Ksawery Stawiński, Adam Jankowski
10.09 – The Unclear Role of Belarus During the Russian Drone Strike
The Belarusians played an interesting role during the Russian drone strike on Polish territory. The Chief of the Belarusian General Staff, Pavel Muraveiko, reported an unexpected instance of cooperation from Minsk. According to Reuters, Belarusian services reportedly informed Poland and Lithuania about unidentified objects entering their airspace. This information was meant to prepare the Poles for the approaching threat, which allowed them to scramble aircraft in advance and shoot down enemy objects. Moreover, the general emphasized his commitment to continued cooperation, stating: “The Republic of Belarus will continue to fulfill its obligations within the framework of information exchange on the airspace situation with the Republic of Poland and the Baltic states.”
This unexpected assistance from the eastern neighbor comes in tandem with other significant developments concerning Belarus. The day after the drone attack, John Coale – the special envoy of President Trump to Belarus – arrived in Minsk. The purpose of his visit was to begin an attempt to normalize relations between the two countries. As a gesture of goodwill, the Americans decided to lift sanctions on the Belarusian airline Belavia. Lukashenko, in turn, decided to release 52 political prisoners. The reopening of the U.S. embassy in Minsk has been announced, and John Coale himself expressed a desire to further develop bilateral relations.
This event can be interpreted in two ways: either as an American “carrot” for Moscow, showing that the U.S. is indeed willing to make concessions, or as a signal to Belarus that it is not bound to Russia and can mitigate its influence within the country. The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) argues that lifting sanctions on Belavia will not result in a significant financial influx for Belarus, and Russia itself does not seem alarmed by Washington’s actions, while Minsk exaggerates the importance of this contact. Nevertheless, a new chapter in U.S.–Belarus relations has just begun.
28.09 – Massive Drone Attack on Kyiv and Ukraine’s Critical Infrastructure
Russia carried out a large-scale strike operation against Ukraine, involving dozens of missiles and hundreds of drones. The main targets were the Kyiv region and other strategic areas of the country. As a result of the attacks, at least four people were killed and dozens were injured. According to Ukrainian defense forces, Russia launched 595 drones and 48 missiles, of which Ukrainian air defenses managed to shoot down 568 drones and 43 missiles. The attacks lasted for more than 12 hours, hitting both civilian and military facilities.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described Russia’s actions as “vile strikes” and called on the international community to take decisive action. He stated that while the UN General Assembly is in session, Russia “uses every moment, every hour, to attack Ukraine.” Russia, on the other hand, claimed that the targets were military-industrial facilities, including airports, repair plants, energy infrastructure, and elements of military logistics. The Kremlin insisted that it does not strike civilian targets.
However, the effects of the attacks were also felt in the capital — residential buildings, production facilities, and power stations were damaged. In one cardiology facility in Kyiv, at least one person was killed, and among the victims was also a child. Zaporizhzhia was also hit, with nearly 40 people reported injured.
28.09 – Russia Withdraws from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
Vladimir Putin signed a law formally withdrawing the Russian Federation from the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture. The information was announced by government sources. This decision implements an earlier vote in the Russian parliament, according to which Russia would withdraw from this international treaty, to which it had been a party since 1998.
The official justification for leaving the Convention stated that Moscow took this step in response to the Council of Europe’s refusal to grant Russia a seat on the committee overseeing the Convention’s implementation. The move is seen as another step in Russia’s distancing from European institutions and a weakening of international human rights oversight mechanisms. It also means limiting Russia’s formal international obligations regarding the prevention of torture and the right to file complaints with independent monitoring bodies.
29.09 – Increase in Military Conscription in the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing a mass military draft from October 1 to December 31, 2025, described as “the largest autumn conscription in nine years.” The Moscow Times reported that the number of individuals to be called up reaches 135,000 candidates aged 18 to 30, an increase of about 2,000 compared to the same period last year. The largest autumn draft so far took place in 2016, when authorities planned to call up 152,000 people. In recent years, Russia has regularly conducted drafts: in autumn 2022 – 120,000; in 2023 – 130,000; and in 2024 – 133,000.
