The Weimar Triangle: Time for Concrete Action?

Lila Bednarska, Aleksandra Bida, Szymon Bielak, under the supervision of Jędrzej Błaszczak

Introduction

The Weimar Triangle, a forum for cooperation established in 1991 between Poland, Germany, and France, was founded with the hope of overcoming historical divisions and providing impetus for European integration. Although recent years, particularly in the face of geopolitical shifts, have seen increased activity within its framework, the format’s actual functioning, effectiveness, and future remain subjects of analysis and debate, often marked by skepticism stemming from over three decades of experience.

Weimar Triangle Meetings

The recent period, especially 2024, has been characterized by a noticeable intensification of meetings at various levels within the Weimar Triangle framework. The foreign ministers—Radosław Sikorski (Poland), Annalena Baerbock (Germany, until the change of government), and Stéphane Séjourné, followed by Jean-Noël Barrot (France)—held regular consultations, including on February 12 in La Celle-Saint-Cloud, May 22 in Weimar, remotely on September 9, and on November 19 in Warsaw (in an expanded “EU Big Five” format).

The results of these meetings included declarations on strengthening the coordination of actions for the EU, support for Ukraine (including its Euro-Atlantic aspirations), reinforcing European defense and the armaments industry, economic competitiveness, as well as common positions on international issues such as the situation in the Middle East, the Caucasus, or Georgia. The Weimar Summit resulted in the adoption of the “Weimar Agenda,” which emphasized the need to increase defense spending (min. 2% of GDP), develop the EU’s rapid response capabilities, combat disinformation, and ensure the coherence of the Union’s external actions. The meeting of defense ministers in Paris (June 24) brought an announcement of regular joint military exercises and France’s accession to the military mobility initiative.

Dialogue was also conducted at the highest level—between presidents in Munich (February 17) and heads of government in Berlin (March 15)—focusing on support for Ukraine, transatlantic relations, and strengthening the EU’s defense potential. Despite this increased diplomatic activity, Polish experts point to persistent problems in the practical coordination of actions, exemplified by the uncoordinated support for Moldova. Although the intensification of dialogue in 2024 is a fact, the historical fluctuations in the states’ engagement in this format and recent changes in the diplomatic leadership in France and Germany warrant caution in assessing the durability of this revival and its long-term impact on real cooperation.

The Polish Perspective

Unfulfilled Expectations and Lack of Concrete Results:

There is a consensus among Polish research centers that likely no other form of subregional cooperation in Europe is fraught with as many unfulfilled expectations. It is emphasized that the initial, ambitious goals—overcoming divisions and providing impetus for integration—quickly clashed with reality, and the format has largely failed to translate into concrete results. Critics point out that after Poland’s accession to the EU, the format’s original purpose was exhausted, which naturally diminished its importance. A significant problem appears to be the lack of a clearly defined, specific agenda and action plan for the format. To date, meetings have covered an extremely broad range of discussions—from support for Ukraine, through defense and industrial policy, to the situation in the Middle East or the Caucasus—which, according to critics, hinders focus and the achievement of tangible results.

Analysts also list other reasons for its limited effectiveness: the irregularity of meetings, the lack of a permanent institutional structure, and insufficient interest in deepening relations. This aligns with the observations of French analysts, who point to the absence of a common structure and real means of action. As a result, the Triangle’s potential, though considered significant, remains largely untapped. Moreover, the format’s historical tendency to generate ambitious declarations that rarely translated into joint, concrete actions calls for a reserved approach to the latest announcements—their actual implementation, not the mere frequency of meetings, will be the true test of the Triangle’s revival.

Cooperation has also been hindered by political disputes, such as migration issues or the Polish-French conflict over the Caracal helicopter contract in 2016, which led to the cancellation of that year’s summit. Other tensions have also occurred, both Polish-German and German-French. These differences in approach, for example towards Russia or the assessment of partners’ credibility in the defense sphere (where Germany is sometimes perceived by Poland as a ‘difficult partner’), stem from fundamentally different interests and strategic cultures, structurally limiting the Triangle’s potential to develop deep, lasting cooperation. This raises the question of whether the Weimar Triangle offers real added value beyond standard bilateral relations and existing EU/NATO mechanisms, or if its ‘revival’ is mainly a response to current geopolitical pressure, with the format itself remaining a convenient label for trilateral consultations.

