Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
01.07 – Orlen freed itself from Russian oil
The first day of July marked the expiration of a twelve-year contract that the Polish energy giant had signed for oil supplies from Russia. The last refinery relying on Russian crude – Litvínov in the Czech Republic – replaced its previous supplier with a mix of partners from around the world. From now on, the oil processed by our southern neighbors will flow from the Italian port of Trieste through the Transalpine Pipeline via Austria and Germany to Orlen’s refinery in the northwestern corner of the Czech Republic. This means that all Polish company refineries have definitively said goodbye to Moscow.
The company’s CEO commented:
“Money from Russian oil will not be used against those it should not be used against. People in Ukraine will not die because of money from Russian oil.”
The Czechs obtained permission from Brussels for a partial exemption from sanctions – the embargo on Russian oil – which gave them time to expand the Transalpine Pipeline and secure raw material transit capabilities, ensuring energy stability in the country. The halt of oil imports seems definitive, especially after the recent closure of the “Friendship” gas pipeline running through Ukraine, which supplied countries south of the Carpathians and the Sudetes.
Thus, the Czech Republic joins Lithuania and Poland as countries fully independent of Russian oil. Orlen’s supplier diversification (contracts signed with 74 partners since 2024) secures the entire Central European region. It’s worth noting that Russian oil imports in the EU fell from 27% in 2022 to just 3% in 2025. Ultimately, European countries aim to completely cut off Russian oil and gas by 2027 (only Slovakia and Hungary still oppose this policy).
01.07 – Cameroonians in Russian service
The K-2 battalion fighting near Sievierodonetsk captured two Russian soldiers originally from Cameroon.
Metugene Unana Jean Pafe came to Moscow in March to work at a shampoo factory. At the airport, his documents and personal belongings were confiscated; fingerprints were taken, and a dental mold was made. He was detained, then transported by police to a military facility where he was forced to sign a one-year contract with a salary of 1.1 million rubles (over $13,500 or 7 million Central African francs). This is a significant amount compared to Metugene’s earnings in Cameroon (30–50 thousand francs monthly) but still lower than native Russian soldiers’ pay.
After two months of training, the Cameroonian was sent to the front near Luhansk. He survived a bombing, escaped the trenches, and—as he says—walked for six days until he encountered Ukrainian soldiers.
Anatol Frank, a Cameroonian teacher, came to Moscow last August for dental treatment. Specialists did attend to his teeth, but they were military personnel, not dentists. Anatol’s fingerprints and jaw mold were also taken. He was transported and forced to sign a military contract. Anatol admitted he cried every day during training, couldn’t sleep, and suffered serious psychological damage. During a mission, he fled from his Russian comrades and remained in hiding until Ukrainian soldiers found him. During a joint evacuation, a Russian drone attacked, injuring Anatol, who has since been treated in Ukraine. He has two sons, Messina and Mofu.
Both men agreed to speak on camera for Ukrainian soldiers to warn other foreigners about the dangers they face in Russia. They did not know Russian when forcibly recruited and spoke in their native language in the video, openly and honestly. They said they were treated well in Ukrainian captivity except at the moment of capture, when Ukrainians were “rough” with them. According to them, soldiers from Senegal, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, and China also fight in Russian ranks.
Although both were civilians, Cameroon has struggled with draining its armed forces to support the Russian conflict. A Cameroonian soldier earns $85 to $234 per month, while in Russia it’s over $2,400. However, Russian forces do not only recruit volunteers from the Global South—India recently busted a human smuggling ring sending young Indians to the Russian army under the guise of work visas. The case of the two Cameroonians shows that immigrants in Russia cannot feel safe.
04.07 – Polish consulate in Kyiv attacked by Russians
On the night of July 3-4, Kyiv faced a massive attack by Russian drones. Out of over 500 unmanned aerial vehicles, air defenses shot down 478. Yurii Ihnat, spokesperson for Ukrainian Air Forces, stressed this was the most intense drone attack so far. Still, thanks to effective defense, injuries in the city were limited to around 20 people.
This terror strategy affects all residents—when sirens sound, Kyiv citizens descend to shelters, waiting for the “all clear.” Polish diplomatic staff are routinely forced to take cover. A Russian drone exploded above the Polish consulate, with fragments damaging the roof and facade. It is unclear if it was a kamikaze drone or a drone shot down by Ukrainian defense whose debris hit the building. No staff were hurt, and the consulate resumed operations.
It’s worth noting the attack coincided with reports of another conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—part of Kremlin’s long-term strategy to undermine the US president and humiliate Americans.
04.07 / 07.07 – Sudden Russian Death Syndrome
July claimed bloody victims among the Russian elite. On the seventh of the month, the body of Roman Starovoit—the former governor of Kursk Oblast and, until a few hours before his death, still serving as transport minister—was found. He allegedly committed suicide in his Tesla Model X. The murder weapon was a Makarov pistol given to Starovoit in 2023 by Vladimir Kolokoltsev, then Minister of Internal Affairs.
The misfortune that led to Starovoit’s death began when he took office as Kursk governor. The post offered great opportunities for corruption, which ultimately caused the politician’s demise. The funds he embezzled were meant to strengthen border defenses with Ukraine—barriers that did not prevent Kyiv’s spectacular summer 2024 offensive that captured much of Kursk Oblast.
Starovoit’s death coincided with an investigation involving the current Kursk governor (who took office after his predecessor in September 2024, during the Ukrainian offensive). His body was discovered just hours after Putin demoted him. The reason for this sudden decision remains undisclosed. Adding intrigue are conflicting reports on the exact date of death and another fatality.
