The importance of possessing autonomous space capabilities was underscored by a later quarrel between Elon Musk and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The world’s richest man highlighted that the Ukrainian front could collapse immediately if he decided to shut off Kyiv’s access to Starlink. Since Poland finances internet access for Ukraine, Minister Sikorski remarked, “If SpaceX proves to be an unreliable provider, we will be forced to look for another supplier”. In a non-diplomatic fashion, Musk responded, and U.S. Senator Marco Rubio followed with his own statement, dismissing the concerns raised by the Polish diplomat[1].
Indeed, Starlink – satellite constellation used for providing internet access, has significantly enhanced the capabilities of the Ukrainian army[2]. By providing internet connectivity to both military and civilian personnel, it supports drone navigation, data transmission, artillery fire control, and more. All of these functions were crucial for preserving Ukrainian independence in the early days of the war. This is evident from statements made by Russian officials, who condemned Musk’s decision[3]. The Ukrainian system of communication and data transfer relies on the goodwill of the SpaceX CEO, making Kyiv dependent on an external actor for capabilities that are critical to the war effort. The use of Starlink in the Russo-Ukrainian War has demonstrated the strategic importance of space for military operations, and importance of relying on one autonomous capabilities.
Space Militarisation
Using space as an environment to conduct military operations is referred to as the militarization of space[4]. Outer space was first used for war effort with the development of ICBMs, followed by the creation of defence systems to counter them[5]. Since then, space weaponry has become increasingly sophisticated. Currently, technologies such as non-chemical lasers, electromagnetic railguns, high-altitude nuclear detonations, and uranium rods dropped from orbit are being researched as potential weapons to be deployed from Earth’s orbit[6]. These are considered weapons of the future, while the development of anti-satellite weaponry is a more immediate and pressing concern[7]. Such capabilities are used in offensive operations aimed at denying an adversary the use of space-based assets, thereby reducing the effectiveness of their forces across all military domains. Satellites, as well as the ground infrastructure and communication signals used to control them, are prime targets in these operations[8].
This is an active way of using the outer space environment for military purposes—costly and requiring the most advanced technologies. A more suitable approach, aligned with Poland’s needs and capabilities, is the passive use of orbit, where gathering information is most important aspect[9]. War in space is characterized by the use of orbit for data gathering, which in turn benefits all other domains of the battlefield. Through satellite usage, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are being enhanced. Gaining situation awareness capabilities is a goal that a state should aspire to reach if it seeks to establish its presence beyond the sky[10], since the collected data is crucial in decision-making processes. During open conflict side of the war that is able to utilize information more quickly and adequately holds an advantage over its opponent[11]. This highlights the crucial role of space in the modern battlefield as a source of reliable information.
Satellites are the primary tools used for gathering this type of data. Their daily operations are often dedicated to civilian purposes only. However, the tasks performed by satellites—such as Earth observation, navigation, and communication—align closely with the military’s reconnaissance needs in the event of war, making them crucial to the war effort[12]. This characteristic leads them to be considered dual-use technology, as they provide significant utility for the military [13]. Satellites are necessary for ‘’C4ISR capabilities and leveraging the power of traditional operational effectors […] they are the foundation for any military communications and information systems”[14]. In fact, 95% of satellite technology is considered dual-use[15]. Because of its close ties to national security, it is regarded as sensitive technology, and achieving greater proficiency in its use offers a strategic advantage over competitors[16]. The means of launching satellites into space are also considered dual-use, as they impact missile production capabilities[17].
All things consider it seems that in order to enhance army space capabilities careful cooperation of the state, and the private sector is crucial for gaining desired outcome[18]. The growing importance of the commercial space industry is directly proportional to the decreasing costs associated with launching objects into orbit, which are being reduced thanks to technological advancements[19]. Such an environment promotes market competitiveness and shifts the responsibility for creating innovative solutions from the state to the free market, which deviates from the Cold War-era dominance of the state in controlling the space industry and its accessibility[20]. Since that is the case Poland should invest in its domestic private sector rather than create space capabilities through state dictum. It is that through a means of development of private sector desired abilities can be gained thanks to creating domestic know how in creating dual-use space technology[21].
