What lies ahead for Russia in 2025?

Introduction

The year 2025 could mark a critical turning point in the ongoing war in Ukraine. In a war of attrition, the capacity to replenish losses and sustain industrial output is of paramount importance. This analysis focuses on two key areas shaping the Russian Federation’s efforts: the state of its economy and the military’s ability to recover from losses and maintain power projection.

Economic situation

The Russian economy is facing significant challenges. While extensive public spending and domestic consumption are sustaining growth, the rate of expansion is steadily declining. Domestic consumption, in particular, serves as a means of mitigating inflationary pressures [1]. According to IMF forecasts, economic growth in 2025 is projected to reach just 1.3%. Russia’s reliance on high levels of government spending means any significant reduction in such spending could trigger unemployment, a decline in GDP, or even a recession. A potential recession could have severe repercussions for the Russian economy and its political regime, potentially destabilizing the country’s political landscape. Living standards are declining significantly, with Rosstat data revealing sharp year-over-year price increases for staple goods: potatoes are up by 81%, cabbage by 37%, red onions by 46%, and butter by 36.5%. Inflation reached 8.9% in November 2024. In response, the interest rate has been raised to 21%, a move that could trigger a wave of bankruptcies, particularly among companies not engaged in defense contracts [2]. Additionally, rising tax burdens, increased customs duties, and escalating costs are eroding the profitability of businesses. However, the inflation data presents a mixed picture. According to an index published by ROMIR, inflation in September 2024 stood at 22.1% year-over-year, whereas official figures for the same period reported a significantly lower rate of 9.67% year-over-year [3].

The unusually high interest rate is expected to curb domestic consumption. This consumption, a key driver of inflation, is fueled in part by government spending and wage growth resulting from labor shortages. Meanwhile, the ruble has experienced significant depreciation, recording a 25% decline in November 2024 compared to its local peak in 2022 [4].

Options for stabilizing the exchange rate are severely constrained by sanctions, which have frozen nearly half of Russia’s foreign reserves. Additionally, the funds available in the National Welfare Fund are insufficient to support an effective exchange rate policy.

This approach is driven by two main factors: inflation and the depreciation of the ruble. The sharp decline in Russia’s economic exchanges with advanced economies that transact in dollars has caused turmoil in the foreign exchange market, leading to a substantial depreciation of the ruble—approximately 20% over the past 12 months [5]. The rising interest rate is significantly impacting the cost of debt servicing, with 5.8% of the federal budget allocated for this purpose in 2024. This figure is projected to rise to 7.7% in 2025 [6].

Ruble to USD exchange rate against the real interest rate, source: [7]

Official unemployment is relatively low, standing at 2.3% as of November 2024 [8]. A challenge is the labor shortage, which is driving up nominal wages and contributing to inflation. This shortage has been exacerbated by the emigration of a significant number of young, skilled workers fleeing conscription, as well as the conscription or contracting of approximately 500,000 men into the military since 2022. Over the past year, average wage growth has remained around 20% [9].

On November 21, 2024, the Russian Duma approved the 2025 budget, with total spending estimated to rise to 41.5 trillion rubles ($415 billion)—an increase of approximately 5% compared to 2024. Most of the additional funds are earmarked for sectors related to warfare and security. It is worth noting that the final distribution and allocation of funds may shift in 2025, reflecting potential adjustments and increases during the year.

In 2025, defense spending is projected to reach a record $132 billion, or 6.3% of Russia’s GDP. Officially, this represents 33% of the federal budget, but when accounting for hidden expenditures in other departments or services, the total can be estimated at 43% of the budget. The significant increase—despite initial plans for reductions—can be attributed to the overly optimistic budget assumptions for 2024, which did not account for the failure to break Ukrainian defense.

The deficit is to be financed domestically through the purchase of government bonds by state-controlled banks.

Sanctions have significantly impacted the Russian arms industry (OPK), driving up costs, increasing dependence on allies, and affecting the quality of procured equipment. Maintaining production at current levels appears unsustainable in the medium term.

