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Oct 04
Analysis, Geopolitics, International Politics, Publications

The geopolitics of energy transition, part 1: Six challenges for the international balance of power stemming from transitioning away from fossil fuels

October 4, 2021
The geopolitics of energy transition, pt. 1: Six challenges for the international balance of power stemming from transitioning away from fossil fuelsDownload

Introduction

– The global transition away from fossil fuels is a “two steps forward, one step back” process. Although a non-linear phenomenon, subject to temporal recessions, regional variables and facing the challenge of a rapidly rising global energy demand, the transition is well in progress and its advancements are quantifiable.

– The transition away from fossil fuels is also one towards renewable sources of energy. As such, it entails geopolitical challenges, risks and opportunities similar in nature to those which accompanied previous energy transformations.

The premise of the inevitability of doing away with fossil fuels is already shaping long-term strategies of fuel importing and exporting states alike. The cross-dependencies resulting from this emerging new energy security landscape will to a large extent define the geopolitics of the next several decades.

Between the years 2009 and 2019, the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in global energy generation was increasing by about 5% per year[1], compared with an average of 1.7% growth for fossil fuels in the same period.[2]  The share of renewables in satisfying national energy demand has been rising in the past years, reaching the levels of about 12%, 20% and 26% for the US[3], EU[4] and China[5] respectively. Renewables are on the path to overtake coal to as the world’s primary source of electricity generation worldwide by 2025.[6] At the same time, and in spite of widespread support for “green recovery” to address the COVID-19 crisis, national recovery packages included investments in fossil fuels worth about six times the amounts allocated therein to renewables.[7] Crucially, however, these values and numbers should be looked at through the lens of the rapidly growing global demand for energy, the meeting of which will remain a strategic priority for national economies, higher on the agenda than their domestic and international commitments to cut GHG emissions. This realization is central to understanding the paradox lying in the fact that certain countries, while doubling-down on the green energy transition, are at the same time adding hundreds of GW of coal power to their power grids every year (think China or Indonesia, but also Germany). Such decisions fuel accusations of hypocrisy against the governments of such states, but a closer look at this phenomenon unveils a nuanced picture.

While today’s projections – which are based on the quantification of global commitments to climate policies – make it difficult to assess the chances for reaching the goals of the global climate agenda, the estimations as to the future share of clean energy in the global energy mix are more easily determinable. If the presently observed trends continue, up to about 300 GW of solar[8] and 160 GW of wind energy[9] will be added, and between 50 and 70 million EVs[10] will be produced worldwide every year by 2040. The value of the green energy industry has in 2018 equalled that of fossil fuels, and is on track to represent up to 10% of the global market value already by 2030.[11] If the current pace of progression of the green economy continues, then the critical minerals market alone is predicted to outvalue the fossil fuels industry by 2040.[12] Although it faces numerous known and yet to be known obstacles, the global economy’s transitioning away from fossil fuels and towards clean energy is now a process well underway.

The implications of the global green energy transition exceed beyond the energy sector, and the disruptive nature of the process considerably impacts the geopolitical status quo. At the same time, the existing analyses of this transformation tend to assume its specific temporality and focus on the “before” as opposed to what comes “after” the era of fossil fuels. Such an approach can be especially misleading, given that the advancing transformation does not operate on a one-dimensional timeframe. Measuring this transformation is also problematic considering its non-linear progression in different regions, making its assessment prone to subjectivity and error. Energy transitions can be “messy, conflictual, and highly disjointed processes”[13] which often resemble a dynamic equilibrium (or the lack thereof) rather than a line on a graph. Therefore, in order to avoid falling into the trap of assuming a limited temporality of the ever-accelerating green energy transition, the focus should be on the transformative process itself and its continuous impact on the global balance of power. A geopolitical analysis should focus on identifying the direct and indirect results, as well as new relationships of interdependence which spring from the transition itself and the mitigation efforts of the impact of climate change. Guided by this assumption, this text identifies six fundamental geopolitical considerations, which – depending on the subject and interests involved – entail risks, challenges and opportunities for various stakeholders of the green energy transition.

Risks, challenges and opportunities in transitioning away from fossil fuels

First, energy needs and policies adopted to meet them will increasingly vary among nations. Over the past two decades, energy consumption decreased where economic growth was slow but energy efficiency figured high on the agenda. The EU states (combined) consume today about 5% less energy than they did in 2000.[14] This decrease has reached 15% in Japan, 20% in Canada, and has remained largely flat in the USA[15]. In the same period, however, primary energy use has doubled in India and the Middle East, and nearly tripled in central Africa and China, causing an overall 40% increase in the global energy use.[16] It comes then as no surprise that non-OECD countries will account for 70% of the global energy demand by 2040.[17] Meeting this nearly exponential demand growth without compromising the global climate agenda will require yearly investments in the range of $100bn+ to expand renewable energy in developing economies alone, with most of it in need of being financed with foreign capital[18]. The question of who and how will provide funding and technology to meet this growing demand is increasingly important, not least to the success of the global climate agenda. The outcome of the emerging international rivalry around this issue is likely to determine who will control many of the most important supply chains of tomorrow: some of the world’s least developed states are home to most critical minerals needed in clean technologies, and at the same time are in need of developing their renewable sectors.