In December of 2019, NATO officially announced that space joined land, sea, air and cyberspace as separate fifth domain of warfare[22].
Being set in a unique environment, it is a battlefield of sui generis, with its own characteristic and effect on other domains[23]. It can be divided into three distinct segments: outer space itself, terrestrial infrastructure required to operate assets beyond the sky, and the electromagnetic spectrum that connects these two dimensions. To avoid being left behind in the global race to integrate space capabilities into military operations, Poland must establish its presence in space. Given its size and resources, Poland should focus on developing autonomous ISR and communication capabilities, with the long-term goal of launching satellites into orbit. This requires the development of domestic satellite manufacturing industry and suitable rocket technologies. Such efforts should be considered imperative, as these systems are essential for modern warfare and effective decision-making[24]. Achieving autonomy in this domain will enable Poland’s military to operate independently, without relying on third parties who might restrict access to critical space-based assets. These goals can be accomplished by developing a domestic space industry, which tends to be more innovative than the state sector and produces technologies with dual-use potential, thus suiting army needs.
Status Quo
The year 2012 marks a turning point that begins the period of autonomous space capabilities development, which will later prove to be crucial for meeting the current needs of the Polish state[25]. It was a year in which Poland joined European Space Agency (ESA) that marked a beginning of the modern domestic space industry. First document that established this national ambition was Ministry of Economy’s Program for the Development of Space Technologies. Polish firms established after the fall of the communist regime were unable to compete with foreign companies due to their lack of presence in the European Space Agency, which serves both as a platform for competing for space contracts and as a networking hub. The way ESA operates is straightforward: each member state receives contracts for its space program roughly equal in value to the contributions it makes to the agency with additional benefit of using its resources and support. In 2008, every euro contributed to ESA has generated approximately €4.5 in additional income, making the primary motivation for joining the Agency financial[26].
However, the Ministry’s program also highlighted the strategic importance of the space sector in advancing national interests through the technologies it produces. At the time, the main challenge was the lack of a coherent government strategy for further development of the sector[27]. As a result, the Polish Space Agency (POLSA) was established two years later – in 2014. Its initial responsibilities included coordinating public-sector efforts to develop and utilize key space capabilities across various fields, as well as monitoring and supporting the domestic space industry[28]. Later on – in 2017 document titled Polish Space Strategy (PSS) was issued by the Council of Ministers. Which further concretised Poland ambitions in space building on the rapid development of the sector that followed its accession to ESA. Main goals established were to obtain Earth Observation capabilities, support of domestic space enterprises, expansion of the upstream sector, increased contributions to ESA, workforce development, creation of demand for space data within public administration[29], all of which has its use for the army as well due to its dual-use nature. POLSA was subsequently strengthened by being granted a new status[30].
In 2021, the National Space Program (NSP) document was introduced, further reaffirming Poland’s ambitions in space. It was the first to concretely outline what kinds of ISR tools should be developed and integrated into the state’s infrastructure[31]. However, the document has no legal binding power, as it was not officially signed, leaving Poland effectively reliant on the 2017 definitions.
The Polish space industry sector—defined as the production and services involved in launching and operating objects in space—consists of approximately 300–400 enterprises and institutions, employing around 12,000 people[32].
Its development follows the global trend of increasing accessibility to space, where private companies are now overtaking state-controlled initiatives, unlike during the Cold War era[33]. Currently, the miniaturization of satellites enables the creation of satellite constellations, which are deployed in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)[34]. This offers the advantages of reduced costs and improved efficiency in Earth observation efforts. The businesses competing for ESA contracts are primarily small and medium-sized enterprises. Poland specializes in developing and maintaining software for space systems and terrestrial operation stations[35].
