Ksawery Stawiński, Kateryna Vasylyk
6.01 – Major Demographic Crisis in Russia
During the annual international conference “Foundry Council” in Chelyabinsk, renowned Russian economist and Moscow State University professor Natalia Zubarevich stated that Russia’s population will continue to shrink until it begins producing a generation of “maternal capital children.” During a meeting with representatives of industrial enterprises, the professor highlighted the main challenges of Russian demographics, such as long-term declining trends in births and fertility, illustrated their impact on the labor structure, and presented forecasts for 2026 along with potential solutions to the problem.
According to the expert, negative changes in the country’s fertility structure are driving a demographic crisis, which is an additional factor putting pressure on the Russian economy. “The average age of first-time mothers in Russia is currently over 25 years. In Moscow, it is even higher – 29 years. We have moved to a different reproductive model. First, you finish your studies, start working, meet your financial needs, build a career, and only then have children,” Zubarevich noted, mocking state plans to increase birth rates among female students, including the requirement to provide rooms for mothers with children at universities. She also stated that, given the current age structure, there is no other way to solve the depopulation problem except through mass migration.
The researcher also identified three key demographic trends affecting the Russian labor market. The first is the decline in the working-age population, noticeable since 2018. Currently, the number of young people in the workforce has decreased by one-third, resulting in a real shortage of fresh labor in the country. The second factor is rising labor and wage costs, driven by competition for personnel and the resulting wage race – a process that was particularly intense in 2023 but has slowed since 2025 due to weak economic growth or stagnation. The third key trend is the decline in the number of labor migrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which fell from 4.5 million before the pandemic to 3.5 million in 2022.
Commenting on the current situation of labor migrants in Russia, Natalia Zubarevich mentioned the concept of organized recruitment (Russian: оргнабор) – a government employment system in which workers are selected, vetted, and assigned to specific employers before actually starting work. The economist emphasized that this method will be implemented by Russian authorities in the coming years as the main technique for acquiring foreign labor. “They are telling us: there is no point wandering around the Russian Federation unsupervised. We have to understand that this is a grim story for business,” Zubarevich summarized, noting the inefficiency of attempts to import workers from Bangladesh, India, and North Korea to Russia. Finally, the professor pointed out that increased migration does not offset the country’s current population decline, and with current Russian migration policies, the influx of migrants is likely to start decreasing.
11.01 – Gazprom-Media Develops System to Identify “LGBT Propaganda”
In response to further tightening of laws banning “LGBT promotion” and increasing penalties for “propaganda” of this community in the Russian Federation, the state-owned company Gazprom-Media invested several hundred million rubles in developing the informational system “Predicto Platform.” This complex consists of 12 subsystems responsible, respectively, for content personalization, user activity analysis, recommendation algorithms, and information-search and analytics systems. The most important is the content moderation module, designed “to automatically check for the presence of undesirable elements such as drug, alcohol, and smoking propaganda, as well as scenes involving LGBT individuals.” After processing a video through this program, a file is returned with color coding indicating the presence or absence of “harmful segments.”
In December 2022, President Vladimir Putin signed a package of laws prohibiting, among other things, “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” and “propaganda of gender transition and pedophilia.” One law prohibits “promoting LGBT” in any products sold in Russia – films, books, advertisements, and streaming services. For example, violating the ban on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” carries a fine ranging from 50,000 to 400,000 rubles for individuals, 100,000 to 800,000 rubles for officials, and 800,000 to 5 million rubles or suspension of activities for up to 90 days for legal entities. Subsequently, in November 2023, the Russian Supreme Court recognized the “international LGBT movement” as an extremist organization and banned its activities in Russia. On July 31, 2025, Putin signed a law refusing to license films containing content “denying or discrediting traditional Russian spiritual and moral values.” These regulations will take effect on March 1, 2026.
Following the latest amendment to Russian anti-LGBT law, Gazprom-Media commissioned the private startup Predicto to develop a range of digital solutions, which were registered as state property in July 2025 in the register of the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. According to the list of the subsidiary company “ГПМ Digital Innovations,” which owns the rights to the technology core, clients of the purchased service include other Gazprom-Media entities such as the online cinema Premier, video hosting Rutube (intended to replace YouTube in Russia), vertical video service Yappy, as well as TV channels TNT and Пятница!. Roskomnadzor, the Russian authority responsible for monitoring, controlling, and censoring media, stated that it welcomes “all technical and organizational measures taken by audiovisual service providers to identify illegal information.”
