Expert guidance: Sandra Krawczyszyn-Szczotka
In recent years, particularly in the context of global financial crises, the rise of far-right political forces, and the increasing influence of actors such as Russia and China, the liberal order has been criticized, and it has been concluded that the liberal institutional order is eroding and insufficient to address the serious problems and challenges of today. Among these challenges, the advantages of smaller-scale agreements and minilaterals, which operate with more functionality and less bureaucracy and political constraints, have come to the forefront. Minilateralism has a more temporary and flexible structure compared to established and large multilateral organizations. In this global context, and especially in the rapidly transforming Indo-Pacific region, it is considered necessary for the U.S. and its regional allies to adopt a minilateral approach to cope with common threats and challenges (Panda & Ohn, 2024; Allès & Fournol, 2023).
Minilaterals are generally shaped around shared values and are established according to the capacities and interests of the participating states. The balance of power among members, the commitments made, and mutual goodwill constitute the institutional elements that sustain these structures. These arrangements are shaped in line with the principles of inclusivity and pragmatism, which are critical to maintaining the effectiveness and legitimacy of minilateral initiatives (Panda & Ohn, 2024).
Historically, multilateralism and minilateralism have coexisted in the Indo-Pacific. However, the regional structure is changing; the increasing interest of external powers, especially in security and strategic areas, with regional actors encourages closer cooperation among selected regional players. While various regional agendas, visions, and strategies emphasize ASEAN centrality, they fundamentally do not aim to weaken multilateralism. Nevertheless, the proliferation of mechanisms and formats increases the role of bilateral and minilateral cooperation, directing states toward more targeted and flexible partnerships (Allès & Fournol, 2023).
In the last decade, China’s rise has particularly forced countries in the Indo-Pacific to reassess their foreign policies. In this context, existing mechanisms are being strengthened, and new forms of cooperation are being explored to enhance regional collaboration. Minilateralism, that is, strategic cooperation in small and flexible groups, has become a prominent phenomenon in the region and is seen as an important tool in shaping regional security and economic order. The U.S. plays a significant role in minilateral cooperation; however, secondary powers such as Australia and Japan also participate in minilaterals both in cooperation with the U.S. and independently. Strategic cooperation is conducted through forums such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), Quad, Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), and Partnership for the Blue Pacific (PBP) (Wilkins, Hirono, Envall, & Hatakeyama, 2024). The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), Quad, Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP), and Partnership for the Blue Pacific (PBP) are aimed at strengthening strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. TSD enhances security and strategic coordination among the United States, Japan, and Australia, while the Quad, comprising the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, focuses on maritime security and regional stability. TIP supports infrastructure projects to promote economic development, and PBP aims to strengthen cooperation with Pacific island countries and promote sustainable marine resource management (Envall, 2024; Wilkins, Hirono, & Envall, 2024; U.S. International Development Finance Corporation [DFC], 2022).
Korea and Australia emerge as critical actors in the context of minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries maintain strong security and strategic ties with the United States while simultaneously sustaining intensive economic relations with China, reflecting a complex geostrategic balancing act. Their bilateral alliance, already built on a solid foundation, positions them as pivotal actors in shaping regional minilateral initiatives. In the security domain, Korea and Australia have historically taken the lead in cooperative arrangements, and these partnerships have gained increasing trust and scope over time. In this context, examining minilateral mechanisms through the lens of these two countries provides an important perspective on how secondary powers manage overlapping strategic priorities, balance competing interests, and utilize flexible, targeted, small-scale cooperation frameworks to enhance regional security.
Secondary powers cooperate with the U.S. on security issues while also maintaining significant economic ties with China, which creates certain geoeconomic challenges. In this framework, minilateralism functions as a tool providing these states with flexibility in different foreign policy areas. While China criticizes minilateral institutions, it also participates in some of them; this demonstrates that minilateralism is a tool used in regional strategic cooperation by both the U.S. and China (Wilkins, Hirono, Envall, & Hatakeyama, 2024).
Minilateralism is particularly popular in the Indo-Pacific because the region is characterized by complex security challenges, diversified state interests, and historically fluctuating power dynamics. States prefer small, flexible, and interest-driven coalitions rather than being bound solely to large and rigid alliances. Minilaterals enable regional actors to respond quickly to emerging threats, expand their diplomatic maneuvering space, and maintain strategic autonomy. Moreover, minilateral platforms enhance cooperation mechanisms among member countries, including information sharing, technology transfer, and crisis management, making regional security networks both effective and sustainable. Therefore, minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific is not only a military tool but also a multidimensional cooperation model that provides strategic advantages in economic, diplomatic, and political spheres (Channer, 2022; Prajapati, 2023; Wilkins, 2024).
References
Panda, J., & Ohn, D. (2024). Minilateralism and the new Indo-Pacific order: Theoretical ambitions and empirical realities. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 78(6), 767-781. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2410411
Allès, D., & Fournol, T. (2023, Haziran). Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific: Articulations and convergences in a context of saturation of cooperative arrangements [Raport]. Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/recherches-et-documents/2023/092023-2.pdf
Envall, H.D.P. (2024). Japan/Australia Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific (II). Retrieved from https://hdpenvall.com/essays/japan-australia-minilateralism-indo-pacific-ii-order-building-geoeconomics/
Wilkins, T., Hirono, M., & Envall, H.D.P. (2024). The Quad’s growing focus on maritime security. East Asia Forum. Retrieved from https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/02/28/the-quads-growing-focus-on-maritime-security/
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). (2022). Joint Statement by the United States, Japan, and Australia on the Renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership. Retrieved from https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/joint-statement-united-states-japan-and-australia-renewal-trilateral
Wilkins, T. S., Hirono, M., Envall, H. D. P., & Hatakeyama, K. (2024, Haziran). EWCOP #9: Indo-Pacific security outlook 2024 [PDF]. East-West Center. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/EWCOP_%239_6_4_2024_0.pdf
Prajapati, S. K. (2023, June 30). Emerging era of minilateralism in Indo-Pacific. SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4496884
Dean, P. J. (2024, 23 Ekim). The South Korea-Australia partnership: State of play. United States Studies Centre. https://www.ussc.edu.au/the-south-korea-australia-partnership-state-of-play
Australian Department of Defence. (2021, September 13). Joint statement: Australia-Republic of Korea foreign and defence ministers 2+2 meeting 2021. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2021-09-13/joint-statement-australia-republic-korea-foreign-defence-ministers-22-meeting-2021
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2025, September 15). Republic of Korea country brief. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/republic-of-korea/republic-of-korea-country-brief
Australian Department of Defence. (2025, August 21). Defence industry builds ties with South Korea. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-08-21/defence-industry-builds-ties-south-korea
Channer, H. (2022, September 13). Australia–Korea minilateral: A potential win-win. The Interpreter. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-korea-minilateral-potential-win-win
Wilkins, T. (2024, December 20). What is the future of strategic minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific? The Quad, AUKUS, and the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/what-is-the-future-of-strategic-minilateralism-in-the-indo-pacific-the-quad-aukus-and-the-us-japan-australia-trilateral/
Comments are closed.