However, the industry also encompasses satellite manufacturing capabilities and a rudimentary space launch program. The year 2024 was significant for the further development of the domestic space sector, as “Eagle Eye” was successfully launched into space and began operations. It was the first satellite designed and built entirely in Poland for national needs[36]. Creotech was responsible for this achievement and appears to be the leading player in the space manufacturing market, having secured several lucrative and prestigious contracts with both the Polish government and the European Space Agency. In the near future, it is expected to provide the Polish Army with autonomous ISR capabilities through satellite technology, as well as deliver Poland’s first telecommunications satellite for civilian purposes[37]. Creotech works in collaboration with various domestic companies and institutions, but it currently seems to be the most prominent among them. As of the first quarter of 2025, the company is expected to have the capacity to produce between 10 and 20 satellites per year, making it a prime example of a rapidly developing market[38]. Poland is also an active participant in the international space sector, being a member of the Artemis Accords, ESA, EUSST, and ISS, UNOOSA[39], and having signed a cooperation agreement with USSPACECOM[40], among others.
Poland’s launch capabilities are currently under development. So far, only one rocket—“Bursztyn,” developed by the state-run Łukasiewicz Institute—has surpassed the Kármán line[41]. It will be followed this year by the launch of “Perun,” created by the private company SpaceForest[42]. Both entities have plans to develop autonomous satellite launch capabilities into LEO[43] [44]. However, both projects still have a long way to go before reaching the velocities required to achieve this goal, meaning Poland remains reliant on other actors for orbital access. Nonetheless, due to advancements in technology, achieving LEO may be sufficient for the Polish military’s current ISR needs and could become feasible in the near future. LEO is the easiest orbital region to access in terms of power consumption, making launches more cost-effective[45]. Satellites in LEO can provide capabilities comparable to those in higher orbits, and surpass them in accessibility for delay-sensitive communications[46]. These capabilities often rely on small satellites—sometimes as small as a Rubik’s Cube. LEO is also a prime location for missile detection sensors. However, due to the fast orbital movement of satellites in this region, many are needed to ensure continuous Earth observation, necessitating the creation of satellite constellations. Thanks to their small size, many of these satellites can be launched together in a single mission. They are cheap, easy in exploitation, hard to destroy. These characteristics make LEO a critical domain for the future of modern warfare, and the easiest to access and operate within for Polish Army[47] [48]
Problems
Despite many successes, Poland is facing problems that must be resolved as soon as possible in order to enable the further development of the space industry. As part of the Polish Space Strategy, a second, executive document – the National Space Programme – was to be issued. Its goal was to “build a system of optimal advisory, financial, and educational support tools for the space sector and for institutions implementing and supporting Polish space policy”[49]. It was supposed to be published by the end of 2020 by POLSA; however, the submitted document did not meet the intended requirements, as it failed to specify the sources and methods of financing the PSS, as well as the implementation timeline[50].
Despite the involvement of the Ministry of National Defence, the Ministers of Education and Science, the Minister of Digital Affairs, POLSA, and the private sector in the development of the document, the problems that initially led to the rejection of the NSP were not resolved over a working period of 3.5 years. The reasons included ineffective cooperation between the minister and POLSA and the absence of a representative from the Ministry of Finance in the working group addressing the issue. As a result, the NSP proposal was never submitted for consideration by the Council of Ministers. This has led to a lack of diagnosis of promising branches within the Polish space sector, as well as difficulties in the implementation of ESA contracts by Polish entities[51].
Furthermore, the draft Act on the National Register of Space Objects (NRSP), which was also part of the PSS, was never enacted. This not only results in bureaucratic chaos in terms of registering Polish objects in space, but also portrays Poland as an unserious actor on the stage of international relations. Although work on it has been ongoing since 2017, the act has not been implemented, which hinders POLSA ability to register space objects placed in orbit by Polish entities. The lack of a unified system has created issues for private entities, delaying their operations – a consequence of the failure to adopt the NSP. In turn space industry is being developed without coherent state’s involvement which hurts governmental as well as public sector[52].
