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Institute of New Europe Institute of New Europe
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Apr 12
Africa and Middle East, Analysis, Economy, International Politics, Iran, Publications, Russia, Syria

Ten Years On: A Look Into Syria’s Economy as a Casualty of War

April 12, 2021
Ten Years On: A Look Into Syria’s Economy as a Casualty of WarDownload

Key Points

– After 10 years of war, Bashar Al-Assad controls vast regions of Syria with Russian and Iranian support, with the exception of the area surrounding Idlib and the Northeastern oil fields.

– Syria’s economy was decimated by the war, with key sectors such as agriculture and oil seeing a catastrophic decline in economic returns due to specific targeting of infrastructure and assets.

– As Assad seeks to rehabilitate the economy, Russia and Iran are competing to gain influence in the state’s regime and businesses.

– China’s economic prowess and geopolitical interests may turn it into a formidable third-party actor in this competition.

Introduction

         The Syrian Civil War reached its tenth anniversary on the 15th of March, 2021. Still ongoing, it has resulted so far in the death of over 387,000 people[1] and more than half of Syria’s population remains displaced (6.6 million inside and 5.7 million outside the country).[2] Currently, the Syrian government controls large parts of the state’s territory with the help of Russia and Iran, with the ongoing conflicts with the opposing forces being focused in the region surrounding Idlib, whilst Turkey is intensifying its offensive against the Kurdish forces in the north.[3] Additionally, the Islamic State (IS) continues conducting attacks in various regions, including the Dayr az Zawr Province.[4] As Assad now controls large parts of the territory again, this article seeks to briefly explore the damage done by the war in the key economic sectors of agriculture and oil, as well as analyse the potential following competition various powers will find themselves in as part of the pursuit to help rebuild Syria.

The Economic Damage

         The Syrian Civil War has left no sector or asset of Syria’s economy untouched. A World Bank report from 2017 underlines that Syria lost over $226 billion in GDP, which is nearly twice of the country’s GDP in 2010.[5] Furthermore, the crash of the Syrian Pound has propelled the prices of all commodity items, the strict regulations of Lebanese banks preventing easy banking operations in the private sector, the deliberate targeting of infrastructure and a majorly reduced budget have drastically hurt prospects of economic recovery.[6] As the agriculture and oil industries are some of the biggest sectors in Syria’s economy, this section will focus on them as case studies for understanding the economic damage of the civil war.

         The agriculture sector, which accounts for a quarter of Syria’s GDP, is estimated to have lost over $16 billion in production and assets and left over 7.9 million people in severe food insecurity, and another 1.9 at risk of food insecurity.[7] In terms of infrastructure damage, including irrigation, the UN Food And Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates that the war caused $3.2 billion in damages, with 60% of households featuring extended damage to agriculture, while in regions such as Aleppo or Hassakeh this number raises to 70-90%.[8] The damage was amplified by the deliberate targeting of the water infrastructure, which is especially needed due to the country’s high-temperature climate and lacklustre rainfall, leaving irrigated lands and water reservoirs 50% smaller in 2015 than in the pre-war period.[9] Furthermore, access to manual labour, seeds and fertiliser diminished as a result of the conflict, and strategic assets such as grain silos also became targets in the conflict,[10] damaging not only the production capabilities of the state but also national reserves which intensifies the food insecurity issues. This food insecurity is manifested, among other ways, in long queues for receiving government-subsidised bread, with a scarcity of simple luxuries such as chicken, whose price increased high enough that people struggle to afford it.[11]

