Syria — a year after Assad’s fall

Introduction

One year since Assad’s ouster is gone. Surprising offensive launched by Syrian rebels in late November 2024 have led to their victory on the 8^th of December after ten days of fighting. The anniversary was grandly celebrated by the government with millions of Syrians joining the celebrations, but people are divided over the changes. Today Syria is completely different country but, in many ways, country’s situation remains the same.

Economy and humanitarian situation

War damage and results of heavy sanctions imposed on Syria during Assad’s rule are still the most important factors defining living conditions in this country. 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line and due to that many families cut their spendings on essentials such as water, food, education and healthcare[i]. Food insecurity is a problem for 9-10 million people among 25 million Syrians, 3 million of them face high food insecurity. The access to numerous basic goods is limited for everyone including people who have enough money. Insufficient access to sanitation and hygiene is a problem of around 14 million Syrian people across the country[ii]. It has contributed a lot to the spread of infectious diseases including cholera[iii] and may result in the appearance of new epidemics. In these terrifying circumstances 16 million Syrians are in need humanitarian aid[iv].

The data concerning Syrian economy confirms the post-war catastrophe. According to information provided by the World Bank, Syria’s nominal Gross domestic product declined from 67.54 billion US dollars in 2011 (by the current course of exchange) to 19.99 billion dollars in 2023. At the same time Syrian GDP per capita decreased from 2952.1 $ in current US dollars to 847.4 current US dollars in 2023. The data is estimated only; accurate statistics are hard to obtain. For sure, the fall of oil and gas production is the most painful loss for the Syrian economy. As is noticed in Syria Macro-Fiscal Assessment prepared in June 2025 by World Bank ‘between 2010 and 2024, Syria’s annual crude oil production fell by 90 percent (from 381,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 63,000 bpd), while annual gas production dropped from 8.4 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 3 bcm in 2023; this was largely due to conflict-related damage to energy infrastructure and frequent shifts in control over key resources’. Another huge challenge that the transitional government had to meet was hyperinflation. In 2010 one US dollar was worth 47 Syrian pounds, while by end-2024 the market exchange rate for the Syrian currency amounted to 14,800 SYP per dollar[v].

Despite these challenges numerous Syrians refugees have been coming back home since 2017[vi] and for huge part of them the fall of Assad’s dictatorship is another important reason to return to the homeland. It is a challenge for new Syrian authorities due to the additional resource needs and the reduction of inflow of remittances which are an important source of supplies to Syrian families[vii]. In long-term, however, it will strengthen Syria’s economy.

The transitional governments led by the president Ahmed al-Sharaa implement liberal economic reforms inspired by experience in governing the province of Idlib. One of the first economic reforms of the HTS-led government was the reduction of import restrictions. It had led to the inflow of cheap foreign agricultural products to the market, reducing the price of the food (with the cost of increasing foreign competition to Syrian farmers). The other important early decision of new authorities was the liberalization of currency exchange[viii]. This move has led to the cash liquidity crisis causing the lack of money in ATMs in the economy dominated by cash transactions[ix].

The overthrown of Assad brings radical changes in ownership. The planned privatization is coupled with the nationalization of the property of Assad’s supporters[x]. It is happening after years of confiscations made by the Assad government to its opponents[xi]. The reporters and many Syrians fear that projected changes would disproportionately benefit the new ruling circles resulting in creation of new oligarchy composed of former Islamist militants and figures close to new elites including rehabilitated members of former regime[xii]. It is a typical problem of different countries run by new elites and implementing radical economic reforms.

In this year the economic isolation of Syria was significantly reduced. The United Kingdom and the European Union lifted most of the sanctions put on Syria[xiii], while most of the American sanctions are now suspended[xiv]. It is a milestone for Syria’s recovery and attracting foreign investment. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also paid off Syria’s debt to World Bank[xv] to enable Damascus to take new loans. With extremely high uncertainty, Syria’s real GDP is projected to increase by 1 percent in 2025, after declining by 1.5 percent in 2024[xvi].

Internal politics

Syrian politics is being dominated by the former rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (in the period of conspiracy known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani). He was proclaimed a president for a transitional period by commanders of Islamist militias during The Conference for Announcing the Victory of the Syrian Revolution on the 29th of January[xvii].

