Key information:
According to the Global Firepower Ranking, the Bundeswehr is the 19th country when it comes to military power.
In 2014, German armed forces were ranked as the 7th best in the world; after that, Germany is losing its position annually, even though expenditures are increasing every year.
There was no need to invest in defence capabilities because the USA was perceived as a security giver and Germany could free-ride as a security recipient.
The aim of the 2011 reforms was to produce a formidable force in terms of global crisis management.
Zeitwende was one of the most famous reforms announced during a speech by Olaf Scholz to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022.
From the 100 billion euro special fund, 10 billion euros were spent to sign a contract for F-35 multirole fighters. 35 of these fighters will replace Germany’s aging fleet of Tornado bombers.
In recent years, the development of the Bundeswehr has been delayed by the difficulties of the German industry in implementing comprehensive national or multinational arms programs.
In the upcoming years, the Bundeswehr is and will be facing a personnel crisis, so plans to increase the number of troops will be very hard to achieve. In 5–10 years, it is expected that Berlin will have a much more effective army, but because of a lack of strategic culture, they cannot achieve the position of security leader.
Introduction
During the Cold War, the German armed forces were regarded as a cornerstone of collective defence against the Soviet Union, known for their high level of training and advanced weaponry. However, after the Cold War ended, European countries significantly reduced their military capabilities. The wars of the turn of the 21st centuries, which were usually fought locally, within the GWOR (Global War on Terrorism), required not large land forces or strategic depth, but rather rapidly moving, small, well-trained maneuver units. A paradigm shift occurred in the third decade of the 21st century, particularly following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Despite numerous announced reforms, the Bundeswehr has not yet achieved the capability to sustain a prolonged war like the one in Ukraine. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, German elites believed that deterrence should be non-confrontational and conducted in conjunction with dialogue. One of the most notable reforms was announced by Olaf Scholz in a speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, introducing the concept of ‘Zeitwende’. This shift also included a new German doctrine introduced in 2023. It is the first doctrine document since 2011, during a period when cheap energy from Russia was instrumental in fuelling the German economic boom. [1] Russia’s full-scale invasion and havoc on Ukraine have ended any remaining illusion that Kremlin could be a partner and not a foe for Germany.
Bundeswehr potential
According to the Global Firepower Ranking, the Bundeswehr is currently ranked 19th in terms of military power. In 2024, Germany’s annual defense expenditure amounts to USD 56 billion (2.01% of GDP). Notably, in 2014, the German armed forces were ranked as the 7th best in the world. Since then, despite increasing defence expenditure each year, Germany’s military ranking has steadily declined. [2]
In the 1992 reforms known as Bundeswehr 2000, the German armed forces were divided into two parts: a larger segment focused on defending Germany and NATO-aligned countries, and a smaller constantly ready rapid reaction force known as the Division of Rapid Reaction Forces (DSSR). The DSSR consists of paratrooper regiments, sections of special forces, transport helicopter regiments, support teams, and logistic support units. The larger segment includes the 1st and 10th panzer divisions, which are composed of tank brigades, mechanized and motorized brigades (panzergrenadiere), as well as support units. [3] Tank brigades in panzer divisions dispose of mechanized battalions (panzergrenadiere) with 44 Puma/Marder AFV as well as schutzen battalions with APC Boxer. Four mixed artillery battalions dispose of MLRS Mars I/II and 155mm self-propelled howitzers, Panzerhaubitze 2000. Some support units have self-propelled mortars (R-Rohr).
Reconnaissance is provided by dedicated reconnaissance battalions. The 1st Parachute Brigade “Saarland” includes its own recon company that consists of 310 personnel. The 291st Infantry Battalion, part of the French-German brigade, operates a reconnaissance team equipped with Fennek 1A1/A2 recon armoured vehicles. [3]
Currently, the Bundeswehr lacks divisional-level aerial defence capabilities. Gepard vehicles were disbanded, and the remaining Ozelot and Stinger were transferred to the Luftwaffe.
Until 2011, conscription was mandatory. The reforms of 2011 aimed to increase the number of troops to 185,000 soldiers and 40,000 reservists. However, filling this quota has been a persistent challenge. In 2021, the troop strength was intended to reach 184,000. The goal of the 2011 reforms was to create a formidable force for global crisis management. Since the end of compulsory service in 2011, Germany has faced difficulties in recruiting new personnel and is continually striving to meet its troop targets.
In the coming years, the primary focus for modernizing Germany’s ground forces is to meet NATO requirements. This involves fully equipping and modernizing three divisions. Long term plans include upgrading all Leopard tanks to the Leopard 2A7V standard. The Bundeswehr aims to have 320–328 MBTs (main battle tanks), with the majority being Leopard 2A7. To achieve this, they plan to modernize 104 vehicles under the 2017 contract and approximately 100 Leopard 2A6 vehicles under the 2019 contract. Additionally more Puma vehicles will be procured to fill the ranks. For now, there is a need to purchase at least 210 vehicles. [4] Perhaps more Boxer APC will be bought. Artillery forces were numerously reduced in recent years; ranks will be replenished by the 108 new Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled artillery and the MARS II MLRS. A modernized division is planned to be commissioned in 2025.