Second, the import-export relationships between states producing and consuming energy is evolving due to the geographically dispersed deployment structure of the RES technologies. The ownership of low-carbon technology lies today primarily in the hands of the OECD members and China[19], which also invest most in green tech research and development[20]. The extraction of critical minerals needed to produce these technologies is concentrated, often to extreme extents[21], in countries different to those that have up until now been satiating the global demand for fossil fuels[22]. Moreover, the service of processing raw minerals to make them fit for use in hardware is itself concentrated in only just a handful of countries today, notably in China[23]. The cocktail of all of these factors combined results in a far more complex web of stakeholder cross-dependencies than the one which has underpinned the fossil fuel-reliant global economy. The reconfiguration of the global supply chains of energy, rendered inevitable by the emerging new landscape of connections in the realms of energy production, transport and distribution risks to revive the neo-colonial relation structures between the countries of the Global North and South. Being important and far-reaching phenomena in their own right, the challenges related to the growing demand for critical minerals and the risk of renaissance of quasi-colonial relationships will be addressed at length in a separate instalment of our ClimeNous series.

Third, the risk of energy impoverishment in the green transition process may, if materialized, introduce unprecedented dependence of some states on foreign energy supply. In a global economy relying primarily on oil, gas and coal for its energy needs, the world has seen many times how governments use their control over the direction of flows of fossil fuels to exert influence over countries relying on fuel imports. While progressively dethroning fossil fuels, the green economy is endowing certain nations with new leverages over their neighbours and even geographically remote competitors. Carbon pricing via taxes and emissions trading systems (ETS) constitute one such example. Under the EU’s ETS scheme, emissions price has gone from appr. EUR 8/ton in 2018 to over EUR 50/ton, and its rise is expected to continue. This is several times the current price of such allowances available under China’s ETS[24], launched in 2021 after several years of pilot regional projects and already the world’s largest[25]. While an imposed pricing rule of this kind is usually identically binding for the entities operating within the concerned market – which, in case of the EU, encompasses a number of countries – a rising price for carbon consumption affects the individual situations of industries and national economies to varying degrees. As for the states, those where coal plays a major role in the national energy mix, the pace at which the price of emission allowances is rising increases the risk of unaffordability of energy at a time when renewables are decades away from becoming default energy sources. Such countries are then left with little choice but to procure themselves overly expensive energy to satisfy their ongoing energy needs, all the while pursuing an unprecedentedly costly green transformation. The risk of facing energy gaps which this situation entails for such states increases the relevance of natural gas and other low(er)-emission fuels in reaching Europe’s climate goals. It also affects the political conjuncture around energy infrastructure projects, whether they be of up-, mid-, or downstream type, the utility of which is now measured no longer solely against the availability of a given energy resource, but more importantly against their compatibility with the pursued climate agenda and long-term economic viability.

Fourth, the accommodation of the green energy transition by states dependent on revenues from fossil fuels does not change their fundamental strategic interests. The majority of the world’s largest exporters of fossil fuels are also states with some most geopolitically intricate geographies. Their often expansionist policies, rendered possible by the steady streams of revenues from such exports and the fact alone that they control the flows of such critical resources, constitute tools shaping regional, and at times global, balances of power. While the world is unlikely to ever do away entirely with fossil fuels[26] and the prospect of the low-carbon global economy is decades away, states whose treasuries have thus far relied on exports of hydrocarbons to fill up their coffers are actively anticipating the emerging carbon-hostile green economy. National strategies vary across the spectrum; Saudi Arabia, for instance, intends to “raise the share of non-oil exports in non-oil GDP from 16% to 50%”[27] and reach 50% renewables target by 2030[28], whereas Russia announced to focus on LNG and blue hydrogen production (i.e. hydrogen made of natural gas)[29]. The pace and forms of these and other strategies of hydrocarbon-exporting states will evolve depending on the geopolitical conjuncture underpinning global markets and the climate agenda. Their eventual shape will be the consequence of choices made by governments to address both existing and emerging challenges to national interests, particularly those resulting from the geographic location of such states, through means compatible with the market reality of a global economy bent on decarbonisation.