For now, the most important legal act in the Syrian Arab Republic is the Constitutional Declaration introduced by the president Ahmed al-Sharaa on 13^th of March this year. The document temporarily serves as a constitution, and it was prepared by lawyers selected by the head of state. The Constitutional Declaration is like the Constitution of 2012, the main difference between them is a larger part dedicated to civil liberties in the new one. Just like the old one, the document declares that the Islamic law is the main source of law in the state[xviii]. On the 5^th of October parliamentary elections elected the new legislative assembly. The elections were indirect with electoral colleges choosing two thirds of representatives. The other 1/3 members of assembly was to be chosen by the president. The parliament was planned to have 210 deputies, but elections did not take place in areas controlled by Kurdish forces and Druze separatists. In effect, some seats in the People’s Assembly are absent. The newly formed assembly is expected to prepare a new electoral law and constitution[xix].

The state institutions are being transformed or even replaced by new ones like the army. Old Syrian army was dissolved, and the new one is being built on the basis of former rebel militias. The process of integration faces challenges and the Defense Ministry maintains little control over different units[xx]. This situation undermines government‘s control over large parts of the country. The remaining old state institutions face mass dismissals[xxi]. Islamization is a part of the reforms. Its examples are police training strongly influenced by religion[xxii], changes in the school curriculum[xxiii] and the ban of bikini and other Western beach clothing on public beaches[xxiv]. Many members of religious minorities are worried of potential discrimination and prosecution caused by the increased role of Islam in state. The situation of minorities indeed worsened, but it was not caused by the reforms of law.

With different reasons, the rise of sectarian violence has place in Syria this year. Religious minorities face social exclusion, devastation of places of worship and even physical attacks on their members. Sometimes the same happens to the Sunni Arabs. The worst examples of religion-related violence were coastal massacres in March and bloody fights in the south of Syria in July. The government’s committee as well as the UN Syria Commission had already finished their investigations into violence in the governorates of Latakia, Tartus and Hama between 6^th and 10^th of March. The UN report confirms the responsibility of both pro-Assad forces and the Syrian army for killing civilians and an engagement of armed civilians in crimes. About 1400 people were killed, most of them were civilians of Alawi faith. The report denies the existence of orders demanding killing civilians, it states that the violence was an effect of spontaneous eruption of hate[xxv]. The report prepared by Syrian government’s committee has similar conclusions[xxvi]. The trials of people responsible for the violence have already started[xxvii]. The investigations into the violence in the south, primarily against the Druze population of Suwayda, are still in process.

The brutal violence against Alawites (including murders) did not end with the end of the rebellion of Assadists[xxviii]. By many Sunnis, all Alawites are seen as supporters of the former dictatorship. This circumstance and strictly religious motives are the main reasons for hate toward the Alawi community. To a lesser extent, the same applies to the rest of religious minorities. The special type of sectarian violence are terrorist attacks. An example of it was the suicidal bombing attack on the St. Elias Church in Damascus in June. It was the biggest confirmed attack on Christians in Syria since the fall of Assad. Terrorist attacks are organized by ISIS and minor radical Islamist groups like Saraya Ansar al-Sunna[xxix]. In fact, such organizations and post-Assadist rebels are the only organized opposition to the new Syrian authorities.

There is no evidence that any of the attacks on religious minorities had the approval of government. Syrian authorities allow different religious groups to have their temples and provide the security of the places of worship[xxx]. Their capabilities, however, are very limited. The central government has little control over the country, so that Syria remains very unstable country. Problems caused by the civil war are strengthened by power vacuum and the proliferation of weapons to numerous gangs, armed groups and ordinary civilians[xxxi]. All the specific rankings place Syria among the most dangerous countries in the world. However, with military reforms and strengthening the police and security forces Syria could stabilize itself and become a safer place for all its citizens including these of religious minorities.

North-eastern parts of Syria are controlled by so-called Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dominated by Kurdish military forces called People’s Defense Units (YPG). The autonomy (de facto independent region) is popularly called Rojava. As Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic states in its reports, during the Syrian Civil War YPG had risen to power in ethnically Kurdish lands by brutal elimination of other Kurdish factions and still maintains power by force and political repressions. The organization is also responsible for war crimes in controlled areas[xxxii]. The repressive policies are at first directed against Arab population constituting an overwhelming majority in lands controlled by SDF. The organization represents just a small part of controlled population, so that it could not be for Damascus an equal partner for talks. The just transformation of Syria requires trials of YPG war criminals just like Assadist war criminals are being judged.

