Ksawery Stawiński, Kateryna Vasylyk
04.02 Russians Cut Off from the Internet
In mid-January, Der Spiegel reported on the increasingly frequent use of Starlink technology by the Russian army. Constant access to satellite internet, provided by American technology, guarantees an advantage on the battlefield. It enables rapid information exchange, which shortens decision-making time, while also allowing drone pilots to operate their machines in combat. All of this is possible without the need to build, maintain, and defend physical infrastructure. Moreover, the Russians increased the usefulness of Starlink by placing its terminals on drones, which makes it more difficult to jam the operation of unmanned systems.
The occupying forces have been benefiting from a technology their country obtained not through purchase but through conquest or smuggling. Russia has never signed an agreement with SpaceX authorizing the use of the company’s technology. The terminals currently in its possession were captured from Ukrainians on the front line or obtained through contraband brought in from third countries.
Considering that most terminals in Ukraine are paid for by Poland (30,000 out of 50,000), the funds spent by Warsaw indirectly supported the aggressor in the war in Ukraine. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to this unfavorable situation. Radosław Sikorski raised the issue publicly on the platform X, prompting a response from Elon Musk. One of President Zelensky’s advisers, Mykhailo Podolyak, joined the discussion and together with the head of SpaceX resolved the problem of unauthorized Russian use of Starlink terminals. The Russians were quickly cut off from the internet, and the initiative shifted to the Ukrainian side, which in the following days allowed the recapture of 77 square miles of territory.
From now on, every terminal located in the combat zone is entered onto either a “blacklist” or a “whitelist.” Being placed on the former blocks the device from operating, while placement on the latter allows it to continue functioning. The lists are constantly updated in coordination with SpaceX and Kyiv.
The Russians themselves were forced to look for substitutes for American technology. Enemy units must now rely on fiber-optic lines, Wi-Fi-based radio bridges, or digital radio modems, which are slower, less reliable, and more troublesome to use due to the need to maintain physical infrastructure. In addition, the Russians use Barrage-1 (Rus. Барраж-1) – a stratospheric balloon suspended at an altitude of 20–30 kilometers, equipped with a 5G network terminal using NTN technology.
Although this surrogate does not fully match the capabilities offered by Starlink, it provides a useful supplement to the Russian military’s shortcomings. Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s ambition is to create its own satellite constellation that would serve as a replacement for SpaceX technology. Investment in such capabilities is estimated at 5 billion dollars. The project is to be carried out by a company called Bureau 1440 (Rus. Бюро 1440). Its plan assumes the launch of 292 satellites into low Earth orbit by 2030, with a total of 383 satellites planned. Ninety-one of them will be “backup” satellites ensuring the system’s operability in case several constellation units are lost. Ultimately, the system is intended to provide high-speed internet access to 97% of Russia’s population by 2030, reaching 99% by 2036.
The head of Bureau 1440, Bakanov, is the same man who in 2002 – during a rather boozy dinner – dismissed Elon Musk’s requests to purchase Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. The American had met the Russian when the idea of founding SpaceX was only beginning to take shape in his mind. Soon we may witness the second round of the clash between these two businessmen.
09.02 Growing US influence in Armenia
J.D. Vance visited Armenia, where he met with President Nikol Pashinyan. The meeting between the two diplomats proved highly productive, as it resulted in the signing of an agreement to develop Armenia’s nuclear energy sector with the support of American technology. Washington estimates the scale of the first stage of cooperation at five billion dollars, which will be complemented by another four billion in the form of energy resource supplies and the maintenance of the new energy infrastructure.
The agreement was signed in the context of a relatively pressing deadline for Armenia – the need to shut down its only nuclear power plant, Metsamor, in 2036. The facility currently accounts for 40% of the country’s electricity production. The two reactors built in 1976 (one of which is already out of service) will be replaced by a new power plant based on small modular reactor (SMR) technology.
Washington’s move is another step in expanding its influence not only in Armenia but across the entire South Caucasus – traditionally considered Russia’s “near abroad.” The nuclear agreement was preceded by a peace agreement signed in August by Yerevan and Baku at the White House. The formalized peace led to the resumption of oil and petroleum product transport from Azerbaijan to Armenia and also established the United States as the guarantor of regional peace (although the U.S. did not formally accept such a role in the signed document).
In this way, Washington is taking over Moscow’s traditional role in the region – the provider of security (and energy) for Armenia. The spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, reacted to the move by pointing out the weaknesses of the American plan and referring to the long history of Armenian-Russian cooperation, which itself indicates the effectiveness of American policy.
