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Institute of New Europe Institute of New Europe
  • About
  • Publications
      • Publications

        The primary categories of materials published by the Institute as part of its research and analytical activities.

      • SEE ALL PUBLICATIONS

      • Analyses
        Daily commentary and analysis on international issues provided by our experts and analysts
      • Reports
        Comprehensive thematic studies on international relations and socio-political issues
      • Video
        Recordings of expert debates and series of video podcasts created by our team and experts
      • Maps
        Selection of maps depicting international alliances and foreign visits of key politicians
  • Programmes
      • Programmes

        The main areas of research and publication activities at the Institute with separate teams of experts, functioning under the supervision of the head of a particular programme.

      • WEBSITE OF THE THREE SEAS PROJECT

      • Europe
        Analyses and commentaries on European integration and the place of Europe on the political and economic map of the world
      • Security
        Studies in the field of international and internal security of individual states, with particular emphasis on the role of NATO
      • Indo-Pacific
        An overview of the political and economic situation in the region, the status of the U.S.-China rivalry, and the EU’s policy towards China
      • Three Seas Think Tanks Hub
        Analyses and studies of the Three Seas Initiative, taking into account the perspectives of the participating states
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Jun 19
Europe, Germany, Military and army, Publications

Zeitwende: A huge leap forward for the Bundeswehr or missed hopes?

June 19, 2024

Key information:

According to the Global Firepower Ranking, the Bundeswehr is the 19th country when it comes to military power.

In 2014, German armed forces were ranked as the 7th best in the world; after that, Germany is losing its position annually, even though expenditures are increasing every year.

There was no need to invest in defence capabilities because the USA was perceived as a security giver and Germany could free-ride as a security recipient.

The aim of the 2011 reforms was to produce a formidable force in terms of global crisis management.

Zeitwende was one of the most famous reforms announced during a speech by Olaf Scholz to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022.

From the 100 billion euro special fund, 10 billion euros were spent to sign a contract for F-35 multirole fighters. 35 of these fighters will replace Germany’s aging fleet of Tornado bombers.

In recent years, the development of the Bundeswehr has been delayed by the difficulties of the German industry in implementing comprehensive national or multinational arms programs.

In the upcoming years, the Bundeswehr is and will be facing a personnel crisis, so plans to increase the number of troops will be very hard to achieve. In 5–10 years, it is expected that Berlin will have a much more effective army, but because of a lack of strategic culture, they cannot achieve the position of security leader.

Introduction

During the Cold War, the German armed forces were regarded as a cornerstone of collective defence against the Soviet Union, known for their high level of training and advanced weaponry. However, after the Cold War ended, European countries significantly reduced their military capabilities. The wars of the turn of the 21st centuries, which were usually fought locally, within the GWOR (Global War on Terrorism), required not large land forces or strategic depth, but rather rapidly moving, small, well-trained maneuver units. A paradigm shift occurred in the third decade of the 21st century, particularly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Despite numerous announced reforms, the Bundeswehr has not yet achieved the capability to sustain a prolonged war like the one in Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, German elites believed that deterrence should be non-confrontational and conducted in conjunction with dialogue. One of the most notable reforms was announced by Olaf Scholz in a speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, introducing the concept of ‘Zeitwende’. This shift also included a new German doctrine introduced in 2023. It is the first doctrine document since 2011, during a period when cheap energy from Russia was instrumental in fuelling the German economic boom. [1] Russia’s full-scale invasion and havoc on Ukraine have ended any remaining illusion that Kremlin could be a partner and not a foe for Germany.

Bundeswehr potential

According to the Global Firepower Ranking, the Bundeswehr is currently ranked 19th in terms of military power. In 2024, Germany’s annual defense expenditure amounts to USD 56 billion (2.01% of GDP). Notably, in 2014, the German armed forces were ranked as the 7th best in the world. Since then, despite increasing defence expenditure each year, Germany’s military ranking has steadily declined. [2]

One significant reason for the undermaintained and underfinanced German army over the years was the belief that, following the dissolution of the USSR, there was an opportunity to reap a “peace dividend”. With the USA perceived as the primary security provider, Germany felt it could afford to free-ride as a security recipient, reducing its investment in defence capabilities. Threats from Russia were downplayed until 2014; German elites did not view this danger as imminent. Even when acknowledging the threat, they did not see it as directly targeting Germany.

