Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
01.12 – Turkey balances between Russia and the US, tilting toward Washington
In November, India and China decided to significantly reduce their imports of oil from Russia (as we reported in the previous issue of Oko). The decline in demand caused a sharp drop in the price of Urals crude relative to the global benchmark. The reason is the fear among existing counterparties of secondary sanctions, which – under a decision by the US administration – are to be imposed on economic entities cooperating with Lukoil and Rosneft.
Following New Delhi and Beijing, Ankara took a similar step. A report published at the very beginning of December presents data showing a significant decline in imports of Urals crude from Russia to Turkey. As Reuters reports, in November “deliveries […] fell by 100,000 barrels per day compared with October levels, and total imports dropped last month to around 200,000 barrels per day.” The gap in the market is being filled by Turkish imports of Kazakh and Iraqi oil.
After the invasion, Turkey became a lucrative export market for Russia, which had lost easy access to the European market. Between September 2024 and September 2025, exports of crude oil and petroleum products to Turkey increased by 30 percent, with nearly 70 percent of the volume originating from Russia. The scale of imports makes Turkey Moscow’s third most important partner (after China and India).
In September, Erdoğan visited the White House for the first time since 2019. He met with the US president to discuss bilateral relations. In this context, the most important signal from the meeting was clear US pressure to end Turkey’s imports of Russian raw materials. In return, Ankara would be reinstated in the joint F-35 fighter jet program, and the sanctions imposed on Turkey in 2019 would be lifted. It is worth noting that those sanctions were intended to punish a NATO member for purchasing Russian military equipment – the S-400 missile system, a surrogate for the American Patriot – whose operation near new F-35s would facilitate Russian intelligence collection on allied equipment.
Currently, Ankara – balancing American and Russian influence – has decided to accept Trump’s conditions. First, by limiting imports of Russian oil. Second, by reducing imports of Russian gas (which goes hand in hand with the announced purchase of larger volumes of American energy resources). Third, by once again raising the issue of accession to the F-35 program. A precondition for resuming cooperation could be Ankara’s decision to “hand over” the S-400 systems to Russia – an option Erdoğan reportedly discussed with Putin during their meeting in Ashgabat in mid-December of this year.
Everything indicates that Trump has been successful in exerting pressure on Ankara. The real litmus test of Erdoğan’s compliance will be the US president’s consent to Turkey’s return to the joint F-35 initiative.
15.12 – Armed crews of the shadow fleet
The Chief of the Operational Staff of the Swedish Navy, Marko Petrovic, warns of increased activity by Russian ships and vessels in the Baltic Sea. Moscow’s new tactics include intensified submarine activity as well as an increased, almost permanent military presence of surface vessels near shipping lanes. However, perhaps the most interesting change has occurred aboard the so-called shadow fleet. Alongside civilian sailors, armed individuals dressed in military clothing have appeared.
The navy chief’s information coincides with Danish reports from November this year. The investigative outlet Danwatch obtained information from local seafarers about armed personnel in military attire aboard shadow fleet vessels. One of the witnesses is Bjarne Cæsar Skinnerup, a maritime pilot by profession, responsible for guiding ships through the shallow and narrow waterways of the Danish Straits. Due to his work, he regularly appears on the bridges of all kinds of cargo vessels.
According to his accounts, since the full-scale invasion, professionalism and cooperation on some ships have been replaced by an atmosphere of intimidation, enforced by armed individuals in military clothing. Bjarne testifies that these individuals appear on vessels that most likely belong to Russia’s shadow fleet. Their presence is intended to pressure pilots into overlooking irregularities in the documentation of ships transiting the straits, such as the absence of insurance.
Although NATO states do not have legal tools to arbitrarily detain civilian vessels in international waters, they are not powerless in the face of Russia’s increasing activity. Launched in January 2025, the operation “Baltic Sentry” coordinates a multinational NATO effort focused on monitoring the Baltic Sea – especially seabed infrastructure – and deterring sabotage.
17.12 – The European Union introduces a ban on imports of Russian gas
The European Parliament approved a resolution banning imports of Russian gas into EU member states. While the idea had been raised in the years following the 2022 invasion, member states managed to reach consensus only now. Until recently, only two countries opposed such a solution – Hungary and Slovakia. Their resistance prevented a vote under the unanimity rule. European states therefore decided to use qualified majority voting.
The lack of agreement from both countries stems from their deep dependence on Russia. Despite a significant reduction in energy imports compared to 2021, they remain Moscow’s largest partners in Europe.
Before the invasion, in 2021, 45% of the gas consumed in the EU came from Russia. Currently, that figure stands at 19%. The plan to gradually cut off supplies from the east is spread over two years, with specific implementation dates:
- 01.01.26 – Ban on signing new gas supply contracts
- 17.06.26 – Termination of short-term contracts still in force
- 31.12.27 – Termination of long-term contracts still in force
(The EU foresees a number of exemptions for landlocked states, most likely designed with Hungary and Slovakia in mind.)
