Key takeaways:
– Russia and China are ‘revolutionary’ powers openly claiming their intent to reorganize the world order.
– Russia aims to significantly strengthen its military capabilities within 2 years.
– China is resolute about reunifying Taiwan and might take actions between 2026 and 2028, before the U.S. enhances its capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
– In such a scenario, the U.S. might struggle to effectively support Ukraine and European NATO members.
– Ordinary Russians are likely to support or at least not oppose any further military actions by their country.
– The West should continue supporting Ukraine, swiftly bolster its military capabilities, and maintain effective sanctions on Russia and China.
Russia has not been defeated in Ukraine, despite the loss of hundreds of thousands of men and at least 2500 tanks. Justin Bronk highlighted in his recent analysis for RUSI that Russia is now producing twice the number of long-range missiles compared to the war’s outset, alongside nearly double the artillery ammunition. Its plans include boosting military spending to 6.5% of GDP by 2024, with an imminent shift of its entire economy into military focus within 2-3 years. Additionally, Russia receives military support from Iran and North Korea. This indicates Russia’s preparation for a prolonged war of attrition, and without significant aid from Western allies, Ukraine’s fate appears precarious.
Moreover, China is rapidly advancing its military capabilities, particularly with the development of very long-range anti-ship and anti-tanker/AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft missile systems. These systems are already operational or poised to become so before American counter-measures, such as the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and the new B-21 Raider bomber (anticipated to be available around 2029-2030). Considering this, as suggested by Justin Bronk, the optimal window for China to take action towards ‘reuniting’ Taiwan would likely be between 2026 and 2028 [1]. Chinese President Xi Jinping recently asserted that the unification of Taiwan with mainland China ‘will surely be realized'[2].
This scenario implies that the USA will need to allocate its already limited resources between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In The Heritage Foundation’s 2023 Index of the U.S. Military Strength, the U.S. military posture is categorized as ‘weak.’ The report highlights that the U.S. military ‘is ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs (major regional conflicts)’ and ‘is at significant risk of not meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also managing various presence and engagement activities’ [3]. Despite a significant increase in military spending among the Bucharest Nine, it only accounted for 49% of Russia’s spending in 2022 [4]. Such a situation might embolden Russia, especially if successful in Ukraine, to potentially target eastern NATO flank members like Poland, Finland, or the Baltics. It’s noteworthy that this aligns with the concerns of Halford John Mackinder a century ago: an alliance between ‘Heartland’ and ‘inner marginal crescent’ powers, which, due to their demographic and technological potential, could aspire to establish world domination.
Let’s examine the foundations of this alliance. Firstly, its longevity appears unlikely due to the unequal footing of its partners. Since the onset of the war in Ukraine, Russia relies more on China than vice versa. Beijing has assisted Moscow in surviving Western sanctions and sustaining its war efforts but isn’t keen on Russia achieving a swift and definitive victory, which would bolster Russia’s strength. Instead, the Chinese prefer witnessing a mutual weakening between the West and Russia in the coming years. However, both nations aim to undermine the US-led world order and its institutions, such as NATO or the G7, a goal that will strongly bind them in the short-term perspective [5].
Vladimir Putin recently claimed that ‘Russia has no reason, no interest – no geopolitical interest, neither economic, political nor military – to fight with NATO countries’ [6]. However, this statement seems misleading. Putin’s remarks were in response to discussions in the U.S. Senate concerning financing Ukraine. When Joe Biden suggested that Russia might attack NATO if Ukraine fails, Putin’s intent likely aimed to exacerbate partisan divisions and support the narrative of certain Republican senators. Nevertheless, one might inquire: why would Russia consider an attack on NATO? To address this, we can turn to Henry Kissinger’s perspective. Present-day Russia and China align closely with his definition of ‘revolutionary’ powers, implying their discontent with the existing world order. This discontent makes long-lasting diplomatic resolutions and agreements nearly impossible.
As Kissinger wrote, ‘the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it feels threatened – such feeling is inherent in the nature of international relations based on sovereign states – but that nothing can reassure it. Only absolute security – the neutralization of the opponent – is considered a sufficient guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others’.
According to Kissinger, powers that respect an international order, but ‘without experience with disaster’ and ‘lulled by a period of stability which had seemed permanent’, find it extremely difficult to take warnings seriously, even if they are openly expressed by a revolutionary power [7].
These words, written in 1957 and referencing the events of 1812-1822, remain remarkably pertinent in today’s context. China remains fixated on avoiding a repetition of the ‘century of national humiliation,’ which necessitates its ascension as the foremost global power [8]. Russia has operated as a revolutionary power since the collapse of the USSR, although, akin to China, it went largely unnoticed by the West for many years. Let’s begin with the ‘Falin-Kwicinski’ doctrine, formulated in the early nineties by Valentin Falin, the last Soviet ambassador in West Germany and Julij Kwicinski, a deputy foreign minister of the USSR. This doctrine proposed that Russia should exert dominance in Central and Eastern Europe by leveraging its energy resources instead of deploying troops [9]. Consequently, independent gas pipelines were established in Central and Eastern Europe: ‘Yamal,’ which previously transported gas through Belarus and Poland to Germany, and ‘Brotherhood,’ connecting Ukraine, Slovakia, and Czechia.
The doctrine underwent further development under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, advocating for the construction of more independent pipelines – Nord Stream 1 and 2 – with the aim of enabling energy-based coercion. This strategy aligned with the vision of Alexander Dugin, a prominent Russian geopolitics expert, aiming to establish a robust Moscow-Berlin axis while subduing Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. Meanwhile, the Western world adhered to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and sought to forge pragmatic relations with Russia. Barack Obama initiated a ‘reset’ policy toward Moscow. In 2008, France and Germany effectively obstructed Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO by withholding the so-called Membership Action Plan [10]. This move was not intended to exacerbate Putin’s ‘fears’.