In addition to the autumn draft, Russia traditionally conducts spring drafts — in 2025, these included about 160,000 conscripts, showing that recruitment remains a key element in maintaining the structure of the armed forces. Moreover, the Russian parliament has been working on legislative changes that could make conscription year-round instead of limiting it to the current two periods (spring and autumn). The proposal would extend draft dates from January 1 to December 31.
It is worth noting that since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has not issued a formal decree ending the partial mobilization announced at that time by Putin. Meanwhile, the basic conscription still covers men aged 18–30. In wartime conditions, professional contract service has become an increasingly significant way of replenishing Russia’s armed forces.
30.09 – Russia Announces Partial Ban on Diesel Exports
Moscow announced that a partial ban on diesel exports will remain in effect until the end of 2025, and the existing ban on gasoline exports will be extended for the entire year. The decision was explained as necessary to ensure stability in the domestic fuel market after a series of Ukrainian attacks on refineries. Russian authorities stated that these new restrictions are part of efforts to maintain balance in the internal market.
The gasoline export ban applies to all exporters, while diesel restrictions concern intermediaries and wholesalers, excluding the producers themselves. Experts believe these measures are unlikely to cause a sharp decline in fuel supply within Russia, as a high export tariff on diesel for non-producer entities was already in place.
The official justification emphasized that the escalation of Ukrainian drone attacks on refinery infrastructure has significantly reduced Russia’s production capacity. Fuel shortages have already been reported in several regions, including Nizhny Novgorod and the Far East. Consequently, Crimea introduced limits on fuel purchases (a maximum of 30 liters per transaction) and froze gasoline prices to prevent public discontent.
03.10 European Union Extends Sanctions Against Russia Over Hybrid Actions and Information Manipulation
The EU Council has decided to extend for another year the resolution imposing restrictions on individuals and entities responsible for destabilizing activities carried out by Russia outside its borders. The renewed measures will remain in force until October 9, 2026. The sanctions list includes 47 individuals and 15 entities. Those targeted are subject to travel bans – they cannot enter or transit through EU territory. In addition, their assets have been frozen, and EU citizens and companies are prohibited from making funds, assets, or economic resources available to them.
The decision stems from growing concerns over Russia’s hybrid operations, including what is known as “Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference” (FIMI) — external information manipulation and interference targeting EU member states and partners. The document recalls that on October 8, 2024, the EU Council adopted a framework for restrictive measures against Russia due to its destabilizing actions. The goal of these measures is to counter the Russian government’s policies and activities that undermine the core principles of the European Union, such as security, independence, and the integrity of member states. In May 2025, this framework was expanded to include new elements: sanctions were extended to assets linked to Russia’s destabilizing operations and to those financially supporting them. The EU also gained the ability to suspend broadcasting licenses of Russian media outlets involved in spreading disinformation.
03.10 The “Drone Wall”: Ambitious Vision Meets Harsh Reality
The European Union is increasingly emphasizing the need to strengthen its borders against new forms of threats, especially from the Russian Federation. In this context, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed creating a so-called “Drone Wall” — a European defense system against unmanned aerial vehicles. The idea envisions an integrated network for detecting, tracking, and neutralizing drones, which are increasingly used both in military operations and in hybrid warfare.
The initiative was motivated by numerous incidents, including airspace violations by drones coming from the direction of Russia. Von der Leyen stressed that traditional interception methods, such as deploying fighter jets, are not cost-effective. According to her, Europe needs a modern technological solution that can effectively counter these threats without placing excessive burdens on defense budgets. The project does not entail building a physical wall but rather a digital and electronic barrier — a system of radars, sensors, jamming devices, and specialized drones designed to monitor the EU’s eastern flank.
The first phase is to cover states bordering Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with later expansion to the entire Union. The Commission’s goal is for the main infrastructure to be operational within a few years, achieving full functionality by the end of 2027. However, the ambitious plan faces practical obstacles: building such a vast network requires enormous financial resources and coordinated cooperation among all member states. Some governments remain skeptical, particularly regarding funding and the Commission’s competence in defense matters. Experts also point out that even if implemented, the system would not solve all security challenges — drones are only one aspect among others, such as cyberattacks, energy sabotage, and disinformation.
The “Drone Wall” therefore carries symbolic weight. It reflects Europe’s recognition of the need to build its own defense capabilities and reduce reliance on NATO allies. At the same time, it exposes how difficult it is to translate political declarations into tangible results. If realized, the plan could become a milestone toward European strategic autonomy. If stalled by bureaucratic disputes, it may remain merely an ambitious slogan with little impact on citizens’ real security.
