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Apr 16
Africa and Middle East, International Politics, Military and army, Publications, Security, Terrorism

Private military companies and combating terrorism in Mozambique

April 16, 2021
Private military companies and combating terrorism in MozambiqueDownload

The article outline:

– The government of Mozambique uses the services of the Private Military Companies (PMCs) to counteract the spread of the Ansar al-Sunna organization.

– Initially, the cooperation with foreign contractors resulted only in intensified extremist attacks.

– The activity of the private military companies mainly focuses on ad-hoc fights with the threat, without considering the broader context and the reasons for the radicalization in a given area.

Introduction

Mozambique has been facing the attacks from jihadists for many years. In 2018, an Islamist extremist group, Ansar al-Sunna, started a campaign of violence against the governmental and civilian targets in Cabo Delgado, the northern province of Mozambique. Muslims form 54% of its citizens[1], while the majority of Mozambique inhabitants are Christians. The group started its activity around 2017 as a religious organization, and only later it became militarized. Its first members were supporters of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Kenyan priest, who was shot in 2012. After this incident, Ansar al-Sunna has been moving into the territory of Mozambique. Although the rebels are also referred to as Al-Shabaab, they have nothing in common with a terrorist organization from Somalia with the same name.

The background of the conflict

The Cabo Delgado province is home to the biggest community of Muslims in Mozambique and its terrain is rich with many profitable natural resources. The dissatisfaction within the province began to be visible in 2010, after the discovery of gas deposits, whose value is estimated at 60 million dollars[2]. Mozambique also has large deposits of coal and titanium, as well as agricultural and hydroelectric potential. However, the development process had its impact on the citizens, who have been forcibly relocated due to the gas pipeline construction projects. The initial reluctance of the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi towards accepting the international support and an underestimation of threat has created a fertile ground for the radical extremist Islamic groups, and valuable natural resources have become one of the main targets of terrorists. Despite the rich mineral resources in Cabo Delgado, the marginalization of the Muslim population, which forms a majority in this region, has also played a vital role in inciting the rebels[3].

The Ansar al-Sunna has gradually extended its presence in the region by conducting its first attack on a police station in Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017. In 2019, it became a part of the so-called Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)[4]. The dynamic development of this terrorist organization is connected with its methods of operation and acquiring new members. The combatants build relationships with the local community, and then they take advantage of their position to influence the people. The answers of the government of Mozambique have not been adequate enough to face the scale of the problem. There has also been disturbing news about human rights violations by government forces during the interventions, which has only enhanced the local reluctance towards the administration of President Filipe Nyusi[5]. The Armed Forces of Mozambique, not having proper equipment and training, attempted to suppress the terrorist activities with the help of their private military counterparts.

Private military companies and the mercenaries

The activity of the mercenaries is prohibited by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries introduced in 1989 by UNO. Although the character and scope of the private companies’ activities evoke associations with the mercenary activities, no binding definition has been yet agreed that would confirm or disprove this assumption. According to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, “a mercenary is any person who fights in an armed conflict, is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict, is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict and is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party”[6].

Private military companies are in turn legal entities, which provide a professional service, in general hiring retired, well-trained soldiers, considered to be experts on the matters connected with the military. The companies mediate between the government and professional soldiers, thereby particular units are not directly contracted by the government. The services offered by the companies cover a comprehensive scope of activities, starting with logistic activities, through the security of military objects or civil servants, to escorting convoys with humanitarian funds and training local security forces. They often provide security to private corporations dealing with the mining industry (mainly oil and diamonds), particularly in Africa.

In 2008, the Montreux Document was introduced, signed by the majority of governments using the services of the private military companies. The document assumes that delegating some responsibilities by the state towards PMCs is acceptable. On the other hand, the document orders the countries that hire private military subjects to supervise them and monitor their activity. At the same time, the state’s responsibility has been clearly separated from the PCMs responsibility arising from the violations of international humanitarian and human rights[7]. Despite an entry in the Montreux Document, which prohibits the use of private companies for direct participation in an armed conflict[8], it has not been possible to develop comprehensive regulations, which would be able to fully define the international PMCs status[9].