In the 1992 reforms known as Bundeswehr 2000, the German armed forces were divided into two parts: a larger segment focused on defending Germany and NATO-aligned countries, and a smaller constantly ready rapid reaction force known as the Division of Rapid Reaction Forces (DSSR). The DSSR consists of paratrooper regiments, sections of special forces, transport helicopter regiments, support teams, and logistic support units. The larger segment includes the 1st and 10th panzer divisions, which are composed of tank brigades, mechanized and motorized brigades (panzergrenadiere), as well as support units. [3] Tank brigades in panzer divisions dispose of mechanized battalions (panzergrenadiere) with 44 Puma/Marder AFV as well as schutzen battalions with APC Boxer. Four mixed artillery battalions dispose of MLRS Mars I/II and 155mm self-propelled howitzers, Panzerhaubitze 2000. Some support units have self-propelled mortars (R-Rohr).

Reconnaissance is provided by dedicated reconnaissance battalions. The 1st Parachute Brigade “Saarland” includes its own recon company that consists of 310 personnel. The 291st Infantry Battalion, part of the French-German brigade, operates a reconnaissance team equipped with Fennek 1A1/A2 recon armoured vehicles. [3]

Currently, the Bundeswehr lacks divisional-level aerial defence capabilities. Gepard vehicles were disbanded, and the remaining Ozelot and Stinger were transferred to the Luftwaffe.

Until 2011, conscription was mandatory. The reforms of 2011 aimed to increase the number of troops to 185,000 soldiers and 40,000 reservists. However, filling this quota has been a persistent challenge. In 2021, the troop strength was intended to reach 184,000. The goal of the 2011 reforms was to create a formidable force for global crisis management. Since the end of compulsory service in 2011, Germany has faced difficulties in recruiting new personnel and is continually striving to meet its troop targets.

In the coming years, the primary focus for modernizing Germany’s ground forces is to meet NATO requirements. This involves fully equipping and modernizing three divisions. Long term plans include upgrading all Leopard tanks to the Leopard 2A7V standard. The Bundeswehr aims to have 320–328 MBTs (main battle tanks), with the majority being Leopard 2A7. To achieve this, they plan to modernize 104 vehicles under the 2017 contract and approximately 100 Leopard 2A6 vehicles under the 2019 contract. Additionally more Puma vehicles will be procured to fill the ranks. For now, there is a need to purchase at least 210 vehicles. [4] Perhaps more Boxer APC will be bought. Artillery forces were numerously reduced in recent years; ranks will be replenished by the 108 new Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled artillery and the MARS II MLRS. A modernized division is planned to be commissioned in 2025.

Transport helicopter regiments (10th and 30th) are equipped with H135, UH-1D, and the newest NH90. Additionally, the 36th Regiment has two squadrons of Tigers. In the air force, there is a critical need to replace the aging CH-53 transport helicopters, many of which are currently grounded. The fleet of NH90 transport helicopters is also slated for modernization. [4] As of now, the German Air Force operates 143 Eurofighters from 2004-2008. Plans are in place to replace 38 of these with new models, and an additional 15 aircraft have been commissioned for electronic warfare. By 2026, the Bundeswehr is expected to receive all 53 commissioned A400M transport aircraft as well as three SIGINT (signals intelligence) systems based on Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft. German pilots are currently facing significant training challenges, with at least half of unable to meet NATO requirements due to shortage of training aircraft. [5]

For a decade, Bundeswehr developed the medium-range aerial defence system TLVS; for now, it disposes of only 12 batteries for modernized Patriot systems.

When it comes to Deutsche Marine, the Bundestag approved the procurement of four frigates (126). They should be commissioned until 2028. [4] Deutsche Marine currently has four frigates 125, three frigates 124, four frigates 123, and one frigate 122. The Bundeswehr has already ordered five new Corvettes 130, which are due to enter service by 2025. Discussions are underway to upgrade or replace the five platforms of this type currently in use.