06.10 Angela Merkel on Europe’s Mistakes Toward Russia: An Interview Stirring Debate in Poland
Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in a recent interview with the Hungarian online channel Partizán, revisited Europe’s relations with Russia and the circumstances that, in her view, led to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Merkel recalled that as early as 2021 — just months before the outbreak of war — she and then-French President Emmanuel Macron tried to convince the EU to create a new dialogue format with Moscow. She argued that the existing agreements, such as the Minsk format, were losing effectiveness and required renewed political engagement with the Kremlin.
However, her idea did not meet with enthusiasm across the EU. Poland and the Baltic states, in particular, opposed the plan, fearing that talks with Putin might be interpreted as weakness and encourage further aggression. Merkel expressed regret that the EU failed to reach a unified stance on Russia at the time, suggesting that this lack of consensus later hampered diplomatic efforts.
Following the interview, Polish media headlines suggested that Merkel blamed Poland for the war in Ukraine. Yet independent analyses, including reports on disinformation, confirmed that Merkel did not attribute responsibility to Poland. Her comments referred instead to Europe’s broader lack of a common strategy toward Moscow. Experts note that some media outlets distorted her remarks, taking them out of context. In reality, Merkel spoke about diplomatic challenges and the need for a unified European approach, not about assigning “shared blame” to Eastern European countries.
10.10 Developments in the War in Ukraine: Early October 2025
Between October 3 and 10, 2025, Russia intensified its military operations in Ukraine while facing growing domestic challenges. On October 5, intelligence sources reported that Russian forces launched 53 missiles — including two hypersonic Kinzhal weapons — and nearly 500 drones across nine Ukrainian regions. At least five people were killed, and extensive damage was inflicted on the country’s energy infrastructure. Five days later, during the night of October 9–10, Russia carried out another massive strike involving around 465 drones and 32 missiles targeting Ukraine’s power and gas facilities, temporarily cutting electricity to over a million residents.
Meanwhile, Russia itself saw an increasing number of drone attacks, reaching as far as the Ural and Tyumen regions, raising questions about the effectiveness of its air defenses. On land, Russian troops gained an additional 34 square miles of territory in the week ending October 7 — a 162% increase from the previous week’s 13 square miles. Over the four-week period from September 9 to October 7, territorial gains totalled 166 square miles. President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia had captured nearly 5,000 km² (about 1,930 sq mi) of Ukrainian territory in 2025, though independent assessments put the figure closer to 3,153 km² (around 1,217 sq mi).
In international affairs, the key topic was Donald Trump’s proposal to sell long-range Tomahawk missiles to NATO countries, potentially to be supplied to Ukraine. On October 6, Trump said he had “somewhat made up his mind” but wanted to know Ukraine’s intended use first. Russia warned of a “serious escalation,” with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claiming the missiles could carry nuclear warheads. Some senior Russian lawmakers even hinted at striking the Polish base in Rzeszów — a crucial logistics hub for Western aid to Ukraine.
On arms control, Russia offered to extend the New START treaty by one year beyond its February 2026 expiration. Trump called the idea “a good one” without elaborating on the terms. The Kremlin reacted cautiously, noting uncertainty about resuming inspections or data exchanges, leaving Moscow’s true intentions unclear.
13.10 Russian Couple Accused of Espionage and Attempted Bombing in Poland
In recent proceedings before the District Court in Sosnowiec, Polish prosecutors filed charges against a married couple – Russian citizens Igor R. and Irina R. – accused of cooperating with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). According to investigators, the pair collected and transmitted information potentially harmful to the Republic of Poland. Prosecutors allege that from February to August 2022, Igor R. acted on behalf of the FSB, gathering intelligence on Russian opposition activists residing in Poland and on institutions supporting them.
These materials were allegedly passed to his wife Irina, who then transmitted them from Polish territory — directly or through intermediaries — to Russian intelligence. Additionally, Igor R. was charged with sending a parcel containing an explosive device in July 2024, assisted by two Ukrainians and another Russian. The package was discovered in a courier company’s warehouse in the Łódź region.