         A Chatham House article discovers that the damage was exacerbated by the conflict and mismanagement, which forced farmers to flee to safety or, even prior to the war, move to urban areas to supply their families.[12] With the government being one of the main buyers of agriculture products before the war,[13] its channelling of resources towards fighting its enemies leaves the agriculture starved of the finances it needs to recover; forcing it to rely on projects funded by the Syrian Recovery Trust Fund instead.[14] In return, warring sides imposed heavy taxation, siege tactics and deliberate targeting of the infrastructure which led to widespread damage.[15] Another study underlines the ongoing favouritism and corruption surrounding the purchase of a product through connections in the region of Hama even before the war, where local authorities would collect payments on behalf of the executive bureau officials, and in return offer additional various needed subsidies (such as fuel) for farmers.[16] While the return of externally displaced Syrian refugees might help suppress the labour shortage, the lack of a program that would organise their return leaves that possibility to be desired. Furthermore, with the refugees seeing security and regime impressions as a decisive factor towards their return,[17] they may be dissuaded to do so in the near future if one observes the Assad regime’s strong-armed approach towards land reconciliation. As a mean to combat rebels, the regime would perform a siege in one of their regions and then offer a reconciliation agreement where the government would control the territory and ‘reconcile affairs’, but considering the ongoing priority of the regime to combat rebels, in practice these agreements are forcing the community back into government control.[18] This type of attitude being exhibited by the regime in terms of property control, the general sense of insecurity and intimidation can overall discourage people to return; while also signalling that the type of regime-led recovery may lead to pre-war conditions, which were undesirable for farmers.

         The oil sector was also greatly affected by the war. Bashar Al-Assad’s regime has considerably less profitability from the state’s oil supply due to its lack of reach at the main pumps in the northeast. At the start of the war, many trading partners, including the EU, imposed sanctions over the outbreak of the conflict, leading to many international organisations, such as Shell, pulling out.[19] While this has harmed Syria’s capability to profit off the quantities it sells, the conflict escalated with the emergence of IS, which would take over many of the oil fields Syria had, producing and smuggling oil worth millions of dollars.[20] Since IS controlled these regions, the revenue they made from smuggling the oil would naturally return to them and not to the regime. Moreover, even after IS lost its control of the oil fields in Syria, that control turned towards the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the US, with the former benefitting from the oil fields as a primary source of revenue to fund its operations and the latter defending key oil facilities in this area after Donald Trump declared an interest in keeping them.[21] While this oil will still not return to the regime’s funding as well, which would still impede efforts of economic recovery, the US intensified its defence over the oil facilities, with them and the SDF successfully defending the region against one attack that led to hundreds of attackers dead.[22] Overall, the lack of access would result in an over 90% decrease in Syria’s oil production, from approximately 353.000 barrels per day at the start of the conflict to 22.000 per day in 2020.[23] This is forcing Assad to rely on heavily importing crude oil from Iran.[24] Yet, even this is affected by strong international sanctions currently in effect, which forced the Iranian flow of oil to halt through the Suez Canal.[25] This culminates in fuel and oil prices skyrocketing in Syria, which in turn affects electricity provision to the population and leaving an economy starved of the fuel it needs to increase its activity.[26]

Sanctions and the Competition for Post-War Syria

         In 2019 the United States ratified the Caesar Act, which sanctions any entity collaborating with the Assad regime (individual, government or organisation) that encourages the continued fight by providing equipment, financial support, spare parts or more.[27] This does not replace the previous set of sanctions, it is meant to complement them as an effort to force the Assad regime to “take irreversible steps towards a peaceful resolution”[28] and it also denies access to visas of people who encourage the regime’s ongoing military efforts, and sanctions the delivery of aircraft materials and transactions which may help the growth of the regime’s petroleum industry.[29] Similarly, the EU committed to the extension of its sanctions against Syria until at least the 28th of May 2021, which subjects many entities to asset freezes and travel bans, with the Syrian central bank being subjected as well.[30] The sanctions, which target those who benefit from business with the regime, feature a ban on the import of oil and export restrictions as well.[31] The UK follows a similar line as before the exit.[32] These sanctions are presented as a response to Assad’s repression of the population, as well as the war crimes it has conducted during the decade-long war; meaning, at the very least, that they would not be lifted until this behaviour stops. This kind of response from the West also dissuades Assad from pursuing economic deals with them, as well as not allowing major foreign companies for investing in the state, thus pushing Syria to seek reconstruction deals with its regime allies.

