Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
01.06 “It turns out we don’t have enough potatoes” – Putin
In recent weeks, The Moscow Times has drawn the world’s attention to a problem affecting the daily lives of average Russian citizens – the price of potatoes has risen dramatically. This is a continuation of the worsening situation in the food market that began in 2014, when Russia imposed an embargo on a range of agricultural products imported from Europe. However, recent weeks mark the peak of this unusual crisis.
There is an economic tool called the Borscht Index – it is a collection of products used as necessary ingredients for this nutritious soup popular throughout Eastern Europe. Based on the prices of these products, it reflects not only the rise in food prices, but also inflation and the prosperity of Eastern countries. Following its guidelines, things are not going well in Russia.
The products necessary for making borscht have increased year over year by:
Potatoes (wholesale) – 285.5%
Potatoes (retail) – 166.5%
Onions – 87.2%
White cabbage – 56.8%
Butter – 34%
Beets – 11.9%
General food prices – 12%
Food expenses for the average Russian household currently stand at 34.6% (compared to 28.6% last year).
Nevertheless, it is the price of potatoes that is the most striking. The average global wholesale price for a kilogram of potatoes is 15.5 rubles, while in Russia it is 42.4 (excluding VAT). This situation is the result of unfavorable weather conditions, poor harvests, inadequate storage infrastructure (in which around 20–30% of the produce is lost), farmers’ decisions to plant higher-margin crops, sanctions, etc. The Kremlin has decided to increase imports from friendly countries and simultaneously lift tariffs on certain agricultural products until the end of July – a policy that Russia has been implementing since January this year. In addition, price controls have been introduced for these goods. Belarusian leader Lukashenko has also offered help to the Kremlin, at least verbally, by deciding to increase potato production. At the same time, he lifted the embargo on potatoes imported from the European Union.
The trend of rising food prices has persisted in Russia for a long time, and there is no sign of reversal. However, it is worth remembering that the harvest season has not yet occurred, and perhaps the new supplies will partially ease the ongoing crisis.
Potato shortages are the price Russians are willing to pay in exchange for pursuing their imperial dreams.
01.06 Zapad further to the East
Held every four years since 2009, the ZAPAD exercises are organized by the Union State of Belarus and Russia (USBR), serving as a tool for both countries to project power in the region. The exercises are designed to prepare the armies for a potential conflict scenario with NATO and involve the entire military personnel. Some of the exercises take place just 2 kilometers from the Polish border – in Brest. A rifle bullet has a range of about 3 kilometers, which means stray bullets could land on the Polish side, creating a dangerous precedent. The most recent exercises, scheduled for 2023, did not take place, but those that preceded them – in 2021 – served as a prelude to the invasion of Ukraine. The assembled 200,000-strong army could freely deploy in favorable locations during late autumn and early spring before the attack.
In Bishkek, at a meeting of representatives of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member states, the Belarusian Minister of Defense announced that the Zapad exercises would be moved away from the Polish border. This time they are to be held deeper inside Belarus. Additionally, the number of soldiers involved will drop from the planned 13,000 to 7,000. The signal sent from Minsk to the West aims to de-escalate tensions between hostile factions – this is the official position of the Belarusian regime. However, given Minsk’s subordinate role in its relationship with Russia, the information delivered by Lukashenko was most likely prepared in the Kremlin. Moscow may have been trying to gain a better negotiating position in peace talks on Ukraine with the Americans by changing the intensity of the Zapad exercises. The meeting in Kyrgyzstan took place in anticipation of a second round of Russia–Ukraine peace talks being scheduled.
However, according to experts, the statement by Viktar Khrenin means little. The exercises will not take place for several months – around mid-September – and until then, the positions of Belarus and Russia may change. Raimundas Vaikšnoras, commander of the Lithuanian army, is particularly skeptical about the de-escalation promises. Our northern neighbor plans intensive military exercises in August and September – the goal is to be able to respond quickly to potential provocations. Warsaw is also preparing for the Zapad 2025 maneuvers. The Polish Armed Forces will also train near our borders with Russia. The 18th Mechanized Division plays a particularly important role here. Movements of hostile troops will be monitored.