To summarize the current challenges facing the Russian economy, two scenarios are possible: tightening monetary policy to reduce inflation and cool the economy, risking a recession, or maintaining the current course by keeping interest rates unchanged and sustaining production at the expense of rising inflation. Robert Kagan of The Atlantic aptly described Vladimir Putin’s approach to Russia’s economy as “resovietization” [10].

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Despite its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian Federation is expanding the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts (formerly the Western Military District). These expansions are intended to counter the NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. The plans were formalized on February 26, 2024. The newly established Moscow Military District will cover northeastern Ukraine, while the Leningrad Military District will focus on the border with Finland and serve as a counterbalance to Sweden. Several new units are being created below the district level, including those to replenish losses sustained in Ukraine, such as the 25th Combined Arms Army in the Far East. In 2023, the 18th Combined Arms Army was also formed in occupied Crimea, alongside the 104th Airborne Division (VDV). [11].

The 104th Division and the 18th Army were deployed in the summer of 2023 near Kherson. Additionally, the 11th and 14th Army Corps will be restructured into Combined Arms Armies. The 8th and 25th Combined Arms Armies, along with the 3rd and 40th Army Corps, will be established in new or southern military districts. This expansion of forces may involve the transfer of soldiers from territorial units, but it will not include the creation of fully operational motorized infantry units.

By decree on September 16, 2024, Vladimir Putin ordered an increase of 180,000 troops in the Russian army, bringing the total to 1.5 million active personnel—a target originally announced in 2023 by then-minister Sergei Shoigu. This would place the Russian army in second place globally, just behind China [12].

The constant need to replenish losses and deploy troops on an ongoing basis hampers the army’s ability to learn and effectively apply the lessons of warfare. While units up to the army level undoubtedly gain experience, challenges remain in internalizing and institutionalizing this knowledge across the entire armed forces. A notable example is the 58th Combined Arms Army, which successfully halted the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia before launching its own offensive.

The lack of experience transmission throughout the armed forces is also constrained by factors such as:

1. Russian command culture, which relies on traditional “proven” broad-front operations rather than fostering innovation.
2. Sending under-equipped and insufficiently trained and unaligned units to the front line.

The Russians face challenges in effectively coordinating units above the company level. However, throughout the war, they have significantly enhanced their capabilities in conducting reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and employing precision munitions.

Capabilities of replenishment casualities

Sanctions have significantly impacted the Russian economy, though it has proven resilient and found ways to circumvent some of them—albeit at a cost. In the long and medium term, sanctions have destabilized the economy and permanently damaged its innovation capabilities, which are crucial for sustained economic growth. As a result, Russian industry has been forced to produce equipment that is “sufficient” but not good, and the scale of losses at the front may lead to an unsustainable replenishment of resources. Supply shortages have reached a point where even the Mosfilm film studio is donating T-55 and PT-76 tanks for use by the Russian military [13]. While the sanctions have not completely halted Russian imports, they have significantly driven up the cost of imported materials and goods.

Although microelectronics supply chains have shifted to China and Kazakhstan, this has come at a significantly higher cost. As a result, Russia has increasingly focused on repairing vehicles or refurbishing and modernizing those stored in post-Soviet warehouses. These challenges are especially evident in Russian aviation. For instance, Russia has suspended production of the fifth-generation Su-57 fighter due to technological deficiencies caused by sanctions.

Due to shortages in its ability to deliver modern equipment to the front, Russia is prioritizing the production of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, and UAVs. From February 2022 to November 2024, approximately 20% of IFV losses (e.g. BWP-3) have been replenished through current production, around 65% have come from long-term storage depots, and about 15% of losses remain unsupplemented. Russian military operations are often constrained by equipment losses. According to Western estimates, Russia is able to produce 100-125 tanks per month, mostly refurbished from older equipment in storage. The production of modern T-90-type tanks is limited to around 15 per month. As a result, older T-55s and T-62s are being deployed for infantry attacks [14].
However, the Russian military’s capabilities have significantly improved in areas such as reconnaissance, intelligence, electronic warfare (EW), and drone usage. There is a clear tendency to prioritize quantity over quality, leading to increased production of vehicles like the T-72B3M, BWP-3, and BTR-82, rather than the T-14 Armata, Kurganets-25, and Boomerang. Due to severe shortages in the supply of advanced optics, the Russian army has adapted T-80BVM tanks to the 1G42 configuration, which is commonly seen in older models. [15]. The situation is similar with the T-72B3M and the Sosna-U system, which is being replaced by the 1PN96MT-02. These trends are evident across all areas where shortages of advanced components from the West are forcing Russia to revert to older systems, some dating back to the Soviet era.

