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Jul 27
Analysis, Poland, Publications, Turkey

The Türkiye-Poland Strategic Partnership in the Context of the New Security Architecture

July 27, 2025
  • Deep Historical Ties Support Modern Cooperation – Centuries-old relations, dating back to 1414, and symbolic solidarity (e.g., Ottoman refusal to recognize Poland’s partitions) provide a cultural and diplomatic foundation for today’s strategic alignment.
  • Post-Cold War Revival Anchored in NATO and EU Frameworks – Since the 1990s, Türkiye and Poland have institutionalized ties through agreements and intensified collaboration within NATO and, to a lesser extent, via EU-related channels.
  • Shared Security Concerns Drive Defense Cooperation – Russian aggression has led both countries to prioritize defense—evidenced by NATO exercises, Poland’s purchase of Turkish Bayraktar drones, and trilateral coordination with Romania.
  • Energy and Infrastructure Alignments Create Strategic Synergy – Türkiye’s energy transit role (e.g., TANAP) complements Poland’s LNG diversification. Both aim to become Eurasian logistics hubs within the Belt and Road and EU networks.
  • Ideological and Cultural Diplomacy Reinforce the Partnershi- Similar sovereignty-focused politics (AKP–PiS), shared skepticism toward EU oversight, and growing educational/cultural exchanges (e.g., Erasmus, diaspora ties) deepen mutual understanding and public diplomacy.

Introduction

The relations between Türkiye and Poland have a multi-layered structure shaped not only by current strategic interests but also by deep historical roots and cultural interactions. This network of relations, established with the beginning of diplomatic contacts in 1414, deepened over time with the Ottoman Empire accepting the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as one of its traditional partners in Europe, and transformed into a symbolic solidarity with the support provided by the Ottomans during Poland’s historical traumas. The relations, which were interrupted during the Cold War, were revived with democratic transformations and a shift towards Western alliances in the post-1990 period, and settled on a more structural basis, especially within the framework of NATO and the EU.

1. A Brief Look at Turkish-Polish Relations

Historical Ties (Ottoman period – Polish Kingdom relations)

Diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Poland date back to 1414, when Polish King Władysław Jagiełło sent ambassadors to Ottoman Sultan Çelebi Mehmed (İlhan, 2019, p. 3-4). While these relations are often framed as one of the Ottoman Empire’s deepest diplomatic contacts in the West, their significance lies not merely in symbolic history, but in providing a foundation for today’s pragmatic partnership in security and energy. The historical legacy, once largely ceremonial, now facilitates strategic cooperation as both countries seek partners in an increasingly polarized European security environment. .

Although Poland was shared by three great Powers at the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire did not recognize the partition of Poland and protested this situation symbolically. For example, in diplomatic receptions held in the Ottoman palace, the presence of Poland was emphasized by saying ” The Polish envoy has not arrived” (Mierzwa, 2015, p. 6-8).

In the 19th century, Polish refugees played important roles in Ottoman lands. Among the Poles who took refuge in the Ottoman Empire, especially after the November 1830 Uprising and the January 1863 Uprising, there were those who joined the army (e.g. Józef Bem – Murad Pasha), translators and scientists (İlhan, 2019, p. 9; Mierzwa, 2015, p. 7). During this period, Polonezköy (Adampol), established on the Anatolian side of Istanbul, became an important political and cultural shelter supported by Prince Adam Czartoryski (Mierzwa, 2015, p. 6-7). In the 20th century, Poland was seen as an important partner in the Ottoman policy against Russia, and the Poles participated in wars on the Ottoman side in this direction. The warm relations that began during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent were further strengthened with the Ottoman-Polish agreement signed in 1533 (İlhan, 2019, p. 4).

1.1 Revival of Post-Cold War Relations

After World War II, diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Poland were interrupted. Poland’s position in the socialist bloc and Türkiye’s position in the Western camp, which is a member of NATO, caused relations to continue on a cold line (Mierzwa, 2015, p. 11-12; İlhan, 2019, p. 35).