The Predicto technological solution is designed to assist platforms in filtering video content through automation, especially since verification is currently done manually or semi-automatically. “All content is checked by employees who first attend seminars organized by regulatory authorities to raise awareness of newly introduced legal content requirements. While some basic scenes containing prohibited content are recognized by machines, the vast majority of nuances and semantic connections in audiovisual works can only be recognized by humans,” admits Vladimir Trunov, Director of Government Relations at Tricolor. Andrey Svintsov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma’s Information Policy Committee and deputy of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, also commented on the new censorship tool: “I hope this robot, which will monitor and check content automatically, will be properly configured to flag such content for the editor. The editor will then manually decide whether to block the content, cut the scene, reject the entire episode, or abandon purchasing the series entirely if it is too saturated with topics that, according to the Ministry of Culture licensing commission, may be considered undesirable.”
It should be noted that despite a whole block of legal regulations banning “general LGBT propaganda” and “displaying LGBT content to children,” no criteria were ever defined to clearly distinguish propaganda from mere display, nor was a list of specific punishable acts provided. Consequently, bookstores, publishers, TV channels, and online cinemas began receiving violation notices en masse following the adoption of the first law. In 2023, the Premier online cinema was fined 4 million rubles for “displaying LGBT content,” while in 2024, the Kinopoisk film service paid 10 million rubles for two cases at once – “LGBT propaganda” and “pedophilia propaganda.” In light of the latest legal updates and the upcoming wave of fines, demand is expected to rise in the Russian media market for Gazprom-Media’s automated monitoring system, which will simultaneously deepen the Kremlin’s control over media messaging and its audience.
12.01 – Wagner Members Employed in Russian Houses
Yevgeny Primakov Jr., Director of the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), officially confirmed that Russian Houses in some African countries were opened by the Wagner Group. In an interview with Vedomosti, the diplomat also stated that some members of this “famous PMC (private military company)” currently work within Rossotrudnichestvo. This agency is a specialized body under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, responsible for building influence through soft power.
One of Rossotrudnichestvo’s projects is the Russian Houses – institutions that, according to the official definition, promote Russian culture, language, education, and science, while serving as platforms for public diplomacy. In reality, however, they often function as hubs for Russian propaganda and intelligence operations, with hybrid activities that pose a threat to the host state. By expanding this network of centers, Russia strengthens its ability to influence other international actors through cultural and social channels. After 2020, Rossotrudnichestvo underwent a major transformation: due to deteriorating relations with the collective West, political priorities shifted toward Africa and Asia. A representative manifestation of this change was the closure of several Russian Houses in recent years – Russia lost its influence tools in countries such as Azerbaijan, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, and Macedonia.
“Approximately 26 agreements on partner Russian Houses have been signed, 14 of which concern centers in Africa. We were very pleased to sign similar agreements with Russian Houses opened by a well-known African PMC in Mali and the Central African Republic,” Primakov said. He characterized the former mercenaries as follows: “Several very smart guys from that team joined us, ‘eggheads’ – incredibly intelligent. They are ‘in the know’ […]. With our limited resources, they do amazing things.” The Agency head also mentioned the large number of applications from African students to Russian universities – over 40,000 for 4,800 spots in the 2024/2025 academic year – demonstrating the effectiveness of Russian soft power in developing countries.
The Wagner Group was a para-private military organization established in 2014 under the initiative of Russian intelligence. It consisted of mercenaries with military or security service experience, with the goal of conducting military operations outside Russia. The formation was involved in conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and African countries, and Wagner members are responsible for numerous human rights violations and war crimes. An example of the transition from the Wagner Group to Rossotrudnichestvo is Dmitry Syty, head of the Russian House in the Central African Republic, widely known as a key figure in the PMC leadership. In a 2024 interview with Deutsche Welle, the “cultural ambassador of Russia” admitted that he sometimes conducted “disarmament missions” against armed groups in Central Africa on orders from the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadéra. Syty did not mention, however, that in exchange for mercenary services provided to the country, Russia received favorable concessions for mineral extraction, particularly gold and diamonds. Additionally, the Wagner Group was repeatedly accused of supporting paramilitary African regimes, persecuting and intimidating civilians in the Central African Republic, killing civilians in Mali, raping women and men, and committing “other sexual abuses.”