In 1993, a private military company Executive Outcome (EO) was hired by the government of Angola to recapture the deposits areas of petroleum from the guerrilla UNITA[10]. The operation was successful, which resulted in a long-term Angolan government contract, covering the army training and direct military operations. However, the Executive Outcome has never managed to liberate itself from its mercenary identity. Its actions, no matter how short-term, effective and professional, have never become an antidote to the complex problems of the countries consumed by the conflict. This is confirmed by the fact that shortly after the withdrawal of EO divisions from Sierra Leone, the country has again stumbled into the civil war. What is more, the services of the military companies are mainly provided during the crises of the state and law, and such a state undoubtedly contributes to gainprofits from these subjects, disproportionate to the degree of involvement and cost incurred.

The Wagner’s group

In September 2019, forces of the Wagner’s group were deployed in Mozambique to counteract the rebels from Ansar al-Sunna. This company has been started by Yevgeny Prigozhin – a long-time ally of the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin. Wagner’s group can be perceived as an instrument of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. The operating distance of the group extends over, among others, Sudan, Libia, Central African Republic, and Syria. The Prigozhin’s corporations had been already sanctioned earlier by the United States Department of the Treasury for their actions in Syria, and the Internet Research Agency,financed by him, was responsible for the attempts to interfere in the election in the USA in 2016[11]. The deployment of the Russian counterparts in 2019 took place after the visit of the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi in Moscow, during which the agreements allowing Russian companies to extract liquified natural gas have been signed[12].

At the end of 2019, Ansar al-Sunna, in two separate acts, killed seven workers of the Russian group and 20 soldiers of the local army. The ineffectiveness of Wagner’s forces in combating jihadist rebellion has lead to the decision of the Mozambique government to withdraw the group from the region. Their failure has mainly resulted from the lack of knowledge about the local culture and from the reluctance to cooperate with the Mozambique army[13].

Dyck Advisory Group (DAG)

To substitute the Wagner’s Group, Mozambique has hired the Dyck Advisory Group company, whose main aim was to conduct raids on Ansar al-Sunna positions in Cabo Delgado. Despite certain failures, the air support provided by the DAG has effectively prevented the rebels from taking strategic positions along the country’s coast. In July 2020, the government of Mozambique prolonged the contract with DAG for another 8 months, during which the company provided not only operational support in the field but also training support for the Mozambique forces[14].

DAG already had experience in operating in the field, however, like in the case of the Russian group, the beginning of its activity in Mozambique has not been the easiest. During the first few weeks, as a result of firing, the group lost a helicopter and a reconnaissance aircraft. However, DAG cooperated with the governmental sources, and the support given by the company was helpful to prevent further movements of Ansar al-Sunna to the key cities.

Dyck Advisory Grouphas met criticism from, among others, Amnesty International. In its report, the organization accused both the government of Mozambique and the rebels of war crimes against humanity, including murdering, tortures, and abductions[15]. Mozambique has denied these allegations, as though the soldiers have committed such cruelties, claiming that the crimes were committed by the Islamist insurgents pretending to be soldiers. The non-governmental organization also accuses DAG workers of firing at civilians while prosecuting suspected combatants. It is suspected that the contract with the private military company from CAR has been suspended, but the government of Mozambique has not officially confirmed this report[16].

The Paramount Group

Mozambique has also cooperated with the Paramount Group, a global company of the aviation and technology industry, with its headquarters in the ARC. The company does not provide personnel, it only ensures the equipment and training. Although the additional support provided by the Paramount Group is necessary for combating terrorism, it raises further questions concerning the supplying process and organization of the defense forces in Mozambique. The company has been assigned to cooperate with the Defence Department of Mozambique, while the Dyck Advisory Groupcooperated with the state police[17]. Then the two pillars of security in Mozambique currently use the services of competitive companies, to obtain the same resources in the form of training and equipment for the needs of the same conflict[18].