         Russia and Iran, after helping secure the regime, would stand to geopolitically benefit from this. Assad has been pursuing closer economic ties with Russia as a response to the US sanctions and sought to expand these relations after a meeting with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.[33] Russia, for its part, also pursues closer ties with Syria after investing $500 Million in the Tartus port in 2019, which is a naval base poised to become more equipped for civilian business, as well as another $200 million on modernising a chemical fertiliser.[34] Iran’s private companies already invested in constructing numerous residential areas after Damascus and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding.[35] The two states also held a trade conference in 2020, where it was revealed that Iran’s exports to Syria are ten times greater than the imports.[36] However, Russia and Iran are not complementing each other’s efforts in Syria, but rather competing for influence in the country. A Chatham House report underlines how both states are building connections with local businessmen, while pursuing opportunities for their own companies to enter the key economic sectors of energy, agriculture, real estate and more.[37]

         An actor that was relatively quiet over the Syrian Civil War, but who might become a key economic competitor in Syria, is China. The interests China has in Syria are twofold: seeking to expand its Belt and Road Initiative projects by developing Syria’s and Lebanon’s ports to connect China to the Mediterranean, while cooperating with Syria on counterterrorism efforts against Uighur extremist groups that, according to the Chinese authorities, pose a threat to Beijing.[38] Since Syria’s position is strategic from an economic standpoint, and due to the reconstruction opportunities made almost exclusively available to regime friends as a result of the sanctions and the conflict, China committed to investing in Syria’s ports as a means to bypass the Suez Canal,[39] while also committing to construct a major industrial park featuring space for over 150 companies.[40] By increasing commitment to investing in Syria’s reconstruction, China seeks to establish a strong foothold in the Middle East, a push that cannot be challenged on an equal basis by the West due to the ongoing sanctions and Assad’s regime to work with its allies. Since China’s treatment of Uighur Muslims could result in terrorist attacks from them as a response, Beijing’s interest in befriending the Assad Regime can be understood from a security standpoint as well, since the Syrian Civil War offers both the opportunity for Uighur extremists to gain combat training, while also offering Beijing the opportunity to take the fight to them instead of within the Chinese mainland.[41]

Conclusion

         Syria’s ongoing war may not see a complete end in the near future, but the push for reconstruction is taking more traction as Assad now controls major sways of his state’s territory once again. With its economy crippled from the war, and with the US and EU sanctions preventing reconstruction and Western lack of commitment towards rebuilding with the present regime, Assad seeks the support from his standing allies: Russia and Iran, both whom would offer support competitively despite dealing with their own sanctions. China, an actor with security and geopolitical interests in Syria’s region, aims to seize the opportunity for expanding its influence in the region by offering Assad economic solutions for rebuilding his country, while also pursuing its agenda of expanding the Belt and Road Initiative into the Mediterranean. 

Bibliography

116th US Congress, “H.R.31 – Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019”, Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text#toc-id906365a9748743cb8c04ea486ea1e93d

Ahmed B., (2021) “Inside Syria, millions face destitution after a decade of pain”, Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2021/3/604f63754/inside-syria-millions-face-destitution-decade-pain.html

Alexander B., Ahlam (2021) “Syria’s Economic Collapse and Its Impact on the Most Vulnerable”, Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/syrias-economic-collapse-and-its-impact-most-vulnerable

Alloush B. (2018), The importance of the agricultural sector for Syria’s stability”, Available at: “https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-importance-of-the-agricultural-sector-for-syrias-stability

BBC News, (2019) “Syria war: Who benefits from its oil production?” Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/50464561

Cafiero G., (2020) “China plays the long game on Syria”, Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-plays-long-game-syria

Council of the EU, “Syria: Sanctions against the regime extended by one year”, Available at; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/05/28/syria-sanctions-against-the-regime-extended-by-one-year/

Coward N. F. et al., (2020) “First Designations Under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act Target the Syrian Government” Available at: https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/first-designations-under-the-caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act-target-the-syrian-government/

Elazar G., (2017) “Moving Westward: The Chinese Rebuilding of Syria”, Available at: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/moving-westward-chinese-rebuilding-syria/

