The Polish Navy’s Role in Baltic Sea Warfare

Introduction

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Alfred Mahan, a prominent figure in maritime operational art and naval warfare theory, emphasized the necessity for a state with maritime interests to protect those interests at sea. The Polish Navy’s existence has been debated for a century, raising questions about whether it is an excessive ambition for a state lacking vital sea interests or a crucial investment in safeguarding supply lines and ports. With the escalating threat of conflict with Russia, the strategic significance of the Baltic Sea and Polish ports has grown. These ports serve as vital points for the delivery of supplies and equipment, as well as the unloading of heavy allied forces that cannot be efficiently transported by air.

In the interwar period, the Navy was often viewed as a manifestation of Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s megalomania. This perspective may stem from the limited tradition and weak connections between Poland and the sea during the partitions. However, even during the First Polish Republic, the port of Gdańsk played a pivotal role as Poland’s economic gateway to the world, facilitating the export of food, grain, and wood to other European nations. In light of the evolving threat from Russia, a robust, efficient, and well-equipped navy assumes increasing importance. It should be a guarantor of Polish interests in the Baltic Sea and contribute to the state’s comprehensive security framework encompassing military, economic, and energy aspects.

Following 1989, there was limited focus on the Baltic Sea. However, this trend may change in the foreseeable future due to the deepening collaboration with South Korea, which possesses a shipbuilding industry and diverse offerings. The Polish economy is progressively reliant on the Baltic Sea, evident through the gas pipeline, gas port, and forthcoming wind farms and floating liquefied gas regasification terminal. [1] The Polish Navy should enhance its capabilities and power projection to safeguard critical elements of the Polish infrastructure, which are essential for the functioning of the Polish economy.

Several objections to the Polish Navy can be categorized into historical, economic, and operational factors. These include Poland’s naval setbacks during September 1939, cost comparisons with land-based military assets, and scepticism regarding the importance of the Baltic Sea in Polish defence efforts, given the anticipation of potential conflict with Russia occurring on land. The author aims to address these misconceptions in this work.

Historical background

On November 28, 1918, the Polish Navy was established as a new armed forces branch following Poland’s independence. Despite the lack of strong maritime traditions, the creation and development of this new force posed a significant challenge. Throughout the interwar period, efforts were made to undermine the Polish Navy and integrate it into other branches of the Armed Forces. During the defensive war of 1939, the Polish Navy faced challenges engaging the superior German forces, mainly due to the overwhelming German air power and the outdated nature of Polish naval aviation.

Notwithstanding the controversial Operation Peking, the continuity of Polish pre-war statehood persisted during World War II, notably through Polish ships such as ORP Błyskawica, ORP Burza, and ORP Piorun, the latter being involved in the pursuit of the Bismarck. Polish sailors stationed on the Hel Peninsula were among the last to surrender, holding out until October 2, 1939. The “Peking” plan involved the withdrawal of the Polish anti-torpedo squadron, comprising the destroyers ORP Burza, ORP Błyskawica, and ORP Grom, with the primary aim of safeguarding these ships from unproductive destruction by the Germans. The departure of the Polish ships was met with mixed reactions from other branches of the Armed Forces and Polish society.

Polish Navy Potential

As of the present, the condition of the Polish Navy is subpar, with most ships failing to meet modern battlefield requirements. Their quantity and equipment are insufficient to safeguard Polish interests in the Baltic Sea. [2] Over the last 20 years, the Navy has mainly acquired surplus vessels, including post-Norwegian Kobben-class submarines (over 50 years old) and frigates renamed ORP Gen. K. Pułaski and ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko, which were transferred to the Navy in 2000-2002. To enhance security in the Baltic Sea, a fleet of small, modern ships capable of operating in shallow waters is required, rather than large ocean-going vessels. The current inadequacies in Baltic Sea security provide leeway for Russian Baltic Fleet activities.

The core of the Polish Navy’s forces comprises ship flotillas, the Navy’s aviation brigade, and shore support and security units, including training units. The current assets of the Polish Navy, referred to as MW, consist of the following:

– two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, namely ORP Gen. K. Pułaski and ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko,

– two corvettes: ORP Kaszub (anti-submarine corvette) and ORP Ślązak (originally a multi-purpose corvette, completed as a patrol corvette),

– missile ships: ORP Grom, ORP Orkan, and ORP Piorun,

– minehunters: ORP Albatros, ORP Mewa, and ORP Kormoran. Additionally, a contract has been signed for the delivery of three more Kormoran II-type minehunters along with a logistics package, with the delivery scheduled for 2026-2027,

– ORP Orzeł submarine,

– a fleet of several minesweepers,

– five mine transport ships,

– ORP command ship Rear Admiral Xawery Czernicki,

– ORP Bałtyk tanker,

– radio-electronic reconnaissance ships: ORP Nawigator and ORP Hydrograf (intended to replace the ordered Delfin-class ships),

– several rescue ships,

– hydrographic ships: ORP Heweliusz and ORP Arctowski, and

– training ships.