Even though USBR reports the number of soldiers will be 7,000, Western intelligence warns of the possibility of up to 100,000 enemy troops gathering on NATO’s eastern border. This is a recurring motif in Russian strategy, which officially always downplays the number of soldiers participating in exercises. Therefore, the Belarusian minister’s words mean little since they do not reflect actual numbers. In previous years, troop gatherings were approximately: 2009 – 30,000, 2013 – 70,000, 2017 – 70–100,000, 2021 – 200,000, even though every year (except 2009) the official figures stated around 12,000 soldiers. Until the exercises are held, the number of involved personnel will remain unknown. The Deputy Minister of the Polish Ministry of National Defense assures – “Poland will respond to the Zapad exercises […] in an appropriate manner.” Polish officials are also planning NATO exercises in the east of the country – the President of Poland discussed their implementation at the NATO summit in The Hague. The exact details of these talks and agreements have not been made public.
01.06 Operation Spiderweb
The first day of June began the month with positive news coming from the East. The Ukrainians managed to carry out a spectacular attack deep into enemy territory. The operation, planned for 18 months, resulted in the partial destruction of one element of Russia’s nuclear triad – bombers. Ukrainians sent trucks loaded with drones into remote regions of Russia and parked them near military bases. They served as mobile “launchers” for the drones. At the right moment, the roofs of the trucks opened, and the drones installed inside, remotely controlled, flew out to wreak havoc. In the event of signal loss, they were programmed to autonomously complete their route to the target. This represents a breakthrough in military operations, as the drones were “asleep” – pre-positioned on enemy territory and activated only when the opportunity arose, remaining inactive in the meantime.
About a dozen Russian aircraft were destroyed. However, the number of hits that did not completely destroy the planes but merely damaged them remains unclear. Even among reliable sources, there is confusion – the number of successful strikes might range from 10 to 20 to 40. The impact of the damage on the overall capabilities of Russia’s air force is also assessed differently. Here again, the figures range from 10% to 34% – depending on how the subject is defined. The first figure refers to the entire fleet of long-range bombers, the second to “strategic aviation” (whatever that may include), or to the Tu-95 aircraft model (which was not the only target of the attacks). The damages are estimated at a staggering 7 billion dollars. This is especially significant given that the drone fleet used in the attack consisted of about 100 such weapons. Each of these unmanned aerial vehicles costs several hundred dollars. The cost-effectiveness ratio is thus astronomical. It will be difficult for the Russians to rebuild these losses not only because of the cost but also due to limited access to the semi-finished products necessary to manufacture this equipment, as well as limited production capacity, which is already barely sufficient to meet wartime demand.
In addition to these impressive numbers, a significant success for Kyiv is the deep infiltration of Russia. The targets were located in the deep rear of Russian territory, the furthest of which was as far as 4,300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border – in Siberia, in the Irkutsk Oblast, in the city of Belaya (a place located at the same latitude as the center of Russia’s border with Mongolia, less than 400 kilometers inland). Considering the frequent attacks on high-ranking Kremlin officials…
07.06 Russia infiltrated by Chinese intelligence
The Ukrainians are not the only nation whose services have penetrated deep into Russia. The Chinese took advantage of the vacuum in Russian counterintelligence left by spies sent to Ukraine and began infiltrating their ally. Information of particular interest are: Russian military technologies and details of Western weapons used in Ukraine. The decision to conduct extensive intelligence activities is motivated by the desire to gain a technological advantage over Russia and the West, to assess the effectiveness of the Russian army in the war in Ukraine, to expand into the Arctic, Siberia, and Central Asia, as well as to revise the borders established with Russia in the 19th century – the century of humiliations. This concerns the formerly Chinese Priamurye and Outer Manchuria – a region that forms a triangle between the northernmost border of China, northern Sakhalin, and Vladivostok. Chinese mines and research centers serve as spy hubs in Siberia and the Arctic. In the less wild parts of Russia, various spies are recruited: journalists, businessmen, people close to power in Moscow, frustrated and unfulfilled scientists and academics, and even Russian wives of Chinese students in Russia.