 Foreign relations

The greatest external threat for new Syrian authorities is an Israeli invasion. After the fall of Assad Israel have extended its occupation of Syria beyond the Golan Heights and established so called ‘buffer-zone’ on areas neighboring Golan. Israeli army is also organizing rides deeper into southern Syria and numerous strikes on different targets in the Syrian territory to weaken new Syrian army[xxxiii]. According to Syrian government Israel have staged 1000 strikes on Syria since the fall of Assad[xxxiv]. For now, Syrian army is too much weak and disintegrated to respond to these attacks. In July the ceasefire between the Israel and Syria was reached[xxxv] but it did not survive for long.

Iranian policy is also a huge danger for Syria. Iran is hostile to the new Syrian government, what is dangerous to Damascus due to the Iranian influences in Iraq. However, al-Sharaa’s attitude towards Islamic Republic of Iran have also contributed to the crisis in relations between these two countries[xxxvi]. Syria’s relations with pro-Iranian Lebanese movement Hezbollah are also strained and had led to the clashes between the parties[xxxvii].

The relations with Russia, formerly second main ally of Assad, remain good. After the visit in Moscow on October 15^th President Al-Sharaa announced that Syria honours all agreements made by the former regime. Russia has kept its bases in Khmeimim and Tartus[xxxviii] and is recognizing reestablishment of military patrols in southern Syria (with the approval of the government)[xxxix]. Syria sees Russia as a state, whose backing is necessary in the hard time of reconstruction and regional tensions. The future of mutual relations, however, remains unclear and Damascus will continue to put renegotiations of ties on the table.

Foreign policy of Syria under al-Sharaa is characterized by rapprochement with Sunni states in the Middle East. Riyadh was a destination of the first foreign visit of the Syrian leader[xl]. Between that visit and the current time Saudi Arabia became an important economic partner of Syria, providing such important projects like the reconstruction and development of Syrian gas and oil fields[xli]. The Kingdom provides also a political support for new Syrian authorities; it was Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who persuaded President Trump to lift US sanctions on Syria[xlii]. Other Gulf monarchies, especially Qatar and United Arab Emirates provide support for Syria too[xliii][xliv]. Most GCC members, however, feared the jihadist past of ruling Syrian politicians. Other Arab leaders are afraid of it too. Those fears don’t apply to Turkey, in past one of the main supporters of Islamist opposition movements in the Middle East. Ankara trains Syrian soldiers and promised arms deliveries to Syrian army. The military cooperation between Syria and Turkey exists since the fall of Assad, but it was improved after the parties signed defense cooperation pact in 14^th of August[xlv]. This cooperation is, however, limited. President Erdoğan did not help Syria against Israeli invasion. Such behavior and activity of other leaders decrease the chance of Ankara to become the main partner or even a protector of Syria as was expected a year ago.

Syria’s relations with the West are improved but its further improvement meets significant obstacles. Western countries, unlike Sunni Islamic countries, don’t share political and religious characteristics with new Syrian regime and don’t have such strategic interests there. Any lack of respect for democratic principles and renewed sectarian tensions can quickly lead to deterioration in common relations. Despite some common goals (like preventing Iran from regaining influences here) US objectives in Syria’s policy are somehow different than EU’s. The United States seem to be interested in adding Syria to its network of allies or at least in vide opening Syria to American companies. Since many years US troops station in Syria, most of them in areas under SDF’s control to protect American oil deals[xlvi]. These US activities wait for appropriate regulation or for being curtailed. Syria and the United have already established intelligence cooperation what is a matter of great importance for both sides[xlvii]. States President Trump is also interested in Syria joining the Abraham Accords. The last thing is unlikely to happen (firstly because of a territorial dispute over the Golan Heights). The visit of President Al-Sharaa to the White House was historic[xlviii] but it did not have many consequences except Syria joining the Global Coalition against ISIS[xlix].

The European Union focuses on humanitarian aid and economic activities aimed at accelerating Syria’s recovery and benefiting European companies. EU wants Russian presence in Syria to be finished but is less interested in securing Israeli strategic interests than USA. Among EU members France was the most interested in engagement with Syrian government. It had resulted in Al-Sharaa’s visit to Paris in May 2025[l].