Fifth, the transition process creates new political space within which states will be competing for gains in their overall national power potential. The above-mentioned rise in relevance of natural gas as a transition fuel on the path towards low-carbon economy is in this regard a case in point. Germany has betted heavily on the potential of its renewables sector when it decided to close its nuclear powerplants at risk of a national energy gap. As a result, coal – which it is said to phase out by 2038[30] – has ironically overtaken wind as Germany’s primary source of electricity[31]. More importantly still, reaching Germany’s climate policy goals without resorting to nuclear energy will require Berlin to import increasingly high volumes of gas. This, above all, was the rationale behind Germany’s steadfast support for the Nord Stream 2 project. This new double-pipe conduit will significantly raise the quantities of gas received directly from Russia, and thus expand the latter’s toolbox of instruments allowing it to influence European geopolitics. It also gives Gazprom the upper hand over American LNG exporters, whose hopes to seize the chance created by the pandemic-related supply disruptions and finally get a foot in the door of the European gas market will likely remain unfulfilled. In Europe alone other similar conundrums include quarrels over whether nuclear energy and non-green hydrogen (i.e. one that is not produced from renewable energy) should be included in the EU taxonomy (i.e. EU’s incoming classification system for environmentally sustainable investing). Principally a French-German dispute, the question of the place of nuclear in the taxonomy may determine investment and energy choices in Europe and beyond. Its exclusion from the EU list would likely mean an additional boost for investments in German-produced RES technologies; its inclusion, on the other hand, would reassure those countries which rely on nuclear, possibly via French or American technology, for reaching their defined climate goals. In case of hydrogen, the issue is whether the countries where the RES sector is still in its early days and which are highly reliant on fossil fuels will be able to produce it with low-emission (but not renewable) fuels, especially natural gas. As it may take decades before many European countries will be able to produce green hydrogen in commercially viable quantities[32], a limitation of the taxonomy to cleanest hydrogen only may strengthen Germany’s expansionist green industry at the expense of those hindered elsewhere in Europe.

Sixth, reacting to the climate crisis is only one of the motivations for transitioning away from fossil fuels . While resourcefulness in fossil fuels translated in the past directly into geopoliticalinfluence of certain nations, the currently ongoing green energy transition is already disrupting this trend. So far, many hydrocarbon-rich countries have enjoyed the freedom to employ fossil fuel rents to develop and prosper, unmoved by repetitive announcements of an incoming peak demand[33]. However, even absent anthropogenic climate change, the estimates as to for how long could the world continue to rely on non-renewable fuels indicate that a global transition to renewables sources of power would most likely in any case become inevitable in the XXI century.[34] Overall, the pursuit of the decarbonization is the resultant of the acknowledged need to mitigate climate change, the anticipated exhaustion of the Earth’s embedded fossil resources[35], as well as of the sum total of the economic and political opportunities which the deep-restructuring of the global economy might bring for the transition’s proponents. The urgency of climate action amassed the global push responsible for the current prosperity of the green economy, thus precipitating what otherwise would later in all likelihood need to become a default policy orientation. In the long run, probably extending beyond XXI century, the forecasted depletion of fossil fuels looms large over export-dependent economies. As such, it constitutes an independent source of motivation to pursue the green transformation.

The considerations provided above do not delineate the definitive scope of the discussion at hand. Rather, they should be seen as focal points in the geopolitics of energy transition which governments and industries cannot but integrate into their long-term strategies. The next instalment in our series will provide further insights on this matter.


[1] REN21. 2021. “Renewables 2021 Global Status Report”, p. 13, 33, https://www.ren21.net/reports/global-status-report/

[2] Id., p. 35.

[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2021. “The United States consumed a record amount of renewable energy in 2020”, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48396#

See also International Renewable Energy Agency. 2021. “Renewable Energy Statistics 2021”, p. 414, https://irena.org/publications/2021/Aug/Renewable-energy-statistics-2021

See also U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2021. “The United States consumed a record amount of renewable energy in 2020”, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48396#

[4] Eurostat. 2020. “Renewable energy statistics”, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Renewable_energy_statistics

See also Eurostat. 2021. “Renewable energy largely spared from pandemic effects”, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20210629-1

See also International Energy Agency. 2020. “European Union 2020”, p. 14, https://www.iea.org/reports/european-union-2020

[5] China Energy Portal. 2021. “2019 electricity & other energy statistics (preliminary)”, via https://chinaenergyportal.org/en/2019-electricity-other-energy-statistics-preliminary/

See also International Renewable Energy Agency. 2021. “Renewable Energy Statistics 2021”, p. 158, https://irena.org/publications/2021/Aug/Renewable-energy-statistics-2021

[6] International Energy Agency. 2020. “Renewables 2020: overview”, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2020?mode=overview

[7] Turk, D.; Kamiya, G. 2020. “The impact of the Covid-19 crisis on clean energy progress”. International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/articles/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-crisis-on-clean-energy-progress

[8] International Energy Agency. 2021. “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, p. 55.