One could consider this document another story of the fiction genre, which appear from time to time due to the sudden acquisition of breakthrough documents found in a shroud of conspiracy and secrecy, which appear on the desks of prominent journalists and often contain content that duplicates the narrative of governments involved in the conflict. Also in this case, one can find elements of fantasy, such as the suggestion that the Chinese – out of all the technologies available to them – are interested in the development of ekranoplans. However, regardless of the credibility of these sources, whose authenticity the NYT editorial office failed to verify, attention should be paid to the pro-Asian current existing among Russian decision-makers, which potentially lends credibility to this story.
It is a concept advocating the necessity of changing the Kremlin’s political focus from the West to the East. The logic of this thesis is as follows: Russia’s assault on Europe is pointless because the West is inevitably coming to an end. It is demoralized, degrading on a moral level, and its societies are becoming denationalized. At the same time, it is unable to understand its decline, the loss of its power position in the world, and it is also unable to develop any appealing economic alternative for development in the coming decades. Its position will weaken over time. Asia, on the other hand, is an emerging region with enormous potential, whose diligence and innovation will shift the center of the Earth from the West to the East, effectively ending Europe’s dominance that began with the great geographical discoveries and thus returning to the Asia’s dominance that lasted for millennia before. Russia should therefore abandon Europe and turn East, where long-term development is possible.
This is not a marginal theory because it is represented by Karaganov himself – a figure whose importance cannot be overstated in shaping Russian thought about the formation of the state for the coming decades. Perhaps the above document is a prelude to a greater, strong rivalry between the bear and the dragon in the Far East, which will shape Eurasian politics in the coming decades.
14.06 Ukrainian intelligence carried out sabotage in Kaliningrad Oblast, cutting electricity to Russian facilities
In mid‑June, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) executed a sabotage operation in Kaliningrad Oblast targeting a power substation. The mission took place early on June 14, around 4 a.m., when Ukrainian operatives tampered with the transformer’s cooling system—draining its coolant—and then ignited a fire on the equipment.
The result was a complete power outage at critical sites, especially those connected to Russian military industry and bases, significantly disrupting their operations. Estimated damages reached approximately USD 5 million, delivering a tangible blow to the infrastructure supporting the Russian military apparatus.
This sabotage in Kaliningrad reflects Ukraine’s continued strategy of deploying intelligence operations and sabotage against strategic Russian targets. The aim is to degrade Kremlin’s capabilities in logistics, arms production, and military support. The well‑planned attack struck at technical chokepoints essential to the local power infrastructure’s operation.
20.06 Poland joins an international mission against Russia’s “shadow fleet”
On June 20, Poland, along with thirteen other countries, joined a new joint mission aimed at countering Russia’s so‑called “shadow fleet” operating in the Baltic and North Seas.
This initiative responds to repeated Kremlin efforts to circumvent international sanctions by using obsolete vessels—often stateless or flying false flags—to transport Russian oil and gas, posing threats to maritime security and the marine environment.
Diplomats and government delegations from the UK, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden met and released a joint statement. The signatories called for coordinated actions to counter these Russian maneuvers, particularly those conducted by vessels violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Their collective measures will include monitoring stateless ships and vessels using fake flags, as well as drafting guidelines to enhance transparency in maritime operations and ensure international law compliance.
