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May 25

Disunited We Stand? Central Europe vis á vis Ukraine and the future of the EU. Interview with prof. Aleks Szczerbiak [part I]

  • May 25, 2022
  • Marcin Chruściel
  • 3SI, Europe, European Union, Euroscepticism, Publications

Marcin Chruściel speaks with Aleks Szczerbiak – Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex, UK. His research focus is on comparative Central and East European politics (especially Poland), the impact of European integration on national politics (including the politics of Euroscepticism), political parties and electoral politics.

Marcin Chruściel: There is a growing debate about the future of the European Union as a political project, there are federal versus confederal visions of integration. Do you believe that Central European countries, mainly Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, which are gathered in the Visegrad Group format, can make a real difference in the shape of this debate? How the war in Ukraine may influence this?

Prof. Aleks Szczerbiak: Potentially they can make a real difference, but it is going to be quite difficult. I think that if you look at the post-communist states, they represent quite a sizeable block within the European Union, both in terms of their economies, if you add it all together, and politically, if you consider their votes within the EU Council. I have been at various conferences where people pointed out that if you add together the voting weights and the size of the economy just of the Visegrad Four you have got something that is comparable to the Franco-German axis. So, in one sense, they look quite powerful if they are to work together and can influence debates about the future of the European project. The difficulty is obviously getting them to follow a common line. This is very difficult even just within the Visegrad Group – and even, at times, just between Poland and Hungary, who were generally, until recently, the closest allies among these states. Even if you look back to times when these countries were candidates for EU membership, there was not really much of a record of them working together. Indeed, at times they were almost competing with each other to get to the front of the queue, as they saw it. I think that is one of the problems. They have different approaches to lots of different issues. Eastern policy and Russia is one really good example of this. Here obviously Poland is at the forefront of trying to get the EU and the Western international community to have a more robust common response and tough sanctions, especially now in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Whereas the other countries have generally been more reluctant about this, especially Hungary.

M.C.: Do you consider the Visegrad cooperation as more problematic now?

A.S.: Indeed, the Russian invasion – and the very different responses of the Polish and Hungarian governments which has severely undermined the relationship between Warsaw and Budapest – has made co-operation between the Visegrad Four extremely problematic. In fact, at the current time the Group’s activities have effectively been suspended. For sure, the two countries have always had a somewhat different approach to developing relations with Moscow. However, the war has made regional security the defining issue in European and regional international politics putting the relationship under severe strain – indeed, making it impossible for the two countries to co-operate in a forum like the Visegrad Group at the present time. It is difficult to know how long this will continue – and when and if relations can be restored to the status quo ante; this obviously depends on the course of the war. Notwithstanding their different approach to the Ukrainian conflict, the two governments still have very similar views on the broad trajectory of European integration and moral-cultural issues – and are both in dispute with the EU political establishment over ‘rule of law’ issues.  

M.C.: Don’t you believe that the recent pressure to go in the direction of a federal European Union, put forward openly in the coalition agreement in Germany, can in some way unite Central European countries to somehow oppose these developments, also in the context of the ongoing war?

A.S.: I think the problem here is that if you cast the debate in theoretical terms about ‘do you want to see a more federal EU or one that is more rooted in nation states?’, a lot of the post-communist states would probably answer in terms of the latter and have a more anti-federalist approach. I think the problem here really is that the approach that most Central and Eastern European states have had to advancing their EU agendas – up until now – has been to very much locate themselves within the so-called European ‘mainstream’, which really means working very, very closely with Germany. That has really been the mainstay of their strategy in terms of advancing their interests within the European Union, which makes them very reluctant to break from the EU political establishment. This establishment is, as you correctly say, increasingly committed to putting forward a more federal view of the future of the EU project, and I think this is really part of the problem of trying to get these countries to co-operate with each other. For a lot of these countries closer regional co-operation means breaking with the axiom that they have had up until now, which is that the way that you advance your interests within the European Union is to get close to Germany, and to locate yourself within the European ‘mainstream’.

The war in Ukraine has moved security issues to the top of the political agenda in most post-communist states and Berlin has simply not come across as credible on this issue

Whereas Poland – and obviously, to an extent, Hungary – have been trying to pursue an alternative policy of what is – I think it was Andrzej Duda who coined the term – developing your ‘own stream.’ So, in other words, to try and develop an alternative power block, or alternative power blocks, within the European Union, to advance the interests of the post-communist states. This is a very ambitious project, but it is also a very difficult one to take forward for the reasons I have outlined.