Pashinyan, disappointed with Moscow’s ineffective regional policy – which resulted in the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan – has been searching for a new, credible security guarantor. The first step toward finding a new ally was Armenia’s withdrawal in 2024 from the Moscow-controlled CSTO. Further steps include major purchases from the American defense industry and the TRIPP project – a large American infrastructure initiative in the region.
The project aims to create new networks of economic connections between Armenia and Azerbaijan while bypassing Iran and Turkey, and it is designed in such a way as to support the region’s economic integration with the Western world. At the same time, shared economic interests between formerly hostile states are intended to discourage further wars.
The litmus test of this new cooperation will be the June elections in Armenia. A victory for Pashinyan would mean further distancing of Yerevan from Russia, normalization of relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and a clear strategic turn toward the United States
10.02 Pigeon of war
The Moscow-based company Neiry Group, which also has offices in Dubai, is announcing a revolution in drone technology. Through its proprietary solutions, the startup is working on effectively taking control of pigeons. By implanting electrodes into the birds’ brains, Russian scientists aim to gain control over the animals’ movements. The procedurę – implanting needle-like devices that transmit electrical signals into the pigeon’s head – is said to be safe and to guarantee a one hundred percent survival rate for the “patients.”
In addition to the electrodes, each bird-drone is equipped with a solar-charged battery attached to its back in the form of a small backpack. A camera is mounted on the bird’s chest. A human operator uses a controller to send signals through the electrodes, forcing the bird to move according to the pilot’s commands.
Neiry Group argues that their biodrones surpass conventional drones in several respects. Unlike ordinary drones, they do not attract attention with their appearance and produce none of the characteristic noises generated by propellers. As a result, they are well suited for discreet monitoring of various types of facilities. Moreover, such a cyborg does not consume electrical energy for movement and can remain airborne longer than a typical drone. It also surpasses robotic systems in the length of routes it can cover – according to Neiry Group, up to 400 kilometers. The company claims the technology is particularly suitable for “hard-to-reach places.”
The Moscow startup does not emphasize the potential effectiveness of robo-pigeons on the battlefield in its public communications. However, the technology described by the company clearly falls into the category of dual-use technology. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the invention may eventually be used in warfare – especially since some of Neiry Group’s main investors are entities controlled by the Kremlin. According to the company’s announcements, other bird species – such as crows, seagulls, and albatrosses – may also eventually be incorporated into the program.
12.02 Venezuela’s Oil-Derived Politics
One of the main motivations behind the United States’ attack on Venezuela was the prospect of transferring the South American country’s vast oil resources to companies from the U.S. After the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and during the interregnum caused by his disappearance from the country’s political scene, the role of interim leader was assumed by Delcy Rodríguez. She decided to end the state monopoly in the energy sector that had existed since 1976 by signing legislation allowing private companies to invest in the country.
Donald Trump himself has encouraged American energy firms to invest up to 100 billion dollars in Venezuela in order to rebuild the country’s neglected infrastructure. The collapse of production capacity can be seen in Venezuela’s current oil output – around 1.2 million barrels per day – while only twenty-five years ago the country produced roughly 3 million barrels per day.
The opening of the Latin American country to foreign investment triggered a corresponding reaction from the government in Washington. Until now, cooperation with the Venezuelan state energy monopoly PDVSA had been illegal and strictly sanctioned under U.S. law. The ban applied both to domestic and foreign companies, which could expect economic pressure from the United States if they attempted to cooperate with Venezuela in this sector. The threat of secondary sanctions effectively discouraged foreign investors from working with Caracas.
Following Delcy Rodríguez’s decision, the United States altered this situation. Entities wishing to invest in Venezuela’s energy sector can now do so after receiving the appropriate authorization issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Permission to begin investment has already been granted to some of the world’s largest oil companies – BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell. Although OFAC is an American institution, European companies also had to obtain its approval before cooperating with Venezuela. This is because companies that fail to secure such authorization may become subject to secondary sanctions, the most severe of which in this context would be exclusion from the petrodollar system.
The new regulations stipulate that licenses issued by OFAC to companies seeking to invest in Venezuela cannot be granted to entities from China, Iran, North Korea, or – most importantly – Russia. At the same time, companies wishing to cooperate with firms from those countries (or firms in which they hold significant stakes) in Venezuela’s oil industry cannot receive OFAC approval. This effectively limits the participation of these states in the development of this lucrative market. In practice, Washington is deciding who will benefit from Venezuela’s new opening.