Currently, the largest importers of Russian natural gas are (according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, data for August this year):
- Hungary – EUR 416 million
- Slovakia – EUR 275 million
- France – EUR 157 million
- Netherlands – EUR 65 million
- Belgium – EUR 64 million
The introduction of the gas import ban triggered a Hungarian-Slovak response. Representatives of both states are questioning the legitimacy of Brussels’ decision and intend to pursue their claims through legal channels within EU judicial institutions.
At the same time, the EU is not ending its process of cutting itself off from Russian energy resources. While the gas issue has been regulated, decision-makers are now examining oil imports. The EU’s official position – similar to that on gas – is to eliminate imports of Russian oil by the end of 2027. However, work on this issue is less advanced than in the case of gas, and a precise timetable has not yet been established.
Actions taken so far by member states regarding oil have resulted in a significant reduction in imports over the past four years. In the first quarter of 2021, Russian oil accounted for 29% of Europe’s energy mix; by the third quarter of 2025, this share had fallen to just 1%.
10.12 – The American plan to limit support for Ukraine
In December, as every year, Congress approved the military budget for the following year. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was passed, under which Washington plans to spend USD 901 billion on defense in 2026. Within this framework, a separate amount was earmarked for support to Ukraine, and the competencies of entities responsible for implementing this assistance were redefined.
The specific program through which military aid to Ukraine is channeled is called the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Its budget for the next two years was set at USD 400 million per year. This figure must be placed in the broader context of previous US assistance to understand its real value for Ukraine. In 2024, as much as USD 14 billion was allocated to USAI (not all of which has yet been spent). The program thus recorded a 97% decrease. Additionally, the newly established amount has only been allocated to USAI; this does not guarantee that the funds will actually be used.
Nevertheless, such a radical change does not mean a complete cessation of US assistance to Ukraine, but rather a change in the way it is delivered. The US no longer transfers weapons directly to Ukraine but sells them en masse to Europeans, who then forward them to Kyiv. Europe, without American support, has consistently failed to maintain previous levels of assistance, which in October this year resulted in the lowest tranche of aid to Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion (according to the Kiel Institute).
The NDAA also reflects another trend that will have a tangible impact on the future model of managing US assistance to Ukraine and may constitute moderately positive news:
- the possibility of using USAI funds approved back in 2024 was extended until 2029;
- the president may not suspend intelligence assistance to Ukraine without congressional approval (as Trump did in March this year);
- from now on, the Pentagon may not cancel the delivery of military equipment contracted for Ukraine in favor of its own stockpiles (a response to a June incident in which the Department of Defense classified 20,000 units of anti-drone equipment – specifically produced for Kyiv – as part of its own inventory and sent them to Israel and US military bases in the Middle East).
These important provisions indicate a clear rift within the Republican Party between its “old” members and the MAGA movement. They point to a partial divergence between Congress and the president and his political base. Trump seeks to expand the prerogatives and agency of the US presidency, often at the expense of congressional influence, while the party’s core favors a more collective approach to policymaking and the preservation of Congress’s traditional role. At the same time, a new NDAA provision imposing a minimum threshold of 76,000 US troops stationed in Europe (currently around 80,000) suggests greater engagement by “old” Republicans in European security, as it contradicts the core assumptions of the MAGA movement, which seeks to leave Europe’s security in European hands.
The conflict is thus visible on two levels: first, the division of competencies between Congress and the president; second, engagement in assistance to Ukraine and broader involvement in European security policy. This rift may give Kyiv grounds for cautious optimism, as there is a possibility of a post-Trump shift among Republicans back toward a more traditional US role in Europe. For now, however, it remains unclear how likely this scenario is.
18.12 – EU Expands Pressure on Russia’s Shadow Fleet: 41 Additional Vessels Sanctioned
The Council of the European Union decided to impose sanctions on a further 41 vessels linked to the so-called shadow fleet — a network of tankers and ships used by Russia to circumvent Western restrictions on the export of crude oil and petroleum products. As a result, the total number of vessels targeted by EU restrictive measures has risen to nearly 600. Under the new sanctions, the listed ships are barred from entering EU ports and are no longer allowed to use a wide range of port and maritime services within the European Union.
According to EU decision-makers, the measure is intended to reduce Russia’s ability to export energy resources and to limit funding for its military operations. In its justification, the Council stated that the sanctioned vessels were primarily involved in bypassing the price cap mechanism on Russian oil, supporting Moscow’s energy sector, transporting military equipment, or taking part in the shipment of stolen Ukrainian assets, ranging from grain to cultural property. The expansion of the sanctions list forms part of a broader EU strategy aimed at further reducing revenues from Russia’s maritime oil exports, one of the key sources financing both its economy and the war in Ukraine.