Kazakhstan has become a key intermediary partner in supplying Russia with semiconductors and other microelectronics. From February 2022 to February 2024, exports of these goods to Russia saw an average increase of 567% [16]. A significant amount of these goods go to Kazakhstan from the European Union and the UK.

Significant support for Russia’s war effort is also coming from China, particularly in the form of anti-drone systems (though both Russia and China have denied such agreements). Additionally, Iran has provided substantial assistance, delivering Shahed 131 and 136 cruise missiles—along with a production license—and ballistic missiles. North Korea has also supported the Russian Federation by supplying 6 million artillery shells and 5 Hwasong-11 missiles since the beginning of the war. Furthermore, North Korean troops have been deployed on the frontlines, with estimates ranging from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers [17].

According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia is capable of producing approximately 30 Kh-101 and 20 Kalibr-type missiles per month. The ability to produce advanced cruise missiles suggests that Moscow has found ways to import cutting-edge technology and circumvent sanctions. However, there are indications that Moscow’s stock of long-range cruise munitions is dwindling, which could limit its ability to sustain frequent attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.

One of the key indicators of the army’s offensive capabilities is the average daily number of shells fired during high-intensity battles. Russian artillery is responsible for inflicting 70% of Ukrainian frontline personnel losses. The highest number of shells fired was an average of 38,000 per day in June 2022. Since then, the daily volume has fluctuated between 7,000 and 16,000, with an average of around 10,000 shells per day throughout the rest of the conflict [18]. By the end of 2023, Russia had successfully increased the capacity of its ammunition factories. It is estimated that in 2024, Russia could produce 1.325 million 152mm caliber shells and 800,000 122mm caliber shells, not including the ammunition support received from North Korea, Iran, and Belarus.

Recruiting volunteers has improved the situation on the front, but replenishing equipment at the same rate remains a significant challenge. As of March 2024, the Russian army has managed to maintain a balance with its losses. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that, thanks to covert mobilization, Russia is able to draft 30,000 to 37,000 recruits per month, with Russian figures reporting around 40,000, which are not significantly different. This allows Russia to fully replace its losses, which average around 37,000 troops per month according to data up until June 2024. Ukrainian estimates suggest that most recruits are sent directly to the front lines to replenish losses. Despite the establishment of numerous new recruitment centers, there remains a significant issue with insufficient conscription, and many centers lack the resources to properly train recruits, leading to inadequate preparation [19]. In military aviation, pilots who previously operated transport aircraft are being retrained for attack aircraft, which significantly diminishes the quality of crews and their ability to perform specific combat tasks. Additionally, the activities of informal frontline training centers have been restricted in favor of military academies, driven by the fear that these centers may compete with the academy system [20].

According to a Chatham House report, due to the inadequate training of Russian recruits, Russia will be unable to make sudden changes or breakthroughs on the front line [21]. However, the Russian theory of victory now avoids costly, violent operations and breakthroughs, instead relying on the old Napoleonic like strategy of destroying the enemy’s forces through sustained attrition. It seems that Russian leadership is convinced it can “carve out” a path to victory, with maintaining artillery strength being the key to this strategy.

The replenishment of losses is sufficient to maintain the current pace of operations. Despite the lack of regular supplies and support for Ukraine, the Russians have managed to, and continue to, maintain the initiative on the front.

In the medium term, Russian units will increase in numbers, but their quality will decline significantly, as will their capabilities, further compounded by issues in equipment supply. Importantly, Russian soldiers are not reporting morale issues as long as their pay remains consistent, and they are willing to continue fighting. While the Russian army is facing struggles, expectations of its imminent collapse are likely misplaced.

