Authors: Map – Jędrzej Błaszczak, Analysis and information collection – Dominika Rosiewicz
In the second half of 2025, Sergey Lavrov’s diplomacy was marked by high intensity and a clear focus on the countries of the Global South, aimed at countering Russia’s international isolation. This activity, carried out through numerous foreign visits and telephone conversations, concentrated on building Russia’s image as a key actor in a “multipolar world.”
July 2025 was characterized by a diplomatic offensive in Southeast and East Asia. Minister Lavrov participated in the ASEAN ministerial meetings in Malaysia, where he held a series of bilateral talks, including with representatives of China, Laos, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia. A key element of this trip was a visit to North Korea and a meeting with Kim Jong Un, as well as talks in China with President Xi Jinping, confirming the strategic deepening of relations with these partners. In the same month, contacts with Brazil, India, and Turkey were also continued. August saw the continuation of dialogue with Asian and Middle Eastern countries, conducted mainly from Moscow.
September 2025 was dominated by multilateral activity during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Although Lavrov did not pay an official state visit to the United States, he used the UN forum to hold dozens of meetings with foreign ministers from Latin America (Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua), Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, South Sudan, Chad), and Asia (India, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam). On the margins of the session, there were also significant contacts with European diplomacy, including Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár, Hungary’s Péter Szijjártó, and Switzerland’s Ignazio Cassis.
In October and November 2025, Russian diplomacy focused on the post-Soviet space and Asian allies. Lavrov visited Belarus, taking part in meetings in Minsk, and held talks with representatives of Kazakhstan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Important developments also included contacts with the new leadership of North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and renewed talks with Minister Szijjártó. In December 2025, the focus shifted to the African continent. The year concluded with the Second Ministerial Conference of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum in Cairo. In the Egyptian capital, Lavrov conducted a marathon of meetings with representatives of more than fifteen African countries, including Namibia, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania.
Parallel to official visits, throughout the second half of 2025 communication channels with the United States were maintained through regular telephone conversations with Secretary of State Marco Rubio (recorded in July, September, October, November, and December) as well as a direct meeting in New York. This “back-channel diplomacy” served to coordinate actions on global security issues and the situation in Ukraine despite officially strained relations. Overall, Lavrov’s activities during this period demonstrate that Russia is consistently building alternative alliance systems to the West, based on the BRICS framework and direct relations with states that are neutral or sympathetic to its policies.
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