Transport helicopter regiments (10th and 30th) are equipped with H135, UH-1D, and the newest NH90. Additionally, the 36th Regiment has two squadrons of Tigers. In the air force, there is a critical need to replace the aging CH-53 transport helicopters, many of which are currently grounded. The fleet of NH90 transport helicopters is also slated for modernization. [4] As of now, the German Air Force operates 143 Eurofighters from 2004-2008. Plans are in place to replace 38 of these with new models, and an additional 15 aircraft have been commissioned for electronic warfare. By 2026, the Bundeswehr is expected to receive all 53 commissioned A400M transport aircraft as well as three SIGINT (signals intelligence) systems based on Bombardier Global 6000 aircraft. German pilots are currently facing significant training challenges, with at least half of unable to meet NATO requirements due to shortage of training aircraft. [5]
For a decade, Bundeswehr developed the medium-range aerial defence system TLVS; for now, it disposes of only 12 batteries for modernized Patriot systems.
When it comes to Deutsche Marine, the Bundestag approved the procurement of four frigates (126). They should be commissioned until 2028. [4] Deutsche Marine currently has four frigates 125, three frigates 124, four frigates 123, and one frigate 122. The Bundeswehr has already ordered five new Corvettes 130, which are due to enter service by 2025. Discussions are underway to upgrade or replace the five platforms of this type currently in use.
Zeitwende
In 2021, former German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and General Eberhard Zorn addressed the parliamentary defence commission, highlighting a critical perspective on Germany’s strategic posture. They acknowledged that while Germany traditionally does not think in terms of power and dominance, other states do, which has led to conflicts in east Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Karabakh. [6] The conclusion drawn was that Germany should enhance its capabilities across all domains, with a particular focus on homeland and collective defence. The document emphasised Germany’s underfunded army.
As a result, military expenditures were set to increase drastically, and a special off-budget 100 billion Euro fund was established. [8] To launch this special fund, the parliament had to amend the constitution. This new fiscal instrument, financed by credits, was incorporated to the constitution to exempt it from the fiscal regime’s constraints. [9] The government was mandated to present the state of expenditures annually. The budget committee validates expenditures over 25 billion euros, and a special budget subcommittee oversees the fund’s operations. A majority of the Bundestag (567 out of 736 delegates) supported the new bill, while opposition came from MPs of Die Linke and most of the AfD.
Financial resources from the fund were intended to supplement the regular defence budget to meet NATO requirements (a minimum of 2% GDP for defence expenditures). The Christian Democrats advocated for a regulation ensuring that once the special fund was depleted, defence expenditures would continue at the 2% GDP level. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that after the special fund was exhausted, the federal budget would sustain defence expenditures at the 2% level. The question of whether these expenditures will be maintained after financing from special funds is exhausted is still ongoing. [9] Roderrick Kefferputz, Atlantic Council analyst, believes that eventually extra-budgetary funds will run out and it is no point chasing 2% GDP of expenditures level with them, because in 2027, after fund is spend, military expenditures will sink to embarrassing level of 1,2% GDP. He points out, that in order to really modernise German army, Berlin needs long-term policy. Interesting fact is that Zeitwende was later chosen by the Association of German Languages as a 2022 year German word. [10] 78% of Germans supported the proposed policies. [8] At the beginning of March, 65% of those surveyed favoured the creation of a fund while 69% favoured raising defence spending to 2% of GDP (47 percentage points more than before the Russian invasion). German retired general Erich Vad believes that 100 billion euros is not enough since the sum must be at least tripled to reintroduce operational readiness. Ammunition only requires 20 billion euros; pending repairs of infrastructure are another 50 billion euros. This is not counting new equipment, tanks, vehicles, and aircrafts. Nevertheless, no money would help to solve the main problem of the German armed forces: the personnel crisis. [11] Berlin’s target of 203,000 active-duty personnel by 2031 is unachievable. Currently, the Bundeswehr has 20,000 vacancies. According to Eva Hogl, inspector of the armed forces, last year the German armed forces failed to meet their recruitment plan.
One year after the historical speech still not much has been done in that matter. [9] Minister of Defence Christine Lambrecht has left the office in an atmosphere of defeat. According to the German press, her successor, Boris Pistorius, is facing an extremely difficult quest to restore army potential. From the 100 billion euro special fund, 10 billion euros were spent on signing a contract for F-35 multirole fighters. 35 of these fighters will replace Germany’s aging fleet of Tornado bombers. The first eight F-35 fighters are to be introduced to German services in 2026, but at the beginning they will stay in the USA for pilot training. Another 27 fighters are to be shipped until 2029. The Bundeswehr still has many deficits, and the Zeitwende set of reforms has not started yet. [9] Only 30 billion of the 100 billion special fund was spent to buy equipment. Criticism among European allies and in Germany alone arose after much of the fund was spent to buy equipment from the USA and not in domestic or European industry. [9] Time is crucial when it comes to disposing of special funds. According to Rafel Ross, a specialist in ECFR, 8 billion euros was dedicated to paying off the interest on loans taken by the government. Because of inflation and interest rates, now it is 13 billion euros. Due to inflation, the euro-dolar exchange rate, VAT, and other remaining costs, there remains only 50–70 billion euro for equipment procurement. Loss stated that the longer we keep this money in our pockets, the less we have for expenditures. [9] The chairwoman of the Bundestag defence commission has a different opinion on that matter: she claims it is challenging to spend that amount of money over one year. In the meantime, Boris Pistorius calls for an increase in the special budget by another 10 billion euros.