For Moscow, this represents a significant loss. The previously limited presence of Western companies had made Russia an important partner for Caracas. Cooperation between the two countries dates back to the era of Hugo Chávez and has included the energy, financial, and military sectors. Between 2006 and 2017, Moscow invested around 17 billion dollars in Venezuela. Some of these investments took the form of loans that Caracas repaid through barter – primarily oil deliveries.
American policy has already provoked a response from the Kremlin. Russian representatives – including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov – have complained that “our companies are quite openly being pushed out of the country [Venezuela].”
On the one hand, the United States is diversifying the pool of partners capable of helping Caracas rebuild its oil industry, which reduces Russia’s role in Venezuela through increased competition. On the other hand, Washington is simultaneously excluding Russia entirely from what could become a major new phase in the global race for the energy resources of the world’s most oil-rich country.
17. 02 Peace Negotiations Between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in Geneva
On 17–18 February, another round of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place in Geneva, with the United States acting as mediator. Although this was already the third meeting in this format, the parties to the conflict still failed to reach an agreement. Both the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, and the head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Medinsky, described the meeting as difficult in their later comments. Meanwhile, the U.S. president’s special envoy for peace missions, Steve Witkoff, wrote on the platform X after the first day of talks: “President Trump’s success in bringing together both sides of this war has yielded significant progress, and we are proud to work under his leadership to end the killing in this terrible conflict.”
The recent Ukraine–Russia–U.S. negotiations held at the InterContinental Hotel in Geneva had a broader thematic scope than the two previous rounds in Abu Dhabi, which focused primarily on security issues. As explained by the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Rustem Umerov, the talks proceeded on two levels: military and political. On the military level, representatives of the armed forces of the three countries mainly discussed options for monitoring a ceasefire, with nearly all participants agreeing to the involvement of the United States in a future monitoring mission. While the talks on “technical” military matters could be described as constructive and progressing, the political discussions reached a deadlock on the very first day due to the position of Vladimir Medinsky. Putin’s adviser, who is a key Kremlin ideologue in the field of historical policy, acts during the negotiations as a transmitter of the political line of the President of the Russian Federation and repeatedly advances maximalist demands that make consensus difficult.
During the third round of peace talks, representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States discussed the creation and structure of a potential demilitarized zone that would not be controlled by any of the parties to the conflict. Additionally, in order to facilitate reaching an agreement on this issue, the creation of a free trade zone in that area was proposed. There was also an idea to establish a civil administration that would govern the territory and include both Ukrainians and Russians. At the same time, the Russian side demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the unoccupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The administration of Donald Trump, justifying its stance with the desire to end the war as quickly as possible, has also been exerting pressure on Ukraine to agree to transfer the Donbas to Russia—only then, according to this proposal, would Ukraine receive security guarantees from the United States. President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the prospect of ceding Ukrainian land in an interview with the portal Axios: “Emotionally, people will never forgive this. Never. They will not forgive me, they will not forgive [the United States],” adding that any peace treaty would require approval in a nationwide referendum.
The agenda of the trilateral talks also included the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which has been under Russian occupation since March 2022. Before the war, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe produced about 20% of Ukraine’s electricity. Currently, however, due to the presence of Russian troops at the facility and the ongoing war threat, all six reactors at the ZNPP are shut down. During the negotiations, the U.S. side proposed a solution in which the United States would control the plant and manage the electricity produced there, redistributing it to both Russia and Ukraine. Kyiv rejected the idea as legitimizing the Russian occupation. The discussion also touched upon the issue of presidential elections in Ukraine, around which the Kremlin has long been building a narrative aimed at removing Zelensky from power. In addition, the Ukrainian delegation was tasked with raising the issues of prisoner-of-war exchanges and the release of civilians, as well as initiating preparations for a tête-à-tête meeting between the President of Ukraine and the President of the Russian Federation.
After returning home, Volodymyr Zelensky assessed the results of the negotiations as insufficient, while pointing out that the Russians were dragging out a process that could already be nearing its final stage. At the same time, voices are increasingly appearing in the Russian political scene calling for an ultimatum and the termination of negotiations with Ukraine if President Zelensky does not agree to territorial concessions. The opportunistic approach of the Trump administration is also becoming more visible, as it regularly uses Ukraine’s difficult situation to maximize its own benefits. It is also worth noting that representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy were present in Geneva during the third round of peace talks and held their own negotiations with the Ukrainian side behind the scenes. This signals Europe’s strong willingness to actively participate in the diplomatic process currently coordinated by the United States, as well as to maintain support for Ukraine.