Profit and loss statement

The decision of the Mozambique government on combating extremism with the use of private companies has only brought the opposite effect to the one intended, and even minimal success in restraining the spread of uprising in some key cities has been noted, the military operations have not influenced the root causes, which had resulted in Ansar al-Sunna appearing. Quite the contrary, the deployment of military units caused the mobilization of terrorist groups and a change in the fight tactics, which has translated into more brutal attacks. The lack of transparency characterizing private military companies has also posed a difficulty for the effective information sharing process for the state and regional institutions. Moreover, the defense forces of Mozambique have turned out to be poorly equipped and not trained to fight with the extremists.

During the first nine months of 2020, the Ansar al-Sunna attacks doubled compared to those from 2019[19]. Although Ansar al-Sunna has been primarily treated like a new group composed of the marginalized young people, a potential threat it poses for the expansion of extremism in southern-central Africa cannot be ignored, especially taking into consideration its vast evolution and strong connotations with the external terrorist network.

As the prolonged anti-terrorist operations in Sahel and Horn of Africa have proven, a purely militarized approach is shortsighted if it does not have a strategy, which also deals with political, religious, and ethnic causes of violence. In the case of Mozambique, the government should then implement development and educational programs in Cabo Delgado, to solve socio-economical factors propelling extremism. There is also an urgency to face the humanitarian crisis, which resulted in 530 thousand people being internally displaced[20].

Summary

In countries, in which the private military companies work, security to an increasing extent becomes a private welfare, not a public one. In situations of armed conflict, a return to the public order can be only achieved when the country’s legitimacy will be restored, and its ability to maintain the order and the security of the population will be well-established. It seems implausible when ensuring safety remains in the hands of the private subjects. The main arguments in favor of using the private military companies are, among others, lower costs of operations in comparison to a regular army, greater availability, self-sufficiency, and mobility[21].

Using private military forces in peace-keeping operations and armed interventions weakens the position of the state as a subject entitled to ensure security and to be its guarantee. Between every commissioning party using the services of the private military forces and themselves, there occurs a significant discrepancy of interests. On the operational level, they consistently strive to the realization of a stated objective, however, their long-term strategies and the operating principles are essentially contrary. The private military companies concentrate on maximalizing incomes and expanding the scope of their operations. Whereas the governments and international organizations usually focus on the activities aimed at keeping long-term peace and countries’ stabilization.

Conclusions

The use of services provided by PMCs has primarily prevented degradation of, already serious, situations in Mozambique, but only temporarily. The failure of the private military companies such as the Wagner’s group, DAG, Paramount Group, and the government of Mozambique in the fight with the crisis of security sets in a new light the trend that has appeared among the rules in Subsaharan Africa since the ’90s[22]. Countries often deprived of crucial military potential, to an increasing extent have relied on using private military companies to combat rebellion, civil wars, and what is most important, the security of their natural resources. Angola, Sierra Leone, Kongo, Central Republic of Africa, Nigeria, and Uganda are examples of countries, which have used services preferred by PMCs to maintain peace. In the past, private military services as STEEP and Sanline, provided military support for many governments, often achieving significant successes[23].

However, using the services of private military companies is connected with serious threats. The example of Executive Outcome operating in Angola and Sierra Leone has clearly shown that winning the armed conflicts and creating trained armies does not necessarily mean building a stable, long-term peace.

Bibliography

ACAPS, https://www.acaps.org/country/mozambique/crisis/violent-insurgency-in-cabo-delgado, accessed 03.04.21.

BBC, Mozambique: Why IS is so hard to defeat in Mozambique, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56597861, accessed 05.04.21.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Mozambique: The Problem with Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designations, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mozambique-problem-foreign-terrorist-organization-fto-designations, accessed 30.03.21.

Chr. Michelsen Institute, War in resource-rich northern Mozambique – Six scenario, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7231-war-in-resource-rich-northern-mozambique-six-scenarios.pdf, accessed 30.03.21.

Council on Foreign Relations, The Military-First Approach in Northern Mozambique is Bound to Fail,www.cfr.org/blog/military-first-approach-northern-mozambique-bound-fail, accessed 30.03.21.

