Selected Aspects of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Policy: The War in Ukraine and Relations with Poland

On February 23, 2025, Bundestag early elections took place. The Christian Democratic CDU/CSU coalition won, while the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second position.
The Social Democrats (SPD) suffered the worst defeat in their party’s history, and the Greens lost 3.1 percent.[1]
It is likely that a new government, led by Friedrich Merz from the CDU/CSU, will be formed by the end of April 2025. The SPD–Green–FDP coalition led by Olaf Scholz is ending amid disappointment and crisis.
Olaf Scholz has shown himself to be a politician who prioritizes national interests over the values promoted by the Greens, such as democracy, the rule of law, or human rights. This often leads to misunderstandings within the coalition and hinders the achievement of common goals.[2]

Olaf Scholz, former Vice-Chancellor and Finance Minister in Angela Merkel’s government from 2018 to 2021, took office as Chancellor on December 8, 2021. The SPD politician received 395 votes from Bundestag members, exceeding the minimum threshold of 369.[3]

The euphoria surrounding the new SPD–FDP–Green coalition quickly gave way to major challenges. About two months into his term, the newly elected chancellor faced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He called this event a historic turning point (in German, Zeitenwende). Under his leadership, the first ever “National Security Strategy of Germany” was created. Its central conclusion was that Russia is the main threat to national security. The strategy’s starting point was strengthening defense readiness together with the North Atlantic Alliance. The 74-page document, however, focused more on issues like biodiversity, feminist foreign policy, climate protection, or pandemic prevention than on specific military solutions. This is evident from the fact that it does not include terms such as army, air force, navy, or reserves.^[4] Apart from a 100 billion euro special fund for modernizing the Bundeswehr, it is hard to see comparable large-scale actions taken by Germany. Only in 2024—two years after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine—did Germany exceed the 2% of GDP threshold for defense expenses.^[5] Specifically, defense-related expenditures reached 2.12% of GDP. The last time Germany met the 2% of GDP goal was in 1991.[6]

The Decline of the “Scholzomat”

In recent years, Olaf Scholz’s popularity has fallen sharply. In 2023, a survey by Infratest Dimap for ARD, Tagesthemen, and Die Welt showed that only 17% of Germans were satisfied with the SPD–Green–FDP coalition. This was the worst result for that coalition so far. Only 20% of respondents gave a positive rating to Olaf Scholz’s performance as Chancellor. In doing so, the SPD politician set a record for the lowest approval rating of any head of government in Germany since Infratest began surveys in 1997.[7]

Scholz’s term did not coincide with a period of economic prosperity. In 2023, the Federal Constitutional Court invalidated the government’s budget, putting the Chancellor in a tough spot. The SPD and the Greens favored higher spending on social welfare and climate protection, while the FDP pushed for fiscal discipline. Scholz tried to balance austerity with citizen support, but the budget dispute led to a conflict with the FDP.^[8] Ultimately, the budget clash caused an irreconcilable conflict between the SPD and the FDP, resulting in the dismissal of Finance Minister Christian Lindner and the collapse of the coalition. This sparked a series of unfavorable events for Olaf Scholz. On December 16, 2024, he failed to secure a majority in the Bundestag on his own confidence vote. This led to early elections on February 23, 2025. Thus, the SPD–Green government under the current chancellor is coming to an end, and he will most likely hand over power to the CDU’s Friedrich Merz.^[9]

From the perspective of the future chancellor of the CDU/CSU, Olaf Scholz “left the country in its greatest economic crisis since the war.” Merz criticized Scholz’s lack of decisiveness on matters of the war in Ukraine, defense, and energy policy, which he believes weakened the competitiveness of German companies.^[10]

Uncertain Aid for Ukraine

The dispute over the “debt brake” (Schuldenbremse), which limits the budget deficit to 0.35% of GDP, affected aid for Ukraine. On July 17, 2024, Reuters reported Germany’s plans to reduce military support for Kyiv—from 8 billion euros in 2025 down to 4 billion euros, then 3 billion in 2026, and finally 0.5 billion from 2027 to 2028. Scholz justified these cuts with the G7’s plan announced in June 2024 at the summit in Apulia. It involved providing Ukraine with 50 billion dollars in loans financed by profits from frozen Russian assets.[11] Nevertheless, the Berlin government’s decision to reduce aid to Ukraine is difficult to reconcile with the intentions laid out in the 2022 National Security Strategy. On the other hand, it could be explained as an attempt to save the ruling coalition by appealing to pro-Russian voters, given the coalition’s falling popularity.