Fairbanks W., (2020) “Syria Emerges As Iran’s Top Crude ‘Customer’”, Available at: https://www.mees.com/2020/4/10/geopolitical-risk/syria-emerges-as-irans-top-crude-customer/425de6d0-7b37-11ea-89bc-23bf20e49277

Fairbanks W., (2019) “Syria: Oil Products Shortage Heightens Damascus ‘Post-War’ Challenges”, Available at: https://www.mees.com/2019/5/3/geopolitical-risk/syria-oil-products-shortage-heightens-damascus-post-war-challenges/1e7ebca0-6d97-11e9-ae03-53f90f9af5df

Financial Times (2011), “Shell to quit Syria after EU extends sanctions”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/bc9dae8a-1cd1-11e1-a134-00144feabdc0#axzz24klfkSfR

Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, (2020) “UK sanctions relating to Syria”, Available at; https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-syria

Food and Agriculture Organisation (2017), “Counting the cost Agriculture in Syria after six years of crisis”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/880759/

Food and Agriculture Organisation (2020), “Syrian Arab Republic | Humanitarian Response Plan 2020”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/appeals/detail/en/c/1260421/

Jedina M., Kajjo S., (2019), “Report: Iran Preparing for Role in Syria’s Reconstruction”, Available at: https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/report-iran-preparing-role-syrias-reconstruction

Haaretz, (2019) “Russia Announces $500m Investment in Syrian Port City”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/f52bdde6-20cc-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b

Hatahet S., (2019) “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria”, Available at: https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russia-and-iran-economic-influence-in-syria

Harvey F. J, (2020), “China shows greater interest in Syria amid pandemic, US tensions”, Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/06/china-invest-syria-assad-reconstruction-us-tension.html

Higginbottom J., (2019) “Why Syria’s small oil reserves have become the linchpin for political control in the region”, Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/13/syrian-oil-reserves-now-the-linchpin-for-political-control-in-region.html

Laub Z., (2021) “Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror”, Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war

Lead Inspector General US Department of Defence, (2019), “Operation Inherent Resolve” Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/04/2002243770/-1/-1/1/Q1FY2020_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2020feb05&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief

Lee J., (2019) “Denied Iran’s Oil, Syria Has Few Options But Russia”, Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-07/denied-iran-s-oil-syria-has-few-options-but-russia

Lyall N., (2019) China in Postwar Syria”, Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-postwar-syria/

Madi N., (2019) “Cultivating a crisis: the political decline of agriculture in Syria”, Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/65465

Tehran Times, (2021) “Iran-Syria trade conference held in Tehran” Available at; https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/458697/Iran-Syria-trade-conference-held-in-Tehran

The World Bank, (2020) “The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis”, Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-mobility-of-displaced-syrians-an-economic-and-social-analysis

The World Bank, (2017) “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Impact of The Conflict in Syria”, Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria

RAND Corporation, (2017), “Oil, Extortion Still Paying Off for ISIS” Available at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/oil-extortion-still-paying-off-for-isis.html

Razzaq A. A., (2015) “Water used as a weapon of war in Syria”, Available at: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/5/6/water-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-syria

Reuters, (2020) “Syria seeks Russian investment as U.S. sanctions hammer economy”, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-russia-fm-meetings-lands-idUSKBN25Y0YX

Saad H., Hubbard B., (2021) “Having Won Syria’s War, al-Assad Is Mired in Economic Woes”, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/world/middleeast/syria-assad-economy-food.html

Shaar K., Christou W., (2020) “2021 budget reveals the depth of Syria’s economic woes”, Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/2021-budget-reveals-the-depth-of-syrias-economic-woes/

Sosnowski M., (2020) “Reconciliation agreements as strangle contracts: ramifications for property and citizenship rights in the Syrian civil war”, Peacebuilding 8(4): p.460-475

Syrian Observatory of Human Rights (2020), “On International Human Rights Day: Millions of Syrians robbed of “rights” and 593 thousand killed in a decade”, Available at: https://www.syriahr.com/en/195385/

