The Death of Maneuver? On the “Revolution” on the Battlefield in Ukraine

Introduction

The dronisation and sensorisation of the battlefield have led to a forced process of troop dispersal in the context of static military engagements. The significant presence of reconnaissance and strike elements makes it impossible to mass forces for conducting major military operations. Offensives on the battlefield increasingly lack the essential element of mass, which is also related to the accumulation of anti-tank assets on the field. Dronisation is changing the battlefield; however, the war in Ukraine should not be treated as an oracle for how future wars will be fought. The current war is itself a hybrid of the world wars fought in the 20th century and modern technological solutions known from 21st-century conflicts. In the author’s opinion, the solutions currently being tested and implemented during the war in Ukraine do not constitute an RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs), but rather an evolution—the most effective use of currently available solutions, as well as the democratisation and “economisation” of the battlefield. Drawing conclusions from the ongoing conflict is essential, but one must not fall into the extreme of treating this war as the absolute determinant of the appearance of future wars. The same mistake is being made here that analysts made when drawing conclusions from the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Due to the lack of significant impact of tanks on the hostilities conducted there and their vulnerability to anti-tank measures, erroneous conclusions were reached that they would not prove significant on the battlefield. 

Conducting Operations in Semi-Positional Warfare

There is no single specific reason why the war currently being fought in Ukraine has taken its particular form. The primary cause is the characteristics of the warring parties, followed by the capabilities these parties possess [1]. Both sides are able to maintain their positions, cover their flanks, and hold reserves at the tactical level. Problems begin at the operational scale; the long front line, numerous flashpoints, and the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of both sides make achieving a Schwerpunkt (main focus/center of gravity) impossible. Pulling tactical units from other sectors of the front to achieve superiority and break through defenses elsewhere involves high risk. For this reason, gaps in the front line are often plugged and left unexploited by either side. Additionally, penetration attacks are costly, making the exploitation of breaches difficult; this was particularly evident in the failed Ukrainian offensive in Zaporizhzhia in 2023 [2]. Ultimately, the solid defensive positions used by both sides prevent the effective use of traditional means of engagement.

Conducting operations with significant forces in the environment of modern technological battle is decidedly difficult due to:

1. The accumulation of sensors and effectors on the battlefield.
2. The dronisation of the battlefield.
3. The economisation of strikes using loitering munitions at the operational and tactical levels.
4. The development of electronic warfare (EW) devices – both offensive and defensive.
5. The economisation and accumulation of portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft assets.

Russian motorised rifle regiments are currently losing maneuvering space. The activity of these units often boils down to movement, camouflage, survival, and engagement only in favorable situations [3]. The concentration of subunits is significantly hampered due to vulnerability to deep strikes. The classic concept of maneuver is being replaced by dislocation, treating maneuver as a subset thereof [4]. Mass itself is also being replaced by the concentration of capabilities. Contrary to the classic principles of the art of war regarding striving for Schwerpunkt (dominance in mass in a given operational direction), the goal is now superiority in terms of capabilities that imitate and replace classically understood mass. The collapse of classic mechanised operations took place in 2022–2023. This was followed by a transition to positional clashes. After the fiasco of mechanised operations, the Russians are resorting to infantry infiltration tactics known for 100 years. Maneuver itself is shifting to lower levels of operation conduct. Maneuver has not died; it is merely changing its form, adapting to the conflict being waged.

It should be remembered that the specific nature of the war being fought in Ukraine is caused by many external factors (outside the battlefield) that prevent the conduct of operations with significant forces to break the front line. These factors include:

1. Problems in replenishing forces (both manpower and armored vehicles) on both sides of the armed conflict.
2. Reluctance to waste forces and resources in ineffective offensives (e.g., in Russia’s case, a reluctance to send the newest vehicles to Ukraine).

The transition to positional clashes itself resulted from the subunits losing the ability to generate force in a given operational direction. This was caused by the very nature of attrition warfare.

