Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
07.11 The U.S. Superficially Diversify Hungary’s Energy Supplies
Like most European countries, Hungary operates its own nuclear power plant — Paks, built in 1982. Budapest is currently expanding the facility with two additional reactors. The completed project, named Paks II, will increase the share of Hungary’s electricity demand covered by nuclear energy from 50% to 70%. In 2014, the expansion contract was awarded — without a tender — to Russia’s Rosatom. The final stage of preparations for Paks II is the start of construction, expected in the first quarter of 2026.
The new reactors were originally intended to run on Russian fuel, just as those at Paks I currently do. However, Hungary has set a course toward diversifying its energy sources, which entails limiting Russia’s role as its primary supplier. On 7 November, Viktor Orbán met Donald Trump in Washington, where the two leaders signed an agreement for the purchase of fuel for the Paks I reactors. It is the first transaction of this kind between the two countries and is valued at USD 114 million. The U.S. will not, however, completely replace Russia as Hungary’s nuclear fuel supplier. Alongside Moscow and Washington, Budapest will also import fuel from France.
The presidents also agreed that, in addition to nuclear fuel, Hungary would purchase USD 600 million worth of LNG from the United States — further reducing its dependence on Russia. Moreover, Hungary was exempted from enforcing sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil.
Despite these developments, the Trump administration’s actions have not significantly weakened Russia’s position as Hungary’s main energy supplier. Compared to Hungary’s annual energy-import budget, the announced sums are relatively minor, and since the beginning of the second invasion Hungary has shown a consistent increase in its import volumes from Russia. This dependence is most evident in crude oil: Russian oil’s share of Hungarian imports has risen from 61% before the invasion to 92% this year. It remains an open question whether the deal with the U.S. is a one-off gesture or a prelude to Washington’s deeper involvement in Hungary’s energy sector.
10.11 The End of the Beginning of Sudan–Russia Cooperation
With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia lost its only overseas naval base. The end of its lease in Tartus marked a failure of Moscow’s efforts to establish a strategic footprint in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The planned alternative to the Syrian base was the port in Sudan’s aptly named city of Port Sudan. Such a shift would have moved Russia’s center of regional engagement from the Middle East to the more distant Red Sea, but it would have enabled the Kremlin to fulfill its ambition of maintaining a naval base south of the Bosporus and Dardanelles.
Russia initiated efforts to secure a base in Port Sudan as early as 2017. Political instability in Sudan delayed progress, as successive governments rose and fell and Moscow’s alliances with Sudanese factions shifted accordingly. Despite these obstacles, earlier this year Sergei Lavrov and Ali Yusuf al-Sharif agreed that Russian forces could begin stationing in Port Sudan.
Ten months after the agreement, Russian ambassador Andrei Chernovol announced a “suspension” of the joint initiative due to Sudan’s ongoing internal conflict. However, according to the Progress Center for Policies, the decision to halt cooperation came from Khartoum, not Moscow. In this interpretation, Sudan is attempting to balance the influence of competing external powers. Distancing itself from Russia may be intended to bring Khartoum closer to the United States — and, consequently, to Israel.
Khartoum may be maneuvering toward normalizing relations with Tel Aviv and returning to the Abraham Accords framework, an initiative launched by Donald Trump during his first term. In 2021, this strategy brought Sudan tangible benefits when the U.S. removed it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. However, Sudan never implemented the agreement.
12.11 Sharp Decline in Russian Oil Prices
According to Kommersant (followed by most news outlets), Urals crude — the benchmark for Russian oil — is being sold at a record discount compared to the global benchmark, Brent.
The current discount is around USD 20 per barrel. This is not the largest markdown offered by the Kremlin during the second invasion of Ukraine: the record was roughly USD 30 per barrel in Q2 2022 and Q1 2023. However, at that time global prices were much higher — around USD 110 in 2022 and USD 80 in 2023. Today, Brent trades at roughly USD 63 per barrel. If Kommersant’s calculations are accurate, this implies a discount of around 30%.
