In May this year, world media wrote a lot about the tour of the president of the United States Donald Trump to the Arabian Peninsula and contracts signed by American leader and rulers of Gulf monarchies. Most observers, however, had ignored the wider context of this trip. This article analyses evolution of US-GCC relations over the last decade and the reasons for decisions made during President Trump’s first foreign visit in his second term. Today, when the quarter of year since the visit is gone, it’s possible to talk about its first long-term effects.
Historical background
Since the United States finally broke with isolationism after The Second World War, they had put their attention to the Arabian Peninsula, which is a crucial region in the modern great powers’ rivalry due to its vast resources and strategic location. In this period Washington had formed an alliance with Saudi Arabia and then with monarchical neighbors of Saudis (after these countries gained independence). Arab monarchies of Persian Gulf region were key allies of the United States during the Cold War, their policy in the 80s (keeping low oil prices and financing Afghan guerilla) was an important factor which had contributed a lot to the collapse of the USSR. The importance of this group of states (since 1981 grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council) in American foreign policy had been progressively increasing, the key events which led to that were: 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the Gulf War of 1990-91 and World Trade Center attacks in 2001. The cooperation between the United States and GCC members was based on three main pillars:
- cooperation in the fields of military and security,
- oil imports to America,
- delivery of advanced American technologies to the Gulf states.
The parties realize completely different socio-political models – the United States is a secular democratic republic, while members of the Gulf Council are Islamic monarchies with strong, mostly absolute power of the rulers. With such differences it is impossible for parties to find a common ground in the field of values and the only way to establish cooperation is a pragmatic approach. The idea of human rights plays some role in American-Gulf relations, but for most of the time its importance was minimal and restricted to interventions in cases of the most basic issues (for example when President Kennedy forced Saudi Arabia to abolish slavery). There were moments when contrary political interests led to serious problems in relations between the United States and Gulf monarchs (for example during the Oil Crisis of 1973 caused by Arabic embargo imposed on countries supporting Israel) but for Washington profits coming from close relations with GCC members, especially Saudi Arabia – leader of Sunni Islamic world and a leading figure of OPEC group, were compensating controversies and disadvantages connected to these relations.
The second decade of the 21st century had led to changes in American public debate on alliances with GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, leading to the growing criticism on cooperation with countries behaving such contrary to democratic ideals. One of the sources of criticism of these alliances was s support given by GCC countries to militant Islamic organizations around the Islamic world. This policy was the most characteristic for Saudi Arabia supporting many fundamentalist organizations also known for financing of building Salafi mosques in Europe. These actions seemed to be contrary to Western efforts to combat terrorism. In its internal policy Saudi Arabia was following Wahhabism, the strictest sect of Islam, inspiring the fighters of various jihadist units.
These circumstances could have led to the expectations, that prince Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power would led to the improvement in relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The new crown prince cut Saudi aid to radical Islamic organizations and introduced some liberal reforms including permitting women to drive a car and lifting mandatory covering the female hair. These changes in fact caused Saudi Arabia to shift away from Wahhabism. New Saudi ruler is also implementing a plan to reform country’s economy and to make it independent from oil exports, most of the strategy is included in the state program called ‘Vision 2030’. This ambitious plan cannot be succeeded without participation of foreign investors, and it is a great chance for American companies.
The changes in Saudi Arabia however did not lead to the improvement in relations between the Kingdom and the American Republic. One of the main objectives of MbS’s reforms is to strengthen the power of the ruler by limiting the role of religion in politics but without undermining religious legitimacy of the reigning dynasty. The authoritarian character of Saudi reforms coupled with criticism of Riyadh over bloody war in Yemen and assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi resulted in Joe Biden’s electoral promise to ‘treat Saudi Arabia like a pariah’. This approach had influenced American policy toward Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf region in the beginning of Biden’s presidency. Biden was the first American president who put human rights-related issues among priorities in his policy toward Saudi Arabia and the whole Gulf region. This was a part of Biden’s idealistic vision to spread liberal values and democracy in the world as much as possible.
American-Chinese rivalry in the Arabian Peninsula
The American pressure on Gulf leaders to adopt more Western standards on governance and civil liberties couldn’t have been very effective at the turn of the second and third decades of the 21st century. The rise of non-Western powers like China, India and Russia have been leading to the situation when countries in conflict with the West can find alternative economic and political partners. Additionally, the West is now forced to compete with the new powers in various geographical regions, and interference in internal affairs of different countries makes the Western countries unattractive partners for states of the Global South, often having other political systems than democracy.
Deeper contacts between People’s Republic of China and Arab monarchies of Persian Gulf goes back to 1993, when China ceased to be self-sufficient in oil and started to search for new importers of this resource. Relations between parties had been evolving, GCC members, like most countries in the world, became importers of cheap Chinese products then progressively replaced by more advanced ones. Today China is a key supplier of modern technologies to the Gulf monarchies, the Chinese export here such technologies like 5G network and ‘smart cities’. In recent years China replaced USA and EU as main suppliers of industrial technologies to the Saudi Arabia. In 2022-23 Beijing had doubled its export to Saudi Arabia compared to the pre-pandemic period reaching export worth 45 billion of dollars, while American exports decreased from 19 billion $ in 2015 to 11,5 billion $. At the same time EU’s exports decreased from 45 bln $ to 33 bln $ and that means that in the 2023 the Chinese export to Saudi Arabia was bigger than EU’s combined with American. Similar trends are seen in trade relations of the other GCC countries.