Placing former fighters in positions related to cultural promotion and cooperation is a bold but calculated move by Russian diplomacy, which traditionally uses structures like Rossotrudnichestvo as cover for intelligence and sabotage operations. Wagner members not only have combat experience but are also familiar with security services – both Russian and African. These connections can be leveraged to expand and strengthen Russian influence over local elites, and the operation of Russian Houses would help build a network of agents as well as political and business contacts. In its strategy toward African states, Russia legitimizes participants in armed actions by giving them diplomatic positions, combining elements of coercion and attractiveness to more effectively pursue its interests and promote its image in the Sub-Saharan African region.
18.01 – Sanctions Drain Resources of Russia’s National Wealth Fund
Fearing secondary sanctions, Russia’s largest oil buyers – China, India, and Turkey – have decided to reduce purchases of Russian oil. Consequently, Moscow is forced to sell its products at steep discounts, negatively affecting the country’s budget plan, which was based on higher oil revenues. Following the introduction of U.S. restrictions, previous Kremlin ventures can no longer be financed with proceeds from energy sales. Searching for alternative sources, Russia decided to liquidate assets from the National Wealth Fund.
While the Russian Ministry of Finance estimates the 2026 budget shortfall at $49 billion, Gazprombank puts it at $77 billion – about 3% of GDP. Russia’s official budget policy plans to maintain a deficit at 1.6% of GDP ($49 billion). If Gazprombank’s scenario occurs, the state would need to cover roughly 1.5 percentage points, i.e., $38 billion.
Until now, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation (NWF) has covered urgent cash needs of the Kremlin. The NWF is an institution where surpluses from energy sales were deposited to secure the state’s financial capacity. In practice, it has been used for the war in Ukraine for several years. According to The Moscow Times, liquid assets in the fund were $113.5 billion in 2022 and are now $52 billion. Gold reserves have fallen to 40% of their original level. Judging by the scale of the shortfall, the fund could be entirely depleted within one to two years. Between January 16 and February 5 alone, Russia sold $2.5 billion from the fund – the highest level since the pandemic.
26.01 – Syrian-Russian Relations
Syria, under Ahmed al-Shary, who won last year’s nearly 15-year civil war, is bringing territories back under Damascus control. The ongoing campaign to restore state authority has expanded to northeastern Syria, controlled by a Kurdish faction supported by various foreign actors, including Russia. Moscow became involved in this region in 2019 in response to Turkey’s third anti-Kurdish offensive in Syria. Since then, Russia has acted as a mediator between the Kurds and Turkey, supervising ceasefire enforcement. The Russian military’s logistical hub became the Kameshli base.
Moscow has apparently decided to pivot this policy toward building bilateral relations with Syria’s new government. The previous strongman supported by the Kremlin – al-Assad – lost the war. Consequently, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kameshli, along with the end of support for the Kurdish cause in the country, is a goodwill gesture toward the new Syrian leader, al-Shary, whose faction previously opposed by Moscow’s support is now in power. Notably, the UK and U.S. are pursuing similar policies, abandoning former allies to normalize relations with the new Syrian leadership. Al-Shary’s policy also includes establishing friendly relations with Israel and Turkey.
Another reason Russia seeks good relations with Damascus is the desire to maintain control over its two military bases in western Syria (Russia’s only military port abroad and a second airbase). The future of these bases was discussed by both countries’ presidents in January during another meeting in Moscow. The matter of potential extradition of Bashar al-Assad from Russia to Syria was also raised, but Russia has so far denied Damascus’ requests. All indications suggest that Russian presence in Kameshli is ending, as inferred from reporter accounts and a passing comment by Lavrov on the future of Russian forces in Syria. The question of whether the two remaining bases will continue to operate or be closed remains unresolved.
27.01 – U.S. Policy of Actively Countering the Shadow Fleet
On December 17, the U.S. imposed a maritime blockade on Venezuela. It targets sanctioned tankers that are prohibited from leaving or docking in Venezuelan ports. One of these vessels – Bella 1 – violated the ban and breached the blockade, prompting a pursuit by U.S. forces. The chase, lasting several days, ended in the North Atlantic, south of Iceland.
During the pursuit, Bella 1 changed its flag, transitioning from a Panamanian to a Russian vessel. It was renamed Marinera, and according to the Kremlin, it was “temporarily authorized to fly the Russian flag.” Consequently, the ship, its cargo, and crew came under Moscow’s protection. Had the U.S. ceased the pursuit, it would have demonstrated that Russia successfully broke the maritime blockade imposed on its ally by Washington.