The Weimar Triangle format is largely based on meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It is worth noting that over the last 18 months (since the end of 2023), there have been significant changes in these positions in Germany and France. In Poland, Radosław Sikorski has remained the Minister of Foreign Affairs. France has seen two changes: in January 2024, Stéphane Séjourné replaced Catherine Colonna, and then in September 2024, Jean-Noël Barrot became the new minister. In Germany, following the tenure of Annalena Baerbock (Green Party), Johann Wadephul (CDU) took over as Minister of Foreign Affairs after the elections in February 2025 and the formation of a new CDU government.

The Format’s Potential

Despite the criticism, Polish analysts see potential in the format. According to an analysis of the think tank environment, Poland seems to be the most invested in revitalizing the Triangle, and its significance is primarily emphasized in Polish public debate. The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) points to the possibility of the Triangle playing a more active role in strengthening European security, recommending the maintenance of a dialogue based on equality and a focus on security, support for Ukraine, and pressure on Russia. It was recommended, among other things, to develop and present to allies and partners a common strategic approach of the Weimar Triangle to the war in Ukraine, as well as to explore the possibility of increasing and streamlining the coordination of military aid in order to announce a Weimar Military Aid Package. It was also recommended to develop a set of principles for creating a long-term strategy towards Russia, based on a common understanding of the seriousness and long-term nature of the threat posed by Moscow, as well as a commitment to avoid unilateral gestures towards Russia. The need to develop a common Weimar Triangle approach to potential Russian diplomatic initiatives or negotiation proposals was also indicated.

Regarding Ukraine, there is an expert consensus on the responsibility of the Weimar states to increase support, despite existing differences about its scope. Support for Georgia’s pro-European aspirations was also confirmed. From a Polish perspective, it would be desirable to transform the Triangle into a forum that co-shapes EU policy. There are calls for institutional rebuilding: regular meetings, the creation of platforms for expert and academic cooperation, and even the establishment of a secretariat. The creation of an International Weimar Fund could also serve to strengthen cooperation. The role of Poland as a link to Central and Eastern Europe and the importance of strong economic and social ties between the three countries are emphasized. According to researchers, the Triangle can be a source of new ideas for the EU, but this requires reform and the definition of a common strategy.

German and French Perspectives

Despite some revival, the Weimar Triangle is not a frequent topic of publications by French and German think tanks. There is a lack of current, in-depth analyses of its functioning. Authors usually mention it only occasionally, as one of many tools of European policy. Think tanks in France and Germany devote little attention to the format, often treating it as marginal. This limited attention, contrasting with the Polish emphasis on revitalizing the format, may suggest that Paris and Berlin prefer to settle the most important issues in the proven bilateral Franco-German format, treating the Weimar Triangle as a subsidiary or complementary forum. Analyses often focus more on the personal roles of leaders (Macron, Scholz, Tusk) than on permanent structures. Sometimes, one gets the impression that the term “Weimar Triangle” is used as a convenient shorthand to describe any trilateral relations. This observation can be interpreted not only as proof of brand recognition but also as a symptom of the format not being perceived as having its own distinct substance and agenda.

Despite these reservations, nearly all analyses share the conviction that cooperation with Poland is of key importance for Germany, France, and the entire EU.

The German Approach:

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is one of the main centers dealing with the format. Its experts (Ross, Tèterchen, 2025) suggested that the new German government should prioritize dialogue with France, and then with other partners. Former ambassador Rolf Nikel (2023) argued for the Triangle’s potential in strengthening the EU and its eastern flank, even proposing the inclusion of Ukraine in the talks. Renata Alt (FDP, 2021) called for making the Triangle a motor for EU reforms and a platform for coordinating policy towards Russia, combining Eastern and Western perspectives. In turn, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP, 2024) saw the format (in the Macron-Scholz-Tusk configuration) as a tool for resolving conflicts and connecting regions of Europe, although it pointed to uncertainty related to the change of government in Germany.