Zeitwende

In 2021, former German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and General Eberhard Zorn addressed the parliamentary defence commission, highlighting a critical perspective on Germany’s strategic posture. They acknowledged that while Germany traditionally does not think in terms of power and dominance, other states do, which has led to conflicts in east Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Karabakh. [6] The conclusion drawn was that Germany should enhance its capabilities across all domains, with a particular focus on homeland and collective defence. The document emphasised Germany’s underfunded army.

On February 27, 2022, German chancellor Olaf Scholz announced an extensive program of military modernization known as the Zeitwende. He asserted that the era of long-lasting peace is over now and that Russia sought to restore its imperial status, marking a historic turning point for Germany and Europe. Scholz’s speech was met with a standing ovation, an unprecedented display of unity. [7]

As a result, military expenditures were set to increase drastically, and a special off-budget 100 billion Euro fund was established. [8] To launch this special fund, the parliament had to amend the constitution. This new fiscal instrument, financed by credits, was incorporated to the constitution to exempt it from the fiscal regime’s constraints. [9] The government was mandated to present the state of expenditures annually. The budget committee validates expenditures over 25 billion euros, and a special budget subcommittee oversees the fund’s operations. A majority of the Bundestag (567 out of 736 delegates) supported the new bill, while opposition came from MPs of Die Linke and most of the AfD.

Financial resources from the fund were intended to supplement the regular defence budget to meet NATO requirements (a minimum of 2% GDP for defence expenditures). The Christian Democrats advocated for a regulation ensuring that once the special fund was depleted, defence expenditures would continue at the 2% GDP level. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that after the special fund was exhausted, the federal budget would sustain defence expenditures at the 2% level. The question of whether these expenditures will be maintained after financing from special funds is exhausted is still ongoing. [9] Roderrick Kefferputz, Atlantic Council analyst, believes that eventually extra-budgetary funds will run out and it is no point chasing 2% GDP of expenditures level with them, because in 2027, after fund is spend, military expenditures will sink to embarrassing level of 1,2% GDP. He points out, that in order to really modernise German army, Berlin needs long-term policy. Interesting fact is that Zeitwende was later chosen by the Association of German Languages as a 2022 year German word. [10] 78% of Germans supported the proposed policies. [8] At the beginning of March, 65% of those surveyed favoured the creation of a fund while 69% favoured raising defence spending to 2% of GDP (47 percentage points more than before the Russian invasion). German retired general Erich Vad believes that 100 billion euros is not enough since the sum must be at least tripled to reintroduce operational readiness. Ammunition only requires 20 billion euros; pending repairs of infrastructure are another 50 billion euros. This is not counting new equipment, tanks, vehicles, and aircrafts. Nevertheless, no money would help to solve the main problem of the German armed forces: the personnel crisis. [11] Berlin’s target of 203,000 active-duty personnel by 2031 is unachievable. Currently, the Bundeswehr has 20,000 vacancies. According to Eva Hogl, inspector of the armed forces, last year the German armed forces failed to meet their recruitment plan.

One year after the historical speech still not much has been done in that matter. [9] Minister of Defence Christine Lambrecht has left the office in an atmosphere of defeat. According to the German press, her successor, Boris Pistorius, is facing an extremely difficult quest to restore army potential. From the 100 billion euro special fund, 10 billion euros were spent on signing a contract for F-35 multirole fighters. 35 of these fighters will replace Germany’s aging fleet of Tornado bombers. The first eight F-35 fighters are to be introduced to German services in 2026, but at the beginning they will stay in the USA for pilot training. Another 27 fighters are to be shipped until 2029. The Bundeswehr still has many deficits, and the Zeitwende set of reforms has not started yet. [9] Only 30 billion of the 100 billion special fund was spent to buy equipment. Criticism among European allies and in Germany alone arose after much of the fund was spent to buy equipment from the USA  and not in domestic or European industry. [9] Time is crucial when it comes to disposing of special funds. According to Rafel Ross, a specialist in ECFR, 8 billion euros was dedicated to paying off the interest on loans taken by the government. Because of inflation and interest rates, now it is 13 billion euros. Due to inflation, the euro-dolar exchange rate, VAT, and other remaining costs, there remains only 50–70 billion euro for equipment procurement. Loss stated that the longer we keep this money in our pockets, the less we have for expenditures. [9] The chairwoman of the Bundestag defence commission has a different opinion on that matter: she claims it is challenging to spend that amount of money over one year. In the meantime, Boris Pistorius calls for an increase in the special budget by another 10 billion euros.