The new Miecznik-class ships will soon replace the ageing Oliver Hazard Perry-class ships also conducting ZOP (anti-submarine warfare) operations.

Naval aviation assets include:

– several PZL M28B Bryza aircraft performing various tasks such as reconnaissance, patrol, transport, and ecological monitoring,

– four Mi-2D/R helicopters,

– eight PZL W-3WARM Anakonda helicopters,

– four Kaman SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters,

– eight Mi-14PŁ/R (to be replaced by AW101),

– four Leonardo AW101 helicopters delivered in 2023.

Enhancing the security of Polish interests in the Baltic Sea economically could entail acquiring air defense frigates and submarines under the Orka program, which is presently under construction within the Miecznik program. These vessels would relieve air defense squadrons, multi-role aircraft, and motorized battalions required in land theater operations. [3] The operational nature of a frigate or submarine can be likened to that of a general army battalion or a multi-role aviation squadron. [4] Unlike a battalion, a frigate can operate logistically at sea for several months. Furthermore, both Finland and Sweden are investing in this type of weaponry – Finland is procuring 4 frigates, and Sweden is expanding Visby-class units. Both frigates and submarines would allow Poland to participate in the NATO 4×30 initiative, which involves deploying for operational operations within 30 days: 30 general army battalions, 30 tactical aviation squadrons, and 30 combat ships. Presently, the Polish Navy has 3 ships suitable for this initiative. However, due to their age and technical condition, their effective participation is unfeasible. The new Orka and Miecznik ships will meet NATO criteria and enable Poland to participate in the 4×30 initiative in a cost-effective manner. The Miecznik ships are expected to be operational by 2033, and the Orka-class submarines by 2034. Despite their high unit cost, these vessels are expected to serve for several decades. [5] Nonetheless, the process of acquiring naval assets is prolonged and costly. Acquiring vessels of this magnitude may take up to 15 years: 1-2 years to define needs, a further 1-2 years to select a supplier and negotiate a contract, roughly 1 year for production preparation, around 5 years for production itself, and an additional 1-2 years for system integration, sea and port tests, launching, and equipment. [6] This timeline further encompasses training programs for sailors and commanders and harmonizing them with the ships. By initiating orders now, we are reinforcing the MW between 2035 and 2039.

Analysis of Littoral Warfare in the Baltic Sea

The Polish Navy’s operational environment in the Baltic Sea is characterized by a blurred line between war and peace, necessitating the deployment of strategies focused on deterrence and power projection. An illustrative instance is the September campaign, when the mere presence of Polish submarines dissuaded the Germans from entering the Bay of Gdańsk with large vessels.

Future wind farms within Poland’s exclusive economic zone hold the potential to emit false AIS signals, effectively concealing the movements of the coastal fleet. To realize this capability, turbines should be outfitted to generate both passive and active false signals. [7]

Coastal warfare demands a considerable fleet of small vessels like corvettes and frigates, capable of maneuvering in shallow waters. The expansion of the coastal fleet is justified by the challenges faced by the US Navy in exerting influence in the Black Sea due to the restrictions imposed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Notably, the convention limits the tonnage of warships entering the Black Sea to a maximum of 30,000 tons. Consequently, a fleet of smaller coastal ships provides a more agile and adaptable force in supporting Ukraine and US allies in the region. [8] Furthermore, such ships can be designated as support vessels, thus exempting them from the regulations of the convention.

Strategic Objectives of the Polish Navy in the Baltic Sea

The Polish coastline along the Baltic Sea spans 770 kilometres, with territorial waters covering an area of 8,783 square kilometres, nearly equivalent to the size of the Opole Voivodeship. The Polish exclusive economic zone extends over 22,595 square kilometres, facilitating the pursuit of economic activities such as fishing and resource exploitation.

In 2023, cargo turnover in Polish ports reached 135.9 million tons, denoting a 14.3% increase from 2022. [9] Key trading ports such as Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin-Świnoujście serve as pivotal components of the Baltic Sea’s maritime infrastructure, ranking among the top 10 largest ports in the region.

Moreover, 458 vessels with a cumulative gross tonnage (GT) of 4,937.4 thousand underwent refurbishment in Polish shipyards in 2023. Anticipating the future, energy emerges as a fundamental industry in the Baltic Sea, exemplified by the substantial activities at the Gdańsk oil port managed by the PERN Group. The port handled 37 million tons of crude oil and liquid fuels in 2023, signalling a 50% increase from the previous year. [10]

Furthermore, the LNG terminal in Świnoujście achieved remarkable performance, receiving 62 deliveries of liquefied gas in 2023, with the majority originating from the United States. [11] These developments align with broader initiatives aimed at bolstering Poland’s energy independence through the utilization of the Baltic Sea.

The following developments in the Polish energy and maritime sectors are notable: the anticipated production of over 10 GW of electricity from offshore wind farms in the Polish economic zone by 2040, the commencement of operations of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline in 2022, with an initial transmission of 6,339 million cubic meters of gas in 2023, and the planned maximum capacity of 9 GW for the Polish nuclear power plant once all reactors are operational, in comparison to the 5.4 GW generated by the coal-fired power plant in Bełchatów.