The goal is to clearly target and block the activities of Russian ships evading sanctions and to secure these waters. The European Union had previously sanctioned about 350 vessels linked to this “shadow fleet,” including banning their entry into EU ports. This new initiative seeks to strengthen and expand those restrictions, exerting even greater pressure on the Kremlin.
The move coincided with Poland’s EU Council presidency, during which Warsaw actively worked to highlight the threats posed by the shadow fleet. A meeting on this issue took place on June 17, 2025, with EU experts and the so‑called NB8++ group, demonstrating Poland’s growing engagement on this issue at the European level.
A military response also formed part of the strategy: in May, the Polish navy ship ORP Heweliusz chased away a Russian tanker suspected of suspicious activity near undersea power cables between Poland and Sweden. This action won praise from Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who emphasized Poland’s readiness to defend maritime infrastructure.
This overall operation is part of a comprehensive strategy combining sanctions, military action, and international cooperation, aiming to limit Russia’s ability to finance the conflict via covert resource transport. The multinational initiative sends a clear signal that regional countries are prepared to act together to protect their strategic interests, security, and the ecosystems of the Baltic and North Seas.
23.06 EU sanctions on Russia stalled—Hungary and Germany push back
The adoption of the European Union’s 14th sanctions package against Russia has hit a roadblock. Both Germany and Hungary have raised objections, stalling progress on the proposed new measures.
The package, due for approval by the end of June, included expanded restrictions on Russia’s economy—specifically targeting LNG trade, sanction‑evasion “shell companies,” and transport by road and sea.
However, EU rules require unanimity among member states, and that consensus is currently missing. Germany has voiced concerns—reported by Reuters—about the impact of “extraterritorial clauses,” which would require European businesses to ensure their third‑country partners also comply with sanctions. Berlin fears this could drive contracts toward less restrictive countries like China or India.
Hungary, maintaining its traditionally more accommodating stance toward Moscow, has repeatedly blocked or delayed additional sanctions, and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán continues to be one of Putin’s closest partners within the EU.
Negotiations on the sanctions package continue, but time is running out. Russia‑critical states like Poland and the Baltic countries are increasingly vocal in their frustration at the drawn‑out process. They argue that delay weakens the EU’s leverage and gives Moscow more time to sidestep existing restrictions.
The European Commission says it’s in active discussions with the governments in Budapest and Berlin to find a compromise. If objections can be addressed, the package might pass in July. If not, the EU will face a serious dilemma regarding its capacity to act in unison against the Kremlin’s aggressive policies.
29.06 On the ISS – former Ukrainian officer convicted of treason now serving in space
Since April, Oleksii Zubrytskyi—an ex‑lieutenant in the Ukrainian Armed Forces—has been aboard the International Space Station (ISS). Reports indicate that Zubrytskyi defected from the Ukrainian military during the annexation of Crimea and joined Russian forces; in 2025, a court in Vinnytsia convicted him of treason to a 15‑year prison term.Born in Zaporizhzhia, Zubrytskyi graduated from the Ukrainian Air Force University in Kharkiv and served as a pilot deployed in Crimea. Following Russia’s takeover of the peninsula, he was ordered to redeploy on May 12, 2014, but refused and instead aligned with Russian side.
According to the Vinnytsia court, from late March to mid‑May 2014, Zubrytskyi was in Sevastopol, where he “acted intentionally, motivated by personal gain, and sided with the enemy,” which the court deemed an act of treason threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.
On April 8, 2025, Zubrytskyi was launched to the ISS. The current ISS crew comprises seven members: Zubrytskyi, JAXA astronaut Takuya Onishi, NASA astronauts Jonny Kim, Anne McClain, and Nichole Ayers, and cosmonauts Kirill Peskov and Sergey Ryzhikov. Additionally, the four‑person Axiom Mission 4 is now aboard, including Polish astronaut Sławosz Uznański‑Wiśniewski—Poland’s second human in space and the first on the ISS—who is expected to conduct two weeks of microgravity research and engage in educational outreach.
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