Analysis: Jakub Graca; data collection: Ksawery Stawiński, Dominik Wereszko graphic design: Natalia Matiaszczyk
In the first six months of his second term, US President Donald Trump made four foreign trips, three of which were planned and had significant political objectives (a visit to the Middle East, participation in the G7 summit in Canada, and the NATO summit in The Hague), while one was mainly symbolic (attendance at the funeral of Pope Francis). However, even in the Vatican, there was a brief behind-the-scenes conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
In addition, the US president met with a dozen or so leaders of allied and partner countries in Washington (meetings during the first five weeks of the new administration are described in a separate article). The most frequent guest at the White House was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (three visits), while the biggest disappointment was the lack of a meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, although in the latter case, the political turmoil in Seoul that lasted several months as a result of the imposition of martial law in December 2024 was of key importance.
Numerous telephone conversations during this period, mainly with leaders of allied and partner countries, but also with Xi Jinping (probably twice) and Vladimir Putin (at least six times), complete the picture of the first half of the year, in which Trump’s foreign policy focused primarily on Middle Eastern, European, and North American issues, pushing the Indo-Pacific theater—which is most important to US interests—into the background.
The Middle East Front
Donald Trump’s Middle East policy in the first half of his second term focused primarily on developing partnerships with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula (as evidenced by the US president’s visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in May), as well as deterring Iran and curbing and combating its influence in the region (through negotiations on a new nuclear agreement, supporting Israel, siding with the new authorities in Syria and lifting sanctions on that country, bombing the Houthis in Yemen, and finally carrying out a bombing operation against Iranian nuclear facilities). The third direction of this policy was an attempt to reach an agreement that would end the war in the Gaza Strip.
As in his first term, Trump made his first planned foreign visit (not counting his unexpected attendance at the Pope’s funeral) to Riyadh, followed by visits to Doha and Abu Dhabi. The meetings with the leaders of the three Arab monarchies were primarily business-oriented and resulted in the signing of contracts and declarations of cooperation in various areas (technology, armaments, aviation, etc.), the value of which, once implemented, could reach from several hundred billion to even several trillion dollars. However, the reasons why these countries are investing in cooperation with the US are largely political, as each of them is dependent on Washington in the area of security, and their main rival in the region is Tehran. Close relations between the US and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula also help to counteract China’s efforts to build influence in the region.
In the area of security, Trump became more involved in Middle East affairs than planned, forced by circumstances and Israel’s aggressive policy. Trump’s most important goals after returning to power in January were to work out a new nuclear agreement with Iran and end the war in Gaza, combined with the release of prisoners held by Hamas. However, the ceasefire in Gaza, negotiated before January 20, ended on March 18, while attempts to persuade Iran to engage in talks failed to yield tangible results. In the meantime, the US undertook a several-week bombing campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen (one of the goals of which was to pressure Iran to sit down at the negotiating table). US-Iranian negotiations formally began in April, but have not yet resulted in an agreement.
Although Trump repeatedly stated that he would not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and considered a targeted air strike on Tehran’s nuclear facilities, Israel ultimately decided to carry out a large-scale military operation against Iran against the wishes of the US, which was met with retaliation from Tehran and the outbreak of the Iranian-Israeli war. However, Trump supported Netanyahu and not only defended Israel against missile attacks from Iran, but also carried out an operation to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.
In the area of security, an important event was Trump’s meeting with the new Syrian leader Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa, which took place in the presence of Mohammed bin Salman on the sidelines of the US president’s visit to Riyadh. The talks resulted in the US lifting sanctions on Syria. Preventing Damascus from falling into Tehran’s sphere of influence is a common goal of Washington and Tel Aviv, although Trump’s opening up to Syria, at bin Salman’s urging, was probably contrary to Netanyahu’s expectations.
The “European Front”
Donald Trump’s European policy during the period in question focused primarily on: renegotiating trade cooperation (which was to be achieved by introducing tariffs on European goods), shifting more responsibility for European security to European allies within NATO (by pushing for all Alliance members to spend 5% of their GDP on defense), and attempts to end the Russian-Ukrainian war through negotiations.
In the first of these areas, Trump has not yet achieved any significant gains, while his aggressive and chaotic customs policy has led to a significant decline in the confidence of European allies in the US. In the second area, however, the unanimous commitment by 32 NATO countries at the Hague summit to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP within 10 years—a goal that seemed unrealistic just a few months earlier—was a success that cannot be overestimated.
In the third area, Trump’s policy proved ineffective: despite six telephone conversations between Trump and Vladimir Putin and a broad offer of cooperation from the US, Russia showed no willingness to end the war, instead misleading Washington for several months by playing for time. After his last conversation with Putin in early July, the US president significantly changed his rhetoric and began a clear correction of his policy towards Russia.
The “Pacific Front”
The Indo-Pacific region is a priority for Washington, although Donald Trump has paid relatively little attention to it over the past six months, with meetings and talks focusing more on the economy and trade than on security. The tariffs imposed by Trump in early April on many allied countries, including Japan (46%), South Korea (50%), and Australia (10%), although quickly reduced, contributed to undermining these countries’ trust in Washington. Although the Quad and AUKUS formats are formally maintained (the latter is currently under review by the Department of Defense), only two bilateral meetings at the highest level with allies in the region (Japan and India) have taken place. Due to Trump’s premature departure from the G7 summit in Canada, he did not meet with the Australian prime minister, who was also a guest at the summit. The leaders of NATO partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region (the so-called AP4 or IP4 group, comprising Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand), with the exception of New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, also did not attend the NATO summit in The Hague, although they had attended almost every summit for three years in a row (only the 2024 summit in Washington was not attended by the Australian prime minister).
It is likely that the two conversations with Xi Jinping also largely concerned economic issues, especially the second one, which took place after the US imposed high tariffs on China, which was met with Chinese retaliation. After a brief exchange of blows, which led to tariffs being raised to 145% (US tariffs) and 125% (Chinese tariffs), negotiations took place between Washington and Beijing, resulting in the tariffs being lowered and a trade agreement being concluded. In July, during the ASEAN summit in Malaysia, Marco Rubio said that there was a good chance that a meeting between the leaders of the US and China would take place before the end of the year.
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