However, after 1990, with Poland abandoning the socialist regime and embracing liberal democracy, relations between the two countries were revived. The “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement” signed on November 3, 1993, institutionalized Türkiye-Poland relations after the Cold War, establishing a formal framework for political and economic collaboration. This agreement was a continuation of the first friendship agreement signed in Lausanne in 1923 (Mierzwa, 2015, pp. 7-12). Similar milestones followed, such as the establishment of the “High-Level Consultative Committee” in the same decade, and Poland’s support for Türkiye’s EU candidacy during the early 2000s. These institutional steps marked a transition from historical goodwill to structured strategic cooperation

The “High-Level Consultative Committee” established in the post-1993 period pioneered the establishment of direct connections between mutual governments, universities, cultural institutions and local governments. Within the scope of the Science, Culture and Education Program, which came into force between 2003 and 2006, concrete projects such as student exchange programs, academic collaborations and the digitalization of historical sites such as Adampol village were implemented (Mierzwa, 2015, pp. 7-13).

1.2 Institutionalization of Relations through the EU and NATO

Poland’s full membership status in NATO in 1999 and in the European Union in 2004 allowed relations between Türkiye and Poland to be established on a more structural basis. In particular, within NATO, the two countries carry out joint activities, primarily in the fight against terrorism, border security and regional stability (İlhan, 2019, p. 35-36; Mierzwa, 2015, pp. 11-12).

Türkiye has occasionally received indirect support from Poland in its relations with the EU. It has been stated that Türkiye could be a bridge to Türkiye within the scope of Poland’s “eastern opening”, especially during Türkiye’s EU membership process. Poland has the potential to be an intermediary actor between the EU and Türkiye, and this creates a strategic advantage for bilateral relations. Relations, which have been institutionalized with various agreements since the 1990s, have been enriched with mutual arrangements in the fields of trade, investment, customs cooperation, combating tax evasion, tourism, education and culture (Mierzwa, 2015, p. 12).

1.3 Cooperation Developing on Issues Such as the Ukrainian War, Migration, and Energy in Recent Years

The developments in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea have made regional security a priority for both Poland and Türkiye. Since then, both countries have participated in NATO joint military exercises focused on Eastern European security and Black Sea stability. Poland’s hosting of over 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees and Türkiye’s status as the country hosting over 4 million refugees highlight the shared challenges of managing large-scale migrant flows.

Within NATO, Türkiye and Poland have strengthened defense industry cooperation: the sale of 24 Bayraktar TB2 drones to Poland in 2021 marked Poland as the first NATO country to purchase Turkish UAV systems (The Economic Times, 2021). In the energy sector, Türkiye’s role as a gas transit hub, with the TANAP pipeline transferring over 16 bcm (billion cubic meters) of gas annually to Europe, complements Poland’s LNG diversification strategy, including its terminal in Świnoujście with a regasification capacity of 8.3 bcm/year (Enerdata, 2025; Anadolu Agency, 2023).

These concrete initiatives demonstrate that cooperation between Türkiye and Poland has shifted from general diplomatic alignment to practical, infrastructure-focused, and defense-oriented collaboration in response to Russia’s threat.

In addition, the events organized on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of Türkiye-Poland diplomatic relations celebrated in 2014 have accelerated cultural diplomacy. In this context, concerts, exhibitions and academic symposiums held in Istanbul and Warsaw brought the public opinion of the two countries closer together (İlhan, 2019, p. 38-42; Mierzwa, 2015, p. 6-10)..

2. Pillars of the Emerging Türkiye-Poland Strategic Partnership

2.1. NATO and Military Cooperation

Poland and Türkiye stand out as two critical actors on the eastern flank of NATO. Poland became a member of NATO in 1999; with this development, its relations with Türkiye in the field of defense gained a strategic dimension (Financial Times, 2023). Both countries cooperate, especially in the context of strengthening deterrence against Russia in Eastern Europe.