However, the Russian president did not seem intimidated anyway, as he attacked Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, as he almost explicitly declared in Bucharest in 2008 during the NATO Summit [11]. Earlier, in 2005, Vladimir Putin had referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ [12], yet it seemed to receive little serious attention at the time. In 2021, Russia proposed an agreement that demanded the withdrawal of almost all NATO military forces from Central and Eastern Europe, clearly delineating its anticipated sphere of influence [13].
Russia seeks ‘absolute security’ by ‘neutralizing its opponents’, aiming to weaken the United States and making its forces unable to act globally. It desires control not only over Ukraine but also over Poland, as the events of the recent two years have starkly revealed — Poland’s geographical proximity serves as a geopolitical key to Ukraine.
It’s notable that this strategic approach reflects a century-old Russian modus operandi — surrounding core territories with buffer zones, historically used by Russia to expand its influence. However, let’s not limit our analysis solely to the realistic paradigm; let’s consider more nuanced factors. Primarily, there’s a high likelihood that Vladimir Putin aims to be remembered as the leader who restored at least a portion of former Russian power.
According to the independent public opinion research center ‘Levada,’ between 1992 and 2018, a majority of Russians (fluctuating between 72-88%) believed that ‘Russia must reclaim and maintain its role as a superpower’ [14]. In October 2023, 76% of Russians supported the war in Ukraine, a higher percentage than in October 2022 [15]. Moreover, while increased military expenses will burden ordinary Russians, they are significantly lower than those of the USSR in 1985 (21% of GDP). Hence, it seems unlikely that the Russian economy will collapse in the short term or that people will rebel [16]. Even if there were inclinations toward rebellion, the Russian political system has transitioned from ‘soft authoritarianism’ to what Andrei Kolesnikov terms ‘hybrid totalitarianism.’ Russian citizens are not only expected to refrain from contesting the regime but are also compelled to actively support it [17].
As per Kissinger’s perspective, revolutionary powers can only be compelled to accept a legitimate world order through sheer force or when they realize there’s no other viable option. This doesn’t imply that Russia and China should be attacked by the West; rather, they should be contained — through military, economic, and political means. It’s crucial for the West to support Ukraine, maintain effective sanctions, restrict the transfer of top technologies to China and Russia, and, most importantly, bolster its own military capabilities. On multiple occasions, Mr. Putin has openly signalled his desire to dismantle the U.S.-led world order, echoing sentiments expressed by Xi Jinping. The West must not allow their intentions to materialize once more.
Foto: Image from Pexels
Bibliography
[1] Bronk, J. (2023). Europe Must Urgently Prepare to Deter Russia Without Large-Scale US Support | Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/europe-must-urgently-prepare-deter-russia-without-large-scale-us-support
[2] Tajima, Y. (2023). Taiwan “surely” will be unified with China, Xi says . https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/Taiwan-surely-will-be-unified-with-China-Xi-says
[3] Wood, D. L. (2023). 2023 Index of the U.S. Military Strenght.
[4] SIPRI Milex. (n.d.). Retrieved January 2, 2024, from https://milex.sipri.org/sipri
[5] Bogusz, M., & Rodkiewicz, W. (2023). Games between allies. Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow | OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-03-24/games-between-allies-xi-jinpings-visit-to-moscow
[6] Falcounbridge, G. (2023). Putin says Russia has no plan to attack NATO, dismisses Biden remark as “nonsense” . https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-says-bidens-remark-about-russian-plan-attack-nato-is-complete-rubbish-2023-12-17/
[7] Kissinger, H. (1957). A World Restored. Metternich, Castlereahh and the problems of peace 1812-1822.
[8] Daalder, I. (2023). Xi is fixated on ending China’s century of humiliation . https://www.politico.eu/article/xi-is-fixated-on-ending-chinas-century-of-humiliation/
[9] Problems of energy security of Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, and Baltic States. (2020). https://warsawinstitute.review/rodmonline-en/problems-of-energy-security-of-poland-belarus-ukraine-and-baltic-states/
[10] Zaryckyj, W. (2018). Why the Bucharest Summit Still Matters Ten Years On – Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-the-bucharest-summit-still-matters-ten-years-on/
[11] Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, April 2, 2008). (2008). https://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putin-s-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html
[12] Bigg, C. (2005). World: Was Soviet Collapse Last Century’s Worst Geopolitical Catastrophe? https://www.rferl.org/a/1058688.html
[13]Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. (2021, December 17). https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en&clear_cache=Y
[14] Гудков, Л. (2023). Левада-Центр : Тоска по «Великой Державе». https://www.levada.ru/2023/12/25/toska-po-velikoj-derzhave/Левада-Центр : Conflict with Ukraine: Assessments for October 2023. (2023). https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/12/27/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-october-2023/
[15] Гудков, Л. (2023). Левада-Центр : Тоска по «Великой Державе». https://www.levada.ru/2023/12/25/toska-po-velikoj-derzhave/Левада-Центр : Conflict with Ukraine: Assessments for October 2023. (2023). https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/12/27/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-october-2023/
[16] Bronk, J. (2023). Europe Must Urgently Prepare to Deter Russia Without Large-Scale US Support | Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/europe-must-urgently-prepare-deter-russia-without-large-scale-us-support
[17] Kolesnikov, A. (2023, September). The End of the Russian Idea. Foreign Affairs, 60–76.
Foto: Image from Pexel
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