[9] Id., p. 63.

[10] Id., p. 84.

[11] FTSE Russell. 2018. “Investing in the global green economy: busting common myths”, https://content.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/research/fr_investing_in_the_global_green_economy.pdf?_ga=2.2437301.443003715.1633101333-1935563774.1633101333

[12] International Energy Agency. 2021. “Press release: Clean energy demand for critical minerals set to soar as the world pursues net zero goals”, https://www.iea.org/news/clean-energy-demand-for-critical-minerals-set-to-soar-as-the-world-pursues-net-zero-goals

[13] Sovacool, B. K. 2016. “How long will it take? Conceptualizing the temporal dynamics of energy transitions”. Energy Research & Social Science 13: 202-215, p. 205.

[14] Berdysheva, S.; Ikonnikova, S. 2021. “The Energy Transition and Shifts in Fossil Fuel Use: The Study of International Energy Trade and Energy Security Dynamics”. Energies 14 (5396), p. 1.

[15] Id. pp. 1-2.

[16] Id., p. 2.

[17] International Energy Agency. 2018. “World Energy Outlook”, p. 180.

[18] Goldthau, A. 2020. “The Global Energy Transition and the Global South”. In The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition edited by M. Hafner and S. Tagliapietra, p. 334.

[19] Id., p. 321.

[20] Id., p. 324.

[21] Some of the critical minerals needed for the global green transition to succeed are extracted primarily in some of the least developed countries. A case in point is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which provides today 70% of the global supplies of cobalt. See: International Energy Agency. 2021. “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, p. 12.

[22] Goldthau, A. 2020. “The Global Energy Transition and the Global South”. In The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition edited by M. Hafner and S. Tagliapietra, p. 324.

[23] International Energy Agency. 2021. “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, p.13.

[24] Argus Media. 2021. “China ETS: Emissions prices, volumes hit new record low”, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2250672-china-ets-emissions-prices-volumes-hit-new-record-low

[25] See International Energy Agency. 2020. “China’s Emissions Trading Scheme”, https://www.iea.org/reports/chinas-emissions-trading-scheme

[26] See International Energy Agency. 2021. “Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector”, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/beceb956-0dcf-4d73-89fe-1310e3046d68/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf

[27] Saudi Vision 2030. 2016. Available at: https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/v2030/overview/, p. 60.

[28] Saudi Green Initiative. Available at: https://www.saudigreeninitiative.org/targets/renewable-energy/.

[29] See IFRI. 2019. “Russia’s Energy Strategy-2035: Struggling to Remain Relevant”, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/russias-energy-strategy-2035-struggling-remain

[30] Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment. 2020. Act to Reduce and End Coal-Powered Energy and Amend Other Laws, via https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-08-31/germany-law-on-phasing-out-coal-powered-energy-by-2038-enters-into-force/

[31] Destatis. 2021. “Press release #429: Electricity production in the 1st half of 2021”, https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2021/09/PE21_429_43312.html

[32] See International Energy Agency. 2019. “The Future of Hydrogen”, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen

[33] International Renewable Energy Agency. 2019. “A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition”. Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, https://www.irena.org/publications/2019/Jan/A-New-World-The-Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transformation    

[34] See Ritchie, H. 2017. “How long before we run out of fossil fuels?”,p. https://ourworldindata.org/how-long-before-we-run-out-of-fossil-fuels
See also International Renewable Energy Agency. 2018. “Global Energy Transformation: A roadmap to 2050”, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Apr/IRENA_Report_GET_2018.pdf

[35] International Renewable Energy Agency. 2018. “Global Energy Transformation: A roadmap to 2050”, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Apr/IRENA_Report_GET_2018.pdf

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Maciej Bukowski Maciej Bukowski. A PhD candidate in the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at Jagiellonian University. A graduate of l’École de Droit de la Sorbonne and Cornell Law School, he is a senior expert at Poland’s Ministry of Climate and Environment.

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Maciej Bukowski Maciej Bukowski. A PhD candidate in the Institute of Political Science and International Relations at Jagiellonian University. A graduate of l’École de Droit de la Sorbonne and Cornell Law School, he is a senior expert at Poland’s Ministry of Climate and Environment.
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Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Aleksy Borówka

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Wroclaw, the President of the Polish National Associations of PhD Candidates in 2020. The author of dozen of scientific papers, concerning security studies, political science, administration, international relations. Laureate of the I, II and III International Geopolitical Olympiad.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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Financed with funds from the National Freedom Institute - Center for Civil Society Development under the Governmental Civil Society Organisations Development Programme for 2018-2030.

Sfinansowano ze środków Narodowego Instytutu Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego w ramach Rządowego Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030.



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