Poland’s position in the Baltics and Black Sea security overlaps with Türkiye’s regional defense vision. While Türkiye limits the entry of non-NATO actors by protecting the Montreux Convention in the Black Sea, Poland is increasing its defense investments against Russia’s aggressive policies in the Baltic Sea (CATS, 2024).

In addition, the sale of Bayraktar TB2 SİHA between the two countries was also an important turning point. Poland became the first NATO country to receive this system from Türkiye, and this was considered not only a technical purchase but also an indicator of strategic harmony in the security axis (Financial Times, 2023). The trilateral Türkiye-Romania-Poland dialogue organized within the framework of NATO is also an important platform for regional military coordination.

This security-first approach is broadly supported across Türkiye’s political spectrum. The ruling AKP and its nationalist MHP allies view NATO-based military cooperation with Poland as central to their foreign policy priorities. Even the opposition CHP and İYİ Party, despite their differing ideological stances, consider NATO cooperation with Poland as a fundamental security guarantee. While the AKP emphasizes pragmatic and flexible diplomacy, often focusing on bilateral defense agreements and energy partnerships, the MHP frames this cooperation as essential for national security and Eastern European military strategy. The CHP and İYİ Party, although more aligned with EU norms, also support NATO collaboration, viewing it as Türkiye’s essential security anchor.

2.2. Strategic Partnership in the Context of the Ukraine War

The Ukraine war that began in 2022 led Türkiye and Poland to a closer strategic cooperation. While Poland gave open support to Kiev, Türkiye adopted a “balance policy”, on the one hand providing Ukraine with UAVs and naval platforms, on the other hand maintaining economic and diplomatic relations with Russia (CATS, 2024).

In this context, Türkiye played a key role in the implementation of the Black Sea Grain Corridor agreement and demonstrated its diplomatic influence. Poland, on the other hand, supported Türkiye as an important mediator in such initiatives. Türkiye’s proposal for a trilateral summit in Istanbul (USA, Ukraine, Russia) has also demonstrated Ankara’s diplomatic influence capacity at the global level.

It is observed that both countries have taken a position against Russia’s expansionist policies, but they do so with different methods. The search for a balance between Türkiye’s multipolar diplomacy approach and Poland’s Atlanticist approach continues.

2.3. Energy Security and Logistics Lines

Energy security is another area of ​​strategic importance in Turkish-Polish relations. Both countries are dependent on energy imports, which has led them to cooperate on LNG, pipelines, and alternative energy sources.

While Poland positions itself as a key logistics and energy hub within the European Union, enhancing its infrastructure to diversify supply routes away from Russian sources, Türkiye aims to become a transit center linking Asia to Europe through its Middle Corridor strategy. In the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both countries have the potential to become logistics centers. Poland’s central role in Europe’s railway networks, in particular, coincides with Türkiye’s efforts to connect to these lines via the Caucasus and Central Asia (Financial Times, 2023).

The ruling AKP has emphasized energy cooperation as a key element of foreign policy toward Poland, seeing Poland’s demand for diversified supply routes as an opportunity to strengthen Türkiye’s position as an energy hub. Similarly, İYİ Party and CHP also highlight the importance of energy security cooperation in their respective policy discourses, advocating increased trade and technological partnerships with European states like Poland.

In addition, joint R&D efforts in the field of green energy technologies (solar and wind) are also on the agenda in energy cooperation. It has been stated that both countries aim for technology and infrastructure-based development in order to avoid the middle-income trap.

2.4. EU and Democracy Debates

Poland and Türkiye have experienced various tensions in their relations with the EU in recent years and have frequently been the target of criticism on issues such as the rule of law, media freedom and judicial independence. While the European Parliament has referred to Türkiye as “transitioning to full authoritarianism,” Poland has also frequently clashed with the EU due to its judicial reforms.

An ideological convergence between Türkiye’s ruling AKP and Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) helps explain this parallel trajectory. Both parties emphasize national sovereignty, conservative family values, and skepticism toward EU oversight, which facilitates informal cooperation in prioritizing national autonomy within the EU framework. The AKP, like PiS, portrays EU conditionality as a challenge to national autonomy, even while maintaining official pro-membership rhetoric. These similarities contribute to the formation of a sovereignty-focused partnership that shapes both countries’ relations with the EU (Potera, 2021, s. 207-211).