Situation on the frontline

Among the most important cities captured were: Avdiyivka, Vulhedar, Selydovo and Kurakhovo [23]. On December 16, 2024, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belolusov announced that the four Ukrainian regions identified as annexed in 2022—Zaporizhzhya, Luhansk, Kherson, and Donetsk—would be fully conquered in 2025 [24]. More than half of the territory captured by the Ukrainian army in the Kursk region in August 2024 has already been recaptured [25]. The Russians gained the most territory in November. By the end of December, heavy fighting was taking place in the Pokrovsk area.

Status of hostilities as at January 19, source: ISW [26]

Possible scenarios for ending the war in Ukraine

The EU’s 15th sanctions package successfully blocked an additional 52 tankers from the “shadow fleet” from using European ports [27]. Combined with additional sanctions that may be imposed by the US, this will place significant economic pressure on Russia. Furthermore, an increase in US fuel supply to the market will lower prices, thus reducing revenues to the already strained Russian Federation budget. The main challenge with these measures is their implementation, which is expected to push Putin toward the negotiating table. Ultimately, Donald Trump’s primary goal is to break up the Sino-Russian alliance. [28]. The concern about giving up or abandoning Ukraine seems unfounded. Such a move would likely be perceived as a significant failure of U.S. foreign policy, undermining its credibility and damaging the reputation of Donald Trump, who would be seen as abandoning his allies. This would signal weakness to Beijing, potentially prompting China to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy.

How the ceasefire or the end of the conflict in Ukraine will ultimately play out is impossible to predict, but the author will try to present 4 possible scenarios. Problems with the Russian economy provide a new range of actions by the new US administration in trying to resolve the conflict.

Possible scenarios:

1. Prolonging the conflict: Russia’s preparations to sustain pressure and continue the war until exhaustion are becoming increasingly evident. This is reflected in the long-term financial plans and monetary policies in place. The Kremlin views the war as a tool to secure its long-term legitimacy and maintain societal unity, especially given the existential nature of the conflict for Ukraine’s independence and the stability of Putin’s regime [29].
2. Conflict freeze. Enables both sides to rebuild their potentials and prepare for a potential “Round Two” [30].
3. Russian victory: a breakthrough in the Ukrainian front or the acceptance of Russian peace terms (either the 2021 ultimatum or revised terms). This scenario would likely be accompanied by a withdrawal of Western support for Ukraine, a trend that is already becoming apparent as of the date of writing. On January 21, 2025, Donald Trump suspended non-military support for Ukraine for 90 days, though military assistance remains unaffected [31].
4. Ukrainian victory. The least likely scenario, characterized by Ukrainian victories at the front thanks to increased aid from the West, a significant tightening of sanctions or Russia’s economic and political problems.

In the author’s opinion, the most likely scenarios are 1 and 2. All potential outcomes are influenced by a number of factors, the most significant of which include:

1. The level of Western support for Ukraine,
2. Ukraine’s ability to sustain a prolonged war of attrition,
3. The offensive capabilities of the Russian military and its capacity to generate additional forces and units needed to break through the front lines or conduct significant offensives,
4. The internal situations in both Ukraine and Russia, including the willingness of their societies to endure the ongoing military effort,
5. The economic capacities of both countries.

Summary

Despite economic challenges, including high inflation and the ongoing war, a surge in public discontent seems unlikely. Recent polls show that Putin enjoys 87% public support, and according to a Levada Center survey, 72% of citizens believe the country is heading in the right direction. Although declines in Russian arms production could pose difficulties in a potential symmetrical conflict with NATO countries, Russia is increasingly likely to rely on hybrid tactics. The lessons learned by the Russian military present a significant operational-level threat to NATO. Despite the issues facing the Russian military, it should still be regarded as a formidable adversary, especially given its disregard for losses and its ability to replenish them. The same holds true for Russia’s war economy, which has proven remarkably resilient to sanctions and can continue supporting the war effort, albeit at the cost of ordinary Russians’ living standards.

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