The French Approach:

French analysts also see potential, but also limitations. Louise Souverbie (IRIS, 2024) emphasizes Poland’s growing role and the Triangle’s ability to strengthen European defense, provided that Paris and Berlin overcome their internal crises, although she does not specify a key role for the format itself. The Institut Montaigne (2024) proposes using the Triangle as a platform for European industrial policy, seeing it as a tool rather than an independent entity. Joseph de Weck (Institut Montaigne, 2021) considered the Triangle as a support or alternative to the Franco-German “engine,” pointing to Poland as a key partner strengthening this duo. Paul Maurice (IFRI, 2022) criticized the lack of structures, uneven commitment, and divergences (especially towards Russia). An interesting observation from an IFRI report (2025) is the perception of France as a potentially easier defense partner for Poland than Germany, which is assessed as a “difficult and unreliable partner”. Nevertheless, in the context of the EU, Poland remains an important partner for both powers.

Summary

An analysis of the Weimar Triangle’s functioning to date, based on the voices of experts from Poland, Germany, and France, paints a picture of a format with great but still largely unrealized potential. Despite over three decades of existence and numerous meetings at various levels, it is difficult to point to many tangible, concrete actions that are the direct result of cooperation exclusively within this format. Its operation is largely based on irregular meetings, mainly at the foreign minister level, sometimes organized in various, expanded configurations (like the “EU Big Five” format meeting in Warsaw). An additional challenge is the frequent personnel rotation in these key positions, especially in France and Germany, which hinders the building of continuity and a long-term strategy.

The Weimar Triangle could play a more active and significant role in strengthening European security, among other things, by conducting a dialogue based on partnership, focusing on security issues, supporting Ukraine, and exerting greater pressure on Russia. Analysts’ recommendations in this regard—such as developing a common strategic approach of the Weimar Triangle to the war in Ukraine or creating a Weimar Military Aid Package—have not yet been implemented by the format’s member states. Despite noticeable differences in the approach to increasing support, a common sense of responsibility in this area is evident.

Despite general criticism, some recent successes can be noted, such as adding the so-called shadow fleet to the EU sanctions list, initiating the new Digital Weimar Triangle format, and finally, all three countries reaching the 2% of GDP defense spending threshold. However, these contrast with fundamental problems, such as the chronic failure to implement announced actions and an imprecise, overly broad meeting agenda. A key problem remains the structure in which France and Germany do not show interest fully equivalent to Poland’s. These states still prioritize action at the bilateral or EU level, rather than in the Weimar Triangle forum.

The Weimar Triangle consistently struggles with accusations of a lack of concrete results and systematic action. The issue of the discrepancy between ambitious political declarations and their actual implementation is often raised. Structural weaknesses, such as the lack of permanent institutions or a clearly defined, focused agenda, make the format susceptible to political fluctuations in the capitals and personnel changes. An asymmetry of engagement is also observed—Poland seems to attach greater importance to the format than France and Germany, for whom bilateral relations remain the key coordination mechanism. As a result, despite its symbolic importance and utility as a consultation forum, especially in times of geopolitical crises, the Weimar Triangle has so far not fulfilled the hopes originally placed in it to become a real engine of integration or a coherent European policy. Its future role and effectiveness will depend on overcoming historical limitations and the possible implementation of postulated structural reforms.

Appendix:

Date	Place	Polish Representative	German Representative	French Representative	Provisions	Sources
Feb 12, 2024	La Celle-Saint-Cloud, France	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Stéphane Séjourné, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	– Striving to strengthen the coordination of actions within the Weimar Triangle to make the format serve the EU and become a more effective tool for promoting an ambitious European agenda. – Expressing the will to hold a Weimar+Ukraine meeting. – Continuing cooperation on mutual assistance and solidarity under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. – Continuing cooperation to support Ukraine’s pro-European and pro-NATO ambitions. – Appeals for peace in the Middle East, Caucasus, and Sahel. – A call for the future European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) to present proposals for measures to increase the EU’s overall defense readiness. – Striving to adopt NATO defense production plans. – Striving to strengthen the competitiveness, innovation, and resilience of European economies. – Undertakings aimed at tightening cooperation within the Weimar Triangle.	[1],[2]
Feb 17, 2024	Munich, Germany	Andrzej Duda, President	Olaf Scholz, Chancellor	Emmanuel Macron, President	– Developing common positions on issues where Poland, Germany, and France have similar interests. – Developing cooperation within the EU. – Analysis of the EU’s policy to date.	[3],[4]
Mar 15, 2024	Berlin, Germany	Donald Tusk, Prime Minister	Olaf Scholz, Chancellor	Emmanuel Macron, President	– Cooperation of the Triangle to maintain the current scale of aid to Ukraine. – Developing transatlantic relations. – Increasing the EU’s defense potential. – Supporting Moldova.	[5]
May 22, 2024	Weimar, Germany	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Stéphane Séjourné, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	Security and Defense: – Spending 2% of GDP on defense. – Filling gaps in air defense, land combat capabilities, precision strike capabilities, drones, command and control, mobility and logistics, ammunition, and new technologies. – Development of industrial capabilities. – Joint European procurement of military equipment. – Development of European crisis management, CSDP, achieving European rapid deployment capability by 2025. – Combating disinformation and foreign interference in electoral processes. – Ensuring long-term European support for Ukraine’s war effort. – Supporting the Ukrainian and Moldovan defense sectors.   Cohesion: – Exploring the idea of creating an integrated EEAS and Commission sanctions team acting as a single EU point of contact for sanctions. – Exploring ways to strengthen the role of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of external actions. – Introducing a “Weimar reflection process” on external relations to start discussions on more long-term reforms.   Global Outreach: – Continuing efforts to make the EU a bastion of green innovation. – Introducing a “Green Weimar Triangle” to support third parties in implementing the decisions of the first Global Stocktake. – Developing global partnerships under the Global Gateway strategy. – Improving the quality of the Union’s strategic communication and foreign policy.	[6],[7]
Jun 24, 2024	Paris, France	Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, Min. of National Defence	Boris Pistorius, Min. of National Defence	Sébastien Lecornu, Min. of National Defence	– Announcement of regular annual military exercises of the Triangle countries. – France’s accession to the “mobility initiative”. – Announcement of support for Ukraine in its pro-NATO and pro-European aspirations.	[8],[9]
Sep 9, 2024	(Remote)	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Stéphane Séjourné, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	– Emphasizing that in the face of upcoming challenges, the Union must face them united. – European defense capabilities should be developed in harmony with NATO.	[10]
Nov 19, 2024	Warsaw, Poland	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Jean-Noël Barrot, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	Note: Meeting within the “Big Five of the European Union” format: ministers from Italy and Spain, the UK minister, and Kaja Kallas were also present. – Emphasizing NATO’s role as the foundation of Europe’s defense and security. – Increasing defense spending, including above 2% of GDP. – Striving to strengthen Europe’s security and defense through financial and economic strength, and the development of European industry. – Announcement of investments in critical military capabilities, including air defense, high-precision strike systems, drones, and integrated logistics, as well as in critical infrastructure and cyber defense, while investing in R&D and leveraging new technologies. – Striving to increase European resilience to information and cognitive threats. – Continuing support for the Ukrainian war effort. – Further deterring Russia, reducing Putin’s ability to sustain his aggressive war, and curbing the development of Russian military capabilities, including through restrictive measures.	[11],[12]
Dec 6, 2024	(Joint statement, not a typical meeting)	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Jean-Noël Barrot, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	– Emphasizing determination to support Georgia’s pro-democratic and pro-European aspirations. – Condemning the use of force against protesters and attacks on the media and opposition. – Calling on the Georgian Dream to de-escalate. – Announcing actions to be taken against the Georgian Dream at the EU level and by the Weimar Triangle states.	[13],[14]
Apr 29, 2025	Bornholm, Denmark	Radosław Sikorski, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Annalena Baerbock, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Jean-Noël Barrot, Min. of Foreign Affairs & Min. for European Affairs	Note: Joint meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar Triangle and the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8). – Affirming that a sovereign, independent, and democratic Ukraine is an integral part of Euro-Atlantic and global security and supporting its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity. – Announcing continued support for Ukraine, including long-term support. – Maintaining support for Ukraine’s pro-European and pro-NATO aspirations. – Identifying Russia as the greatest security threat. – Maintaining efforts to strengthen the defense and resilience of the region’s states. – Supporting increased defense funding for European countries. – Expressing support for the idea of a European Defence White Paper and the ReArm Europe program. – Striving for deeper cooperation within the EU and NATO. – Calling for increased pressure on Russia through further sanctions packages. – Condemning Russian hybrid activities in Europe. – Announcing continued cooperation in information exchange. – Identifying the so-called shadow fleet as a threat to security and navigation in the Baltic and North Seas. – Expressing a desire to cooperate in countering the so-called shadow fleet with respect for the law.	[15]