The Baltic Pipe gas pipeline connects Poland and Norwegian production platforms in the North Sea with the Polish gas system through Denmark, boasting a 10 billion cubic meters capacity. The pipeline’s inauguration coincided with the disruption of Nord Stream 1 and 2, contributing to Poland’s energy security. [12] Furthermore, liquefied gas is delivered via sea, with the gas port in Świnoujście’s capacity expected to rise to 7.5 billion cubic meters from its current 6 billion cubic meters. Altogether, 17 billion cubic meters of gas will be transported to Poland by sea, constituting 80% of the country’s gas consumption. The deployment of a floating FSRU terminal in the Bay of Gdańsk is envisaged to elevate further the share of gas transported by sea. [13]

Given the impracticality of maintaining continuous naval presence along the entire Baltic Sea segment of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, it is essential to map the pipeline’s seabed and create digital maps. Periodic reevaluation, including the use of artificial intelligence tools to identify discrepancies, is imperative. While the Polish Navy lacks the capacity for this task, Kormoran II-type minehunters could assist due to their observation systems, ability to recognize mine threats, and experienced crews. [14]

Allies

The recent developments mentioned in the text highlight new economic opportunities for Polish ports and the maritime economy. In light of the conflict in Ukraine, Polish ports are transforming into crucial transshipment hubs and supply routes. The Baltic Sea is increasingly significant in securing Poland’s energy independence. The participation of Sweden and Finland in NATO has heightened the importance of collective allied activities in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, it is advisable for Poland to prioritize collaboration with strategic partners and establish long-term international agreements based on the concept of “shore sharing.” This approach would involve sharing coastlines and allowing units to operate freely in allied waters following prior coordination with the relevant country’s operational service. [15] A similar agreement should be pursued with the Baltic states. Poland, in collaboration with the Baltic states, should work towards establishing a unified coastal defense policy, requiring alignment of defense strategies, joint formulation of fleet modernization plans, and linking of defense plans.

Another issue to consider is the integration of the naval commands of Poland and the Baltic states, following the example of the Dutch-Belgian “Admiral Benelux” agreement. [16] Facing the threat of Russian invasion, the role of transfer channels capable of supplying the defending Baltic states is increasing, including through the port of Rostock and Gotland. To realize the vision of making the Baltic Sea the alliance’s internal sea, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland must be able to safeguard maritime supply routes. The Russian Baltic Fleet’s ability to launch attacks using long-range missiles necessitates robust anti-aircraft defence from the fleets of NATO countries to secure supply routes. [17] Countries in the region have noted this gap in defence and have shifted from investing in small surface vessels to ordering multi-role frigates (Sweden and Finland) or air defence ships (Poland). An additional advantage of these units is their ability to neutralize the threat posed by Russian submarines capable of operating in the open sea.

Summary and Recommendations

Poland’s economic interests and the capacity of the Polish economy are closely tied to the sea. Safeguarding these interests and developing the fleet are not merely ambitious goals but strategic necessities. Pipelines, gas pipelines, optical fibres, and shipping lanes cannot be enclosed and protected by perimeter defences alone. They require a critical infrastructure protection model that fleet and shoreline protection can provide. Most of the challenges facing the Polish Navy stem from a continuation of interwar thinking and a failure to recognize the potential of the Baltic Sea. Today, the Polish coastline spans 770 km, compared to 71 km before World War II. Presently, some of the largest ports in the Baltic Sea are located there, not to mention gas pipelines and oil ports. In the near future, Poland will meet 100% of its oil, 90% of its gas, and 20% of its electricity demand through or from the sea. The current Polish model of critical infrastructure protection is insufficient to safeguard maritime assets. [18] Object-oriented thinking (defence of specific infrastructure elements akin to operations on land) predominates, rather than process-oriented thinking (protection of the entire supply line or its vulnerable segment). [19] An example of this can be seen in supplying liquefied gas through the Baltic Pipe, which originates in the North Sea and traverses beneath the bed of the Baltic Sea.

Poland, despite being a landlocked country, possesses substantial maritime capabilities. The public and policymakers must acknowledge the strategic significance of the Baltic Sea for Poland. This involves both leveraging its potential and safeguarding Polish interests. Exploring avenues for cooperation with neighbouring states in the Baltic Sea, such as Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states, is crucial. Collaborative efforts in the form of a “shore sharing” agreement and a unified strategy for coastal fleet defence and modernization hold significant importance.

Furthermore, it is essential to consider escalating the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for mine countermeasures and anti-submarine warfare. Embracing UAVs to enhance the Polish Navy’s operational awareness and conduct surveillance, particularly in coordination with allied units, is pivotal for detecting Russian hybrid activities, including those of the Russian shadow fleet.

It is essential to recognize that warfare is a multifaceted system. Without ensuring energy and economic security, in which the Baltic Sea plays a central role, Poland would face challenges in both functioning during wartime and effectively deterring potential adversaries.

Bibliography