In the realm of tactics, small infantry units known from the end of World War I have returned to the battlefield. It is worth recalling the basic principles of Prussian small infantry unit tactics (Sturmtruppen), which were laid out in Erwin Rommel’s work “Infantry Attacks” [5]:

1. Maneuver is more important than frontal attack (instead of striking the most heavily defended place, one should look for weak points and flank the enemy or get to their rear).
2. Surprise and initiative (the attack should be fast, sudden, and aimed at disorganising the enemy before they can react).
3. Independence of units and initiative of lower-level commanders (small infantry groups receive objectives but have freedom of action – flexibility and tempo count, not a rigid plan).
4. Dispersion in attack (instead of mass columns – small, mobile groups, difficult to shell).
5. Use of terrain (Rommel emphasized the continuous use of cover and concealment – ditches, hills, trees, and covered approaches).
6. Precise reconnaissance (before an attack occurs, accurate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position and weak points is key).
7. Short, violent strikes (attacks executed quickly so the enemy does not have time to conduct an effective counterattack) [6].

However, similar to 100 years ago, there are problems with fire preparation for the assault due to the short window for counter-battery fire and the accumulation of sensors. In direct contact, infantry combat is undergoing a renaissance, having been forgotten during the last decades of asymmetric warfare. The Russians are banking on maneuver and achieving fire superiority in a given direction [7].

It is significant that most problems of the Ukrainian battlefield are unique to the semi-positional battlefield characteristic of Ukraine. In the case of a maneuver battle, the utility of fiber-optic FPV drones decreases due to the static nature of drone command and control posts and the limited range of fiber-optic cables. Standard FPV drones would be more useful in a maneuver battle, though they are easier to jam. In the case of a static front line, using loitering munitions of this type is much easier; it allows for the designation of drone “kill zones”, maintaining constant aerial patrols of reconnaissance and strike drones, and the positioning and securing of command and control posts. From the Russian point of view, this “revolution” is not a coherent, linear process. There is no change control or management within it [8]. It relies on adaptation and counter-adaptation.

The currently waged war provides the lesson that conducting maneuver in specific directions of action, aiming to gain an advantage in that sector, is yielding to numerous operations of smaller units dispersed across a given area [9]. The structure of the units themselves is also changing; instead of a whole battery, a single howitzer often operates, supported by a reconnaissance drone. Russian military analysts propose smaller, more numerous task forces instead of large operating units.

The democratisation of reconnaissance-strike assets, and their integration with sensors and effectors, has significantly shortened the time from target detection to destruction [10]. Every second in the OODA loop is crucial; both sides strive to accelerate the cycle by delegating tasks to a lower level [11]. In a war conducted this way, the superiority of command based on Mission Command and Auftragstaktik over centralised post-Soviet models is visible. The ability to strike the enemy’s rear and influence areas up to 70 km from the front line often makes effective massing of forces for operations and the creation of reserves impossible. Decentralised defense, often based on strongpoints, is rewarded.

The Ukrainian offensive in Zaporizhzhia in 2023 did not achieve the assumed results for many reasons. The Russian army in 2023 had partially learned lessons from the defeats of 2022. Ukrainian units encountered prepared defensive positions (the Surovikin Line), and the masking of the operation also failed. The Russians kept UAVs in the air acting as an anti-surprise capability, thereby preventing an effective approach to positions. An example of this situation is the event of June 6, where three Russian Orlan-10 UAVs circled over the village of Mala Tokmachka, detected a Ukrainian attempt to breach a minefield, and then directed artillery, FPV, and helicopter strikes onto them [12]. Reconnaissance capabilities and the channeling of enemy movements (thanks to numerous minefields), disproportionate engagement of forces and resources, and lack of training proved key to the failure of this offensive [13]. The Ukrainians drew conclusions from this defeat, which were applied in the Kursk operation. Despite the democratisation of ISR assets, the Kursk operation was an interesting example where an operation was successfully conducted in the initial phase. Operational security was very tight; tactical unit commanders had to sign special documents, and General Syrsky took personal command of the operation [14]. Since then, neither side has achieved significant successes in operations. Surprise is a key aspect of the success of an offensive and military operations. Analysis of the two offensive operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023 and 2024 provides a conclusion: strict operational masking and operational maskirovka (deception) are key to an effective offensive operation on the modern battlefield.

Is the War in Ukraine an RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)?

The main premise of an RMA is a change in the conduct of war such that a return to the preceding state is impossible. The technological and tactical solutions used during the war in Ukraine are not new solutions. They are merely being implemented in a mass and economical way. The war in Ukraine is an innovation laboratory, with innovations arising mostly from the bottom up, reacting to front-line requirements. The drones functioning within the conflict are often complementary goods alongside artillery. For example: an artillery barrage falls on a defensive position hidden in wooded terrain, destroying cover, then drones enter and precisely eliminate targets. The synergy effect between precision munitions and indirect fire achieves astonishing results, but this is the result of a multi-year evolution of reconnaissance and strike means.

