Expert guidance: Sandra Krawczyszyn-Szczotka
The increasing influence of China in the Indo-Pacific and the uncertainty created by shifts in regional power have directed small and medium-sized states toward more limited and focused collaborations instead of traditional great power alliances. In this framework, forums such as the U.S.-led Quad initiative and China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization, along with mechanisms like BRICS and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, constitute the foundation of minilateral cooperation in the region. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has, in turn, brought new structures such as the Ramstein Group to the agenda, accelerating the U.S. strategy to strengthen regional alliance networks through the Quad (Dean, 2024).
In this context, despite the challenges posed by their strategic positions, South Korea and Australia have developed a strong bilateral cooperation in regional security. South Korea, due to its border with North Korea and its proximity to Asia, must balance its regional security priorities, while Australia, positioned at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, aligns its priorities in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia with complex security issues. These conditions enhance the importance of bilateral security relations and the maintenance of regional stability through minilateral cooperation (Dean, 2024).
The security cooperation process between South Korea and Australia has increased significantly in recent years, with a turning point considered to be the “Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation” signed in 2009 by then-President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea and then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia. This statement envisaged expanding cooperation in areas such as military information sharing, the defense industry, military exercises, and similar fields. Within this framework, the two states signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2009, which was ratified in 2010. In the same year, Australia participated in an international investigation led by South Korea to verify claims that a North Korean torpedo had sunk the ROK Navy vessel Cheonan (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
In 2012, the two countries conducted their first joint naval exercise, and in November of the same year, they agreed to hold a 2+2 meeting at the level of foreign and defense ministers between then-Prime Minister Julia Gillard and President Lee Myung-bak. This meeting marked South Korea’s second 2+2 ministerial meeting outside of the U.S. In Australia’s organized 2+2 meetings, South Korea participated as the sixth country, following previous meetings with the U.S., the United Kingdom, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. The increase in security cooperation continued in 2014 and was reaffirmed during a summit in April 2014 between President Park Geun-hye and then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The two leaders issued a joint statement titled “A Secure, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future Between South Korea and Australia,” emphasizing the importance of cooperation (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
The “Blueprint for Defence and Security Cooperation” adopted in 2015 laid the foundation for security cooperation between the two countries and aimed to strengthen mutual security interests. Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK) held 2+2 meetings at the level of foreign and defense ministers in 2017, 2019, 2021, and 2024 to advance cooperation in defense and security; these meetings reinforced the strategic partnership and agreed on joint efforts to ensure regional peace and stability (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
Since 2021, South Korea has participated in the TALISMAN SABRE and PITCH BLACK exercises, and its Indo-Pacific Strategy announced in 2022 was positively received by Australia. The two countries regularly conduct Defense Ministers’ Dialogues, Strategic Dialogues, and Defense Policy Consultations; moreover, cooperation has continued under the PSI initiative since 2009. The Inter-Services Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) signed in Seoul on 19 October 2023 further strengthened relations among the army, navy, and air force. At the sixth 2+2 meeting held in Melbourne in May 2024, the parties emphasized strategic convergence, the responsible management of competition, the expansion of security cooperation at both bilateral and regional levels, and the establishment of a permanent framework for mutual defense (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
In November 2024, a Track 1.5 dialogue titled “Security Cooperation” was organized in Canberra in partnership with the South Korean Embassy in Australia and the U.S. Studies Center. Over 50 government officials and researchers participated to discuss defense and security issues shaping bilateral relations. Conducted under the Chatham House Rule, the event aimed to address challenges and opportunities for advancing stronger security cooperation amid a deteriorating regional strategic environment. In 2025, the second South Korea-Australia (ROK-AUS) Defense Industry Conference held in Canberra on 13 August brought the defense cooperation, security strategies, advanced technologies, and defense capabilities of the two countries to the agenda. Australian Defence Force officials highlighted the importance of international collaboration for efficient resource use, technology development, industrial capacity, and interoperability. The conference reinforced strategic convergence between the two countries while allowing the identification of areas of cooperation to accelerate regional defense industry integration and the delivery of critical capabilities (Australian Department of Defence, 2025).
At this point, minilateralism presents opportunities beyond bilateral cooperation. Formats involving actors such as India and Indonesia (e.g., KIA: Korea–Australia–India) hold potential in areas including strategic dialogue, cybersecurity, countering disinformation, counter-terrorism, and disaster management. However, these minilateral cooperations are not homogeneous. While the U.S. generally occupies a central role in Western-led minilaterals, the agendas of regional actors such as Australia and Japan can also be decisive, as they shape priorities and implementation strategies based on strategic interests, regional expertise, balancing relations with China, and cooperation with the U.S. For example, Australia plays an active role in maritime security and infrastructure investment, while Japan influences initiatives through technological capacity and infrastructure financing. In contrast, China develops a Beijing-centered minilateralism model, aligning the scope and direction of regional cooperation with its strategic priorities (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
This comparative framework demonstrates that minilateralism is not a one-size-fits-all structure; it diversifies through different norms, goals, and practices. In the context of Australia–South Korea security cooperation, minilateralism can contribute to deepening bilateral relations and has the potential to create a more flexible and diversified regional security architecture as an alternative to U.S.-centered structures. Regional uncertainties and power shifts direct states toward more limited and focused collaborations beyond traditional great power alliances. In this context, security cooperation between South Korea and Australia can contribute both to the development of bilateral relations and the support of regional stability through minilateral frameworks. The cooperation carried out by the two countries through regular dialogues, joint exercises, and defense policy mechanisms demonstrates the role minilateral cooperation can play in regional security strategies (Australian Department of Defence, 2021; Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2025).
References
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