Summary and recommendations

Since the fall of Assad, Syria is in a transitional period characterized by political transformations, instability and remaining economic and humanitarian problems caused by the civil war and sanctions. The weakness of the state leads to increased violence, including attacks on members of different religious communities. Some signs of recovery and stabilization are seen, but it is unclear whether the overall situation of the country will improve in the coming years. The future role of religion is also unknown, but for sure the country will be more conservative than in the past. Syrian leadership conduct active foreign policy aimed at breaking the past isolation and finding partners in reconstruction and allies in preserving territorial integrity endangered by warlords, separatists and foreign powers.

The European Union should continue the provision of humanitarian aid and financial support to Syria. It will enable fast reconstruction and lead to the end of humanitarian catastrophe in this country, reducing the risk of further radicalization of Syrians. Deals made for reconstruction can benefit European companies a lot. It is, however, still unclear whether Syria will stabilize or stay unstable like Libya after the ouster of Gaddafi, so EU members should wait with bigger engagement with new Syrian authorities. The cooperation with Syria should not be conditioned by requirements related to the political system. It should, however, be conditioned by religious tolerance. EU should also pressure Israel to stop its aggression on Syria. Israeli attacks deepen instability of Syria and can lead to the rebirth of ISIS.

[i] ‘Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Response Priorities (January to December 2025)’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24.07.2025.

[ii] S. Nowacka, A. M. Spancerska, M. Wojnarowicz, ’The Transformation of Syria and Challanges for EU Policy in the Middle East’, The Polish Institute of International Affairs 17.09.2025.

[iii] L. Albitar, I. A. Almasri, ’Cholera in Syria, a crisis following crises: Assessment of knowledge, attitude, and practice in a cohort of syrian population’, Heliyon 9(10333): e18278, 2023.

[iv] S. Nowacka, A. M. Spancerska, M. Wojnarowicz, op. cit.

[v] ‘SYRIA MACRO-FISCAL ASSESSMENT JUNE 2025’, World Bank.

[vi] ’Country profile: Syrian Arab Republic’, World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic; access 17.11.2025 at 9:06 p. m.

[vii] ’SYRIA MACRO-FISCAL…’

[viii] F. Grzebuła, ’Raport z Syrii’, Institute of New Europe 28.05.2025; access 19.11.2025 at 5:58 p. m.

[ix] ’SYRIA MACRO-FISCAL…’

[x] S. Nowacka, M. Wojnarowicz, A. M. Spancerska, op. cit.

[xi] M. O. Agha, ’Amid calls for refugee returns, Assad’s property grab continues’, Middle East Institute 20.06.2023 https://mei.edu/publications/amid-calls-refugee-returns-assads-property-grab-continues; access 20.11.2025 at 6 p. m.

[xii] T. Azhari, F. Dalatey, ’Syria is secretly reshaping its economy. The president’s brother is in charge.’ Reuters 7.08.2025 https://www.reuters.com/investigations/syria-is-secretly-reshaping-its-economy-presidents-brother-is-charge-2025-07-24/; access 20.11.2025 at 6:12 p. m.

[xiii] S. Nordin, E. Pearson, E. Pessotto, ’Status update: EU and UK easing of sanctions on Syria’ White & Case 30.06.2025 https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/status-update-eu-and-uk-easing-sanctions-syria; access 20.11.2025 at 6:50 p. m.

[xiv] D. Gooding, G. Whisnant, ’Trump Welcomes New Syrian Leader Ahmad al-Sharaa as US Lifts Sanctions’, Newsweek 10.11.2025 https://www.newsweek.com/trump-syria-al-sharaa-white-house-historic-visit-sanctions-11023913; access 20.11.2025 at 7:01 p. m.

[xv] ’World Bank says Saudi Arabia and Qatar have paid off Syria’s outstanding debt’, Associated Press 16.05.2025 https://apnews.com/article/syria-world-bank-saudi-arabia-qatar-debt-007d228b56cd1a42cc1daaf1e662cfec; access 20.11.2025 at 7:05 p. m.

[xvi] ’SYRIA MACRO-FISCAL…’

[xvii] T. Azhari, T. Perry, ’Syria’s Sharaa declared president for transition, consolidating his power’, Reuters 30.01.2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-leader-sharaa-named-president-transitional-period-state-news-agency-says-2025-01-29/; access 6.05.2025 at 12:47 a. m.