Syrian Recovery Trust Fund, (2020) “The SRTF’s Agriculture Efforts Help Over 27,400 Farmers in 2020”, Available at: https://www.srtfund.org/news/466_the-srtf-s-agriculture-efforts-help-over-27-400-farmers-in-2020

US Department of State, “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, Available at: https://2017-2021.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act//index.html

[1] Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, (2020) “On International Human Rights Day: Millions of Syrians robbed of “rights” and 593 thousand killed in a decade”, Available at: https://www.syriahr.com/en/195385/

[2] Ahmed B., (2021) “Inside Syria, millions face destitution after a decade of pain”, Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2021/3/604f63754/inside-syria-millions-face-destitution-decade-pain.html

[3] Laub Z., (2021) “Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror”, Available at: https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war

[4] Lead Inspector General US Department of Defence, (2019), “Operation Inherent Resolve” Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/04/2002243770/-1/-1/1/Q1FY2020_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2020feb05&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief

[5] The World Bank, (2017) “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Impact of The Conflict in Syria”, Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria

[6] Alexander B., Ahlam (2021) “Syria’s Economic Collapse and Its Impact on the Most Vulnerable”, Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/syrias-economic-collapse-and-its-impact-most-vulnerable

[7] Food and Agriculture Organisation (2020), “Syrian Arab Republic | Humanitarian Response Plan 2020”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/appeals/detail/en/c/1260421/

[8] Food and Agriculture Organisation (2017), “Counting the cost: Agriculture in Syria after six years of crisis”, Available at: http://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/880759/

[9] Razzaq A. A., (2015) “Water used as a weapon of war in Syria”, Available at: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/5/6/water-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-in-syria

[10] World Bank, “Toll of War”, Online

[11] Saad H., Hubbard B., (2021) “Having Won Syria’s War, al-Assad Is Mired in Economic Woes”, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/world/middleeast/syria-assad-economy-food.html

[12] Alloush B. (2018), The importance of the agricultural sector for Syria’s stability”, Available at: “https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/the-importance-of-the-agricultural-sector-for-syrias-stability

[13] ibid.

[14] Syrian Recovery Trust Fund, (2020) “The SRTF’s Agriculture Efforts Help Over 27,400 Farmers in 2020”, Available at: https://www.srtfund.org/news/466_the-srtf-s-agriculture-efforts-help-over-27-400-farmers-in-2020

[15] Alloush, “The Importance of Agricultural Sector”, Online

[16] Madi N., (2019) “Cultivating a crisis: the political decline of agriculture in Syria”, Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/65465

[17] The World Bank, (2020) “The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis”, Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-mobility-of-displaced-syrians-an-economic-and-social-analysis

[18] Sosnowski M., (2020) “Reconciliation agreements as strangle contracts: ramifications for property and citizenship rights in the Syrian civil war”, Peacebuilding 8(4): p.460-475

[19] Financial Times, (2011) “Shell to quit Syria after EU extends sanctions”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/bc9dae8a-1cd1-11e1-a134-00144feabdc0#axzz24klfkSfR

[20] RAND Corporation, (2017), “Oil, Extortion Still Paying Off for ISIS” Available at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/oil-extortion-still-paying-off-for-isis.html

[21] BBC News, (2019) “Syria war: Who benefits from its oil production?” Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/50464561

[22] Higginbottom J., (2019) “Why Syria’s small oil reserves have become the linchpin for political control in the region”, Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/13/syrian-oil-reserves-now-the-linchpin-for-political-control-in-region.html

[23] Shaar K., Christou W., (2020) “2021 budget reveals the depth of Syria’s economic woes”, Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/2021-budget-reveals-the-depth-of-syrias-economic-woes/

[24] Fairbanks W., (2020) “Syria Emerges As Iran’s Top Crude ‘Customer’”, Available at: https://www.mees.com/2020/4/10/geopolitical-risk/syria-emerges-as-irans-top-crude-customer/425de6d0-7b37-11ea-89bc-23bf20e49277