Eminetra, Mozambique looks to the private sector in a war with Islamists, https://eminetra.com/mozambique-looks-to-the-private-sector-in-a-war-with-islamists/429956/, accessed 03.04.21.

Energy Voice, Mozambique, mercenaries accused of war crimes,https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/303697/mozambique-war-crimes-private/, accessed 01.04.21.

Global Policy, PMSCs: Risks and Misconduct, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/contractor-misconduct-and-abuse.html, accessed 30.03.21.

Global Risk Insights, https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/, accessed 30.03.21.

Jackson Institute, A Very Private War: The Failure of Mozambique’s Approach to Defeating an Islamist Insurgency,https://jasoninstitute.com/2020/07/19/a-very-private-war-the-failure-of-mozambiques-approach-to-defeating-an-islamist-insurgency/, accessed 01.04.21.

Małgorzata Zachara, 2009, Starcie praktyki i prawa. Prywatne Firmy Wojskowe (PMC) we współczesnym systemie bezpieczeństwa, https://ruj.uj.edu.pl/xmlui/bitstream/handle/item/244479/zachara_starcie_praktyki_i_prawa_2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 13.04.21.

Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 2016, Private military and security companies policy in africa: regional policy stasis as agency in international politics, https://www.ajol.info/index.php/smsajms/article/download/151279/140856, accessed 01.04.21.

Zoe Salzman, Private military contractors and the taint of a mercenary reputation, https://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/40.3-Salzman.pdf, accessed 01.04.21.


[1]Joseph Hanlon, Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war,https://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/sites/www.open.ac.uk.technology.mozambique/files/files/Mozambique_484-30Apr2020_Supplement-religion-vote.pdf, accessed 30.03.21.

[2]Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-total-mozambique-idUSKCN24I2FZ, accessed 30.03.21.

[3]Foreign Policy, Mozambique’s Insurgency Is a Regional Problem, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/mozambique-islamist-insurgency-regional-problem-cabo-delgado/, accessed 13.04.21.

[4]Sky News, Mozambique conflict: Why will one million people have been forced to flee their homes? https://news.sky.com/story/mozambique-conflict-why-have-500-000-people-been-forced-to-flee-their-homes-12209615, accessed 01.04.21.

[5]Amnesty International, War crimes in Mozambique’s forgotten cape, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4135452021ENGLISH.PDF, accessed 13.04.21.

[6]Additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12th, 1949 https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6a78d9/pdf/, accessed 03.04.21.

[7]A. Foong, The Privatization of War: From Privateers and Mercenaries to Private Military and Security Companies, “Asia Pacific Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law” 2008–2011, pp. 231–232.

[8]International Committee of the Red Cross, The Montreux Document, https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/135841/montreux_document_en.pdf/, accessed 03.04.21.

[9]Kacper Mirosław Milkowski, 2017, Status prawny prywatnych firm wojskowych a zaangażowanie we współczesne konflikty zbrojne – komercjalizacja wojny? http://www.pedkat.pl/images/ksiazki/Wsp%C3%B3%C5%82czesne_zagro%C5%BCenia_-_naturalne_i_cywilizacyjne.pdf#page=562, accessed 13.04.21.

[10]The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

[11]CNN, Russian mercenaries fight shadowy battle in gas-rich Mozambique, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/29/africa/russian-mercenaries-mozambique-intl/index.html, accessed 02.04.21.

[12]Geopolitical Monitor, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa/, accessed 02.04.21.

[13]The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/31/7-kremlin-linked-mercenaries-killed-in-mozambique-in-october-sources-a67996, accessed 04.04.21.

[14]Global Risk Insights, Mozambique and the Fight Against Insurgency, https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/, accessed 04.04.21.

[15]Amnesty International, Mozambique: Civilians killed as war crimes committed by armed group, government forces, and private military contractors – new report, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/mozambique-civilians-killed-as-war-crimes-committed-by-armed-group-government-forces-and-private-military-contractors-new-report/,accessed 04.04.21.

[16]BBC, Mozambique town Palma ‚retaken’ from militant Islamists,  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56637573, accessed 04.04.21.