[xviii] The Constitutional Declaration of Syria of 13th of March 2025 available at https://kassioun.org/news/item/82565-2025; previous Constitution of 24th of February 2012 available at https://egov.sy/page/en/137/0/Constitution.html; the access to both 6.05.2025 at 12:15 a. m.

[xix] O. Sandiki, ’Syria holds first elections since overthrow of Assad’s regime by rebels’, Independent 6.09.2025 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-elections-assad-ahmed-al-sharaa-damascus-b2839958.html; access 24.11.2025 at 9:17 p. m.

[xx] K. Kampa, B. Carter, ’The New Syrian Army: Order of Battle’, Institute for the Study of War 14.11.2025.

[xxi] S. Nowacka, M. Wojnarowicz, A. M. Spancerska, op. cit.

[xxii] K. Ashawi, A. Ismail, ’Syria’s new leaders turn to Islamic law in effort to rebuild Assad’s police’, Reuters 23.01.2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-new-leaders-turn-islamic-law-effort-rebuild-assads-police-2025-01-23/; access 6.05.2025 at 8:40 p. m.

[xxiii] M. Farhan, ’Curriculum changes in Syria: a move to impose a single ideology in a diverse country?’, Deutsche Welle 3.01.2025 https://www.dw.com/ar/تعديل-المناهج-في-سوريا-ـ-توجه-لفرض-فكر-أحادي-في-بلد-متعد/a-71202289; access 6.05.2025 at 8:27 p. m.

[xxiv] R. Carroll, ’Syria mandates burkinis for women at public beaches: What to know’, Al Monitor 11.06.2025 https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/06/syria-mandates-burkinis-women-public-beaches-what-know; access 6.07.2025 at 10:30 p. m.

[xxv] ’UN Syria Commission finds March coastal violence was widespread and systematic: outlines urgent steps to prevent future violations and restore public confidence’, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 14.08.2025 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/un-syria-commission-finds-march-coastal-violence-was-widespread-and; access 26.11.2025 at 5:42 p. m.

[xxvi] ’More than 1,400 killed in sectarian violence in coastal Syria, report finds’, Al Jazeera 22.07.2025 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/22/more-than-1400-killed-in-sectarian-violence-in-coastal-syria-report-finds; access 26.11.2025 at 5:42 p. m.

[xxvii] ’First Public Trial Session for Coastal Violations Concludes in Aleppo’, The Syrian Observer 19.11.2025 https://syrianobserver.com/syrian-actors/first-public-trial-session-for-coastal-violations-concludes-in-aleppo.html; access 26.11.2025 at 5:47 p. m.

[xxviii] ’Thousands of Syria’s Alawites protest against what they say is discrimination by the government’, Associated Press 25.11.2025 https://apnews.com/article/syria-alawites-sectarian-protests-latakia-tartus-ghazal-5960b4cddfc0660dd7af2e26770cf787; access 27.11.2025 at 1:48 p. m.

[xxix] To read more: M. al-Lami, ’Explainer: New militant group in Syria target Alawites, Assad loyalists’, BBC Monitoring 13.02.2025 https://monitoring.stage.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003bt5; access 7.05.2025 at 12:28.

[xxx] K. O’Malley, ’The terrorist attack that didn’t happen’, Mission Network News 13.08.2025 https://www.mnnonline.org/news/the-terrorist-attack-that-didnt-happen/; access 9.12.2025 at 6:17 p. m.

[xxxi] S. Hartley, M. E. Picard, CalibreObscura, ’‘Every Gun Was Taken’: Syria Could Fuel Arms Trafficking Crisis’, Inkstick 1.07.2025 https://inkstickmedia.com/every-gun-was-taken-syria-could-fuel-arms-trafficking-crisis/; access 25.11.2025 at 12:29 a. m.

[xxxii] Reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iici-syria/documentation; access 10.12.2025 at 6:55.

[xxxiii] F. Grzebuła, ’Raport z Syrii’, Institute of New Europe 28.05.2025; access 3.12.2025 at 7:53 p. m.

[xxxiv] L. Al-janidi and B. Yilmaz, ’Israel stages drone strike in Damascus countryside, raids in southern Syria’, Anadolu Ajansı 3.12.2025 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-stages-drone-strike-in-damascus-countryside-raids-in-southern-syria/3761416; access 3.12.2025 at 7:57 p. m.

