Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
01.03. The Syrian Express – “Could we be more on the front foot?”
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia lost an important ally in the region. As a result, the lease agreement for the military port in Taurus (the only naval base under Russian control outside its borders) ended prematurely. Despite this unfortunate event, Moscow quickly turned the crisis into an opportunity. The Kremlin ordered the transportation of military equipment from Syria to the Ukrainian front. Although the shortest route from Taurus to Russia passes through the Black Sea to occupied Sevastopol, the connection was rendered unusable due to the ongoing war in the area. Sailors must take a detour through Europe—via Gibraltar, the English Channel, the Danish Straits, and the Baltic Sea, heading toward Królewiec and St. Petersburg. The increased movement of the Russian navy on this route, transporting military equipment from Syria, led the British press to dub it “The Syrian Express.”
The need to pass through the Kaliningrad Strait and Gibraltar—areas controlled by the Royal Navy—was cleverly used by the Russians to send a clear political signal. To transport the military equipment, they chose a ship under U.S. sanctions. Washington’s restrictions prohibit the transport of military goods by the vessel Baltic Leader, which sails the Syria–Russia route. Despite the sanctions, the Russians selected this container ship to transport military equipment. All of this happens under the watchful eyes of the British, who cannot intervene because the Baltic Leader is escorted by warships, and the Russians are exercising their rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The British had no choice but to monitor the Russian convoy. It is a direct insult to all European nations that the convoy will pass.
This is a clear test of the British. Especially since the general activities of Russian warships around the Isles have intensified. The British government accused Russia of espionage—mapping the United Kingdom’s underwater infrastructure. In the summer, a Russian submarine was observed in waters surrounding Scotland. Adding to this is the Syrian Express, whose name speaks for itself.
The Labour Party seems to have no concrete plan to counter Russia’s provocations. In response to a question from an anxious parliamentarian: “Could we be more on the front foot?”, and “Aren’t we being too ‘soft’?” the Minister of Defence pointed out that the government is actively fighting Russia on other fronts—by financing Ukraine and organizing a Coalition of the Willing. He also mentioned that in a scenario where the Russians were to sever underwater cables, the English would not retaliate in the same manner.
Although not directly, the parliamentarian got his answer.
04.03. Russkiy korabl, idi…
While the number of ships in the North Sea is increasing, their number in the port of Gdynia is decreasing—by at least one.
“Katanga” (Хатанга) is a Russian tanker that measures 150 by 26 meters, weighs 15,000 tons, and was used to transport oil and its derivatives. Since 2017, it has been moored in the port of Gdynia, rusting and posing a threat to the environment, port infrastructure, maritime safety, and the Polish state. The ship got stuck in Poland when it failed its technical inspection, and as a result, it was detained at the port for the necessary repairs. In 2020, the ship’s owner, the Murmansk Shipping Company, declared bankruptcy, leaving the tanker ownerless. By law, the port cannot take control of the ship without the consent of the bankruptcy trustee. Unfortunately, contact with the trustee is difficult.
According to a source from Radio Zet: “From time to time, the Russians sent a representative to check if the ship was still there, but the last one got deported, and contact was lost.” The ship is incapable of sailing on its own, lacks power, has no crew, and there is no contact with its owner. The vessel occupies space on the pier, and its maintenance has cost the port a total of 13 million PLN. The Poles cannot board the ship, so no one knows what is inside, and the contents of Katanga potentially pose a very significant threat.
Ships transporting oil must be properly secured when decommissioned. Tankers undergo “degassing,” which prevents the remnants of the cargo from spontaneously igniting and causing an explosion. This procedure must be repeated periodically. However, the last degassing took place in 2017, and no further degassing has been performed since. The poor technical condition of the ship makes it easy for a spark to ignite a potential explosion of the 15-ton tanker. Since no one can board the ship, the fire department must continually monitor it.
Gdynia is the most important port for the Polish navy. It is here at the Baltic Container Terminal that NATO equipment is unloaded (including equipment that goes to Ukraine). The ship may have intelligence or surveillance equipment on board.
The Internal Security Agency (ABW) and Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) became interested in the ship when it broke loose from its moorings on December 15 and January 12, threatening a nearby vessel used for setting up wind farms. The circumstances of this incident are being investigated by authorities. Anna Szumańska, spokesperson for the Ministry of Infrastructure, commented that “The Ministry of Infrastructure sees no reason for concern.” The management of the Port of Gdynia also reassures. According to the newspaper Wprost, Deputy Minister of Defence Cezary Tomczyk, when asked for a comment, said, “Even if I had heard about it, not much can be said on the matter if the services are dealing with it.” It seems that only the Maritime Office took the potentially dangerous object seriously.