17.02 FSB Granted Authority to Block Communications and Internet Access
On Tuesday, 17 February, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted amendments to the law “On Communications” that enable the Federal Security Service (FSB) to shut down communications across the entire territory of Russia. According to the new provisions, the FSB may demand that mobile operators block all services, while the decision regarding the time, location, and scope of such measures lies solely with the President of the Russian Federation. The amended bill was adopted without debate in the second and third readings by 393 deputies—taking approximately two minutes. On Friday, 20 February, the law was signed by Vladimir Putin and thus entered into force, completing a legislative process that had begun in January.
The obligation for telecommunications operators to comply with the orders of state authorities was already written into Russian telecommunications law in 2003 under the pretext of combating terrorism. This permanently introduced the practice of shutting down the internet in Russia on the orders of the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor). As power became increasingly centralized and authoritarianism strengthened, various forms of digital communication blockades intensified. For example, in 2019, during elections to the Moscow City Duma, the authorities shut down mobile internet in response to protests that erupted after election commissions refused to register many independent opposition candidates. In the same year, a law on the “sovereign internet” was adopted, allowing for centralized management of Russia’s public communications network “in the event of threats to stability or security,” and advocating the development of tools enabling the autonomization of Russia’s digital environment—effectively making the Runet independent from the global internet. This document forms the foundation of full state control over the communication system in Russia.
The Russian–Ukrainian war has contributed to an increase in state control over the network, and interruptions in internet access across the territory of the Russian Federation have become a daily occurrence. The first mass outages were recorded on 7 May 2025 during preparations for Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, when the mobile networks of all telecommunications operators were cut off for several hours. By July 2025, the number of internet outages had reached a record 2,029 incidents across Russia—exceeding the total number of internet shutdowns worldwide in 2024 (296 cases in 54 countries). Russian authorities present these actions as “security measures aimed at protection against attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).” Stanislav Zavalny, head of the Department of Informatization and Communications of Krasnodar Krai, claimed: “Using fast mobile internet, the enemy can control UAVs to carry out terrorist attacks.” This statement is disputed by Mikhail Klimarev, who explained to Deutsche Welle that mobile connectivity is not ubiquitous and serves only as an auxiliary technology for adjusting flight trajectories; modern drones therefore rely on a combination of different guidance systems. “Drones therefore continue flying along their programmed trajectory even without internet access,” emphasized the head of the Internet Protection Society. It is also worth noting that restrictions on network access often affect regions where Ukrainian UAVs have never appeared. Moreover, despite the declared temporary nature of the shutdowns, in reality the internet disappears in some places for many months.
Using the context of Ukrainian attacks, the Russian government prepared an amendment to the aforementioned “Law on Communications” and submitted it to parliament as early as November 2025. The first version of the amendments was motivated by “countering terrorism” and assumed that communication services would be suspended on the basis of an FSB “request” in cases “established by legal acts of the president and the government in order to protect citizens and the state from emerging security threats.” However, in the subsequent and ultimately adopted version, the word “request” was changed to “demand,” and the authority to impose restrictions was left exclusively to the president. The reference to “security threats” was also removed, meaning that the reasons for communication blockades will effectively be unlimited. In this way, the updated law further expands the powers of the FSB and contributes to the development of a “managed communications system,” constituting a Russian variant of digital totalitarianism.
Another significant change in the law is the exemption of telecommunications operators from liability for suspending access at the request of the FSB, even if their actions violate contracts with customers. This means that consumers will not be able to claim compensation for services not delivered. Contrary to appearances, such a solution harms both groups, since constant communication blockades may provoke users to abandon the services of operators—thereby hitting Russia’s digital economy. The vague wording of the document allows the authorities to block any type of communication: internet access (wired, mobile, and satellite), mobile services (including phone calls and text messages), telephone lines, email, and more. Network outages also disrupt many aspects of everyday life, including preventing taxi bookings, paralyzing courier services, limiting access to banking, and causing financial losses for businesses. The latest actions of the Russian authorities in the sphere of digital communications are a clear manifestation of deepening control over society, as well as increasing centralization of power, manipulation of information flows, systemic indoctrination, pervasive surveillance, legalization of repressive tools, politicization of private life, and the criminalization of narratives inconsistent with the official doctrine—phenomena characteristic of totalitarian states.