[xxxv] ’Syria: Statement by the Spokesman on the ceasefire agreement’, EEAS 19.07.2025 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesman-ceasefire-agreement_en; access 3.12.2025 at 8:05 p. m.

[xxxvi] ‘Iran and Syria: Will regional developments break the freeze?’, Shafaq News 3.12.2025 https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-and-Syria-Will-regional-developments-break-the-freeze; access 3.12.2025 at 8:18 p. m.

[xxxvii] M. Zerrouky, ’Fighting between Syria’s new army and Lebanese militias rages on border’, Le Monde 10.02.2025 https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/02/10/fighting-between-syria-s-new-army-and-lebanese-militias-rages-on-border_6737999_4.html; access 14.12.2025 at 11:30 a. m.

[xxxviii] I. Delande, ’Syria’s new leaders keep Russia in play‘, Le Monde diplomatique 5.12.2025 https://mondediplo.com/2025/12/05syria-russia; access 13.12.2025 at 5:07 p. m.

[xxxix] M. Qawas, ’Why Are Russian Monitoring Forces in Southern Syria?’ Progress Center for Policies 26.11.2025 https://www.arabprogress.org/en/why-russian-monitoring-forces-in-southern-syria/; access 3.12.2025 at 8:35 p. m.

[xl] ’Syria’s President al-Sharaa meets Saudi Arabia’s MBS in first foreign trip’, Al Jazeera 2.02.2025 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/2/syrias-president-al-sharaa-meets-saudi-arabias-mbs-in-first-foreign-trip; access 12.12.2025 at 6:03 p. m.

[xli] ’Saudi firms sign agreements to develop Syrian oil and gas fields’, Arab News 10.12.2025 https://arab.news/2ae7f; access 12.12.2025 at 6:10 p. m.

[xlii] Y. Guzansky, C. Valensi, ’A New-Old Partner in Damascus: Is Qatar Rebuilding Syria in Its Image?’, INSS 21.08.2025 https://www.inss.org.il/publication/qatar-syria/; access 12.12.2025 at 6:15 p. m.

[xliii] Ibidem.

[xliv] ’UAE, Syria deepen ties in talks focused on stability and economic recovery’, The Arab Weekly 8.07.2025 https://thearabweekly.com/uae-syria-deepen-ties-talks-focused-stability-and-economic-recovery; access 12.12.2025 at 6:20 p. m.

[xlv] L. Kenez, ’Turkey trains Syrian Army in air defense using Turkish munitions as military ties deepen’, Nordic Monitor 24.09.2025 https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/09/turkey-trains-syrian-army-in-air-defense-using-turkish-munitions-as-military-ties-deepen/; access 12.12.2025 at 6:35 p. m.

[xlvi] K. R. Rosen, ’ Who Benefits from a U.S. Oil Deal in Northeast Syria?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 18.09.2020 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-benefits-us-oil-deal-northeast-syria; access 13.12.2025 at 9:08 p. m.

[xlvii] ’Syria: Transition and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service 9.05.2025 https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33487; access 14.12.2025 at 11:45 a. m.

[xlviii] A. Damon, Ö Özkizilcik, ’ Two views on the Syrian president’s visit to the White House—and what’s next’, Atlantic Council 11.11.2025 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/two-views-on-the-syrian-presidents-visit-to-the-white-house-and-whats-next/; access 13.12.2025 at 9:06 p. m.

[xlix] G. Cafiero, M. Khurma, ’Syria joining the anti-ISIS coalition is a westward pivot—with opportunities and risks’, Atlantic Council 21.11.2025 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/syria-joining-the-anti-isis-coalition-is-a-westward-pivot-with-opportunities-and-risks/; access 14.12.2025 at 5:50 p. m.

[l] G. Blackburn, ’Syria’s interim leader Ahmad al-Sharaa visits Paris in first official trip to Europe’ Euronews 7.05.2025 https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/07/syrias-interim-leader-ahmad-al-sharaa-visits-paris-in-first-official-trip-to-europe#:~:text=Al%2DSharaa’s%20visit%20to%20Paris%20on%20Wednesday%20is,willingness%20to%20engage%20with%20Syria’s%20new%20leadership.; access 13.12.2025 at 9:10 p. m.