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1. Minister Radosław Sikorski took part in the meeting of the heads of diplomacy of the Weimar Triangle countries in Paris, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/minister-radoslaw-sikorski-wzial-udzial-w-spotkaniu-szefow-dyplomacji-panstw-trojkata-weimarskiego-w-paryzu
2. Declaration after the meeting of the Weimar Triangle countries, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/deklaracja-po-spotkaniu-panstw-trojkata-weimarskiego
3. Munich. Meeting with the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany, prezydent.pl, https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wizyty-zagraniczne/monachium-spotkanie-z-prezydentem-francji-i-kanclerzem-niemiec,64771
4. Minister Przydacz on the meeting of the President of the Republic of Poland with the President of France and the Chancellor of Germany, prezydent.pl, https://www.prezydent.pl/kancelaria/aktywnosc-ministrow/minister-przydacz-o-spotkaniu-prezydenta-rp-z-prezydentem-francji-i-kanclerzem-niemiec,64830
5. Weimar Triangle Summit in Berlin, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/pdt-trojkat-weimarski
6. Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Weimar Triangle countries, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/spotkanie-ministrow-spraw-zagranicznych-panstw-trojkata-weimarskiego
7. The Weimar Agenda for a strong and geopolitical European Union, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/agenda-weimarska-na-rzecz-silnej-i-geopolitycznej-unii-europejskiej
8. We are intensifying cooperation within the Weimar Triangle, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/intensyfikujemy-wspolprace-w-ramach-trojkata-weimarskiego
9. French and German soldiers will come to Poland. The Head of the Ministry of National Defence on important arrangements, polsatnews.pl, https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2024-06-24/do-polski-przyjada-francuscy-i-niemieccy-zolnierze-szef-mon-o-waznych-ustaleniach/
10. Minister Sikorski participated in a Weimar format tele-bridge as part of this year’s Conference of Heads of Foreign Missions, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/minister-sikorski-uczestniczyl-w-tele-moscie-w-formacie-weimarskim-w-ramach-tegorocznej-narady-kierownikow-placowek-zagranicznych
11. Meeting of the ‘Big Five of the European Union’ and the United Kingdom in Warsaw, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/spotkanie-wielkiej-piatki-ue-oraz-wielkiej-brytanii-w-warszawie
12. Statement of the ministers of foreign affairs of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/fda7a8db-b9e2-4a6d-be56-a050f4e04359
13. Joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland, France, and Germany, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/wspolne-oswiadczenie-ministrow-spraw-zagranicznych-polski-francji-niemiec
14. Joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland, France, and Germany, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/cb4b50fe-baa6-406f-8962-7d9c88fd9cd4
15. Minister Radosław Sikorski participated in the meeting of the heads of diplomacy of the Nordic, Baltic, and Weimar Triangle countries, gov.pl, https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/minister-radoslaw-sikorski-uczestniczyl-w-spotkaniu-szefow-dyplomacji-panstw-nordyckich-baltyckich-i-trojkata-weimarskiego

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Photo: MSZ