Earlier decisions in recent weeks also included sanctions against individuals and entities facilitating the operations of these vessels, increasing pressure on the logistics chain of the shadow fleet. The decision of 18 December represents a continuation of the EU’s policy toward Russia’s aggression, seeking to undermine the financial foundations of the conflict through increasingly stringent restrictions on entities involved in fuel exports and activities supporting Moscow. In its official statement, the EU emphasized that it remains ready to intensify pressure further if necessary to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region.
23.12 – Status of the Russian Offensive in the Second Half of December 2025
As of 23 December 2025, the Russia-Ukraine war remained a high-intensity conflict, despite nearly four years having passed since the start of the full-scale invasion. From late November through the third week of December, Russian forces recorded further, albeit limited, territorial advances. Over the course of less than a month, Russian troops took control of an area exceeding 130 square miles, in line with the average pace of expansion observed in the second half of 2025. Particularly notable shifts in the front line occurred between 16 and 22 December, when Russia gained more than 50 square miles of territory, indicating sustained military pressure despite heavy losses.
The human cost of the conflict remains severe. Since the beginning of the war, Russia is estimated to have lost nearly 800,000 soldiers killed or wounded, with tens of thousands listed as missing. Ukrainian losses are also immense, amounting to several hundred thousand killed or wounded military personnel. The war has also claimed thousands of civilian victims, especially in Ukraine, where the number of civilian casualties significantly exceeds figures reported by Russia. These statistics reflect the scale of destructive shelling and missile strikes targeting cities and civilian infrastructure. Alongside personnel losses, both sides have suffered massive equipment losses. Russia has lost tens of thousands of weapons systems and military vehicles, including large numbers of tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and naval units.
Ukraine has likewise lost thousands of combat vehicles and aircraft, further straining its defensive and logistical capabilities. The scale of destruction on both sides confirms that the conflict remains one of the most devastating in Europe since the end of World War II. The consequences of the war are particularly visible in large-scale population movements. In Ukraine, more than ten million people have been forced to leave their homes — some finding refuge in other parts of the country, while millions have fled abroad. Although internal displacement in Russia is far more limited, the country has experienced mass emigration, with hundreds of thousands of citizens leaving for political, economic, and security reasons.
26.12 – Russian Court Sentences Meduza Co-Founder to Five Years in Prison in Absentia
Russia’s judiciary issued a ruling sentencing Galina Timchenko, co-founder and publisher of the independent news outlet Meduza, to five years in prison in absentia. The verdict was based on charges related to leading an organization designated by Russian authorities as “undesirable.” The court’s decision stems from laws prohibiting the operation of such organizations within the Russian Federation.
Timchenko, who has long lived in exile and heads the Latvia-based outlet, did not appear in court. Prosecutors had sought a harsher sentence of six years, but the court ultimately imposed a five-year term. In addition to the prison sentence, the court banned Timchenko from holding managerial positions for the next five years. The ruling represents another stage in the repression of independent media, which in recent years have been systematically marginalized and constrained through legal measures in Russia.
Meduza was added to the list of “undesirable organizations” by Russia’s Prosecutor General’s Office in 2023, effectively eliminating the possibility of its legal operation within the country. Individuals associated with such media outlets may face prosecution for their involvement, even if they reside outside Russia. Russian law enforcement authorities have previously applied various legal measures against Timchenko — in 2024 she was labeled a “foreign agent,” and earlier she was fined for alleged participation in the activities of an “undesirable organization.”
27.12 – Russian Federation Launches Massive Missile and Drone Attack on Kyiv
Ukraine’s capital became the target of one of the largest aerial offensives since the start of the full-scale invasion, with Russian forces deploying 500 unmanned aerial vehicles and 40 missiles, primarily aimed at critical civilian infrastructure. According to statements from Ukrainian authorities, the attack on Kyiv involved hundreds of strike drones and dozens of missiles of various types.
The primary targets were energy facilities and other infrastructure essential to the city’s functioning during the winter. The offensive had serious consequences for residents: in many parts of the capital and surrounding areas, electricity and heating supplies were disrupted, while emergency services battled fires caused by strikes on residential buildings. The President of Ukraine emphasized that the attack demonstrated the scale of the escalation and Russia’s determination to strike civilian targets. Many people were injured, and the extent of the damage indicated that the strikes were both intense and widespread.
The situation was serious enough for Poland to implement additional security measures. Air force units were placed on heightened alert, and several airports in southeastern Poland were temporarily closed to ensure the safety of the region’s airspace.
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