Moreover, allocating 2% of GDP to defence is approved by more than 80% of the voters of the Christian Democrats, FDP, and SPD. 68% of Green voters are in favour of such a decision. Among AfD supporters, 51%, and the Left, 42%. [12] In Germany, discussions about dedicating more funds are ongoing. The first priority is achieving the already planned modernizations. The aim of these reforms is to supply the Bundeswehr with basic infantry equipment as well as modernize vehicles and provide them with enough spare parts and ammunition. According to the press, for now, ammunition will run out after three days of full-scale armed conflict. [4] Replenishing the ammunition stocks of all types of German armed forces in accordance with NATO guidelines would reportedly cost around 20 billion euros. These kinds of expenditures will still be financed by the annual defence budget.

On the NATO 75th anniversary, German defence minister Boris Pistorius announced a new set of reforms. The long-term plan consists of moving troops from missions all around the world to the homeland. It also involves  changing doctrine from foreign missions toward national and alliance defence. Mr. Pistorius wants less bureaucracy in the Bundeswehr. His first reform would be to establish operational command to coordinate operations in a single place. Previously, domestic and foreign operations were coordinated separately. [13]

Even Boris Pistorius perceives merging operational command, which was previously responsible for foreign operations, with territorial command, which is responsible for domestic operations, as a step forward. Another branch of military forces—cyber and information warfare—is to be established. Mr. Pistorius gave himself and his team six months to complete the task. Although many observers thought that mandatory military service would be reintroduced, nothing of that nature happened. The defence minister aims to keep 200,000 troops in service until 2031. According to Boris Pistorius, [13] Germany wants to maintain a high combat readiness of 35,000 troops, gathered in the full operational division since 2025 and in another division since 2027.

Difficulties with implementing reforms

General Inspector Carsten Breuer stated that the Bundeswehr should be ready for war in five years. [15] He pointed out that a change in mindset is a necessity if the Bundeswehr is to be ready for a full-scale war effort. Unfortunately, according to the general inspector, some of the Bundeswehr defence capabilities will be ready later than expected. He did not specify which ones because of military confidentiality. The German ministry of defence’s ambition is to dispose of 3 full modernised divisions that can be mobilised under 3 months since the war outbreak until 2031. [5] FOI report from 2021 states that after the outbreak of war German armed forces will only be able to commission 3-4 mechanized battalions, and only in their stationary location. Additionally, 2-3 light infantry battalions that can be airlifted. [5]

Problems with the reformation of the German armed forces are deeply rooted in society. It believed in the idea of everlasting peace. [16] The Army is often said to be a depiction of society’s condition. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, German society was sure that the era of armed conflicts had become history. Also, soldierliness and the use of military power are often associated with uncomfortable Nazi past. The fact that German soldiers in recent years were involved in some cases implicating right-wing extremism did not ease these associations. [13]

When it comes to equipment, German helicopters are being repaired very slowly and are lacking spare parts. A Bundeswehr report from December 2022 revealed that only 40% are in combat readiness. In 2023, “Der Spiegel” informed that during exercises of the 10th Panzer Division, all 18 Puma vehicles were inoperative. In the army depot, special artillery equipment was nowhere to be found to aid thousands of German troops stationed in Lithuania. [17] Only one in three fighter and one in two howitzer are operational to enter combat. In recent years, the development of the Bundeswehr has been delayed by the difficulties of the German industry in implementing comprehensive national or multinational arms programs, resulting in the delivery to the army of equipment that required improvements and further modernization (including the Puma, Boxer, Tiger, NH90, A400M, Eurofighter, K-130, and F-125). [4] This was superimposed on the ineffective management of the defence ministry and arms agencies, as well as bureaucracy and problems in recruiting military personnel.