M.C.: Do you think that this prevailing strategy of working closely with Germany in the EU will be changed now in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Berlin’s ambiguous reaction in terms of supporting Ukraine and sanctioning Moscow? Would you agree with the thesis that Central and Eastern European states have gained political leverage now to develop ‘their own stream’ in the EU (relying more on the US)?

A.S.: This is possible but it is a bit too early to tell at the moment because the situation is so dynamic with so many ‘moving parts’. Germany has certainly lost a lot of political capital through what many leaders and citizens of post-communist states now see as it over-conciliatory approach towards developing economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow over the heads of their European allies. At the same time, Poland’s credibility and international standing has been enhanced through the fact that it has been at the forefront of efforts to persuade the Western international community to develop a common, robust response to what they always saw as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist de-stabilisation of the region, and specifically to ensure that sanctions on Moscow were maintained and extended.

This is a particular problem for Germany as the war in Ukraine has moved security issues to the top of the political agenda in most post-communist states and Berlin has simply not come across as credible on this issue. On the other hand, there may also be a sense in these states that deeper EU integration – and, therefore, working closely with Berlin and the EU political establishment – may help to embed them more deeply within the Western international community and thereby enhance their security. Moreover, if security moves down the international agenda for these countries and more mundane economic concerns start to assert themselves, the pressure to work closely with the European ‘mainstream’ may once again assert itself strongly in post-communist states.

M.C.: Do you expect that the Visegrad Group will try to formulate a common vision of the European project in the future, according to the euro-realistic approach? It is very interesting, whether we should expect from the Visegrad countries any attempts to produce such an alternative vision to the mainstream political establishment in Western Europe, especially the Franco-German coalition. Do you think that the Visegrad Group will be able to at least try to produce this kind of common vision?

A.S.: Well, it is able to do that, but I do not think it is anywhere near doing that at the moment. I think that is the problem. Because, for a lot of these countries, and particularly if you go beyond Poland and Hungary, this means breaking with their traditional approach to how they pursue their EU interests. And I think the Polish government, which is at the forefront of trying to push for the development of Central and Eastern Europe as an alternative power block within the EU, is, in many ways, pursuing a much more pragmatic, kind of long term, bottom-up approach to advancing this project. So if you look, for example, at the Three Seas Initiative, this is an attempt to try to secure co-operation between all post-communist states, not just the Visegrad Four, and indeed more broadly. But rather than being pitched explicitly as developing an alternative to the Franco-German axis with some kind of an alternative vision of European integration, it is starting by co-operating in very pragmatic sorts of policy areas. So, in terms of infrastructure, technology, energy – these kind of areas where it is much easier to get countries to co-operate because they have a tangible common interest, rather than starting with this more abstract idea of trying to develop an alternative inter-governmental project for European integration, which is going to be much more difficult for this countries to sign up to.

One of the interesting things that has happened in recent years is the way that attempts to deepen European integration have often not survived confrontations with democracy

And I think that an interesting sign of the fact that the Polish government is realistic about what it can do in the short term – with things like the V4 and the Three Seas Initiative – is the fact that it is seeking allies beyond Eastern Europe for promoting its vision of European integration. So, it has been working much more closely with parties on the Eurosceptic right in Western Europe. Initiatives like the Warsaw Summit, which you saw just before Christmas, was a good example of this. So, the fact that Poland has had to seek allies among parties that it has been very wary of trying to build alliances with in the past, because of their approach to Russia – groupings like the French National Front, now the National Rally, or the Italian radical right parties, like the League. Even before the Russian invasion, Law and Justice and the Polish government were worried about building links with these parties because of their relations with Russia, but I think they realised that if they wanted to have partners in terms of building an alternative vision of European integration in the long-term, they could not simply rely on trying to work with other post-communist states. And of course, Britain’s departure from the EU was very important in this respect, because at one point Poland saw Britain as a key ally in this project. Whereas, with Britain leaving the EU, its main ally on the mainstream right in Western Europe – the British Conservatives – were gone, as far as the EU affairs were concerned at least.

M.C.: As long as I understand, you are trying to say that because of the lack of consensus within the Visegrad Group on the EU’s future, and also because of the departure of the British Conservatives from the European structures, the Law and Justice government was actually pushed to seek for additional allies, which are probably more difficult politically, in order to try to create an alternative vision to the Franco-German one in the EU. Should we understand it in this way and if so, do you think this strategy is still viable taking into account the developments in Ukraine?

A.S.: I think that is a pretty accurate summary of where we are now. With the only addition being the difficulties of forming a common approach with the post-communist states, and in particular of getting them to break with the European mainstream and with Germany. You could probably have developed a common approach if the Polish and Hungarian governments – obviously, if there had been a change of government in Budapest – were also to fall in line with the European mainstream. But then it would not be a common approach in terms of building any kind of alternative vision of European integration.