At the end of November, the Russian Central Bank announced that the official Urals discount had reached 23% — a six-percentage-point increase compared to the previous month.
This sudden and steep drop in Russia’s revenue is the result of U.S. sanctions imposed on Rosneft and Lukoil — the main exporters of Russian crude. According to the U.S. Treasury, the sanctions were introduced due to Russia’s lack of “serious engagement in peace negotiations regarding Ukraine.” The specific goal of the sanctions is to “degrade the Kremlin’s ability to generate revenue used to fuel Russia’s war machine and support its weakened economy.”
18.11 China and India Reduce Purchases of Russian Oil
Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil have led to a decline in demand for Russian oil in India and China. Former clients fear secondary sanctions, which the U.S. administration had already threatened in October. The deadline for phasing out cooperation with these two companies was set for 21 November.
Russia continues to offer oil to Beijing and New Delhi, both officially and via the “shadow fleet” and other intermediaries that help circumvent sanctions. However, this oil is no longer as attractively priced: it is now nearly as expensive as Brent. Its price has still fallen somewhat — now USD 2–4 below Brent — but it is increasingly avoided due to the time-consuming, complex, and risky procedures necessary to remain “in the shadows.”
As Washington expected, India’s largest refineries halted imports of Russian oil by declining to sign December purchase contracts (which are renewed monthly). Five Indian refineries — collectively responsible for roughly 60% of India’s Russian oil imports — took this step. A major exception was the state-controlled Indian Oil Corp., which continues purchasing via intermediaries but not directly from Russia. Another exception is Nayara Energy Ltd., half-owned by Rosneft. India is compensating for reduced Russian supply by increasing imports from the Middle East and, naturally, from the United States.
China is following India’s lead. Although Beijing has not moved as abruptly, major Chinese companies are also limiting their ties with Russian crude. Among the most important refiners suspending seaborne imports are PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, and Zhenhua Oil — together responsible for about half of China’s refinery capacity. The other half is controlled by small “teapot” refineries.
Crucially, Chinese companies are withdrawing specifically from purchasing Urals crude — shipped mainly from western Russian ports and the key variety exported to India. China still receives ESPO crude via land routes from eastern Russia, which meets most of its demand for Russian oil. Unlike Urals, ESPO is not heavily discounted; its price is close to, though still below, Brent. The smaller discount reflects established infrastructure and supply chains, the higher quality of ESPO, and its easier refinement.
Nevertheless, China is reducing its purchases of Russian oil. Russian crude accounts for 45% of China’s total oil imports, with overall demand at around 12 million barrels per day. China’s withdrawal from Urals alone represents a significant loss for Russia.
20.11 Attack on the Polish Ambassador in Russia – Incident in Saint Petersburg and Warsaw’s Reactions
A dangerous situation involving the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Russian Federation occurred in Saint Petersburg. While walking along the city’s main street, Nevsky Prospect, he was surrounded by a group of demonstrators who initially shouted offensive slogans at him and then attempted a physical attack. Thanks to the intervention of his security detail, the ambassador avoided serious injuries. A spokesperson for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the group of protesters carried banners with anti-Polish and anti-Ukrainian slogans. According to the ambassador, the action was well-organized, indicating that the incident was not accidental.
The diplomat sent a diplomatic note of protest to the Russian authorities, demanding explanations. The reaction of the Polish authorities was immediate; besides the official protest, the entire event was sharply criticized. According to former Polish Ambassador to the USA Marek Magierowski, the attack was an “unacceptable act” and a clear violation of diplomatic norms. Meanwhile, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, reminded that it is the host country — in this case Russia — that is responsible for the safety of accredited diplomats. The Russian side, as reported, received the note of protest and declared that “such incidents should not occur.” Despite these assurances, the incident has significantly deepened tensions in Warsaw-Moscow relations.