20.02 Moscow’s Gulag Museum to Be Transformed into the Museum of Memory
On Friday, 20 February, the website of the Moscow mayor’s office announced the liquidation of the Gulag History Museum. In its place, the first national Museum of Memory will be established, dedicated to the victims of the “genocide of the Soviet people.” The new exhibition will cover “all stages of Nazi war crimes during the Great Patriotic War,” and visitors will have the opportunity to learn “about manifestations of Nazism, biological weapons tests conducted by the Japanese on Soviet citizens, the liberation mission of the Red Army, and the trials of Nazi criminals.” The Gulag Museum was one of the last institutions in Russia that researched and commemorated the crimes of Soviet authorities.
The core of the exhibition at the new Museum of Memory will primarily consist of archival materials from the project “Without a Statute of Limitations,” which aims to preserve the historical memory of the war crimes of the Third Reich. As part of this initiative, lessons on the “genocide of the Soviet people” have already been conducted in Russian schools. The term “genocide of the Soviet people” did not exist during the Soviet period; it was coined in 2020 by Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, in response to accusations by the Council of Europe that the USSR, acting in cooperation with Nazi Germany, helped trigger World War II. Russia’s campaign to consolidate historical memory surrounding the so-called Great Patriotic War reached its peak in 2025, when Vladimir Putin signed the law “On Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of the Genocide of the Soviet People.” Martyrdom narratives, the heroization, and the idealization of the Soviet era form the foundation of contemporary Russian historical policy, and the creation of its own narrative of genocide has allowed Russia to portray itself as a victim rather than a perpetrator.
The director of the Museum of Memory has been appointed Natalia Kalashnikova, who since April 2025 has headed the Smolensk Fortress Museum. Before her career in culture, she supervised, among other things, the creation of the joint-stock company Krymenergo after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Moreover, Kalashnikova is a “veteran of military operations” and has received the medals “Participant of the Special Military Operation” and “For Contribution to Strengthening the Defense of the Russian Federation.” As the director of the museum, she regularly organizes meetings with participants of the Russian–Ukrainian war and patriotic events at the Smolensk Fortress, and she also cooperates with the local branch of the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, established by Anna Tsivilyova, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and Putin’s niece. Kalashnikova considers one of the main tasks of the new Museum of Memory to be “shaping in the younger generation a firm rejection of Nazism in any of its forms.” At the same time, her older son Dmitry Kalashnikov left Russia a week before the outbreak of the war in 2024 and has not returned since.
The Gulag History Museum was founded in 2001 and until recently remained the only major institution that continued to focus on the victims of Stalinist repression without feeling pressure from the authorities. In November 2024, the museum suspended its activities, according to the official version due to “violations of fire safety regulations.” A few months later, the Moscow Department of Culture announced the dismissal of Roman Romanov from the position of director of the Gulag History Museum, which he had held since 2012. The direct reason for his dismissal was his refusal to censor a section devoted to repression in the USSR in the exhibition “History of Moscow,” as demanded by the authorities. After the announcement of the institution’s transformation into the Museum of Memory, thousands of exhibits from the Gulag Museum—including personal belongings of former prisoners—will be deposited in archives. The documentation center, which helped people find information about repressed relatives and loved ones, will also be closed. Despite the formal suspension of the museum’s activities, its staff continued their work until the very end: organizing research expeditions, recording interviews with victims of repression, and preparing books on the history of the Gulag for publication.
The Moscow mayor’s office has announced plans to open the Museum of Memory in 2026, although Kalashnikova herself believes it is still too early for a rapid launch. “First we need to check what the situation with fire safety looks like there—you remember those problems,” the new director added. Russian authorities intend to use the new museum as a platform for youth indoctrination, describing the process as “historical enlightenment.” By introducing patriotic education, the Kremlin aims to raise a new generation of loyal soldiers. Under Putin’s rule, memory policy has been oriented toward rehabilitating the Soviet legacy while simultaneously erasing the crimes committed by the Bolsheviks. The figure of Joseph Stalin illustrates this tendency: alongside his glorification as the conqueror of the Nazis and the “father of the nation,” the authorities marginalize the memory of his mass crimes. The cult of the Great Patriotic War functions in contemporary Russia as a founding myth and a story of power that Putin uses as an antidote to the bleak poverty experienced by the average citizen. The Russian authorities’ “obsession” with Nazism serves to create a constant “us–them” division, intimidate their own citizens, and maintain power within the model of a “besieged fortress.
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