I think that, in order to achieve its strategic objectives, Law and Justice, and the Polish government, is forced to pursue various options. It has not abandoned the idea of developing an alternative axis to Berlin among the post-communist states. This is still critical to its EU strategy, particularly in the longer term. But for the reasons that you have outlined Law and Justice is also having to look for other allies in places where it might not necessarily always feel very comfortable looking for them. But it does not really have any choice if it wants to pursue its strategy of building alternatives to the European mainstream.

M.C.: Do you think this strategy is still viable taking into account the developments in Ukraine?

A.S.: In the short-term, Law and Justice will not want to give a high profile to its links with West European right-wing Eurosceptic parties as it leaves them open to opposition criticisms that it is developing links with politicians and political groupings who have in the past had close relations with Moscow and been insufficiently critical of Vladimir Putin. However, building links with these parties is part of a long-term project to shift the terms of the debates about the process of European integration, so it will not abandon it completely and return to this project at some point in the future.

M.C.: There is also a very interesting question whether the societies in post-communist states in Central Europe are ready for the federalization project, because they have a different history than the ones in Western Europe, they still remember the times of administration from the above within the Soviet bloc and cherish their regained independence.

A.S.: Well, I think they are different and I think that that plays itself out in a number of ways in terms of their relationship to membership in the European Union. But actually, in this particular respect, I wonder whether the societies of post-communist states really are that different from West European societies? What I really wonder is whether, if you go beyond the political elites, there is really that much support for a federal approach or deeper political European integration among the West European public? Traditionally, the approach of the European Union elites was to pursue integration by stealth. It was on the basis of something that was called “the permissive consensus”. So, essentially, integration was pursued in a very technocratic, apolitical way. With the publics of those countries basically not really being aware of what was going on. I think that this has been extremely problematic since the Maastricht Treaty and since the attempt to develop a single European currency. Because, from that point onwards, the European Union started to become involved in areas which were previously assumed to be very clearly in the domain of nation states.

With younger generations, it is much more about calculating the costs and benefits of EU membership. It is much more instrumental

One of the interesting things that has happened in recent years is the way that attempts to deepen European integration have often not survived confrontations with democracy. As a result, the EU political establishment – I mean the main EU powers, the Commission and the majority of the European Parliament – which does remain committed to deepening European integration and more federal approach has had to proceed extremely cautiously and has been really wary about any kind of attempts to achieve this aim through changing the Treaties. I think that you are now seeing a lot of the attempts to further European integration again essentially by stealth, with a lot of people not realising what is at stake. I think if people realised what was at stake with, for example, the proposal for the mutualization of debt, which is one of the elements of the EU’s response to the coronavirus pandemic crisis, then there would be a much stronger reaction to it.

M.C.: What do you mean by saying that ‘integration by stealth’ is back?

A.S.: What I mean is that the EU is going back to doing things in a very kind of technocratic way, or using the EU legal framework to advance integration. So, the idea that the EU political establishment furthering integration through using, for example, the rulings of the European Court of Justice – is one of the arguments that the Polish government is currently using. And again, this is a way of achieving this objective of deeper integration without confronting it with the democratic process.

So, I think you are absolutely right – there are some key differences in the way that the EU and EU integration is perceived in the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. But at the same time, I think that opposition to a federal Europe and deeper integration is something that is a pan-European phenomenon. I think federalization is an elite project. It is something that, when is confronted with democracy through referendums, against which there is often a lot of pushback. And that is not just something that is true in post-communist states.

M.C.: Do you think that this integration by stealthis actually behind the strong support in Central Europe for political parties which are more EU-sceptical? Because it does not have to be scepticism towards European integration as an idea, but rather towards the way how the EU is functioning, and how it is trying to develop its policies and potentially widen its competences. So, according to your distinction between Soft and Hard Euroscepticism, I would place these parties within a soft Euroscepticism.

A.S.: So, first of all, I think you are absolutely right to draw this distinction between what I, with my Sussex colleague Paul Taggart, have termed Hard and Soft Euroscepticism. The first thing to say here is that there is really very little support for Hard Euroscepticism, this kind of rejectionist approach to the European Union, in the EU. I mean among both political parties and public opinion. Indeed, Brexit has not really led to any kind of impetus for this. If anything, it has probably put a few people who were thinking of their country trying to leave the EU off. The criticisms of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe are – as you say – about the way that it functions and about the trajectory of the European integration project.  