[17]Global Risk Insights, , Mozambique and the Fight Against Insurgency, https://globalriskinsights.com/2021/02/too-many-mercenaries-in-mozambique/, accessed 04.04.21.

[18]Ibidem.

[19]Vigil InSight, http://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Mozambique-Vigil-InSight-Situation-Report.pdf,accessed 01.03.21.

[20]UNHCR, Legal aid project on the right to documentation for internally displaced persons in Mozambique, https://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/press/2021/2/602ba5af4/legal-aid-project-on-the-right-to-documentation-for-internally-displaced.html,accessed 04.04.21.

[21] R. Uesseler, Warsaw 2008, Wojna jako usługa, op. cit., pp.17-19.

[22]Institute for Security Studies, https://issafrica.org/chapter-3-private-military-and-security-companies-and-the-nexus-between-natural-resources-and-civil-wars-in-africa-mpako-h-foaleng, accessed 13.04.21.

[23]JASON Institute, https://jasoninstitute.com/2020/07/19/a-very-private-war-the-failure-of-mozambiques-approach-to-defeating-an-islamist-insurgency/ accessed 13.04.21.

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Program Europa tworzą:

Marcin Chruściel

Dyrektor programu. Absolwent studiów doktoranckich z zakresu nauk o polityce na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim, magister stosunków międzynarodowych i europeistyki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prezes Zarządu Instytutu Nowej Europy.

dr Artur Bartoszewicz

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Maciej Pawłowski

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Karolina Siekierka

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The programme's team:

Marcin Chruściel

Programme director. Graduate of PhD studies in Political Science at the University of Wroclaw and Master studies in International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. President of the Management Board at the Institute of New Europe.

PhD Artur Bartoszewicz

Chairman of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Economic Sciences at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics. Expert in the field of public policy, including state and economic strategies. Expert at the National Centre for Research and Development and the Digital Poland Projects Centre.

Michał Banasiak

He specializes in relationship of sports and politics. Author of analysis, comments and interviews in the field of sports diplomacy and international politics. Former Polsat News and Polish Television’s foreign desk journalist.

Maciej Pawłowski

Expert on migration, economics and politics of Mediterranean countries. In the period of 2018-2020 PISM Analyst on Southern Europe. Author of various articles in Polish and foreign press about Spain, Italy, Greece, Egypt and Maghreb countries. Since September 2020 lives in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria).

Jędrzej Błaszczak

Graduate of Law at the University of Silesia. His research interests focus on the Three Seas Initiative and politics in Bulgaria. He acquired experience at the European Foundation of Human Rights in Vilnius, the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, and in Polish embassies in Tehran and Tbilisi.

PhD Aleksander Olech

Programme director. Visiting lecturer at the Baltic Defence College, graduate of the European Academy of Diplomacy and War Studies University. His main research interests include terrorism, international cooperation for security in Eastern Europe and the role of NATO and the EU with regard to hybrid threats.

PhD Agnieszka Rogozińska

Member of the Institute's Programme Board. Doctor of Social Sciences in the discipline of Political Science. Editorial secretary of the academic journals "Politics & Security" and "Independence: journal devoted to Poland's recent history". Her research interests focus on security issues.

Aleksy Borówka

PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences in the University of Wroclaw, the President of the Polish National Associations of PhD Candidates in 2020. The author of dozen of scientific papers, concerning security studies, political science, administration, international relations. Laureate of the I, II and III International Geopolitical Olympiad.

Karolina Siekierka

Graduate of International Relations specializing in Security and Strategic Studies at University of Warsaw. Erasmus student at the Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and the Institut d’Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po Paris). Her research areas include human rights, climate change and armed conflicts.

Stanisław Waszczykowski

Reserve non-commissioned officer. Master's degree student in International Security and Diplomacy at the War Studies University in Warsaw, former trainee at the National Security Bureau. His research interests include issues related to UN peacekeeping operations and the security of Ukraine.

Leon Pińczak

A second-degree student at the University of Warsaw, majoring in international relations. A journalist of the Polish language edition of Belsat. Interested in the post-Soviet area, with a particular focus on Russian internal politics and Russian doctrines - foreign, defense and information-cybernetic.