The Character of Future War

A future war involving the Russian Federation, depending on which area becomes the flashpoint, could take on a different character. However, due to NATO doctrine prioritising Air-Land Battle within multi-domain operations, and the political-military intentions of the Russian Federation, the probable character of a future war will be maneuver-based, at least in the initial stages of the conflict. In line with NATO principles of “speed, surprise, violence of action”, offensive, fire, and maneuver capabilities, as well as C4ISR capabilities, will be key. In the case of a future war, artillery will once again inflict the most casualties, or at least in the maneuver phase [15]. In the current character of fighting, UAVs play the role of a substitute for artillery fire, the effect of which is hard to replace—as indicated by 20th-century conflicts.

A potential war between the Russian Federation and NATO would mean a clash with an adversary possessing technological superiority on a completely different level than previous opponents. A breakdown of existing combat models would occur. Russia would once again have to adapt to new battlefield conditions, if it managed to survive the first stage of losses and disorganisation [16]. The situation in Ukraine looked similar; after the first stage of losses and retreats in 2022, the Russian Federation had time in 2023–2025 to adjust its industry, tactics, and armed forces. In the case of a conflict with NATO, there may not be time for learning and adaptation because their model is based on mass, not on flexible command and adaptation [17]. In a potential future conflict, the Russian Federation’s troops would most likely be numerically superior in a given theater of operations; waging a war of attrition would not be possible in this case.

Casualty statistics (particularly those inflicted by drones) for both sides in the war in Ukraine do not mean that the casualty ratio will be similar in a future conflict. Most likely, artillery will again take first place, especially in a situation of aggressive maneuver warfare. Drones will become inseparable from artillery, operating symbiotically [18].

Successive conduct of operations in an environment rich in assets belonging to the Russian reconnaissance-strike complex will be possible in a situation where these assets are neutralised temporarily and locally. A maneuver window then appears. Key here is the synergy of assets belonging to EW (Electronic Warfare) and other anti-drone capabilities [19]. For the effective conduct of operations, masking the intentions of maneuvers will be essential. Surprise is still achievable under current battlefield conditions, but it requires a different approach than before.

Maneuver warfare is not the opposite of attrition itself, but of attrition warfare [20]. The use of maneuver and fire is key to inflicting overwhelming losses on the enemy so that they seek ways to conclude peace; this favors smaller, better-trained, and equipped armed forces. States possessing “mass” in a given theater of war will, however, prefer attrition warfare. Maneuver is not conditioned by the environment; rather, a given actor should shape the operational environment to their advantage.

Recommendations 

Key lessons in conducting modern maneuver warfare are provided by actions in Ukraine in 2022–2023. Crucial to the effectiveness of conducting such actions is training within combined arms [21]. Combined arms training should incorporate capabilities from every spectrum of multi-domain operations (MDO). The war in Ukraine is an innovation laboratory, yet implementing all technological novelties will not result in increased capabilities in the area of conducting operations. For the Polish Armed Forces, it is essential to increase the frequency of field exercises at every level, and particularly to focus on combined arms activities. Building a concept for neutralising the Russian reconnaissance-strike complex will prove key in the event of conducting future operations. Drones (like any weapon) are vulnerable to a range of inconveniences—limited payload, the necessity of maintaining a team, the possibility of being shot down (unlike artillery shells), as well as weather and terrain conditions.

Summary 

The changes visible in military affairs and operational art should not be treated as a Revolution in Military Affairs, but rather as an evolution using means known from previous wars. The conflict in Ukraine is strictly abrasive and semi-positional, which encourages the use of creative and technologically advanced means of engagement; this does not mean that subsequent wars will look exactly the same. The current war is an “outlier” in the art of war in this case. The death of maneuver is greatly exaggerated; a change in its form has occurred, emphasizing lower levels of combat conduct as well as offensive maneuver and flexible defense [22]. The semi-positional character of the currently waged war may merely be a pause before transitioning to the next (maneuver) stage of warfare.

Bibliography

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2. Ibidem.
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6. Ibidem. 
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11. Ibidem.
12. Ibidem.
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15. Ibidem.
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17. Ibidem.
18. Ibidem.
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