25.11 New US Peace Proposal for Ukraine and Republican Criticism
The US administration presented a new proposal to end the war in Ukraine, which immediately sparked strong reactions not only in Europe but also within the ruling political camp in the US. The plan, authored by the Donald Trump administration, included, among other things, limiting Ukraine’s armed forces, Ukraine renouncing its NATO membership aspirations, and transferring parts of the heavily fortified eastern territories currently under fighting to the control of the Russian Federation. The proposal was presented as a possible path to ending the conflict, but its terms were quickly criticized even by members of Trump’s own party in Congress.
Among the harshest critics was Senator Mitch McConnell, who compared the plan to “capitulation” and expressed the belief that forcing Ukraine to concede to the aggressor would not lead to lasting peace. Similarly, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker, described the document as full of serious flaws, doubting that it could ever lead to a stable ceasefire. Representative Brian Fitzpatrick called the plan “Russian propaganda” and urged its rejection as “unserious.” Critics point out that the conditions proposed weakening Ukraine’s defense, renouncing NATO, and ceding territories actually serve Kremlin interests rather than achieving real peace. According to many commentators, instead of pressuring Russia, the offer could be perceived as a reward for aggression. Meanwhile, the US administration, together with the Ukrainian delegation and European allies, is negotiating a possible revision of the plan. Parties have expressed willingness for further negotiations, though it has not yet been disclosed which points may be changed.
27.11 Russia Closes the Polish Consulate in Irkutsk — Response to Closure of Russian Consulate in Gdańsk
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its intention to close the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Irkutsk. The facility is scheduled to cease operations on December 30, 2025. At the same time, the Polish ambassador was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow. Moscow presented the decision as a response to Warsaw’s earlier closure of the Russian consulate in Gdańsk, which, according to the Russian side, was a “hostile and unfounded” action. For Poland, this move was not a surprise. A spokesperson for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that, while they accept Russia’s decision, there are no justified reasons to close the consulate.
He also emphasized that Poland is not involved, as the Russian MFA claimed, in any acts of terror or sabotage on Russian territory. The closure of the facility is a classic example of diplomatic retaliation. The Irkutsk consulate played a special role, providing care for, among others, descendants of Poles exiled to Siberia. For many, it was a place maintaining ties with Polish heritage. The current situation may result in some documents and sites of memory, such as graves, being left unattended.
28.11 Merkel retracts her statement “Poland and the Baltic States Bear No Responsibility for Russia’s Aggression”
Angela Merkel addressed interpretations of her earlier statements, which had sparked broad discussion in both Germany and Central and Eastern Europe. The former Chancellor clearly stated that she never attributed any responsibility to Poland or the Baltic states for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. She emphasized that reports suggesting otherwise were the result of misinterpretations and taking her words out of context. Merkel explained that her recollections of diplomatic activities in 2021, when she, together with France, proposed EU-level talks with Russia, were presented in a way inconsistent with her intentions.
Poland and the Baltic states were opposed at the time to engaging in dialogue with Moscow, believing that such actions could be seen as weakening the joint stance against Kremlin aggression. She emphasized that this was not the fault of those countries but a difference of opinion regarding how to conduct foreign policy within the EU framework. The full responsibility for initiating the war rests with Russia and its authorities, as the decision to attack Ukraine was a unilateral action by the Kremlin. She also criticized the way some media presented her position, noting that false interpretations led to unnecessary tensions and misunderstandings. In Central and Eastern European countries, the initial reaction was concern, perceiving the media reports as an attempt to shift responsibility for developments in the East onto countries that had long warned against Moscow’s imperial policy.
29.11 Massive Attack on Kyiv and Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure
The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that 600,000 people in the Kyiv region were left without electricity following attacks on the region’s critical infrastructure by Russian drones and ballistic missiles. Around 36 missiles and 600 unmanned aerial vehicles were launched at targets across Ukraine. Ukrainian energy infrastructure has become a primary target due to the winter season. In addition to energy installations, residential buildings in Kyiv were also targeted.
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