27-mayis-2022.en.mfa
• Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Türkiye’s connectivity and multilateral transportation policy. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-multilateral-transportation-policy.en.mfa
• Rusanda, D. E. (2025). Limited Strategic Cooperation between Romania and Türkiye in the Black Sea Region: Historical Ties and Diverging Interests. Kırklareli Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 14(2), 204-217. https://doi.org/10.53306/klujfeas.1749372
• Tringham, K. (2024, July 3). MCM Black Sea Task Group starts operations. Janes. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/sea/mcm-black-sea-task-group-starts-operations
• TVP World / Sikorski, R. (2025). Remarks on the Poland-Romania-Turkey Trilateral Format. https://tvpworld.com/78965337/poland-romania-and-turkey-align-on-nato-security-spending
• Wódka, J. (2023). Turkey’s mediatory endeavours: Facilitating dialogue in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 21(1), 155-169. https://doi.org/10.36874/RIESW.2023.1.10