Experts from Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) determined that the parcel contained nitroglycerin, Soviet-made electric detonators, a modified power bank serving as a triggering device, a thermos with a shaped-charge insert, and a bag of powdered aluminum. The entire setup was classified as a “shaped-charge bomb,” capable of causing significant damage to infrastructure. The couple was arrested in July 2024 and has remained in custody since.
16.10 Frozen Assets
At the outbreak of the war, Russia held its assets in Western financial institutions. Approximately €200 billion of these were located in EU countries. Most of this money went to Euroclear – a private institution and securities depository based in Belgium. It holds about €185 billion of this amount, currently mostly converted into cash. The question of how to use frozen Russian assets has been discussed in the infosphere since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine. In October, a renewed debate on this solution emerged, initiated by the European Commission.
There is no law allowing the European Union to take ownership of the financial resources of any country from a private financial institution. While new precedents have been established through the EU decision to confiscate the interest generated from the aforementioned funds to finance Ukraine’s military effort, confiscating the entire original amount is problematic. Russia could resort to arbitration institutions and pursue its claims, e.g., at the International Court of Justice, where the law would likely be on its side.
To circumvent this problem, Ursula von der Leyen proposed the following solution: The European Central Bank (ECB) would issue a zero-coupon bond, which would then be fully purchased by Euroclear using the cash left in Belgium by the Russians. The EU would then use these funds to cover the Ukrainian military’s current needs, thus incurring debt to Russia. However, repayment of the debt would be conditional upon Russia fulfilling a series of requirements set by the EU regarding Ukraine’s reconstruction and the payment of war reparations. In this way, Russia would additionally pay for the possibility of being repaid by Europeans. The actual guarantors of the repayment of Russian funds would be individual European countries, with the new debt distributed according to the size of their economies. Due to the number of member states, the process of reclaiming the funds would certainly be complicated for Russia, as it would require a separate procedure for each case.
Thus, the European Commission bypassed the problem of lacking legal mechanisms to simply confiscate another state’s resources. While opposition from Slovakia and Hungary could be bypassed by voting for the resolution with a qualified majority, or simply excluding these countries from the plan and distributing their financial obligations among other EU members, Belgium itself raised reservations. While the EU argues that financial obligations will be compensated by member states, Belgium is currently responsible for the Russian account, and the decision to release the funds could affect the credibility of its financial institutions for foreign investors. Due to the opposition of those involved, the matter is at a deadlock along with the Russian assets.
16.10 Europe Wants to Be Ready for War with Russia by 2030
The European Commission published a document proposing a solution to Europe’s current weak military condition. It identifies the Russian Federation as a threat to its security and outlines military areas that need to be strengthened to prepare for conflict.
These areas include:
- Air and missile defense
- Strategic capabilities (e.g., communications, reconnaissance, logistics)
- Artillery systems
- Military mobility
- Missiles and ammunition
- Cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare
- Drones and counter-drone systems
- Land forces
- Navy
Improving Europe’s military situation is to be achieved through the creation of various “Member States’ Capability Coalitions,” which will work together to enhance specific areas. These units will remain in constant contact with the Foreign Affairs (Defense) Council, facilitating the financing of projects with EU funds.
The planned timeline for achieving specific goals is as follows:
- Establish Capability Coalitions in all priority areas, appoint leading and co-leading states, and develop implementation plans by 2030 – by Q1 2026.
- Collect preliminary data on EU defense industry capabilities in priority areas, with appropriate Commission support – by mid-2026.
- Launch projects in all priority areas – first half of 2026.
- Organize at least 40% of defense procurement as joint orders – by the end of 2027.
- Ensure the implementation of projects, contracts, and financing necessary to eliminate key capability gaps in priority areas – by the end of 2028.
- Complete all orders funded under the SAFE program, contributing to the elimination of all capability gaps in priority areas – by the end of 2030.
Key projects will include:
- Establishing a comprehensive anti-drone system on the eastern flank
- Creating a pan-European missile defense shield
- Establishing a European space defense system
- Introducing legislative changes to streamline military equipment production
- Deepening security cooperation with Ukraine
- Developing the military market
- Ensuring funding for projects
The document presents all these projects along with their corresponding timelines and milestones. Although differences in security perceptions in Europe may not force all member states to participate, the plan provides Poland with a good tool to use EU funds for its own needs and represents a positive direction for the development of military cooperation among EU member states.