The inaction that has guided the Polish authorities for at least the last five years is unjustifiable in this case. Although the slow decay of the Katanga in port was guaranteed by compliance with international law regarding the trustee’s approval, it is not the only law deciding the fate of the ship. The vessel could be placed on the sanctions list, which would result in the authorities taking control of it. The ship could also be taken due to the increasing debts of the owner, which stem from the costs the port has incurred to maintain the Katanga. To assess the condition of the ship, Port State Control—an international organization set up to address such problems with stateless ships—can easily board. Therefore, the legal loophole is wide open, and the solutions offered are just a few of the available options.
In February, however, the Ministry of Infrastructure had a change of heart on the matter of the threat posed by the Katanga, stating that “the vessel poses a threat to navigation safety and is decommissioned”. Work began in early March to remove the ship. The decision was made about half a month after a series of articles highlighting the issue were published in the media at the end of January. The Gdynia Port Authority will attempt to sell the vessel, with the proceeds covering at least part of the 13 million PLN spent on monitoring it. However, according to unofficial estimates, the ship is worth only 5 million PLN in its current state, leaving Poland with an 8 million PLN shortfall. The invoice for 13 million PLN will be sent to the owner—the same one with whom there is no contact.
20.03 Decree of Vladimir Putin on Regulating the Status of Ukrainian Citizens in Occupied Territories and the Russian Federation
The decree issued by Vladimir Putin on March 20, 2025, concerning the regulation of the status of Ukrainian citizens residing in the territory of the Russian Federation, has sparked significant controversy both internationally and among Ukrainian citizens themselves. The document, which imposes on Ukrainians living in Russia the obligation to regularize their legal status by September 10, 2025, may have serious consequences not only in the context of international law but also in a broader geopolitical dimension.
According to the new regulations, Ukrainian citizens residing in Russia, including those in the occupied areas of Donbas (Donetsk, Luhansk), Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, are forced to carry out formalities related to legalizing their stay or leaving Russian territory. The deadline for completing these formalities is September 10, 2025, which serves as an ultimatum for hundreds of thousands of people living in areas under Russian control. If Ukrainians fail to regularize their status, they may face deportation, and their stay in Russia will be considered illegal.
This decree aims at full control over Ukrainian citizens residing in Russia, fitting into the broader context of the policy pursued by the Kremlin. Such actions may constitute forced assimilation and Russification, aimed at gradually eliminating Ukrainian cultural, social, and political identity. This is part of a larger plan that includes not only demographic changes but also strengthening Russian influence in the occupied regions.
26.03 New Report on the Six-Month Activity of Ukrainian Drones Targeting Russian Critical Infrastructure
According to a joint investigation by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the Ukrainian project Frontelligence Insight, Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities over the past six months have caused estimated losses of 59.4 billion rubles (around 706.5 million USD). The analysis is based on over 100 satellite images showing the aftermath of these attacks.
From September 1, 2024, to February 12, 2025, Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes on Russian territory and occupied areas of Ukraine. Initially, the targets were primarily military facilities, such as ammunition depots, but over time, the focus shifted to oil and gas infrastructure, including fuel storage and refineries.
An example is the attack on the Lukoil refinery in the Volgograd region on February 3, which accounts for approximately 4% of gasoline production and 7% of diesel fuel production in Russia. Damage to the crude oil distillation unit and the loading ramp caused a week-long halt in the facility’s operations, resulting in losses of 1.3 billion rubles (15.5 million USD). Additional costs due to limited production capacity were estimated at 1.8 to 2.9 billion rubles (21.4–34.4 million USD), totaling between 3.2 to 4.2 billion rubles (38.1–50 million USD) in losses, excluding repair costs.
During the analyzed six months, Ukrainian drones attacked a total of 12 fuel depots, 9 refineries, 2 pumping stations, and one gas storage site. As a result of these actions, 50 oil tanks were destroyed, and 47 others were damaged. The most costly attack occurred on October 7 in Feodosia, where 11 storage tanks with a combined capacity of 69,000 cubic meters were destroyed, causing losses exceeding 3.3 billion rubles (39.2 million USD).
Attacks on refineries and gas processing plants have more severe consequences for the Russian economy than strikes on fuel depots due to their greater technological complexity and higher repair costs. In March 2024, Reuters reported that in the first quarter of that year, at least seven Russian refineries had to halt operations due to Ukrainian drone attacks, affecting the processing of 4.6 million tons of oil, or about 7% of Russia’s total refinery capacity.
On March 18, 2025, following a phone call between Russian and US Presidents Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, the Kremlin announced a 30-day mutual suspension of attacks on energy infrastructure. However, despite the planned ceasefire, neither side has made attempts to adhere to the new agreements.
27.03 Crisis of Trust Between Kadyrov and the Kremlin in the Context of Secret Negotiations with the Middle East
Relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have deteriorated in recent months. The cause of the tensions appears to be Kadyrov’s unauthorized negotiations with Middle Eastern countries regarding the future of his assets and the security of his family.
Sources from iStories, including current and former officers of the Federal Security Service (FSB), journalists from the North Caucasus, and human rights activists, report that the FSB informed Putin about these unofficial talks. Kadyrov, concerned about his deteriorating health, was said to have sought guarantees from foreign allies regarding his assets and his family’s security.