Andrei Kornieichuk, a 42-year-old Ministry of Transport employee and deputy head of the Federal Road Agency’s asset department, died of a heart attack during a work meeting. His death occurred the same day as Starovoit’s, though no known connection beyond working for the same government body exists. No official information about Kornieichuk’s corruption is available.
There are three theories about the former governor’s death: he committed suicide under pressure from the corruption scandal and its consequences; he was killed on Kremlin orders, which deals harshly with those neglecting military efforts; or he was beaten to death by people Starovoit could have exposed as corrupt associates. The truth will likely never be known, but this death fits a Kremlin trend of eliminating incompetents.
Another tragic death was that of Andrei Badalov, vice president of Transneft—the world’s largest pipeline network owner responsible for transporting 80-90% of Russian crude. It’s unclear if he committed suicide or was defenestrated. While the “Baza” portal says Badalov lived on the tenth floor, the VP allegedly fell from the seventeenth floor. He died hitting the pavement of Rublyovskoye Highway in a wealthy, prestigious Moscow district where Stalin himself had a dacha. Suspicions of murder arise due to the mysterious and sudden deaths increasingly affecting Russian oligarchs domestically and abroad. The motives of any possible perpetrator remain unknown.
15.07 – Russian attack on a Polish factory in Vinnytsia
Russian drones struck the production plant of the Barlinek Group in Vinnytsia, Ukraine, one of the company’s three key facilities. The attack, carried out during the night of July 15–16, was coordinated — drones approached from three different directions, indicating that the facility had been deliberately chosen as a target.
It was part of a larger air offensive in which Russia used around 400 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile. Ukraine’s air defenses managed to shoot down most of the drones, but five of them hit Barlinek’s production halls. Between six and seven people were injured in the attack, including two with serious burns. Fortunately, none of the victims were Polish citizens.
The company’s CEO, Wojciech Michałowski, stated that the damage was severe and that production could not resume for at least six months. The incident triggered strong political reactions. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stressed that Vladimir Putin’s criminal war is dangerously approaching Poland’s borders. The Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated that the strike on a civilian industrial facility was a violation of international law and issued a formal protest to the Russian ambassador. The case also became the subject of an appeal from the Lewiatan Confederation’s Council of Entrepreneurship, which urged the authorities to provide financial support for Barlinek. The organization emphasized that the company cannot expect wartime compensation and suggested that frozen Russian assets be used to help rebuild the plant.
21.07 – 18th EU sanctions package against the Russian Federation
The European Union adopted its eighteenth package of sanctions against Russia, aimed at significantly reducing the Kremlin’s budget revenues. The new measures primarily target the energy, financial, and military sectors and introduce mechanisms to make it harder to circumvent earlier restrictions.
One of the key provisions is a dynamic price cap on Urals crude oil, lowered from $60 to $47.6 per barrel. Starting in September, it will be adjusted automatically every six months to at least 15 percent below the average market price. The EU also sanctioned an additional 105 tankers belonging to the so-called “shadow fleet,” increasing the total number of vessels on the blacklist to 444.
These ships, along with their owners, flag operators, and even one captain, are banned from entering EU ports and using maritime services within the EU. For the first time, a ban was also imposed on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines, preventing them from being activated without EU consent.
Sanctions also hit Russia’s financial sector: another 22 banks lost the ability to conduct transactions with EU entities, adding to earlier exclusions from the SWIFT system and other financial services. The Russian Direct Investment Fund and its subsidiaries were also placed on the sanctions list, cutting them off from the European capital market. The new rules expand the ban on the export of dual-use technologies and specialized banking software, and they target military equipment suppliers from third countries, including China, Hong Kong, and Turkey.
Additionally, the EU introduced a ban on importing fuels refined from Russian crude oil, even if sourced from other countries, which will take effect at the start of 2026. If effectively enforced, the new package could further limit Russia’s ability to finance its war effort, striking at its most important sources of revenue and weakening its long-term economic potential.
29.07 – Colombian national responsible for arson attacks in Poland acted on behalf of the Russian Federation
In May 2024, two arson attacks on construction warehouses took place in the Mazovia region the first in Warsaw on May 23, and the second in Radom a week later. Investigations by the Internal Security Agency (ABW) revealed that the attacks were carried out by a 27-year-old Colombian national working for Russian intelligence.
The man received detailed instructions from his handlers on how to choose his targets, how to carry out the arson using Molotov cocktails, and how to arrange transportation. The investigation, conducted by ABW’s Radom office under the supervision of the National Prosecutor’s Office, classified his actions as acts of terrorism.
He was charged with collaborating with a foreign intelligence service and committing terrorist offenses, which carry a penalty of 10 years to life imprisonment. The case has an international dimension, as the man is currently serving an eight-year prison sentence in the Czech Republic, where he was convicted of setting fire to a bus depot in Prague and preparing an attack on a shopping center — also on orders from Russian intelligence.
Analysis of similar cases in Central and Eastern Europe indicates that his actions fit into a broader scheme in which individuals with military experience from Latin America are recruited via messaging platforms such as Telegram. They are then sent to carry out sabotage operations and required to document their actions for Russian propaganda purposes. The Polish investigation into the arson attacks in Warsaw and Radom continues in cooperation with an international team that includes the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Romania.
Law enforcement agencies view these incidents as part of a broader strategy to destabilize the region and undermine the sense of security in allied states.
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