Bartosz Mirowski, Giuseppe Adamo, Maciej Pawłowski

Tunisian society is mentally the closest to European societies. However, the country’s authorities are increasingly turning towards cooperation with China. At the same time, Tunisia remains an important EU partner in terms of trade, energy transit, and combating illegal migration. The construction of new infrastructural connections may be a way to keep this country close to Europe, including by increasing European exports to the Tunisian market.

Relations with the EU

For decades, Tunisia has maintained close economic and political relations with the EU, being one of the key partners in the Mediterranean basin. The EU is Tunisia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 54.8% of its trade in 2024: 67.2% of Tunisia’s exports (€13 billion) went to the EU, while 45.2% of Tunisia’s imports (€12.1 billion) came from the EU. In 1995, an association agreement was concluded between Tunisia and the EU, and in 2012 a privileged partnership. During the Tunisian democratic experiment of 2011–2019, the country received EU funds totaling around €1 billion. Unfortunately, these often ended up in organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which only simulated liberal‑democratic activities.

EU member states remain the leading suppliers of goods and services on the Tunisian market: Italy ($3.32 billion), France ($3.14 billion), Germany ($1.92 billion), Spain ($1.06 billion). Polish exports to Tunisia in 2023 amounted to $174 million. However, non‑European suppliers are becoming increasingly significant: China ($2.56 billion), Russia ($2.12 billion), Algeria ($1.81 billion), Turkey ($1.32 billion), USA ($687 million), India ($580 million), and Brazil ($410 million).

In terms of investment, EU member states are also gradually losing their dominant position. French, German, and Italian investments still dominate in the automotive, textile, agriculture, and renewable energy sectors. However, in the pharmaceutical and technology sectors US investments prevail, while in electronics Japanese investments do. In conventional energy, real estate, and banking, the leading investor is the United Arab Emirates. Infrastructure and telecommunications investments are mainly carried out by China.

At the same time, these relations have a strategic dimension – Tunisia is recognized by the EU as a buffer state in the fight against illegal migration. The first agreement in this regard was concluded between Tunisia and Italy as early as 1998. In 2011, thanks to cooperation between the foreign ministries of both countries, it was possible to reduce the wave of illegal crossings of Italy’s border by Tunisians, triggered by the chaos of the so‑called Arab Spring. Another agreement was signed in 2023. However, the way Tunisia implemented it raised concerns.

The growing economic rapprochement with China also translates into political relations. When in 2024 President Kais Sayed refused to properly comply with the above‑mentioned migration agreement with Italy, he received official support from the Chinese Embassy in Tunis. Tunisia refused to create jobs for migrants from Sub‑Saharan Africa and continued the practice of sending them into the desert at the Libyan border. As a result, Italy reduced its planned financial support for Tunisia from €1 billion to €217 million.

Energy connections

Within the Global Gateway strategy and the REPowerEU plan, the European Union is strengthening energy cooperation with North Africa, treating the region as a key source for supply diversification and green transition. Gas pipelines linking Algeria, Libya, and Italy, such as Enrico Mattei and Greenstream, are of particular importance. According to DG ENER, this infrastructure may in the future be used to transport hydrogen, which increases its strategic value. Tunisia plays the role of a transit country in these projects.

The most ambitious undertaking is the SoutH₂ Corridor, included in 2024 on the PCI project list. It is to connect Algeria and Tunisia with Italy, Austria, and Germany, delivering up to 4 million tons of green H₂ annually, corresponding to 40% of the REPowerEU import target. However, the investment carries financial risks – the European Court of Auditors warns that the EU may not achieve the planned hydrogen import volumes by 2030.

Gas extraction, like all mining work, requires large amounts of water; however, the idea of exporting water from the EU to Africa does not appear in the documents of European institutions. In the current logistical context, a water‑pipeline project seems unrealistic. Instead, the EU supports the development of seawater desalination and various forms of technology transfer.

According to the IEA, in 2023 more than 95% of Tunisia’s electricity came from natural gas, nearly half of which was imported from Algeria. The share of low‑emission sources was only 3–4%, mainly solar and wind. The government in Tunis, however, plans to achieve 35% renewables by 2030 and as much as 80% by 2050, developing projects such as the Kairouan Solar Power Station (120 MW, launch 2025). According to the World Bank, increasing the share of renewables is also fiscally necessary, since fuel and electricity imports account for a significant part of the budget deficit. It also increases Tunisia’s political dependence on neighboring Algeria, exemplified by a short‑lived dispute in the 1970s between Algerian President Houari Boumediene and his Tunisian counterpart Habib Bourguiba. When Boumediene suggested creating an Algerian‑Tunisian union, Bourguiba replied jokingly that this would first require balancing the countries’ potential – for example, by annexing Annaba to Tunisia. Boumediene responded by cutting off electricity supplies, leading to a nationwide blackout. Power was restored only after Bourguiba’s apology.

Infrastructural connections

Maritime transport plays a key role in Tunisia’s economy – an estimated 98% of the country’s trade is carried out by sea. The most important port is Port Rades in Tunis, handling around 80% of the country’s container throughput. Tunisian ports maintain regular connections with major Italian (Genoa, Palermo, Civitavecchia) and French (Marseille) ports. They handle both passenger and cargo traffic, including Ro‑Ro ferries (ships adapted to carry wheeled cargo and vehicles – cars, trucks, or rail wagons). The strategic importance of Tunisia’s ports results not only from their location in the center of the Mediterranean, but also from their role in transiting goods to Libya and Sahel countries. However, this location also facilitates illegal transit, including smuggling of goods and people, which poses a serious challenge to border security and customs control.

Air transport serves primarily passenger traffic, supporting tourism (mainly European). The main airport is Tunis‑Carthage, which in 2024 handled over 7 million passengers. Tunisia maintains a dense network of connections, particularly with France and Italy. The Tunisian government has presented an air‑transport development strategy aimed at increasing the capacity of the main airports from 19.5 million to 35 million passengers by 2035.

In the past, there have been recurring ambitious ideas of building a bridge between Tunisia and Sicily, regularly resurfacing as a symbolic connection between Africa and Europe. The planned route would be around 140 km long, but the prospects for its implementation remain limited. There are serious doubts regarding its feasibility, due to geographical conditions (depth and sea currents) as well as the lack of clear premises confirming its economic rationale. However, the chances for future implementation have increased with the decision of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on August 6, 2025. She approved the construction of the first bridge between Sicily and mainland Italy. The undertaking is to be implemented over 10 years, at a cost of €13.5 billion.

Conclusions and perspectives

Tunisia has the potential to become a regional logistics and energy hub. Its location, close to Sicily, allows for fast transport of goods and people to the EU, as well as the development of energy and industrial projects in a nearshoring model (relocating production abroad, but to a nearby location). Achieving this goal will require further investment in the modernization of maritime infrastructure, development of air infrastructure, and improvement of intermodal connections. The EU already finances a significant part of these investments – however, the effectiveness of this support will depend on the country’s political stability and its ability to implement reforms.

The construction of new infrastructural connections, such as a possible bridge from Sicily to Tunisia, could reduce the transport costs of European goods, improving their competitiveness against products from outside the EU. At the same time, investments in renewable energy could make Tunisia attractive as a potential electricity supplier to southern Italy or Malta.