But I think the root of this, the upsurge of this what you called EU-scepticism or Soft Euroscepticism in post-communist states, is actually to be found elsewhere. I think that there is a process that has been taking place in recent years, where what has driven support for EU membership and the EU integration in post-communist states in the past has changed – in the sense that it is now much less romantic, and therefore more instrumental, more ‘cost-benefit’ driven. When these countries joined the EU – in 2003 they held referendums, in 2004 most of them joined, apart from Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia who acceded a little bit later – the real thing that drove support for European integration through the EU was the romantic notion that they were making a kind of historical, civilizational choice; that they were re-joining a West that they had always belonged to spiritually and culturally. So joining the EU was seen as completing the process of post-communist transformation. It was seen as the final or the most significant stage in that process. And this made it really difficult for any Eurosceptic to argue against, because essentially they appeared to be arguing against the logic of history. It also provided a really important ‘cut-through’ issue for a lot of people to identify with that went beyond the kind of dry discussions about economic costs and benefits.

M.C.: Do you think that that has changed in the recent years?  

A.S.: Definitely. Maybe with the older generation, maybe with those people who voted in that referendum in 2003 and remember back to Communism, there is still that kind of romantic element to it, but I think a lot of that kind of romanticism has gone. And particularly with younger generations, it is much more about calculating the costs and benefits of EU membership. It is much more instrumental. And obviously that is problematic for the EU because it means it does not have the kind of diffuse support that it might need in a time of crisis, and if the result of that cost-benefit analysis feels like it is changing to the EU’s disadvantage.

For me, a really important episode here, as far as Central and Eastern Europe was concerned, was the migration crisis of 2015. Particularity the EU’s proposal to introduce the migrant relocation scheme – compulsory quotas of migrants from North Africa and from the Middle East, from predominantly Muslim countries, to be located in all EU states. This was viewed by many people in Central Eastern Europe, and indeed by their governments, as enforced multiculturalism. It was something that went against the original idea that underpinned their joining the Union. Many people in these countries felt that they did not join the EU because they wanted to have multiculturalism forced upon them. This was not part of what they were signing up to – and if they were going to become multicultural, like countries in Western Europe, then that was a choice that they would like to make for themselves. So, it was really about the principle of what was involved. Whether you like it or not, that is how many citizens in post-communists felt about the prospect of mass Muslim migration.

For sure, the numbers involved in the scheme were pretty small, early on at least. But for many citizens it was not about the numbers, it was about the principle of who should determine which non-EU migrants should be admitted by these states. And it was also about the idea that maybe this civilizational choice that these post-communist countries had made, or thought they were making – to rejoin the West – well maybe they were actually making different civilizational choices, or wanted to make different civilization choices, from those being made by the elites and the governments in the West. I think that opened the gates to broader questions relating to other moral-cultural issues, where people in Central and Eastern Europe have also often made somewhat different choices. And when they were joining the EU they did not realize that they would be required to make – or, in fact, it was explicitly argued that EU accession would not involve making – choices on these sort of moral-cultural issues.

M.C.: Thank you Prof. Szczerbiak for this part of the interview.

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About The Author

Marcin Chruściel. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

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Program Europa tworzą:

Marcin Chruściel

Dyrektor programu. Absolwent studiów doktoranckich z zakresu nauk o polityce na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, magister stosunków międzynarodowych i europeistyki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prezes Zarządu Instytutu Nowej Europy.

dr Artur Bartoszewicz

Przewodniczący Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk ekonomicznych Szkoły Głównej Handlowej. Ekspert w dziedzinie polityki publicznej, w tym m. in. strategii państwa i gospodarki.

Michał Banasiak

Specjalizuje się w relacjach sportu i polityki. Autor analiz, komentarzy i wywiadów z zakresu dyplomacji sportowej i polityki międzynarodowej. Były dziennikarz Polsat News i wysłannik redakcji zagranicznej Telewizji Polskiej.

Maciej Pawłowski

Ekspert ds. migracji, gospodarki i polityki państw basenu Morza Śródziemnego. W latach 2018-2020 Analityk PISM ds. Południowej Europy. Autor publikacji w polskiej i zagranicznej prasie na temat Hiszpanii, Włoch, Grecji, Egiptu i państw Magrebu. Od września 2020 r. mieszka w północnej Afryce (Egipt, Algieria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Absolwent studiów prawniczych Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach. Jego zainteresowania badawcze koncentrują się na Inicjatywie Trójmorza i polityce w Bułgarii. Doświadczenie zdobywał w European Foundation of Human Rights w Wilnie, Center for the Study of Democracy w Sofii i polskich placówkach dyplomatycznych w Teheranie i Tbilisi.