[25] Lee J., (2019) “Denied Iran’s Oil, Syria Has Few Options But Russia”, Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-07/denied-iran-s-oil-syria-has-few-options-but-russia

[26] Fairbanks W., (2019) “Syria: Oil Products Shortage Heightens Damascus ‘Post-War’ Challenges”, Available at: https://www.mees.com/2019/5/3/geopolitical-risk/syria-oil-products-shortage-heightens-damascus-post-war-challenges/1e7ebca0-6d97-11e9-ae03-53f90f9af5df

[27] 116th US Congress, “H.R.31 – Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019”, Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/31/text#toc-id906365a9748743cb8c04ea486ea1e93d

[28] US Department of State, “Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, Available at: https://2017-2021.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act//index.html

[29] Coward N. F. et al., (2020) “First Designations Under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act Target the Syrian Government” Available at: https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/first-designations-under-the-caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act-target-the-syrian-government/

[30] Council of the EU, “Syria: Sanctions against the regime extended by one year”, Available at; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/05/28/syria-sanctions-against-the-regime-extended-by-one-year/

[31] ibid.

[32] Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, (2020) “UK sanctions relating to Syria”, Available at; https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-syria

[33] Reuters, (2020) “Syria seeks Russian investment as U.S. sanctions hammer economy”, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-russia-fm-meetings-lands-idUSKBN25Y0YX

[34] Haaretz, (2019) “Russia Announces $500m Investment in Syrian Port City”, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/f52bdde6-20cc-11ea-b8a1-584213ee7b2b

[35] Jedina M., Kajjo S., (2019), “Report: Iran Preparing for Role in Syria’s Reconstruction”, Available at: https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/report-iran-preparing-role-syrias-reconstruction

[36] Tehran Times, (2021) “Iran-Syria trade conference held in Tehran” Available at; https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/458697/Iran-Syria-trade-conference-held-in-Tehran

[37] Hatahet S., (2019) “Russia and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria”, Available at: https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/russia-and-iran-economic-influence-in-syria

[38] Cafiero G., (2020) “China plays the long game on Syria”, Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-plays-long-game-syria

[39] Harvey F. J, (2020), “China shows greater interest in Syria amid pandemic, US tensions”, Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/06/china-invest-syria-assad-reconstruction-us-tension.html

[40] Lyall N., (2019) “China in Postwar Syria”, Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-postwar-syria/

[41] Elazar G., (2017) “Moving Westward: The Chinese Rebuilding of Syria”, Available at: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/moving-westward-chinese-rebuilding-syria/

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Cosmin Timofte Cosmin Timofte. Graduate student of Politics and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University and International Security at University of Warwick. Former exchange student in the United States. Participant in an analytical project of the media narratives around Brexit in the United Kingdom and Romania. His main research interests are Middle Eastern armed conflicts, disinformation and intelligence.

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Cosmin Timofte Cosmin Timofte. Graduate student of Politics and Intelligence Studies at Aberystwyth University and International Security at University of Warwick. Former exchange student in the United States. Participant in an analytical project of the media narratives around Brexit in the United Kingdom and Romania. His main research interests are Middle Eastern armed conflicts, disinformation and intelligence.
Program Europa tworzą:

Marcin Chruściel

Dyrektor programu. Absolwent studiów doktoranckich z zakresu nauk o polityce na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, magister stosunków międzynarodowych i europeistyki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prezes Zarządu Instytutu Nowej Europy.

dr Artur Bartoszewicz

Przewodniczący Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk ekonomicznych Szkoły Głównej Handlowej. Ekspert w dziedzinie polityki publicznej, w tym m. in. strategii państwa i gospodarki.

Michał Banasiak

Specjalizuje się w relacjach sportu i polityki. Autor analiz, komentarzy i wywiadów z zakresu dyplomacji sportowej i polityki międzynarodowej. Były dziennikarz Polsat News i wysłannik redakcji zagranicznej Telewizji Polskiej.