Conclusions

German society needs direct incentives and a sense of danger to get rid of the false conviction of everlasting peace and prosperity. The current conditions of the Bundeswehr are not enough to sustain long-lasting armed conflict as well as deter danger from the revanchist world superpowers to which Russia belongs. First and foremost, they need to significantly raise defence expenditures. Also, Zeitwende is a huge leap forward for the colossal tanker Germany is. One year is not enough to make the step but time is crucial to act in order to support the collective defence of Europe. Extra off-budget special funds cannot resolve all problems the Bundeswehr is facing, even the financial ones. Germany has no structural solution to sustain increased defence expenditures (over 2% GDP) in long term as for instance in Japan (increased taxes). [11] The crucial effort is to shorten planning and procurement time. Another important issue is to increase the combat and operational readiness of the armed forces as well as providing troops with anti-aircraft armament. [6] In the upcoming years, the Bundeswehr is, and will be facing a personnel crisis, so plans to increase the number of troops will be very hard to achieve. In 5–10 years, it is expected that Berlin will have a much more effective army, but because of a lack of strategic culture, they cannot achieve the position of security leader. There is a need to transform this bureaucratic organization into a functional army ready for prolonged war efforts as well as supporting allies. Change of perception is crucial. Berlin needs to understand that the outcome of the Ukraine war is vital for the security of our region, and the war in Ukraine is not something outside of NATO.

Bibliography

  1. Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2023, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5701724/eacb54dfc428b6808c9088402de91836/broschuere-verteidigungspolitische-richtlinien-2023-data.pdf [dostęp: 02.05.2024]
  2. Bundeswehra – przypadek sił zbrojnych państwa, w którym społeczeństwo uwierzyło w wieczny pokój, Portal Obronny, 04.10.2023, https://portalobronny.se.pl/polityka-obronna/bundeswehra-przypadek-sil-zbrojnych-panstwa-w-ktorym-spoleczenstwo-uwierzylo-w-wieczny-pokoj-aa-nYzd-d5pC-Beqw.html [dostęp: 02.05.2024]
  3. Przebudzenie Bundeswehry? Niemcy stawiają na pancerz i ląd [ANALIZA], Defence24, 04.11.2019 https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/przebudzenie-bundeswehry-niemcy-stawiaja-na-pancerz-i-lad-analiza [dostęp: 03.05.2024]
  4. Justyna Gotkowska, Wojna na Ukrainie: konsekwencje dla Bundeswehry i niemieckiej polityki w NATO, OSW, 30.03.2024, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2022-03-30/wojna-na-ukrainie-konsekwencje-dla-bundeswehry-i-niemieckiej [dostęp: 03.05.2024]
  5. M. Budzisz, Samotność strategiczna Polski, Zona zero Sp. z o. o., Warszawa 2022
  6. https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/niemcy-stawiaja-na-silna-bundeswehre-tarcza-smiglowce-i-drony [dostęp: 03.05.2024]
  7. Justyna Gotkowska, Bundestag: 100 miliardów euro dla Bundeswehry, OSW, 07.06.2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-06-07/bundestag-100-miliardow-euro-dla-bundeswehry [dostęp: 04.05.2024]
  8. Patrick Wintour, The week where decades happened: how the west finally woke up to Putin, The Guardian, 04.03.2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar//russia-ukraine-how-the-west-woke-up-to-vladimir-putin [dostęp: 03.05.2024]
  9. Ben Knight, „Zeitenwende”: sprawdzamy, co ze 100 miliardami dla armii, DW, 02.03.2023, https://www.dw.com/pl/zeitenwende-scholza-sprawdzamy-co-si%C4%99-dzieje-ze-100-miliardami-dla-armii/a-64857668 [dostęp: 03.05.2024]
  10. “Zeitenwende” niemieckim słowem roku 2022. Co oznacza?, Forsal, 09.12.2022, https://forsal.pl/lifestyle/rozrywka/artykuly/8606610,zeitenwende-slowo-roku-niemcy.html [dostęp: 04.05.2024]
  11. M. Budzisz, Pauza strategiczna, Polska wobec ryzyka wojny z Rosją, Zona zero Sp. z o. o., Warszawa 2023
  12. ARD-DeutschlandTREND März 2022 Studieninformation, ARD1, https://www.tagesschau.de/dtrend-747.pdf [dostęp: 06.05.2024]
  13. James Angelos, Can Germany Be a Great Military Power Again?, New York Times,  24.01.2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/magazine/germany-military-army.html [dostęp: 05.06.2024]
  14. Volker Witting, German government wants ‘war-ready’ troops, DW, 04.05.2024, https://www.dw.com/en/german-government-wants-war-ready-troops/a-68748226 [dostęp: 06.05.2024]
  15. Niemcy. Bundeswehra ma być gotowa do wojny za pięć lat, DW, 11.02.2024, https://www.dw.com/pl/niemcy-bundeswehra-ma-by%C4%87-gotowa-do-wojny-za-pi%C4%99%C4%87-lat/a-68226124 [dostęp: 06.05.2024]
  16. Katrin Benhold, Germany Is Ready to Lead Militarily. Its Military Is Not., New York Times, 23.03.2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/world/europe/ukraine-germany-military-russia-scholz-lithuania.html [dostęp: 07.05.2024]
  17. Jędrzej Bielecki, Bundeswehra słabsza niż polskie wojsko, Rzeczpospolita, 19.01.2023, https://www.rp.pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art37802461-bundeswehra-slabsza-niz-polskie-wojsko [dostęp: 04.05.2024]