In contrast, Türkiye’s CHP and İYİ Party emphasize the importance of aligning with European democratic standards and value-sharing, viewing Poland’s experience as both a partner and a point of constructive dialogue within the broader European framework. CHP parliamentarians, in particular, have highlighted the importance of ongoing dialogue on rule of law and human rights within platforms such as PACE, viewing these discussions as opportunities to strengthen mutual understanding and cooperation between Türkiye and Poland. Nevertheless, even these opposition parties acknowledge that Poland’s successful EU accession journey provides valuable experiences and inspiration for Türkiye’s own path towards European integration (Forysiński & Osiewicz, 2007, p. 5).

Poland has been one of the rare countries that openly supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Warsaw argues that Türkiye’s membership has strategic significance for the EU’s eastward expansion, which will pave the way for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (Financial Times, 2023). In addition, the Hungary-Poland-Türkiye trio draws attention as a new axis within Europe. Their common points are foreign policy tendencies that prioritize national sovereignty and distance themselves from Western-centered values.

2.5. Education, Culture and Social Relations

Educational and cultural relations between Türkiye and Poland are developing through Erasmus student exchange programs, joint events and public diplomacy. Turkish students, especially in recent years, have seen Poland as an attractive destination for higher education.

At the same time, the Turkish diaspora living in Poland, although limited in number, is important in terms of cultural interaction. In both countries, common historical narratives contribute to the reinterpretation of the diplomatic heritage extending from Ottoman-Polish relations to the present day through public diplomacy. Poland being the first Western country to accept an ambassador during the Ottoman embassy period is one of the cornerstones of this historical bond (Financial Times, 2023).

Political parties in Türkiye generally support deepening educational and cultural ties with Poland. While the AKP emphasizes cultural diplomacy and shared historical narratives as tools of soft power, the CHP and İYİ Party highlight the importance of expanding academic collaborations and technical exchange programs, viewing them as mutually beneficial avenues for institutional development and integration into the broader European educational space. Across the political spectrum, Poland is seen as both a valued partner and an example in advancing people-to-people contacts and fostering long-term cooperation in education and culture.

Cultural collaborations positively affect mutual perception between the two peoples and contribute to the strengthening of broader strategic relations on a social basis.

Conclusion

Relations between Türkiye and Poland have evolved beyond historical heritage into a strategic partnership in today’s multipolar and fragile security environment. Military cooperation under the NATO umbrella, diplomatic rapprochement developing in the context of the Ukraine war, and common interests in areas such as energy security are increasingly bringing the two countries to a more compatible position. When Türkiye’s goal of becoming the Middle Corridor and logistics center is combined with Poland’s transit role within the EU, it is seen that the economic and geostrategic ties between the two countries are strengthening. At the same time, these two countries, which share similar perspectives on issues of national sovereignty and institutional autonomy within the EU, have the potential to develop a complementary partnership within the evolving landscape of European politics. Cultural interactions, diasporic ties, and educational cooperation shaped by programs such as Erasmus constitute the social basis of this strategic rapprochement. Türkiye and Poland are drawing closer not only with the symbolic friendship of the past, but also with the need for partnership forced by current geopolitical realities. In this context, the relations between the two countries are candidates to assume important roles not only at the bilateral level, but also in multilateral platforms such as European security, energy supply, and diplomatic mediation. The mutual strategic dependence of Türkiye and Poland makes them two important stakeholders in the new security order.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Photo: gov.pl

Uğur Can Özkan is the co-founder, editor, and researcher at Reymonta, an independent platform for critical inquiry into international affairs. His academic interests include International Law, Eastern Europe, and Security Studies. He previously studied at Jagiellonian University in Kraków as part of the Erasmus+ program and is currently a prospective graduate student in International Relations at the University of Warsaw, with a focus on the evolving nexus of law, security, and regional politics.