Another controversial move was Scholz’s phone call with Vladimir Putin in December 2024. This action was criticized by EU countries as well as by the opposition in the Bundestag. According to CDU politician Juergen Hardt, Olaf Scholz mainly wanted to show the German public that he stood for negotiations and dialogue. However, his statement about calling on Putin to “withdraw troops” was considered as naive or out of touch with reality. This move weakened the West’s unity against Russia.[12]

No Improvement in Relations with Poland

Olaf Scholz’s term did not favor any thaw in Polish–German relations. Even the change of government in Poland—from the right-wing conservative PiS to a democratic-liberal coalition of KO, PSL, PL2050, and the New Left—did not break the deadlock in bilateral relations. The points of contention between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk included the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022. According to Berlin, Poland helped a Ukrainian suspected of taking part in this incident, which caused diplomatic tension. The list of misunderstandings between the two governments is much longer. Germany took a different approach to the war in Ukraine, especially early on. While Poland actively supported Ukraine by providing, among other things, first tanks, Germany’s help at that stage was limited to sending helmets, and many pro-Russian milieus in Germany considered continuing business with Russia. Likewise, Scholz’s refusal to supply Taurus missiles has remained controversial and has never received his approval.

The resumption of Polish–German intergovernmental consultations in July 2024—after a six-year gap since 2018—did not bring improvement. It rather confirmed the frosty relations and ongoing stalemate. Another point of conflict was Germany’s offer of 1 billion złoty in war reparations, which the Polish Prime Minister deemed unacceptable. Overall, the head of the German government seems not to understand Tusk’s “new” narrative. Tusk is no longer the same politician he was in 2008. A symbolic sign of strained relations was the postponement of the Polish–German Forum, now scheduled for April 2025.[13]

Summary

Olaf Scholz comes across as inconsistent and overly cautious, often avoiding clear declarations. His stance frequently seems ambiguous, as if he deliberately left himself room to withdraw when convenient. In policies regarding the war in Ukraine, he lacks clarity. He appears more interested in returning to pre-2022 “business as usual” than in decisive action. Examples include blocking the transfer of Taurus missiles to Ukraine and delaying increases in financial support. He has also sidelined Poland in key negotiations, in contrast to the approach taken by his Green coalition partners. At the same time, he strives to protect German interests in China, opposing, for instance, customs tariffs on Chinese cars. His vague statements further highlight his cautious—even ambivalent—governing style.

[1] Po wyborach w Niemczech: koalicja CDU/CSU–SPD z kanclerzem Friedrichem Merzem, OSW, 24.02.2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2025-02-24/po-wyborach-w-niemczech-koalicja-cdu/csu-spd-z-kanclerzem, [access: 06.03.2025]

[2] Germany’s foreign policy: A tricky balancing act, Deutsche Welle, 05.07.2023, Germany’s foreign policy: A tricky balancing act – DW – 05/07/2023, [access: 07.03.2025]

[3] Olaf Scholz zaprzysiężony. Niemcy mają nowego kanclerza, Deutsche Welle, 08.12.2021, https://www.dw.com/pl/olaf-scholz-zaprzysi%C4%99%C5%BCony-niemcy-maj%C4%85-nowego-kanclerza/a-60055988, 08.12.2021, [access: 02.03.2025]

[4] Gesamtverteidigung: Annäherung an den Ernstfall, DGAP, 12.02.2025, https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/gesamtverteidigung-annaeherung-den-ernstfall, [access: 06.03.2025]

[5] NATO-Verteidigungsausgaben deutlich gestiegen, Tagesschau, 18.06.2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/nato-verteidigungsausgaben-106.html, [access: 02.03.2025]

[6] SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://milex.sipri.org/sipri, [access: 02.03.2025]

[7] Rząd Scholza z najniższym poparciem w historii, spadła też popularność kanclerza, Bankier.pl, 07.12.2023, https://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Rzad-Scholza-z-najnizszym-poparciem-w-historii-spadla-tez-popularnosc-kanclerza-8659879.html, access: 02.03.2025

[8] Das Ende der Vermittlungsversuche, Tagesschau, 07.11.2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/ampelkoalition-kanzler-scholz-100.html, [access: 02.03.2025]

[9] Olaf Scholz bez wotum zaufania. Droga do wyborów otwarta, Deutsche Welle, 16.12.2024, https://www.dw.com/pl/scholz-bez-wotum-zaufania-droga-do-wybor%C3%B3w-w-niemczech-otwarta/a-71070051, [access: 02.03.2025]

[10] Niemcy w największym kryzysie od lat. „Scholz kompromituje kraj”, TVP INFO, 16.12.2024, https://www.tvp.info/84051337/niemcy-najwiekszy-kryzys-od-lat-wotum-nieufnosci-dla-olafa-scholza-lider-cdu-friedrich-merz-atakuje-kanclerza, [access: 02.03.2025]

[11] Szczyt G7: zapowiedź 50 mld dolarów finansowania dla Ukrainy, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 18.06.2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2024-06-18/szczyt-g7-zapowiedz-50-mld-dolarow-finansowania-dla-ukrainy, [access: 02.03.2025]

[12] Opozycja krytykuje Olafa Scholza po rozmowie z Władimirem Putinem. “Pomógł w propagandzie”, Onet, 16.11.2024, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/fala-krytyki-spadla-na-olafa-scholza-telefon-do-putina-oznaka-slabosci-a-nie-sily/ndvet1x, [access: 02.03.2025]