Program Bezpieczeństwo tworzą:

dr Aleksander Olech

Dyrektor programu. Wykładowca na Baltic Defence College, absolwent Europejskiej Akademii Dyplomacji oraz Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego główne zainteresowania badawcze to terroryzm, bezpieczeństwo w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz rola NATO i UE w środowisku zagrożeń hybrydowych.

dr Agnieszka Rogozińska

Członek Rady Programowej Instytutu Nowej Europy. Doktor nauk społecznych w dyscyplinie nauki o polityce. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje na problematyce bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego, instytucjonalnym wymiarze bezpieczeństwa i współczesnych zagrożeniach.

Karolina Siekierka

Absolwentka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe, specjalizacji Bezpieczeństwo i Studia Strategiczne. Jej zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną i wewnętrzną Francji, prawa człowieka oraz konflikty zbrojne.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Podoficer rezerwy, student studiów magisterskich na kierunku Bezpieczeństwo Międzynarodowe i Dyplomacja na Akademii Sztuki Wojennej, były praktykant w BBN. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują m.in. operacje pokojowe ONZ oraz bezpieczeństwo Ukrainy.

Leon Pińczak

Student studiów drugiego stopnia na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na kierunku stosunki międzynarodowe. Dziennikarz polskojęzycznej redakcji Biełsatu. Zawodowo zajmuje się obszarem postsowieckim, rosyjską polityką wewnętrzną i doktrynami FR. Biegle włada językiem rosyjskim.

Program Indo-Pacyfik tworzą:

Łukasz Kobierski

Dyrektor programu. Współzałożyciel INE oraz prezes zarządu w latach 2019-2021. Stypendysta szkoleń z zakresu bezpieczeństwa na Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security w Waszyngtonie, ekspert od stosunków międzynarodowych. Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego oraz Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wiceprezes Zarządu INE.

dr Joanna Siekiera

Prawnik międzynarodowy, doktor nauk społecznych, adiunkt na Wydziale Prawa Uniwersytetu w Bergen w Norwegii. Była stypendystką rządu Nowej Zelandii na Uniwersytecie Victorii w Wellington, niemieckiego Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, a także francuskiego Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques.

Paweł Paszak

Absolwent stosunków międzynarodowych (spec. Wschodnioazjatycka) na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim oraz stypendysta University of Kent (W. Brytania) i Hainan University (ChRL). Doktorant UW i Akademii Sztuki Wojennej. Jego zainteresowania badawcze obejmują politykę zagraniczną ChRL oraz strategiczną rywalizację Chiny-USA.

Jakub Graca

Magister stosunków międzynarodowych na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim; studiował także filologię orientalną (specjalność: arabistyka). Analityk Centrum Inicjatyw Międzynarodowych (Warszawa) oraz Instytutu Nowej Europy. Zainteresowania badawcze: Stany Zjednoczone (z naciskiem na politykę zagraniczną), relacje transatlantyckie.

Patryk Szczotka

Absolwent filologii dalekowschodniej ze specjalnością chińską na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim oraz student kierunku double degree China and International Relations na Aalborg University oraz University of International Relations (国际关系学院) w Pekinie. Jego zainteresowania naukowe to relacje polityczne i gospodarcze UE-ChRL oraz dyplomacja.

Kamil Opara

Absolwent Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego na kierunkach prawo oraz stosunki międzynarodowe (specjalizacja: bezpieczeństwo i studia strategiczne). Ukończył także School of Law and Economy of China UW, gdzie obecnie pracuje jako zastępca kierownika. Zainteresowania badawcze koncentruje wokół polityki zagranicznej i wewnętrznej, prawa oraz cyberbezpieczeństwa Chin.

The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Kamil Opara

University of Warsaw graduate (law and international relations; specialization: Security and Strategic Studies); he graduated also from the School of Law and Economy of China in which he currently works as a Deputy Head. His fields of research include Chinese domestic and foreign policy, law and cybersecurity.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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Latest publications

  • 5 challenges facing the Three Seas June 20, 2022
  • Information Technology and Legal Informatics. To what extent are big data technologies friends or foes in the struggle to stop climate change? Legal outlook June 13, 2022
  • Phone calls to Volodymyr Zelensky by high representatives of the Council of Europe member countries, EU, USA and Canada between 24.02 – 25.05.2022 June 1, 2022
  • Visits in Kiev to Volodymyr Zelensky by high representatives of the Council of Europe member countries, EU, USA and Canada between 24.02 – 25.05.2022 June 1, 2022
  • Disunited We Stand? Central Europe vis á vis Ukraine and the future of the EU. Interview with prof. Aleks Szczerbiak [part I] May 25, 2022

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