Łukasz Kobierski

Programme director. Deputy President of the Management Board. Scholarship holder at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington and an expert in the field of international relations. Graduate of the University of Warsaw and the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

PhD Joanna Siekiera

International lawyer, Doctor of social sciences, postdoctor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway. She was a scholarship holder of the New Zealand government at the Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany, Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques in France.

Paweł Paszak

Graduate of International Relations (specialisation in East Asian Studies) from the University of Warsaw and scholarship holder at the University of Kent (UK) and Hainan University (China). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University. His research areas include the foreign policy of China and the strategic rivalry between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific.

Jakub Graca

Master of International Relations at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He also studied Arabic therein. An analyst at the Center for International Initiatives (Warsaw) and the Institute of New Europe. Research interests: United States (mainly foreign policy), transatlantic relations.

Patryk Szczotka

A graduate of Far Eastern Philology with a specialization in China Studies at the University of Wroclaw and a student of a double degree “China and International Relations” at Aalborg University and University of International Relations (国际关系学院) in Beijing. His research interests include EU-China political and economic relations, as well as diplomacy.

Three Seas Think Tanks Hub is a platform of cooperation among different think tanks based in 3SI member countries. Their common goal is to strengthen public debate and understanding of the Three Seas region seen from the political, economic and security perspective. The project aims at exchanging ideas, research and publications on the region’s potential and challenges.

Members

The Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia)

The BSF promotes the security and defense of the Baltic Sea region. It gathers security experts from the region and beyond, provides a platform for discussion and research, promotes solutions that lead to stronger regional security in the military and other areas.

The Institute for Politics and Society (Czech Republic)

The Institute analyses important economic, political, and social areas that affect today’s society. The mission of the Institute is to cultivate the Czech political and public sphere through professional and open discussion.

Nézöpont Institute (Hungary)

The Institute aims at improving Hungarian public life and public discourse by providing real data, facts and opinions based on those. Its primary focus points are Hungarian youth, media policy and Central European cooperation.

The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Austria)

The wiiw is one of the principal centres for research on Central, East and Southeast Europe with 50 years of experience. Over the years, the Institute has broadened its expertise, increasing its regional coverage – to European integration, the countries of Wider Europe and selected issues of the global economy.

The International Institute for Peace (Austria)

The Institute strives to address the most topical issues of the day and promote dialogue, public engagement, and a common understanding to ensure a holistic approach to conflict resolution and a durable peace. The IIP functions as a platform to promote peace and non-violent conflict resolution across the world.

The Institute for Regional and International Studies (Bulgaria)

The IRIS initiates, develops and implements civic strategies for democratic politics at the national, regional and international level. The Institute promotes the values of democracy, civil society, freedom and respect for law and assists the process of deepening Bulgarian integration in NATO and the EU.

The European Institute of Romania

EIR is a public institution whose mission is to provide expertise in the field of European Affairs to the public administration, the business community, the social partners and the civil society. EIR’s activity is focused on four key domains: research, training, communication, translation of the EHRC case-law.

The Institute of New Europe (Poland)

The Institute is an advisory and analytical non-governmental organisation active in the fields of international politics, international security and economics. The Institute supports policy-makers by providing them with expert opinions, as well as creating a platform for academics, publicists, and commentators to exchange ideas.

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Najnowsze publikacje

  • Watching the 20th CCP National Party Congress from Taipei
    by Kuan-Ting Chen
    January 26, 2023
  • Lost and damaged: the geopolitics of belatedly tackled climate and biodiversity adaptation
    by Maciej Bukowski
    January 24, 2023
  • “Financing the Future. How to attract more foreign investors to the Three Seas Region” [Report]
    by Julita Wilczek
    January 16, 2023
  • The CPC 20th National Congress: Taiwan has Become a Key Front Line in the U.S.-China Tech Rivalry
    by Claire Lin
    December 22, 2022
  • The institution of marriage and divorce in Judaism vs. in Islam
    by Aleksandra Siwek
    December 20, 2022

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