In 2024, POLSA evaluated the implementation of the Polish Space Strategy, summarizing the projects intended for establishment and forecasting their development through 2030. While most aspects appear to be progressing adequately, some key projects are lagging behind — particularly the introduction of the NSP advancements in rocket technology, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises. The likelihood of failing to achieve the agenda in these areas by 2030 is assessed as high — the highest level on the provided scale[53].
POLSA’s optimism, shown in rating the risk of not introducing the NSP by 2030 as merely “probable,” appears to be unfounded. Nearly a decade has passed without meaningful progress, and almost a year after the Supreme Audit Office’s report was issued, no concrete steps have been taken. This criticism was echoed in a recent report by the Polish Space Professionals Association, which challenged POLSA’s overly positive outlook[54].
The rocket sector, in particular, is being held back by the absence of the NSP. The state has yet to define a policy that would support the development of this high-risk, high-reward technology — mainly due to the lack of a dedicated financial support mechanism.
Until the NSP is implemented, a de minimis aid program should be established. Another significant issue is the lack of military testing grounds adapted to the specific needs of rocket development. Given the current gap in the European market — particularly the absence of microlauncher technologies designed for launching microsatellites[55] — Poland has an opportunity to fill this niche. With relatively low costs, a developing national launch program, and a need to establish an independent launch system for this exact purpose, Poland could build the capability to deploy various microsatellite constellations. Since this technology has dual-use potential, it should be a strategic priority for the Polish Armed Forces[56].
Recommendations
Introduce National Space Program.
First and foremost, the highest priority is to introduce NSP, the significance of which is difficult to overstate. Its absence stifles the potential of domestic production on multiple levels. In terms of Polish Army interest NSP is crucial for establishing a framework for manufacture satellites support, and create funding system for the domestic rocket sector. In the meantime, de minimis aid should be in place to support ongoing progress of rocket production.
- Maintain funding for ESA optional programs.
To further support funding it is imperative to maintain participation in the ESA optional programmes (150%–200% of the mandatory contribution), as this goal is emphasized by all stakeholders reporting on the Polish space industry[57] [58] [59] [60] . Even thou that reached in this year, its realisation is five years overdue, which could create a threat that it was a once time decision only. - Create a microsatellite constellation for ISR purposes with support from the domestic market.
It is in the Polish Army’s interest for the state to support the development enterprises involved in satellite manufacturing and system operations. Army’s endeavour should focus on acquiring the microsatellites suitable for creating constellations by domestic market, which will enhance ISR capabilities.
- Maintain strong cooperation between the Army and the private sector.
In terms of the Polish Army policy itself, it should maintain its current course, as its cooperation with the private satellite manufacturing sector has proven to be fruitful and beneficial for both parties involved[61]. Thanks to this collaboration, Poland will soon establish the basis of its ISR system[62], which should continue to develop further. The next task is to provide support for the advancement of rocket technology. - Achieve domestic launch capabilities through microlauncher technology and providing a testing site.
Poland’s long-term goal should be to establish autonomous launch capabilities. This could be achieved through the development of microlaunchers, which are well-suited for transporting microsatellites and enabling constellation deployment. Additionally, microlaunchers represent a gap in the European market that Polish entities could fill, offering both strategic and financial benefits. The Army should be responsible for providing a suitable testing range which currently is lacking, as rocket technology will also be used for missile system development as well.
Conclusions
Ultimately, the main issue facing the Polish space sector remains unchanged since the 2012 report, when Poland joined the European Space Agency. The state has consistently failed to fulfil its responsibilities of creating coherent policy toward its domestic space industry support, and has not kept pace with the rapid development of the private sector. This systemic failure negatively affects the entire space ecosystem and shifts the burden of achieving PSS objectives onto individual public institutions — such as the Ministry of Defence and Industrial Development Agency — in an uncoordinated, improvised manner. The absence of a coherent vision for central government involvement in space policy, coupled with the difficulty of cross-sector collaboration between state institutions, remains the cornerstone of the multiple problems. This continues to hinder the development of an industry that is not only high-potential, lucrative, and prestigious but also essential for national defence.
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[52] Ibidem, pp. 20–21.
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