In relation with them, Chinese president Xi Jinping puts main focus on investment, especially great infrastructural projects like port construction. These projects are not separate; they are a part of Belt and Road Initiative. The United States oppose that initiative, just like they oppose it in the other regions where Beijing is trying to build the New Silk Road. American fears about connections between economic and political presence of China in the Middle East were strengthened after the United Arab Emirates joined BRICS group in 2024 together with Egypt and Iran. In this time Saudi Arabia was considering a similar move. Increasing economic cooperation is not the only way China builds its political position in the region. Beijing is already engaged in various diplomatic initiatives regarding the Middle East; for example, Chinese mediation finalized such significant process like normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese have quite long tradition of military cooperation with the Pakistani and Persians; in recent years they have also became a weapon exporter to the rivals of Tehran, like the Saudis, although limited capabilities of Chinese military industry make Beijing unlikely to replace Washington as main weapon supplier to regional powers. China’s capabilities to become a main military ally of the countries in the Middle East are also limited by Chinese strategy of non-engagement in alliances. Its activity in this field is restricted to the network of strategic partnerships already signed with most important players in the Middle East including Emiratis and the Saudis.
Russia is in a reverse position. It was building its position in the Middle East mostly through arm sales and military intervention in Syria. After full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the collapse of the Assad dictatorship these forms of spreading Russian influences are not used but Moscow remains a key partner of GCC countries through OPEC+ group. Gulf rulers try to benefit from chaos caused by the Russo-Ukrainian war. They help Russia escape Western sanctions by selling Russian products and energy resources as its own (with profits for them). Dubai became a safe space for pro-Kremlin oligarchs moving from the West after sanctions against them were implemented. But an action that caused the biggest frustration of the USA was Saudi’s decision to cut oil production instead of increasing it to lower the prices and reduce Russian incomes. This was probably the biggest failure of President Biden’s foreign policy. After Russian aggression of Ukraine previous US President decided to change his foreign policy to more realist one and get the deals against Russia with authoritarian regimes previously harshly criticized by him, but his offer to restore old close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States was rejected. Mohammed bin Salman’s distrust of Joe Biden must have been the main reason of that. This situation is a lesson for all Western leaders – they cannot be too much critical of authoritarian leaders (especially long-standing allies), because they might need their help in future.
Since Obama’s presidency, the USA implements a strategy of ‘pivot to Asia’. The American-Chinese rivalry however is being conducted worldwide, so hypothetical drastic reduction of American presence in regions such as the Middle East would lead to strengthening Chinese position there and globally. In the current reality of world powers struggle Gulf monarchs adopt a pragmatic approach – they choose a power which offer them better technologies and better conditions of cooperation without letting to be dominated by one power if it’s unnecessary.
Trump’s visit in May and its results
As we can conclude from earlier parts of the article, President Trump did not have an easy task when trying to restore friendly relations with his Gulf partners. Old cooperation between two parties was weakened by Biden’s unrealistic policies, GCC countries had multiple alternative choices in their foreign policies, and they were facing less threats due to the Iranian–Saudi normalization. To restore closer cooperation with GCC members Trump needed to offer them really favorable conditions of this cooperation. Going there for the first foreign tour was a good idea, because if this was also a destination of Trump’s first visit in his first term, then he had to go there for the first tour again to show that importance of these countries for him did not decrease. The tour to the Gulf was a success of American president. The main effects of the visit were:
- a Saudi pledge to invest $600 billion in the United States, a $243.5 billion Qatari investment plans, and Emirati investment plan worth $200 billion,
- the sale of 18 000 AI chips to Saudi AI company Humain,
- construction of the largest AI campus outside the USA in UAE,
- $142 bln sale of American weapons to Saudi Arabia,
- an agreement with Qatar to improve military cooperation and sell of advanced American arms to this country including MQ-9B Reaper drone,
- announcing of lifting of US sanctions against Syria.
In Riyadh, Trump gave a controversial speech criticizing previous American administration for interventionist policies, in fact he had stated that Middle Eastern countries do not need democracy, because they resolve their affairs better in different way. This was quite unprecedented declaration of American leader but necessary to compete with China, whose one of main promoted value is non-interference in internal affairs of different countries. Trump used existing opportunities to strengthen relations with Gulf monarchs including the need of GCC members for modern technologies to improve their armies and to realize their ambitious development plans. The deals can lead to return of the USA to the position of the first economic partner of GCC countries, although Trump’s tariff policies can complicate intensification of trade.
Many of the decisions made during meetings between an American delegation and Gulf states representations were just announcements and it’s still too early to conclude how much of that was realized. For now, we can say that Gulf leaders did not commit actions contrary to the spirit of the agreements while preserving existing ties with rivals of the United States. With new generation of ambitious Gulf rulers there is no come back to the past in US-Gulf relations when America was an exclusive and dominant power for GCC countries. Later developments in the Middle East showed also some disadvantages of cooperation with the United States – they could help to defend against Iran, but they could also draw the oil monarchies into war with Iran contrary to their will. The mutual cooperation however survived many troubles in common relations and will probably survive in future too.
Summary
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are long-standing allies of the United States. The character of these alliances had been evolving throughout years, today USA is GCC’s crucial but not the only important partner among great powers. The cooperation lasted so long due to the strategic location of Arabian Peninsula, huge oil resources and the need of local countries for defense cooperation. Because of importance of these countries, for most of the time Washington was doing little to improve democratic standards there. This had changed during Biden’s presidency, and it led to the crisis in mutual relations. Now, President Trump implements completely different, strictly realist policy toward GCC members. This shift has strengthened common cooperation but it’s too early to characterize new era of US-Gulf relations with details.
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Photo: White House
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