In 2024, Novaya Gazeta Europe conducted an investigation that revealed serious health problems for Kadyrov, including issues with his pancreas and kidneys. Kadyrov himself denied these reports, but in recent months, he has made fewer public appearances. The tensions have also affected Kadyrov’s closest political ally, State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov.
According to the Telegram channel VChK-OGPU, Delimkhanov has been avoiding involvement in power struggles since the beginning of 2025, citing a “strict order from above” that forbids Chechen leaders and security officials from engaging in such disputes or drawing public attention. Human rights activist Ansar Dishni added that Delimkhanov is currently staying at the President Hotel in Moscow, which serves as the headquarters for Kadyrov’s representatives in the capital.
Both the Kremlin and the FSB are reportedly displeased with Delimkhanov’s recent involvement in illegal activities, such as extortion and corporate takeovers, without the approval of federal authorities. These reports shed light on the growing tensions between the Chechen leader and the Kremlin, highlighting the delicate balance of power and influence in Russian domestic politics.
31.03 Russian Federation’s Progress Slows Down in March 2025
Russia’s offensive in Ukraine significantly slowed down in March 2025, suggesting a loss of momentum for Russian forces. Data collected by DeepState, a Ukrainian group monitoring frontline lines, indicates that in January 2025, it took the Russians an average of nearly six days to capture an area the size of Manhattan, more than double the time it took in November of the previous year.
In February, the pace further decreased. Russian forces are focusing on eastern regions of Ukraine, such as Pokrovsk, but are encountering strong resistance from Ukrainian forces, supported by combat drones. Additionally, rising casualties among Russian soldiers, recruitment difficulties, and dwindling supplies of armored vehicles are contributing to the slowdown in Russian progress.
Analysts emphasize that military exhaustion, recruitment challenges, and decreasing stocks of military equipment are key factors influencing the slowdown of the Russian offensive. Despite these challenges, Russia continues to concentrate its forces in selected areas, resulting in high losses but limited territorial gains. Both sides of the conflict are seeking to leverage their positions in potential peace negotiations.
Peace Talks
In the context of peace talks regarding the war in Ukraine, three significant events took place in March.
Jeddah, March 11
The representatives of Ukraine and the United States met in Jeddah. This was the first official meeting between the two countries since the infamous row between Trump, Vance, and Zelensky at the White House.
The key agreements were as follows:
- Ukraine agreed to a 30-day ceasefire.
- The resumption of intelligence support and the delivery of military aid to Ukraine by the U.S. (which had been suspended following the aforementioned incident at the White House).
Phone Call, March 18
Donald Trump called Putin. The presidents discussed the future direction of talks aimed at bringing an end to the war, as well as future relations and the need to mitigate Iran’s aggressive policies in the Middle East.
The key points of the call were:
- A 30-day ceasefire was introduced, covering only energy infrastructure.
- The ceasefire lasted only a few hours before being broken by the Russian side. Since then, attacks on energy infrastructure have continued on both sides.
Riyadh, March 23
In Riyadh, delegations from the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine met. However, the talks were conducted bilaterally, with no direct discussions between the Russians and Ukrainians. The Americans first met with the Kremlin representatives and then with the Ukrainian delegation.
The key events included:
- The U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to helping return prisoners of war and stolen Ukrainian children to their homeland. (A few days before this statement, the Trump administration had halted funding for a Yale University project monitoring child abductions.)
- The U.S. announced a ceasefire had been established in the Black Sea.
- Russia stated that a ceasefire would only be established once several conditions were met.
(Note that Ukrainians and Russians have different definitions of the term “ceasefire.”)
Russia laid out specific demands:
- Lifting restrictions on the sale of Russian food and fertilizers.
- Resumption of grain transport in the Black Sea.
- Return of the Russian Agricultural Bank to the SWIFT system.
Experts say these demands are signals to Russia’s partners in the Global South, which are responsible for 75% of the recipients of Russian fertilizers and food. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the Grain Initiative, which aimed to normalize food transport through the Black Sea. As for the sanctions imposed by the West on Russian food and fertilizer exports, none exist. European partners have refrained from such actions, fearing destabilization in developing countries. Only the return of the Agricultural Bank to the SWIFT system would bring about a real change.
Russia’s signal to its partners in the South suggests that the West is obstructing delivery or artificially inflating the price of food products purchased from Russia.
It is unclear what the ontological status of a “ceasefire” is or what it truly entails. Each interested party has a different perspective on the matter, excluding each other’s views. If Russia decides to implement a ceasefire only after its demands are met, it can probably be concluded that there is no ceasefire, as the demands remain unmet. However, Russia defines its demands in such a way that they cannot be fulfilled, such as the removal of sanctions that do not exist (on Russian food).
The most important takeaway from the peace talks in Riyadh is the question: Does Russia truly want peace?
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