22.10 U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil
Following the spectacular failure of the Russia–U.S. meeting in Budapest, Trump imposed economic sanctions on Russia. This is the first such decision taken by the U.S. president during his second term. The restrictions target Russia’s largest oil companies – Lukoil and Rosneft, their subsidiaries, and their partners, both American and foreign.
These sanctions include:
- Cutting the companies off from the U.S. banking system and financial institutions
- Prohibiting any cooperation with Lukoil and Rosneft by American entities
- Prohibiting any cooperation with subsidiaries of Lukoil or Rosneft (i.e., where either company holds more than 50% ownership)
- Threatening secondary sanctions on non-American foreign entities cooperating with Lukoil, Rosneft, or their subsidiaries
The significance of this decision for Russia’s functioning cannot be overstated. For example, in 2023, crude oil and refined petroleum accounted for 31% and 13.5% of Russia’s revenue, respectively, totaling 44.5%. In recent years, Rosneft accounted for 30–50% of Russian oil exports, and Lukoil 12–14%, together 42–64% of total oil exports. These companies account for 6% and 2% of global oil production, respectively. They supply India – the world’s second-largest importer of Russian oil – with about 60% of Russia’s oil exports. China, Russia’s largest customer, must consider that U.S. sanctions could cover up to 45% of the oil imported from its northern neighbor.
Trump’s decision has already reduced demand for Russian oil in these two countries, as companies importing Russian goods do not want to face secondary sanctions, which could, in the worst case, cut them off from U.S. financial institutions. At the same time, global oil prices per barrel have not dropped, and OPEC+ plans to increase production to replace Russian oil with that produced in the Middle East.
All this places Moscow in a very difficult situation. So far, the Kremlin downplays the sanctions’ significance, to which Trump responded: “We’ll see what happens in six months.”
23.10 Nineteenth Sanctions Package
While the U.S. decision was unexpected, Europe introduced the long-awaited 19th sanctions package. It continues the EU’s policy of increasing pressure on Russia, updating every six months the entities subject to economic restrictions, which limit the financing of Russia’s war.
In addition to the standard procedures – expanding the list of shadow fleet ships, restricting dual-use goods sales, limiting European access to certain Russians – the 19th sanctions package introduced two notable changes.
First, a ban on importing Russian LNG into Europe will come into effect from January 2027 (including Slovakia and Hungary).
Second, Chinese companies importing large quantities of Russian oil or helping Russians circumvent sanctions will also be targeted.
The Chinese factor is important because it coincided with the U.S. decision, increasing Western pressure on Russia’s most important client.
24.10 Unfavorable Economic Forecast for Russia
While Russia’s economy continues to function, its condition is steadily deteriorating.
The Central Bank of Russia’s previous policy was largely autonomous from the interests of the Russian defense industry and often contrary to its needs (mainly through very high interest rates – 21% as of April this year). The gradual lowering of interest rates over the past six months (after the latest reduction on October 24, currently at 16.5%) suggests the Kremlin risks higher inflation by prioritizing better conditions for business operations. This may indicate declining autonomy of the Russian Central Bank, whose head had previously prioritized state-owned corporate interests. Elvira Nabiullina informed journalists that interest rates will be gradually lowered to around 13–15% in 2026.
A recently published document by the Central Bank – “Monetary Policy Assumptions for 2026–2028” – outlines its policy for the coming years. Under current macroeconomic trends, it predicts a baseline scenario of Russia’s GDP growth at 1.5–2.5% for 2025–2028, aiming for 4% inflation next year.
However, the “baseline” scenario appears optimistic, as the IMF predicts a Russian GDP growth of only 0.6% in 2025, a sharp decline from 4.3% in 2024.
If the Central Bank lowers interest rates to the planned level, it could trigger a negative “pro-inflationary” scenario, in which anti-inflation measures fail, demand continues to outpace supply, labor competition rises, and wages increase. Sanctions may further exacerbate this, forcing Russia to subsidize imported goods with domestic production.
Considering U.S. measures to reduce demand for Russian oil and the IMF’s negative forecasts, 2026 may present serious challenges for the Russian economy – including a recession in the civilian sector and inflation driven by defense industry demand, potentially resulting in stagflation.
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