Maciej Pawłowski

Ekspert ds. migracji, gospodarki i polityki państw basenu Morza Śródziemnego. W latach 2018-2020 Analityk PISM ds. Południowej Europy. Autor publikacji w polskiej i zagranicznej prasie na temat Hiszpanii, Włoch, Grecji, Egiptu i państw Magrebu. Od września 2020 r. mieszka w północnej Afryce (Egipt, Algieria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Absolwent studiów prawniczych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach. Jego zainteresowania badawcze koncentrują się na Inicjatywie Trójmorza i polityce w Bułgarii. Doświadczenie zdobywał w European Foundation of Human Rights w Wilnie, Center for the Study of Democracy w Sofii i polskich placówkach dyplomatycznych w Teheranie i Tbilisi.

Program Bezpieczeństwo tworzą:

dr Aleksander Olech

Dyrektor programu. Wykładowca na Baltic Defence College, absolwent Europejskiej Akademii Dyplomacji oraz Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego główne zainteresowania badawcze to terroryzm, bezpieczeństwo w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz rola NATO i UE w środowisku zagrożeń hybrydowych.

dr Agnieszka Rogozińska

Członek Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk społecznych w dyscyplinie nauki o polityce. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje na problematyce bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego, instytucjonalnym wymiarze bezpieczeństwa i współczesnych zagrożeniach.

Aleksy Borówka

Doktorant na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Przewodniczący Krajowej Reprezentacji Doktorantów w kadencji 2020. Autor kilkunastu prac naukowych, poświęconych naukom o bezpieczeństwie, naukom o polityce i administracji oraz stosunkom międzynarodowym. Laureat I, II oraz III Międzynarodowej Olimpiady Geopolitycznej.

Karolina Siekierka

Absolwentka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe, specjalizacji Bezpieczeństwo i Studia Strategiczne. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną i wewnętrzną Francji, prawa człowieka oraz konflikty zbrojne.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Podoficer rezerwy, student studiów magisterskich na kierunku Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe i Dyplomacja na Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, były praktykant w BBN. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują m.in. operacje pokojowe ONZ oraz bezpieczeństwo Ukrainy.

Leon Pińczak

Student studiów drugiego stopnia na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe. Dziennikarz polskojęzycznej redakcji Biełsatu. Zawodowo zajmuje się obszarem postsowieckim, rosyjską polityką wewnętrzną i doktrynami FR. Biegle włada językiem rosyjskim.

Program Indo-Pacyfik tworzą:

Łukasz Kobierski

Dyrektor programu. Współzałożyciel INE oraz prezes zarządu w latach 2019-2021. Stypendysta szkoleń z zakresu bezpieczeństwa na Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security w Waszyngtonie, ekspert od stosunków międzynarodowych. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wiceprezes Zarządu INE.

dr Joanna Siekiera

Prawnik międzynarodowy, doktor nauk społecznych, adiunkt na Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu w Bergen w Norwegii. Była stypendystką rządu Nowej Zelandii na Uniwersytecie Victorii w Wellington, niemieckiego Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, a także francuskiego Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques.

Paweł Paszak

Absolwent stosunków międzynarodowych (spec. Wschodnioazjatycka) na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim oraz stypendysta University of Kent (W. Brytania) i Hainan University (ChRL). Doktorant UW i Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną ChRL oraz strategiczną rywalizację Chiny-USA.

Jakub Graca

Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Aleksy Borówka

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Wroclaw, the President of the Polish National Associations of PhD Candidates in 2020. The author of dozen of scientific papers, concerning security studies, political science, administration, international relations. Laureate of the I, II and III International Geopolitical Olympiad.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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  • Polish-Czech Forum 2023: Czech Foreign Policy. Interview with Šárka Shoup [Part 2]
    by Michał Banasiak
    September 19, 2023
  • Outcomes of the 2023 Bucharest Three Seas Initiative Summit
    by Julita Wilczek
    September 13, 2023
  • Czech-Polish Forum 2023: Challenges and Perspectives of Polish-Czech Cooperation discussed by Karel Sál [Part 1]
    by Michał Banasiak
    September 12, 2023

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