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Jan Starosta Head of the Project Office at the New Europe Institute. Graduate of quantitative methods in economics and information systems at the Warsaw School of Economics. Member of the Society of Polish Economists and the Forum of Young Diplomats. Winner of the Young Experts Day competition in 2024. His research interests include: arms diplomacy and military, international security and public finance.

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Jan Starosta Head of the Project Office at the New Europe Institute. Graduate of quantitative methods in economics and information systems at the Warsaw School of Economics. Member of the Society of Polish Economists and the Forum of Young Diplomats. Winner of the Young Experts Day competition in 2024. His research interests include: arms diplomacy and military, international security and public finance.
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Doktorant na Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Przewodniczący Krajowej Reprezentacji Doktorantów w kadencji 2020. Autor kilkunastu prac naukowych, poświęconych naukom o bezpieczeństwie, naukom o polityce i administracji oraz stosunkom międzynarodowym. Laureat I, II oraz III Międzynarodowej Olimpiady Geopolitycznej.

Karolina Siekierka

Absolwentka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe, specjalizacji Bezpieczeństwo i Studia Strategiczne. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną i wewnętrzną Francji, prawa człowieka oraz konflikty zbrojne.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Podoficer rezerwy, student studiów magisterskich na kierunku Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe i Dyplomacja na Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, były praktykant w BBN. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują m.in. operacje pokojowe ONZ oraz bezpieczeństwo Ukrainy.

Leon Pińczak

Student studiów drugiego stopnia na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe. Dziennikarz polskojęzycznej redakcji Biełsatu. Zawodowo zajmuje się obszarem postsowieckim, rosyjską polityką wewnętrzną i doktrynami FR. Biegle włada językiem rosyjskim.

Program Indo-Pacyfik tworzą:

Łukasz Kobierski

Dyrektor programu. Współzałożyciel INE oraz prezes zarządu w latach 2019-2021. Stypendysta szkoleń z zakresu bezpieczeństwa na Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security w Waszyngtonie, ekspert od stosunków międzynarodowych. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wiceprezes Zarządu INE.

dr Joanna Siekiera

Prawnik międzynarodowy, doktor nauk społecznych, adiunkt na Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu w Bergen w Norwegii. Była stypendystką rządu Nowej Zelandii na Uniwersytecie Victorii w Wellington, niemieckiego Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, a także francuskiego Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques.

Paweł Paszak

Absolwent stosunków międzynarodowych (spec. Wschodnioazjatycka) na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim oraz stypendysta University of Kent (W. Brytania) i Hainan University (ChRL). Doktorant UW i Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną ChRL oraz strategiczną rywalizację Chiny-USA.

Jakub Graca

Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Aleksy Borówka

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Wroclaw, the President of the Polish National Associations of PhD Candidates in 2020. The author of dozen of scientific papers, concerning security studies, political science, administration, international relations. Laureate of the I, II and III International Geopolitical Olympiad.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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  • EU-China Affairs Review January 2026
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Financed with funds from the National Freedom Institute - Center for Civil Society Development under the Governmental Civil Society Organisations Development Programme for 2018-2030.

Sfinansowano ze środków Narodowego Instytutu Wolności – Centrum Rozwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego w ramach Rządowego Programu Rozwoju Organizacji Obywatelskich na lata 2018-2030.



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