Moreover, allocating 2% of GDP to defence is approved by more than 80% of the voters of the Christian Democrats, FDP, and SPD. 68% of Green voters are in favour of such a decision. Among AfD supporters, 51%, and the Left, 42%. [12] In Germany, discussions about dedicating more funds are ongoing. The first priority is achieving the already planned modernizations. The aim of these reforms is to supply the Bundeswehr with basic infantry equipment as well as modernize vehicles and provide them with enough spare parts and ammunition. According to the press, for now, ammunition will run out after three days of full-scale armed conflict. [4] Replenishing the ammunition stocks of all types of German armed forces in accordance with NATO guidelines would reportedly cost around 20 billion euros. These kinds of expenditures will still be financed by the annual defence budget.
Even Boris Pistorius perceives merging operational command, which was previously responsible for foreign operations, with territorial command, which is responsible for domestic operations, as a step forward. Another branch of military forces—cyber and information warfare—is to be established. Mr. Pistorius gave himself and his team six months to complete the task. Although many observers thought that mandatory military service would be reintroduced, nothing of that nature happened. The defence minister aims to keep 200,000 troops in service until 2031. According to Boris Pistorius, [13] Germany wants to maintain a high combat readiness of 35,000 troops, gathered in the full operational division since 2025 and in another division since 2027.
Difficulties with implementing reforms
General Inspector Carsten Breuer stated that the Bundeswehr should be ready for war in five years. [15] He pointed out that a change in mindset is a necessity if the Bundeswehr is to be ready for a full-scale war effort. Unfortunately, according to the general inspector, some of the Bundeswehr defence capabilities will be ready later than expected. He did not specify which ones because of military confidentiality. The German ministry of defence’s ambition is to dispose of 3 full modernised divisions that can be mobilised under 3 months since the war outbreak until 2031. [5] FOI report from 2021 states that after the outbreak of war German armed forces will only be able to commission 3-4 mechanized battalions, and only in their stationary location. Additionally, 2-3 light infantry battalions that can be airlifted. [5]
Problems with the reformation of the German armed forces are deeply rooted in society. It believed in the idea of everlasting peace. [16] The Army is often said to be a depiction of society’s condition. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, German society was sure that the era of armed conflicts had become history. Also, soldierliness and the use of military power are often associated with uncomfortable Nazi past. The fact that German soldiers in recent years were involved in some cases implicating right-wing extremism did not ease these associations. [13]
When it comes to equipment, German helicopters are being repaired very slowly and are lacking spare parts. A Bundeswehr report from December 2022 revealed that only 40% are in combat readiness. In 2023, “Der Spiegel” informed that during exercises of the 10th Panzer Division, all 18 Puma vehicles were inoperative. In the army depot, special artillery equipment was nowhere to be found to aid thousands of German troops stationed in Lithuania. [17] Only one in three fighter and one in two howitzer are operational to enter combat. In recent years, the development of the Bundeswehr has been delayed by the difficulties of the German industry in implementing comprehensive national or multinational arms programs, resulting in the delivery to the army of equipment that required improvements and further modernization (including the Puma, Boxer, Tiger, NH90, A400M, Eurofighter, K-130, and F-125). [4] This was superimposed on the ineffective management of the defence ministry and arms agencies, as well as bureaucracy and problems in recruiting military personnel.
Conclusions
German society needs direct incentives and a sense of danger to get rid of the false conviction of everlasting peace and prosperity. The current conditions of the Bundeswehr are not enough to sustain long-lasting armed conflict as well as deter danger from the revanchist world superpowers to which Russia belongs. First and foremost, they need to significantly raise defence expenditures. Also, Zeitwende is a huge leap forward for the colossal tanker Germany is. One year is not enough to make the step but time is crucial to act in order to support the collective defence of Europe. Extra off-budget special funds cannot resolve all problems the Bundeswehr is facing, even the financial ones. Germany has no structural solution to sustain increased defence expenditures (over 2% GDP) in long term as for instance in Japan (increased taxes). [11] The crucial effort is to shorten planning and procurement time. Another important issue is to increase the combat and operational readiness of the armed forces as well as providing troops with anti-aircraft armament. [6] In the upcoming years, the Bundeswehr is, and will be facing a personnel crisis, so plans to increase the number of troops will be very hard to achieve. In 5–10 years, it is expected that Berlin will have a much more effective army, but because of a lack of strategic culture, they cannot achieve the position of security leader. There is a need to transform this bureaucratic organization into a functional army ready for prolonged war efforts as well as supporting allies. Change of perception is crucial. Berlin needs to understand that the outcome of the Ukraine war is vital for the security of our region, and the war in Ukraine is not something outside of NATO.
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