Additionally, The Wall Street Journal reports that Marinera was escorted by a Russian warship and a submarine. Despite this, the Americans caught up with the renamed Bella 1 and boarded it. Russian forces may have repelled U.S. aircraft – including C-17 transport planes, V-22 Ospreys, and AC-130 gunships – that were reportedly involved, according to PISM. Washington justifies its actions under international maritime law, claiming the ship was stateless because it sailed under a false flag and therefore was not protected by any state. The British assisted in the operation, and after it concluded, Marinera and its crew ended up in British waters.
The tanker’s story did not end there. The captured sailors were taken ashore, and their fates diverged depending on nationality and degree of involvement in illegal activities. The captain’s wife, Natia Dzadzama (of Georgian descent), learned that her husband had reached Scottish soil and sought to prevent his further transfer to the U.S. She argued that Captain Avtandil Kalandadze (apparently the couple does not share a surname) was on Scottish territory, so his fate fell under Scottish, not American, jurisdiction. Furthermore, European human rights protections shielded him from extradition. Thanks to her intervention, a Scottish court issued an order preventing the Americans from taking Kalandadze to the U.S. However, it was later rescinded when it became clear the Americans had already preempted the court’s action.
It remains unclear how Kalandadze and the first officer ended up aboard the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Munro, which sailed from Scotland across the Atlantic toward American courts. One Russian source (Военное обозрение) suggests they were simply abducted from Scottish territory by U.S. personnel.
The question of jurisdiction over Kalandadze sparked debate among Scottish politicians and strained relations between the U.S. and Scotland. Ross Greer, a co-chair of the Scottish Green Party and outspokenly anti-Russian, stated: “The U.S. government kidnapped two people from Scotland in the middle of the night […] Trump’s America is a rogue state that disregards international law. It is not our ally and cannot be trusted. It is time for John Swinney to remove U.S. forces from their de facto base at Scotland’s Prestwick airport and block their access to any publicly owned Scottish assets.” The official Scottish government position was more measured, citing BBC: “Deterring, disrupting, and degrading the Russian shadow fleet is a priority for this government. Together with our allies, we are escalating our response to shadow vessels – and will continue to do so.” Nevertheless, statements by First Minister John Swinney suggest Scotland was not fully briefed by the Americans. It is possible that the captain was indeed seized, as claimed by Russian sources and the Georgian couple’s lawyer, Aamer Anwar.
The episode demonstrates the assertive nature of U.S. foreign policy. In recent weeks, the U.S. has intercepted seven sanctioned vessels: Marinera, Sophia, Olina, Skipper, Sagitta, Centuries, and Galileo. This active counter-shadow fleet policy sets an important precedent, allowing European states to independently enforce sanctions on tankers transporting contraband.
29.01 – Lukoil Plans Sale of All Foreign Assets
Under sanctions imposed on Rosneft and Lukoil, both companies must divest their foreign assets. However, this restriction will fully take effect only on February 28. Until then, the companies operate under a transitional sanction regime, allowing relatively normal procedures for selling large portions of their businesses. Although buyers exist, none have yet finalized agreements with Lukoil, primarily due to the lack of approval from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which oversees sanction enforcement.
Despite media reports of potential buyers – including ExxonMobil, Chevron, IHC, Midad Energy, and Gunvor – none have progressed far enough to seek OFAC approval for a transaction. Carlyle could change this. According to a statement on Lukoil’s website, the U.S. investment firm has begun serious negotiations with Lukoil to purchase the entirety of LUKOIL International GmbH – the unit managing Lukoil’s foreign assets. The only exception would be assets held in Kazakhstan, for which Kazakh authorities sent a request to OFAC on January 28 seeking approval for the transaction.
Carlyle is among the largest investment firms in the world, ranking sixth globally, with $474 billion in assets, $20 billion of which are invested in oil and gas.
Lukoil is Russia’s second-largest oil company and, unlike the state-owned Rosneft, operates as a private enterprise. LUKOIL International GmbH, based in Vienna, has an equity value of approximately $22 billion (including Kazakh assets). Lukoil has long provided Russia with a strong presence in global energy markets. S&P estimates that “oil and gas production from Lukoil’s foreign assets will grow through the end of the decade. Lukoil’s share of production from foreign projects is expected to rise by 119,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day compared with 2025 levels, reaching 448,000 barrels per day by 2030.”
The purchase price for Carlyle has not been disclosed, and due diligence is ongoing. Meanwhile, Lukoil continues discussions with other potential buyers. Given the upcoming February 28 deadline, even if Carlyle does not finalize the deal, Lukoil will have to rapidly divest its overseas investments.
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